Supreme Court of the United States, 2013

The Court held that the Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance Act (FEGLIA) pre-empts a Virginia statute that makes a former spouse liable to the actual beneficiary for insurance proceeds when the former spouse was named beneficiary but divorced the insured.

The Supreme Court held that a convincing showing of actual innocence serves as a gateway through AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations for a first federal habeas petition, just as it overcomes procedural bars such as procedural default, because the miscarriage-of-justice exception survived AEDPA and 28 U.S.C.

The Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit's grant of federal habeas relief to Burt Lancaster, who argued that Michigan's retroactive application of People v. Carpenter — which abolished the diminished-capacity defense after his 1993 crime — denied him due process.

The Supreme Court held that Chevron deference applies to an agency's interpretation of a statutory ambiguity concerning the scope of its own regulatory authority, rejecting any categorical 'jurisdictional' exception because the line between 'jurisdictional' and 'nonjurisdictional' interpretations is a mirage.

The Court held that an untimely petition under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act may qualify for an award of attorney's fees and costs if brought in good faith and supported by a reasonable basis.

Justice Sotomayor concurs in the judgment, joining the Court's opinion but reserving consideration of an argument raised by amici that the UK windfall tax is a tax on value rather than income if outlier companies are included in the predominant character analysis.

The Court held that the United Kingdom’s 1997 windfall tax is creditable under 26 U.S.C. § 901(b)(1) because its predominant character is that of an excess‑profits tax, and it reversed the Third Circuit’s judgment.

The Supreme Court held that the United Kingdom’s 1997 windfall tax is creditable under IRC §901(b)(1) as an excess‑profits tax, reversing the Third Circuit’s judgment. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion noting that if outlier companies were considered, the tax might be characterized as a tax on value rather…

The Supreme Court held that a noncitizen's conviction for a marijuana distribution offense is not an 'aggravated felony' under the Immigration and Nationality Act unless the record of conviction necessarily establishes that the offense involved remuneration or more than a small amount of marijuana.

Justice Alito dissents, arguing the majority's interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act departs from the categorical approach and mischaracterizes federal sentencing guidelines as elements.

Justice Thomas dissents, arguing that the plain meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) requires a state offense to be a felony and punishable under the Controlled Substances Act to count as an aggravated felony, and that the majority’s departure creates inconsistency.

Justices Kennedy, Alito, and Breyer concurred in the judgment affirming dismissal of Alien Tort Statute claims. Kennedy endorsed the Court's cautious approach, Alito explained the standard focus of congressional concern, and Breyer would have based jurisdiction on foreign relations law rather than the presumption…

The Court held that the presumption against extraterritoriality applies to claims under the Alien Tort Statute. Nothing in the statute rebuts this presumption. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was affirmed.

A divided Supreme Court held that the natural metabolization of alcohol in the bloodstream does not create a per se exigency excusing the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement for nonconsensual blood draws in drunk-driving cases; exigency must instead be assessed case by case under the totality of the circumstances…

The Court, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, reversed the Third Circuit's judgment approving class certification. Rule 23(b)(3) requires rigorous examination of predominance even when that examination overlaps with the merits.

The Supreme Court held that police use of a trained drug-sniffing dog to investigate a home is a Fourth Amendment 'search' where, as here, the officers physically entered and occupied the curtilage—the porch and area immediately surrounding the house—in conduct not explicitly or implicitly permitted by the homeowner.

Justice Scalia joins Parts I and II of the opinion but dissents from Part III, where the Court defers to the EPA's interpretation of its own regulations. He argues that Auer deference should be reconsidered as it violates separation of powers, and based on a textual reading of the regulations, he would affirm the…

The Court held that the Clean Water Act's implementing regulations do not require NPDES permits for channeled stormwater runoff from logging roads, affirming the EPA's reasonable interpretation of its own regulations under Auer deference.

Justice Breyer’s majority opinion held that the first-sale doctrine applies to copyrighted copies lawfully manufactured abroad, allowing their lawful owners to import and resell them without further copyright-owner permission.

