Supreme Court of the United States, 2002

Justice Souter, dissenting with Justice Ginsburg, argues that the Americans with Disabilities Act does not insulate seniority rules from reasonable accommodation claims. He concludes that legislative history indicates seniority systems should be treated as merely a factor, not a blanket bar.

Justice Breyer, writing for the Court, held that reassignment conflicting with an employer's seniority system ordinarily is not a reasonable accommodation under the ADA, but an employee may establish special circumstances making an exception reasonable.

Justice Thomas, joined by Justices Stevens and Scalia, dissents from the Court’s decision that the IRS lien attaches to real property held as a tenancy by the entirety when only one spouse owes tax.

The Court held that a spouse's interest in Michigan tenancy-by-the-entirety property constitutes property or rights to property to which a federal tax lien may attach under 26 U.S.C. § 6321.

Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, argues the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (CPPA) should be construed narrowly to avoid First Amendment overbreadth. He contends the statute can be limited to hard-core pornography and computer-generated images indistinguishable from real children, excluding materials with…

Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment, agreeing that the government's current rationale does not justify the Child Pornography Prevention Act's broad reach but suggesting regulation may be permissible if technology advances and narrower restrictions or affirmative defenses are used.

Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, held that the CPPA's prohibitions on sexually explicit images that appear to depict minors and materials presented as child pornography were substantially overbroad under the First Amendment.

Justice O'Connor agrees the Child Pornography Prevention Act’s ban on material that “conveys the impression” of containing child pornography is unconstitutional, and agrees the ban on youthful adult pornography is overbroad.

The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit, holding that a judge need not disqualify himself under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) when his name appears erroneously on a prior amicus brief motion without his knowledge or participation, as a reasonable person informed of all circumstances would not question his impartiality.

The Court held that federal immigration policy expressed in the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 foreclosed the NLRB's award of backpay to an undocumented worker who had never been authorized to work in the United States and had obtained employment through fraudulent documents.

Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court, holding that federal public-housing law unambiguously requires lease provisions giving local housing authorities discretion to evict tenants for drug-related activity by household members or guests, even when the tenant neither knew nor should have known…

Justice O'Connor, with Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, dissents from the Court's holding that the Family and Medical Leave Act precludes the Secretary of Labor from requiring individualized notice of qualifying leave and counting leave against the employer's obligation when notice is not provided.

Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, Scalia, and Thomas, held that the categorical penalty in 29 CFR § 825.700(a) exceeded the Secretary of Labor's authority under the FMLA.

The Court, in an opinion by Justice Souter, upheld the EEOC regulation permitting verification supplied after Title VII’s charge-filing deadline to relate back to a timely unverified charge.

The Court held that Title VII permits an otherwise timely written charge filed with the EEOC to be verified after the filing deadline, with the verification relating back to the original filing.

Justice O’Connor concurred in the judgment, disagreeing with the majority's conclusion that deference to the EEOC was unnecessary. She argued the EEOC regulation on charge verification is a procedural rule entitled to Chevron deference and is reasonable.

Justice Scalia delivered the unanimous opinion holding that the Bankruptcy Code’s three-year lookback period for priority and nondischargeability of certain tax debts is equitably tolled during a prior bankruptcy proceeding.

The Court held that a defendant who fails to object to a Rule 11 error must satisfy Rule 52(b)'s plain-error requirements, and that appellate courts may consider the entire existing record when assessing whether a Rule 11 error affected substantial rights.

Justice Stevens concurred in part, agreeing that Rule 11 violations should be evaluated based on the entire record and require remand. He dissented in part, arguing that the government bears the burden of demonstrating that a violation of Rule 11 is harmless, contrary to the Court's allocation of burden.

Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Scalia and Kennedy, dissenting from the denial of certiorari, urges the Court to hear a case challenging whether Congress violated the Compensation Clause by blocking automatic judicial salary adjustments mandated by the Ethics Reform Act of 1989.

Justice Breyer, dissenting (joined by Justices Scalia and Kennedy), argues that the Compensation Clause issue presented is both difficult and important and that the Court should grant certiorari to hear the case, contrary to the majority’s denial of review.

Justice Ginsburg, writing for a unanimous Court, held that the Prison Litigation Reform Act requires exhaustion of available administrative remedies for all inmate suits concerning prison life, including claims arising from isolated incidents of excessive force.

Justice Thomas delivered the unanimous opinion holding that an employment discrimination complaint need not allege specific facts establishing a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas. That framework governs proof, not pleading; complaints instead must satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2).

Justice Scalia concurs in the judgment that peer‑graded student papers are not “education records” under FERPA, but he dissents from the majority’s reliance on a “central custodian” theory of records.

Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, dissents from the Court's majority opinion, arguing that the new contextual approach to determining the adequacy of state procedural grounds improperly expands federal oversight of state trial judges and misapplies the Henry v. Mississippi rationale.

Justice Scalia dissents, arguing the majority incorrectly reverses the Court’s earlier holding in Kansas v. Hendricks regarding the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act. He contends substantive due process does not require a separate finding of inability to control behavior beyond mental abnormality or personality…

Justice Ginsburg, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, and Breyer, held that Missouri's procedural requirements for continuance motions were inadequate to bar federal habeas review in the exceptional circumstances of Lee's case.

The Supreme Court vacated the Kansas Supreme Court's judgment reversing Michael Crane's civil commitment under the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act, agreeing with Kansas that the state court had read Hendricks in an overly restrictive manner by demanding a finding that the defendant is completely unable to control…

Justice Stevens, joined by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, held that an employee's agreement to arbitrate employment disputes does not bar the EEOC from seeking victim-specific judicial relief in an ADA enforcement action.

Justice Thomas, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Scalia, dissented from allowing the EEOC to obtain victim-specific remedies for an employee who had agreed to arbitrate his discrimination claim.

Justice Scalia, writing for five Justices, held that ERISA § 502(a)(3) did not authorize the plan's reimbursement action because it sought personal liability for a contractual obligation to pay money, rather than relief typically available in equity.

Justice O’Connor, writing for a unanimous Court, held that a substantial limitation in performing manual tasks under the ADA requires an impairment that prevents or severely restricts activities central to most people’s daily lives, with a permanent or long-term impact.

Justice Ginsburg dissents, arguing the majority's interpretation of ERISA § 502(a)(3) revives obsolete law-equity distinctions that frustrate statutory purpose. She views restitution as traditionally equitable relief available in modern courts.

Justice Stevens, dissenting, would hold that ERISA's authorization to "enjoin" violations permits any appropriate order prohibiting or terminating a plan violation, without importing historical distinctions between law and equity.