Supreme Court of the United States, 2002

Justice Souter dissents, arguing that the police encounter with bus passengers was an unconstitutional seizure under the Fourth Amendment due to the cramped conditions, the number of officers, and the authoritative manner in which the interdiction was conducted.

Justice Kennedy, dissenting from the denial of certiorari, argues the Court should have granted review to question the application of Dun & Bradstreet to truthful commercial speech. He contends the speech concerns matters of public interest and argues the FTC decision is inconsistent with other FCRA provisions.

The Supreme Court held that a corporation organized under the laws of the British Virgin Islands is a “citizen or subject of a foreign state” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. §1332(a)(2), because the United Kingdom, as the sovereign authority over the BVI, qualifies as a foreign state.

Justice Kennedy, dissenting, argues the Court should grant certiorari in Trans Union LLC v. FTC to review the D.C. Circuit’s rejection of Trans Union’s First Amendment challenge to an FTC ban on target marketing lists.

The Court reversed and remanded the judgment invalidating Kansas's sex-offender treatment requirements, but no rationale commanded five votes. Justice Kennedy's plurality, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas, concluded that the loss of prison privileges and transfer associated with…

Justice Stevens, joined by three other justices, dissents arguing that mandatory sanctions imposed on a prisoner for invoking the Fifth Amendment privilege to refuse participation in a sex offender treatment program violate the self-incrimination clause because the penalties amount to unconstitutional compulsion.

Justice O’Connor concurred in the judgment because she found the penalties imposed on the respondent for refusing to participate in a treatment program were not severe enough to constitute Fifth Amendment compulsion.

Justice Ginsburg delivered the unanimous opinion. Assuming the loan agreements guaranteed unrestricted prepayment, the Court held that ELIHPA repudiated those agreements rather than immediately breaching them.

Justice Stevens concurs in the Court's judgment and Parts I and II-A, agreeing that Federal Circuit exclusive jurisdiction depends on the district court's jurisdiction at the time of the original complaint.

Justice Stevens delivered the Court’s opinion holding that the SEC sufficiently alleged fraud in connection with securities sales under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 where a broker sold customers’ securities as part of a scheme to appropriate the proceeds.

Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice O'Connor, concurred in the judgment on the basis that no patent claim was actually adjudicated on the merits, agreeing in dicta that the Federal Circuit has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over patent counterclaims.

Justice Ginsburg delivered the Court’s opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Breyer. The Court held that 42 U.S.C.

Justice Breyer dissents, arguing the Court's sovereign immunity ruling lacks textual, historical, or purposive support, and that federal agency adjudication against states does not offend state dignity or the Eleventh Amendment.

Justice Stevens dissents, joining Justice Breyer’s opinion. He argues the majority’s decision rests on weak predicates, specifically Alden v. Maine and a dignity rationale he deems insufficient. He contends the Eleventh Amendment limits federal court diversity jurisdiction rather than immunizing States from process.

Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for eight Justices, held that Strickland, rather than Cronic's presumption of prejudice, governed Cone's challenges to counsel's failure to present additional mitigating evidence and waiver of closing argument at capital sentencing.

The Court, in an opinion by Justice Thomas joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, affirmed the Fourth Circuit and held that state sovereign immunity bars the Federal Maritime Commission from adjudicating a private party's Shipping Act complaint against a nonconsenting State.

Justice Kennedy delivered the unanimous opinion holding that a narrowing amendment made to satisfy any requirement of the Patent Act may give rise to prosecution history estoppel, including an amendment addressing § 112.

Justice Souter, concurring, questions whether the Eleventh Amendment bars federal review of a state agency's interpretation of federal law, noting the state is a nominal defendant.

Justice Scalia delivered the opinion for all eight participating Justices. The Court held that federal-question jurisdiction extends to Verizon's claim that federal law preempts the Maryland commission's reciprocal-compensation order and that Ex parte Young permits the suit against the commissioners in their official…

Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a unanimous Court, held that omission of a sentence-enhancing fact from a federal indictment does not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction, overruling Ex Parte Bain to that extent. Because respondents had not objected at trial, their claim was subject to plain-error review.

