Supreme Court of the United States, 2002

Justice Thomas, writing for a unanimous Court, held that ATF’s failure to process an application for relief from federal firearms disabilities because of an appropriations restriction is not a denial permitting judicial review under 18 U. S. C. § 925(c).

The Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. Justice Stevens dissented, arguing the Court should have clarified that a Rule 60(b) motion challenging the integrity of a final habeas order based on changed state law is not a successive habeas petition and should be decided on the merits.

The Court held that an arbitrator, rather than a court, should interpret and apply the NASD's six-year eligibility rule. The rule concerns a procedural prerequisite to arbitration, not a question of substantive arbitrability presumptively reserved for courts.

The Supreme Court denied certiorari in this dispute over Florida's advertisement requirements for dentists. Justice Thomas dissented from the denial, arguing the case should have been granted to clarify First Amendment protections for commercial speech and government-mandated disclaimers.

Justice Thomas dissents from the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari, arguing that the case presents a critical opportunity to clarify First Amendment commercial speech standards and state-mandated disclaimers.

Justice Stevens delivered the unanimous opinion holding that the Federal Boat Safety Act does not pre-empt state common-law damages claims alleging that an outboard motor was defective because it lacked a propeller guard.

The Court, in a per curiam opinion, held that the Ninth Circuit should have remanded to the Board of Immigration Appeals to decide whether changed conditions in Guatemala defeated Ventura’s claim for protection, rather than deciding that issue itself.

In a per curiam opinion, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's judgment affirming federal habeas relief from Visciotti's death sentence. The California Supreme Court's prejudice analysis was not contrary to Strickland merely because it occasionally used “probable” without “reasonably”; read as a whole, its opinion…

The Court, in a per curiam opinion, reversed the Ninth Circuit’s grant of habeas relief because it exceeded the limits imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A state court need not cite or demonstrate awareness of Supreme Court precedent if its reasoning and result do not contradict that precedent.

Justice Stevens dissented (joined by Justice Souter, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer) arguing that execution of offenders under the age of 18 violates the Eighth Amendment. He advocated for reconsidering Stanford v. Kentucky in light of Atkins v. Virginia and evidence of evolving societal standards.

The Supreme Court denied certiorari in this First Amendment challenge to a conviction for furnishing advice to a criminal syndicate. Justice Stevens, respecting the denial, commented on the debatable application of Brandenburg v.

Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, dissents from the Court’s refusal to set the petition for an original writ of habeas corpus. He argues that executing offenders who were under 18 at the time of their crime violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment…

In a unanimous per curiam opinion, the Court summarily reversed the Sixth Circuit’s judgment upholding discovery into federal capital-charging practices. Applying United States v. Armstrong, the Court held that Bass had not supplied evidence that similarly situated defendants of another race were treated differently.

In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(a)(3), as authoritatively interpreted by the Arizona Supreme Court, supplies a procedural ground independent of federal law because its waiver inquiry requires categorizing the right asserted, not deciding the constitutional merits.

Justice Stevens dissents, joining Justice Ginsburg’s opinion and arguing the Court fails to distinguish judicial from political elections, undermining judicial impartiality. He states judges must be indifferent to popularity and that states have a compelling interest in restricting campaign pledges or promises of…

Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment but expressed concerns that electing judges undermines impartiality regardless of campaign speech restrictions. She argued that electoral pressure may create personal stakes in case outcomes and campaign costs may render judges indebted to interest groups.

Justice Ginsburg, dissenting, would uphold Minnesota’s Announce Clause because judicial elections differ fundamentally from political elections and the restriction protects judicial independence, impartiality, and litigants’ due-process rights.

The Court, in an opinion by Justice Scalia joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas, held that Minnesota's prohibition on judicial candidates announcing their views on disputed legal and political issues violates the First Amendment.

Justice Stevens, joined by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, held that shackling Hope to a hitching post for prolonged punitive confinement under the alleged circumstances violated the Eighth Amendment.

Justice Kennedy concurred that Minnesota’s announcement clause restricting judicial candidates’ speech violates the First Amendment. He argued content-based restrictions on political speech fall outside any traditional exception and must be invalidated without strict scrutiny.

Justice Ginsburg's opinion for six Justices held that the Sixth Amendment requires a jury to find an aggravating circumstance necessary to make a defendant eligible for death. Applying Apprendi, the Court overruled Walton in relevant part and reversed and remanded the Arizona Supreme Court's judgment.

Justice Thomas dissents, arguing that the fact of brandishing a firearm, which raises the mandatory minimum under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), is an element of the crime that must be charged in the indictment and proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. He contends that this view aligns with Apprendi v.

Justice Breyer concurred in part and in the judgment, noting he could not logically distinguish Apprendi from this case but maintained that the Sixth Amendment permits judges to apply sentencing factors for mandatory minimums.

The Court affirmed Harris's sentence, holding that 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) defines a single offense and treats brandishing and discharging a firearm as sentencing factors rather than offense elements.

The Court held that Harbury failed to state a backward-looking denial-of-access-to-courts claim. Her complaint did not identify the underlying cause of action allegedly frustrated by government deception, and her subsequent clarification did not identify relief available through the access claim that was unavailable…

Justice Scalia, joined by Justice O'Connor, dissents from the Court's holding that the safety regulatory authority of a State under 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A) encompasses political subdivisions.

Rehnquist dissents from the Court’s holding that the Eighth Amendment bars execution of mentally retarded defendants. He argues the majority improperly relies on foreign laws, organizational views, and polls rather than legislative enactments and jury practices to find a national consensus.

The Court, in an opinion by Stevens joined by O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits executing offenders with intellectual disability. Legislative developments and the rarity of such executions demonstrated a national consensus against the practice.

Justice Scalia dissents, arguing that the Court’s ban on executing mentally retarded individuals lacks historical or textual support under the Eighth Amendment, incorrectly identifies a national consensus based on insufficient legislation and unreliable data, and improperly replaces individualized sentencing with a…

The Court held that FERPA's nondisclosure provisions create no individual rights enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and reversed and remanded the Washington Supreme Court's judgment.

In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that a federal habeas court must conduct a threshold Teague retroactivity analysis when the State properly raises the issue, even when the state court addressed the constitutional claim on its merits without deciding retroactivity.

Chief Justice Rehnquist dissents, arguing that the Village of Stratton’s discretion‑less permit requirement for door‑to‑door canvassers is constitutionally permissible under intermediate scrutiny and should have been upheld.

The Court, in an opinion by Justice Breyer joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg, held that AEDPA's limitations period is tolled during intervals between a lower state court's denial of collateral relief and a timely request for higher-court review.

Justice Stevens, joined by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, held that Stratton's registration and permit requirement for door-to-door advocacy violated the First Amendment on its face.

Justice Souter dissents, arguing that the police encounter with bus passengers was an unconstitutional seizure under the Fourth Amendment due to the cramped conditions, the number of officers, and the authoritative manner in which the interdiction was conducted.

Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court held that punitive damages are unavailable in private actions under Title VI and, through express statutory incorporation of its remedies, § 202 of the ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.

Kennedy, J., dissenting, argues the majority misinterprets AEDPA's tolling provision by treating a California original writ petition as a pending application after an appeal window closes.

The Court held that the Village of Stratton’s ordinance requiring a permit for door‑to‑door advocacy violates the First Amendment because it burdens anonymous speech and is not narrowly tailored to the village’s interests. The ordinance was reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Thomas, and Breyer, held that officers conducting bus interdiction encounters need not advise passengers of their right to refuse cooperation or consent to searches.