Supreme Court of the United States
Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union
June 29, 2004542 U.S. 656
Summary
The Supreme Court affirmed the Third Circuit's judgment upholding a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the Child Online Protection Act (COPA), which imposes criminal penalties on knowing commercial posting of Web content harmful to minors. Applying abuse-of-discretion review, the Court held the District Court acted within its discretion because the Government failed to carry its burden of showing that respondents' proposed less restrictive alternatives, particularly filtering software, would be less effective than COPA, and practical considerations (the chilling effect of criminal penalties, remaining factual disputes, and a technological record five years stale) favored leaving the injunction in place pending trial. The Court declined to consider the Court of Appeals' additional grounds and remanded for trial, emphasizing that it did not hold Congress incapable of enacting any such regulation. Justice Stevens concurred, joined by Justice Ginsburg; Justice Scalia dissented; and Justice Breyer dissented, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor, contending COPA is constitutional.
Holding
- Whether the District Court abused its discretion in granting a preliminary injunction against enforcement of COPA.. No. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in entering the preliminary injunction because on this record the Government failed, at that point, to rebut the plaintiffs' contention that there are plausible less restrictive alternatives to COPA, principally blocking and filtering software, which is less restrictive than COPA and may well be more effective.
- Whether substantial practical considerations supported upholding the preliminary injunction and remanding for trial on the merits.. Yes. The potential harms from reversing the injunction, including self-censorship and a serious chill upon protected speech under threat of criminal penalties, outweigh those of leaving it in place by mistake; substantial factual disputes remain about the effectiveness of filtering software; and the factual record, entered in February 1999, does not reflect current technological reality. Remand allows the parties to update the record and the District Court to consider newly enacted statutes that might qualify as less restrictive alternatives.
- Whether the Court should reach the Court of Appeals' constructions of COPA's statutory terminology and its related constitutional conclusions.. No. Because the Court affirms the District Court's decision to grant the preliminary injunction for the reasons relied on by the District Court, it declines to consider the correctness of the other arguments relied on by the Court of Appeals; none of those statutory constructions were relied on by or necessary to the District Court's conclusions.
Docket 03-218
Cited authorities
- 47 U.S.C. §§ 231
- 112 Stat. 2681
- 47 U.S.C. § 231
- Pub. L. 104-104, § 502
- 110 Stat. 133
- 47 U.S.C. § 223
- 47 U.S.C. § 941
- 47 U.S.C. § 231
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