Supreme Court of the United States

Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds

February 27, 2013568 U.S. 455

Summary

The Supreme Court held that proof of materiality is not a prerequisite to certifying a securities-fraud class action seeking money damages under §10(b) and Rule 10b–5: because materiality is judged by an objective standard it is a question common to the class, and a failure of classwide proof on it would end the case rather than leave individual reliance questions to predominate under Rule 23(b)(3). The Court further held that the District Court did not err in refusing to consider Amgen's 'truth-on-the-market' rebuttal evidence at certification, since that evidence merely attacks materiality and belongs at summary judgment or trial. The Ninth Circuit's judgment affirming certification was accordingly affirmed. Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court; Justice Alito concurred, flagging that reconsideration of the fraud-on-the-market presumption may be warranted; Justice Scalia dissented, reading Basic to require materiality at certification; and Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Kennedy and in part by Justice Scalia, dissented, arguing every fraud-on-the-market predicate, including materiality, must be established at certification.

Holding

  • Whether Rule 23(b)(3) predominance requires a securities-fraud plaintiff invoking the fraud-on-the-market presumption to prove the materiality of the alleged misrepresentations before class certification.. No. Proof of materiality is not a prerequisite to certification of a securities-fraud class action seeking money damages for alleged violations of §10(b) and Rule 10b–5; materiality is a question common to the class, and a failure of classwide proof on it would end the case rather than leave individual questions to predominate.
  • Whether the District Court erred in refusing to consider Amgen's rebuttal ('truth-on-the-market') evidence at the class-certification stage.. No. Because the proffered rebuttal evidence aimed to show that the alleged misrepresentations and omissions were immaterial, and potential immateriality is no barrier to finding that common questions predominate, the District Court correctly reserved the evidence for summary judgment or trial.

Docket 11-1085

Cited authorities

  • Rule 23(b)(3)
  • Rule 23(b)(3)
  • Rule 23(a)(3)
  • Rule 23(b)(3)
  • Rule 23(a)
  • Rule 23(b)(3)
  • Rule 23(b)(3)
  • Rule 23(b)(3)

Cited by