Supreme Court of the United States, 2004

The Supreme Court dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction, concluding it lacked authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1257 to review the California Supreme Court's decision because the judgment was not final. The Court rejected the petitioner's argument that an exception to the final judgment rule applied.

Justice Ginsburg, writing for seven Justices, held that a timely Equal Access to Justice Act fee application may be amended after the 30-day filing period to supply an omitted allegation that the Government's position was not substantially justified.

Justice Thomas, with Justice Scalia joining, dissenting, argues that the 30-day deadline in the Equal Access to Justice Act applies to the allegation that the government’s position was not substantially justified.

The Court affirmed dismissal of the challenge to Pennsylvania's congressional map, but no rationale commanded five votes. Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Thomas, concluded that partisan-gerrymandering claims lack judicially discernible and manageable standards and would have…

Justice Scalia dissents from the denial of certiorari, arguing the Court should have granted review despite the petitioner’s prevailing judgment on qualified immunity. He asserts that the Fourth Circuit’s holding that the prayer violated the Establishment Clause warrants Supreme Court attention to address circuit…

The Supreme Court denied certiorari in this case challenging the constitutionality of prayer at the Virginia Military Institute. Justice Stevens explained the denial was due to mootness, lack of jurisdiction, and absence of a true circuit conflict.

Justice Stevens respectfully dissents from the denial of certiorari, asserting that jurisdiction was lacking because the controversy was moot and there was no true conflict among the circuits.

Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment, arguing that current tribal sovereignty precedent contains incompatible assumptions regarding Congress's power to regulate tribes and the tribes' inherent sovereign authority.

This case decides whether Congress has the constitutional power to relax restrictions on tribal sovereignty through legislation that recognizes inherent tribal authority to prosecute nonmember Indians.

Kennedy concurs in the judgment, rejecting Lara’s double jeopardy claim by reading the Indian Civil Rights Act amendment as recognizing inherent tribal sovereignty rather than a federal delegation.

Justice Souter dissents, joined by Justice Scalia, arguing that tribes lack inherent jurisdiction over nonmember Indians and that Congress cannot restore such power via legislation.

The Court held that Congress has the constitutional power to relax restrictions on a tribe's inherent authority to prosecute nonmember Indians, enabling the dual sovereignty doctrine to bar double jeopardy challenges to successive federal prosecutions.

Justice Souter dissents, arguing tribes lack inherent criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians and view sovereignty as dependent on federal delegation. He contends Congress cannot restore inherent jurisdiction via statute; the Act delegates federal power instead.

The Court held that reasonable suspicion is not required for customs officials to remove and search a vehicle's gas tank at the international border. It found such suspicionless border inspections are justified by the government's paramount interest in protecting its territorial integrity.

Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a unanimous Court, held that customs officials may remove, disassemble, and reassemble a vehicle's fuel tank at the international border without reasonable suspicion.

Justice Kennedy delivered the unanimous opinion holding that FOIA Exemption 7(C) protects surviving family members’ own privacy interests in their close relative’s death-scene photographs.

The Court held that Section 253(a) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 does not preempt state laws prohibiting political subdivisions from providing telecommunications services, reasoning that "any entity" does not include state subdivisions given the absurd results of federal preemption of state self-regulation and…

The Court held that a point source does not need to originate pollutants to require an NPDES permit, but vacated the judgment because factual disputes remain regarding whether the canal and reservoir are distinct water bodies.

The Supreme Court held that a point source can be liable for pollutant discharge even when it does not itself add pollutants, and that summary judgment was improper because genuine factual disputes remain about whether the C‑11 canal and WCA‑3 are distinct water bodies; therefore the Eleventh Circuit judgment was…

Justice Scalia joins Parts I and II-A of the Court's opinion, holding a point source is not exempt from permit requirements for merely not adding pollutants. He dissents from vacating judgment on other grounds, arguing the unitary-waters argument was raised below and summary judgment should not be precluded by…

Justice Ginsburg delivered the unanimous opinion holding that the Sixth Amendment does not require a court accepting an uncounseled guilty plea to warn specifically that counsel might identify an overlooked defense or provide an independent assessment of whether pleading guilty is wise.

