Supreme Court of the United States, 2004

A per curiam of the Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the qualified-immunity question and reversed the Ninth Circuit's denial of qualified immunity to a Puyallup, Washington police officer who shot a fleeing felon in the back as he started to drive away from a residential driveway, expressly expressing no…

Justice Ginsburg, dissenting with Justice Stevens, argues that the Court unnecessarily defers deciding whether Aviall Services may recover cleanup costs from Cooper under § 107 of CERCLA.

The Supreme Court held that the lawfulness of a warrantless arrest under the Fourth Amendment does not depend on whether the offense for which the officer states the arrest is "closely related" to other offenses supported by the known facts: an arresting officer's subjective reason for the arrest is irrelevant, and…

The Court held that CERCLA § 113(f)(1) does not authorize a private party to seek contribution unless that party has been subject to a civil action under § 106 or § 107(a). Because Aviall had undertaken cleanup voluntarily and had never been sued or subjected to an administrative order, its § 113(f)(1) claim failed.

The Court overrules all exceptions filed by Kansas to the Special Master's Fourth Report, adopting the recommendations rejecting appointment of a River Master, limiting prejudgment interest to post-1985 damages, and requiring a 10-year measurement period for compliance monitoring.

Justice Stevens concurred in part and dissented in part, adhering to reasoning from the Kansas III opinion that prejudgment interest is an appropriate component of damages. He argued that interest should apply to all damages accrued after Colorado knew of its violation in 1969, rather than being limited to damages…

The Court overruled Kansas' exceptions to the Special Master's Fourth Report, rejecting the appointment of a River Master, confirming prejudgment interest runs from 1985 on damages accrued after that date, upholding a 10-year measurement period for future compliance, and allowing the Colorado Water Court to initially…

Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment, agreeing the Court reached the correct outcome but arguing that common sense and legislative history should always be considered in statutory interpretation, not solely to resolve ambiguities. He joined the Court's opinion for Justice Breyer.

The Court held that the Truth in Lending Act's $100 minimum and $1,000 maximum statutory damages limits continue to apply to individual actions under clause (i), including personal-property-secured loans.

The Supreme Court held that the 1995 amendment to the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) did not remove the $1,000 statutory damages cap on loans secured by personal property. The Court reasoned that the amendment increased damages only for closed-end loans secured by real property, leaving the original limits intact for…

Scalia, dissenting, agrees with the Court's construction of "subparagraph" as a third-level subdivision but argues the statutory damage cap exception in 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(A) applies only to clause (ii) (leases), not clause (i) (finance charges).

Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment, agreeing the Court of Appeals judgment should be reversed. He argued the statutory text and pre-1995 amendment history clarify Congress did not materially alter liability provisions.

Justice Stevens, acting as Circuit Justice, denied the applications to vacate the district courts' injunctions that limited election‑monitor challengers, leaving the lower‑court orders in place.

Justice Breyer denied an application for a stay of state court orders restricting publication of transcripts from in camera rape shield hearings without prejudice. The denial was based on changed circumstances where the trial court had recently ruled on evidence admissibility, suggesting the state courts might soon…

Justice Ginsburg concurs in the judgment on the Federal Tort Claims Act claim but would construe the foreign-country exception according to the location of the liability-creating act or omission, rather than the place of injury.

Justice Breyer, joined by The Chief Justice and Justice O'Connor, dissents, arguing that the Child Online Protection Act survives First Amendment scrutiny because it targets commercially obscene material, imposes modest burdens on adults via age verification, and serves a compelling interest in child protection; he…

Justice Breyer concurred in part and in the judgment, agreeing with the Court's approach to the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) while emphasizing international comity as a critical consideration. He argued that ATS jurisdiction should be consistent with comity principles to respect the sovereign rights of other nations.

The Supreme Court affirmed the Third Circuit's judgment upholding a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the Child Online Protection Act (COPA), which imposes criminal penalties on knowing commercial posting of Web content harmful to minors.

The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's en banc judgment in companion cases brought by Humberto Alvarez-Machain, a Mexican physician seized at DEA instigation and tried (unsuccessfully) for the 1985 torture-murder of DEA agent Enrique Camarena-Salazar.

The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision upholding a preliminary injunction against the Child Online Protection Act (COPA). The Court held that the Government failed to meet its burden of proving that less restrictive alternatives, such as filtering software, were less effective than COPA.