Chief Justice Rehnquist denied a stay application by North Carolina officials seeking to halt an injunction under the North Carolina Supreme Court that invalidated the state's 2001 redistricting plan for violating the state constitution's 'whole county provision.' The Court found the applicants failed to show a…

Chief Justice Rehnquist, acting as Circuit Justice, denied a stay application sought by North Carolina officials challenging a North Carolina Supreme Court decision invalidating the 2001 redistricting plan under the state constitution's whole county provision.

Justice Souter dissents because the city failed to demonstrate a causal link between isolated combined adult bookstores/arcades and secondary effects justifying the zoning breakup policy under First Amendment intermediate scrutiny.

Justice O’Connor concurs in the judgment and Parts I, II, III-B, and IV of the plurality opinion. She agrees that COPA is not overbroad solely on variation in local community standards.

Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment, arguing Congress intended the statutory term 'community' in COPA to mean the nation's adult community instead of local geographic areas. He relied on legislative history to support a national standard, concluding it avoids serious First Amendment overbreadth issues.

Justice Kennedy concurs in the judgment, joining the Court's vacatur and remand because the Court of Appeals' reliance on community standards variation alone was insufficient to invalidate COPA. He argues overbreadth requires assessing the Act's scope including commercial speech and 'as a whole' definitions.

Justice Stevens, dissenting, would affirm the Court of Appeals because COPA's use of contemporary community standards to regulate material posted on the Internet substantially restricts protected speech nationwide based on the standards of the most restrictive communities.

Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment, agreeing the ordinance survived summary judgment. He maintained intermediate scrutiny applies to zoning ordinances aimed at secondary effects, even if content-based, so long as the purpose is not to suppress speech.

The Court held that the Child Online Protection Act's use of contemporary community standards to define material harmful to minors does not, by itself, make the statute substantially overbroad facially under the First Amendment, and therefore vacated the Third Circuit's judgment and remanded for further proceedings.

The Court held that the Child Online Protection Act’s reliance on community standards to identify material harmful to minors does not, by itself, render the statute substantially overbroad under the First Amendment.

The Court reversed summary judgment invalidating Los Angeles's prohibition on combining multiple adult entertainment businesses in one building and remanded. Justice O'Connor's plurality, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas, concluded that the city's 1977 study reasonably supported its…

Justice Scalia dissents from the Court’s orders granting stays of execution to Curtis Moore and Brian Edward Davis, arguing that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals’ dismissals rest on adequate and independent state grounds that preclude Supreme Court review.

Justice Scalia dissents from the Court's grant of stays of execution for Curtis Moore and Brian Edward Davis, arguing that their habeas petitions were dismissed by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals on adequate and independent state grounds.

Justice Scalia, dissenting, argues that the ADA’s reasonable‑accommodation requirement does not compel employers to override bona‑fide seniority systems, contending that such systems are not disability‑related obstacles and that the majority’s new presumption creates undue uncertainty.

Justice Stevens concurs in the judgment, affirming that a seniority system is relevant to whether an accommodation is reasonable under the ADA. He notes that the Court of Appeals correctly rejected a per se rule on seniority and found triable issues of fact regarding the interactive process, which remain unaffected.

Justice O'Connor concurs but prefers a test focusing on the legal enforceability of seniority systems. She joins the Court's opinion to ensure a majority rule, believing their test often yields similar outcomes.

The Court, in an opinion by Justice O'Connor joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas, held that conditioning the exemption for compounded drugs on restrictions against advertising particular compounded drugs and soliciting prescriptions violated the First Amendment.

Justice Breyer, dissenting, argues that the Federal restriction on advertising compounded drugs directly advances the government's important interest in protecting public health and safety.

The Court affirmed that the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act’s prohibition on advertising compounded drugs violates the First Amendment’s protection of commercial speech.