Justice Ginsburg, dissenting, argues that the majority’s adoption of an international‑exhaustion rule contradicts the text and legislative history of the Copyright Act, and that the Court should have affirmed the Second Circuit’s judgment that unauthorized importation of foreign‑made copies infringes under §602(a)(1).

Justice Kagan, joined by Justice Alito, concurs in the judgment but expresses concern that the Court’s decision, when combined with Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L’anza Research International, Inc., may restrict the scope of 17 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1)’s importation ban.

The Supreme Court held that the first sale doctrine of § 109(a) applies to copies of copyrighted works lawfully made abroad. The Court reasoned that 'lawfully made under this title' means made in accordance with the Copyright Act, not manufactured in the United States, and a geographical interpretation would create…

The Supreme Court held that a putative class representative's precertification stipulation that he and the class will not seek more than $5 million in aggregate damages does not remove a case from the Class Action Fairness Act's jurisdictional scope.

The Supreme Court held that proof of materiality is not a prerequisite to certifying a securities-fraud class action seeking money damages under §10(b) and Rule 10b–5: because materiality is judged by an objective standard it is a question common to the class, and a failure of classwide proof on it would end the case…

Justice Scalia dissents, arguing that a plaintiff invoking the fraud-on-the-market presumption to establish commonality at class certification must prove materiality at that stage, as materiality is a predicate to the presumption and reliance. He contends *Basic Inc. v.

The Supreme Court held that attorneys and human rights, labor, legal, and media organizations lack Article III standing to challenge facially Section 702 of FISA, 50 U.S.C. §1881a.

Justice Alito dissents, arguing the Court's holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial after a judge erroneously terminates a trial based on a nonexistent statutory element contradicts the original meaning and purpose of the Clause.

Sotomayor dissents, arguing Padilla announced no new rule under Teague, but merely applied Strickland as professional norms changed. She would reverse the Seventh Circuit judgment, holding Padilla applies retroactively.

The Supreme Court reversed the Michigan Supreme Court, holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial after a trial court grants a directed verdict of acquittal, even if the acquittal rests on an erroneous understanding of the statutory elements.

Chief Justice Roberts delivered the unanimous opinion holding that Minton’s state-law legal malpractice claim did not arise under federal patent law and that 28 U. S. C. § 1338(a) therefore did not deprive Texas courts of jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court held that a trial court's erroneous directed verdict of acquittal bars retrial under the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Court found the ruling addressed the sufficiency of evidence and resolved the question of guilt or innocence, despite relying on a mistaken view of statutory elements.

Justice Ginsburg’s concurring opinion stresses that the Hague Convention requires swift appellate review of child‑return orders and cautions against routine stays that delay a child’s return. She urges the courts to adopt expedited procedures and suggests Congress consider a leave‑to‑appeal requirement.

The Court held that the categorical authority to detain occupants during execution of a search warrant does not extend to a person stopped nearly a mile from the premises after departing.

The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, held that a child's return to her country of habitual residence pursuant to a Hague Convention return order does not render an appeal of that order moot, because the parents retain a concrete, adversarial interest in where the child will be raised and…

The Supreme Court held that Georgia’s hospital‑authority law does not clearly articulate and affirmatively express a state policy permitting hospital authorities to acquire competing hospitals, so state‑action immunity does not apply. The Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit and remanded for further proceedings.

The Supreme Court held that whether a drug-detection dog's alert provides probable cause to search a vehicle is judged under the totality of the circumstances, rejecting the Florida Supreme Court's requirement that the State produce an exhaustive evidentiary checklist—including field-performance records—before an…

A unanimous Supreme Court held that the 180-day deadline in 42 U.S.C. §1395oo(a)(3) for hospitals to appeal Medicare reimbursement determinations to the Provider Reimbursement Review Board is not jurisdictional, that the Secretary's regulation extending the deadline for good cause up to three years is a permissible…

The Court held the case was not moot and reversed the lower courts, ruling Lozman’s floating home was not a vessel under 1 U.S.C. §3 because a reasonable observer would not consider it designed to a practical degree for transportation on water.

The Court held that a floating home without self-propulsion is not a 'vessel' under 1 U.S.C. § 3 because it is not designed to a practical degree for transportation on water. A reasonable observer examining the structure's physical characteristics would not consider it capable of practical transportation.