The Supreme Court held that 28 U.S.C. § 2241 confers on the District Court jurisdiction to hear the habeas corpus challenges of foreign nationals detained at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, because the statute requires only that the court have jurisdiction over the detainees' custodians, who can be reached by service…

The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit, holding that Jose Padilla's 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas petition challenging his military detention as an 'enemy combatant' was improperly filed in the Southern District of New York: for core challenges to present physical confinement, the proper respondent is the immediate…

A plurality of the Court (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Kennedy and Breyer, JJ.) held that Congress, through the Authorization for Use of Military Force, authorized the detention of a United States citizen captured abroad as an 'enemy combatant' for the duration of the relevant conflict, satisfying 18…

Justice Kennedy, concurring in judgment, argues that the two‑step interrogation technique used in Seibert deliberately undermines Miranda warnings and should be subject to a narrow, case‑specific test rather than a broad multifactor analysis.

Justice Kennedy's concurrence clarifies that the habeas immediate-custodian and territorial-jurisdiction rules are not limitations on subject-matter jurisdiction but function like venue or personal jurisdiction.

The Court, in an opinion by Justice Souter announcing the judgment and joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, held that Miranda warnings delivered midstream—after an unwarned interrogation has already produced a confession—could not effectively comply with Miranda when administered as part of a coordinated…

Justice Stevens, joined by Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, dissents from the Court’s disposition. He argues the Southern District of New York had proper venue to hear Padilla’s habeas petition, the Secretary of Defense was the proper respondent and he would have held the Non-Detention Act prohibits the detention.

Justice Souter, joined by Stevens and Ginsburg, dissents, arguing that the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self‑incrimination should extend to the exclusion of physical evidence derived from unwarned statements, and that the majority’s decision creates an incentive for police to ignore Miranda warnings.

Justice Kennedy concurs with the Court’s judgment that federal courts have jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions from foreign nationals detained at Guantanamo Bay, reasoning that the Eisentrager framework supports such jurisdiction given the base’s practical status as U.S.

This dissent argues the Court's holding that the habeas statute extends to aliens detained overseas contradicts precedent, particularly Johnson v. Eisentrager, and ignores statutory text requiring territorial jurisdiction.

Justice O'Connor, dissenting, argues that the plurality should follow Oregon v. Elstad to admit Seibert’s confession. She contends subjective intent is irrelevant to Miranda voluntariness and would vacate the judgment.

The Supreme Court held that a failure to give Miranda warnings does not require suppression of the physical fruits of a suspect's unwarned but voluntary statements: because the Self-Incrimination Clause is not implicated by the admission of nontestimonial evidence derived from voluntary statements, and because a mere…

A plurality of the U.S. Supreme Court held that a suspect's statement repeated after midstream Miranda warnings is inadmissible when the warnings follow an unwarned, station-house interrogation that has already produced a confession, because such midstream warnings could not effectively advise the suspect that she…

The Supreme Court held that the D.C. Circuit erred in denying mandamus review of discovery orders directed at the Vice President and other senior Executive Branch officials in a Federal Advisory Committee Act suit, because United States v.

The Supreme Court held that Ring v. Arizona announced a new procedural rule under Teague that does not apply retroactively to a capital case already final on direct review, reversing the Ninth Circuit's en banc invalidation of Warren Summerlin's death sentence.

Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, held that Blakely's exceptional sentence violated the Sixth Amendment because it exceeded the maximum authorized by his admissions and depended on judicial findings of deliberate cruelty.

The Supreme Court held that the Fifth Circuit's threshold 'constitutional relevance' test for Penry claims—requiring a 'uniquely severe permanent handicap' and a 'nexus' between the condition and the crime—has no foundation in the Court's precedents and improperly screened out Tennard's low-IQ mitigating evidence…

Justice Thomas, concurring in part and dissenting in part, argues that respondents failed to meet the high burden required for mandamus relief regarding FACA discovery orders against the Vice President.

Justice Ginsburg dissents, arguing the Court should affirm the Court of Appeals' denial of mandamus. She asserts mandamus relief is premature because the Government never asked the District Court to narrow discovery despite opportunities.

Justice Souter dissents, joining Justice Stevens. He critiques the majority's application of the Teague v. Lane new rule standard, arguing the Court overemphasizes finality and undervalues accuracy in capital sentencing. He contends Mills v.