The Court held that admitting an absent witness’s testimonial statement against a criminal defendant generally requires both the witness’s unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination; a judicial finding of reliability cannot substitute for confrontation.

Justice Rehnquist dissents from the Court’s decision to overrule Ohio v. Roberts, arguing that the new testimonial‑versus‑nontestimonial distinction lacks a solid historical foundation and unnecessarily disrupts established precedent.

Justice Breyer, writing for eight Justices, held that a state prisoner ordinarily does not fairly present a federal claim when the state court must look beyond the petition or brief to discover its federal basis.

The Court unanimously held, per curiam, that Heck’s favorable-termination requirement does not bar a prisoner’s § 1983 action when success would not imply the invalidity of his conviction or the duration of his sentence.

Justice Ginsburg's opinion held that Banks established cause for failing to develop evidence in state court that prosecution witness Robert Farr was a paid informant, because the State concealed that information while representing that it had disclosed the required evidence.

Justice Thomas's six-Justice majority held that an airline's unusual and unexpected refusal to assist a passenger can constitute an Article 17 Warsaw Convention accident when it contributes to the passenger's death, even though a normal cabin condition also contributed.

The Court held that a plaintiff must prove some actual damages caused by an intentional or willful Privacy Act violation to qualify for the statutory minimum award of $1,000. An adverse effect sufficient for standing does not alone establish entitlement to damages.

The Court held that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act does not prohibit favoring older employees over younger employees, even when both groups are within the Act's protected age range.

Justice Thomas, dissenting, argues that a search conducted under a facially defective warrant should be analyzed for reasonableness rather than automatically treated as warrantless.

Justice Scalia dissents, arguing that the ADEA’s plain text prohibits discrimination against younger workers as well as older ones and that the Court wrongly rejected the EEOC’s reasonable interpretation.

Justice Thomas, dissenting, concludes the ADEA’s plain text allows suit by relatively younger workers for discrimination in favor of older workers. He argues the Court ignores textual meaning and creates a new “social history” interpretive tool inconsistent with precedent.

The Court held that a flight attendant’s refusal to assist a passenger with a medical emergency constitutes an “accident” under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention. The ruling affirms the Ninth Circuit’s judgment that the carrier’s inaction could support liability when the refusal was unusual and external to the…

Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, concurring in part and dissenting in part, agrees with the Court’s opinion on some issues but dissents from the holding that Delma Banks’s Brady claim warranted habeas relief, arguing that the nondisclosed informant‑payment evidence was not materially prejudicial and that his…

Justice Kennedy dissents in part, agreeing that the Fourth Amendment was violated because the warrant failed to particularly describe the things to be seized. However, he argues the officer is entitled to qualified immunity because the clerical error was a reasonable mistake of fact not of law.

The Court, in an opinion by Justice Stevens joined by Justices O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, held that the search violated the Fourth Amendment because the warrant entirely failed to describe the things to be seized and did not incorporate the supporting documents.

The Court held per curiam that destruction of potentially useful evidence does not violate due process absent police bad faith, even when a discovery request is pending or the evidence is central to the defense.

The Court held that 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1) does not authorize compensation from estate funds for a debtor’s attorney in a Chapter 7 proceeding unless the attorney is employed by the trustee and approved by the court under § 327.

Justice Ginsburg delivered the unanimous opinion holding that Bankruptcy Rules 4004 and 9006(b)(3) establish claim-processing deadlines, not limits on bankruptcy courts’ subject-matter jurisdiction.

Justice Kennedy, writing for a unanimous Court, held that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar enforcement against state officials of a federal consent decree implementing federal Medicaid requirements, even when the decree requires specific measures not expressly required by the statute.