Supreme Court of the United States, 1956

The Court held that the Government's disclosures had wholly discredited the credibility of its witness Joseph Mazzei and tainted the petitioners' convictions. Because Mazzei's testimony was admitted against all defendants and the jury could no longer determine what verdict it would reach without that testimony, the…

Chief Justice Warren's opinion held that the Government's disclosures wholly discredited its paid informer's credibility and tainted the convictions of all petitioners, requiring reversal and a new trial under the Court's supervisory authority over federal criminal proceedings.

The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' dismissal of Parr's appeal, holding that the district court's order dismissing the Corpus Christi indictment was not a final judgment and therefore not appealable under 28 U.S.C.

The Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit, holding that under 17 U.S.C. § 24 the widow and the children of a deceased author succeed to the renewal copyright as a single class, and that an illegitimate child qualifies as a "child" within the statute.

The Court affirmed the dismissal of Parr's appeal from the dismissal of his original tax-evasion indictment after the Government obtained another indictment elsewhere. Viewed separately, the original prosecution ended in Parr's favor, leaving him without an injury supporting appeal; viewed together with the new…

The Court held that the stock options granted to LoBue were taxable compensation under §22(a) and that the taxable gain is measured at the time the options are exercised, not when granted. The judgment of the lower courts was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings on the timing issue.

The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded the case, holding that the discounted stock options received by LoBue constitute taxable compensation and that the taxable gain is measured at the time the options are exercised.

The Court held that Congress could authorize union-shop agreements in the railroad industry under the Commerce Clause and could provide that those agreements would prevail over inconsistent state right-to-work laws.

The Court reversed the Nebraska Supreme Court, holding that the union‑shop provision of the Railway Labor Act is a valid exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power and is not preempted by Nebraska’s “right‑to‑work” constitutional provision, nor does it violate the First or Fifth Amendments.

The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, holding that the capital‑gain tax imposed on the sale of standing timber from the respondents' allotted Indian land held in trust was invalid because the treaty, the General Allotment Act, and the trust patent exempted such income until a fee patent was issued.

The Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit, holding that the proceeds from the sale of timber on the Capoeman's allotted Indian land were exempt from federal capital‑gains tax because the General Allotment Act’s Section 6 amendment and the treaty language prohibiting "charge or incumbrance" preclude taxation until a…

The Supreme Court held that the Arizona Workmen’s Compensation Act cannot be applied to an employee of an interstate carrier who is covered by workers’ compensation in another state because such application would impose an undue burden on interstate commerce, and therefore reversed the Arizona Supreme Court’s judgment…

The Court held that PG&E’s unilateral filing of a new rate and the Commission’s approval under §205 did not alter its existing contract with Sierra, and that the Commission’s power under §206(a) is limited to protecting the public interest, not merely correcting a contract that yields a lower return; the case was…

Chief Justice Warren delivered the unanimous opinion holding that the battery-plant employees’ clothes-changing and showering time was compensable under the Fair Labor Standards Act because those activities were integral and indispensable to their principal work with toxic and caustic materials.

The Court held that the $2,000 per act civil penalty under §26(b)(1) of the Surplus Property Act is a civil remedy, not a criminal punishment, and therefore does not violate the Fifth Amendment double‑jeopardy clause. The judgment of summary judgment was affirmed.

The Court, through Justice Clark, upheld Louisiana's deadline for challenging grand-jury composition, both generally and as applied to Michel, Poret, and Labat. Michel's experienced appointed counsel had adequate time to object; Poret's voluntary flight did not excuse his failure to use available procedures, and he…