Supreme Court of the United States, 2008

The Court held that taxpayers seeking refunds of taxes collected in violation of the Export Clause must comply with the Internal Revenue Code's administrative refund procedures and filing deadlines before suing the Government.

Justice Thomas concurs with the Court’s judgment but separately questions whether the Constitution permits the Court to adjudicate state taxation of multistate enterprises. He argues that the Court’s reliance on the negative Commerce Clause lacks a constitutional foundation and that extending the Due Process Clause to…

The Court held that Article VII of the 1905 Compact does not grant New Jersey exclusive jurisdiction over riparian improvements extending into Delaware’s territory. Delaware retains overlapping authority to regulate such structures, particularly those of extraordinary character like the proposed LNG terminal.

Stevens concurs in part and dissents in part. He argues New Jersey's authority to regulate riparian improvements beyond the low-water mark is subordinate to Delaware's paramount authority as sovereign owner of the river.

Justice Scalia, with Justice Alito joining, dissents from the Court’s decision, arguing the 1905 Compact grants New Jersey exclusive riparian jurisdiction on its side of the Delaware River and the Court’s new 'extraordinary character' test for wharfing lacks foundation in the Compact or prior law.

Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Kennedy, dissenting. He argues the Federal Arbitration Act does not prohibit enforcement of arbitration agreements that provide for judicial review of errors of law.

Chief Justice Roberts's majority opinion held that neither the ICJ's Avena judgment nor the President's memorandum implementing it constituted directly enforceable federal law displacing Texas's restrictions on successive habeas petitions.

Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Souter and Justice Ginsburg, dissents. He argues the ICJ's Avena judgment is enforceable domestic law under the Supremacy Clause without further congressional action because the relevant treaties are self-executing.

Justice Souter's majority opinion held that the grounds specified in FAA §§ 10 and 11 are exclusive for expedited judicial vacatur and modification under the Act and cannot be expanded by contract to authorize general review for legal or factual error.

Justice Scalia dissents from the Court's conclusion that Washington's party-preference system does not violate political parties' First Amendment associational rights. He argues the law severely burdens parties by allowing candidates to associate with them on the ballot while denying the parties the opportunity to…

Justice Thomas's majority opinion held that Washington's top-two primary system was facially constitutional. The system did not select political parties' nominees, and the parties' asserted associational injuries depended on speculative voter confusion about candidates' self-designated party preferences.

Chief Justice Roberts concurred, agreeing the First Amendment associational rights of parties may be implicated if voters perceive candidates as endorsed by parties, but concluding the case is not ripe because the actual ballot design is yet unknown.

Justice Thomas delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court. The Court held that testimony concerning age discrimination by supervisors uninvolved in the plaintiff’s employment decision is neither categorically admissible nor categorically inadmissible under Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 403.

Justice Ginsburg, dissenting, would have held that the Medical Device Amendments do not broadly preempt state common-law claims alleging that an FDA-approved medical device was defectively designed or labeled.

Chief Justice Roberts dissents, arguing that retroactivity of new federal constitutional rules is a question of federal law binding on state courts under the Supremacy Clause. He contends the majority's decision allows state courts to apply their own retroactivity rules, creating unconstitutional disuniformity in…

Justice Stevens concurred in part and in the judgment, agreeing that the statutory text preempts state-law requirements that differ from federal medical-device requirements, including the common-law duties underlying the plaintiffs’ claims.

The Court held that ERISA § 502(a)(2) permits recovery for fiduciary breaches that impair plan assets allocated to an individual participant's defined contribution account, although it does not remedy individual injuries distinct from plan injuries.

Justice Breyer delivered the Court’s opinion holding that federal motor-carrier deregulation law preempts Maine’s tobacco-delivery recipient-verification and deemed-knowledge provisions.

Justice Ginsburg concurs in the judgment, agreeing that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA) preempts Maine’s Tobacco Delivery Law. She writes separately to highlight the regulatory gap regarding online tobacco sales to minors and urges Congress to address this issue.

The Supreme Court reversed the Minnesota Supreme Court, holding that the federal Teague retroactivity doctrine does not limit state courts' authority to provide remedies for federal constitutional violations, state courts may grant relief broader than federal law requires.

The Court held that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 preempts two provisions of Maine's tobacco delivery law because they relate to motor carrier price, route, or service.

Justice Breyer dissents and joins Justice Kennedy's dissent. He agrees Congress intended 'any other law enforcement officer' to apply only to customs or excise officers. He argues context extends beyond textual devices, pointing to drafting history and practical consequences.

Justice Thomas delivered the Court's opinion holding that the Federal Tort Claims Act's exception for property detained by “any other law enforcement officer” covers all law enforcement officers, including Bureau of Prisons officers, rather than only officers performing customs or excise duties.