Supreme Court of the United States, 1994

The unanimous Court, in an opinion by Justice Souter, held that 38 U. S. C. § 1151 does not require proof of VA fault and that the regulation imposing a fault-or-accident requirement is inconsistent with the statute.

The Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, held that the knowledge requirement in 18 U.S.C. § 2252 extends to both the sexually explicit nature of the material and the minority of the performers.

Justice Stevens concurs without reservation in the Court's resolution of the Eleventh Amendment question, but adds that the Amendment's text does not support the Court's broad sovereign-immunity jurisprudence.

The Court held that PATH does not enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity from its employees’ federal FELA suits, reversing the Third Circuit and remanding. The Port Authority’s financial independence and the absence of legal or practical state responsibility for its debts meant that these suits threatened neither the…

Justice Scalia delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court. The Court held that Article III permits an appellate court to consider vacatur after a case becomes moot, but settlement-induced mootness ordinarily does not justify vacating the judgment under review.

Justice O’Connor delivered the unanimous opinion holding that conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 846 does not require proof of an overt act in furtherance of a drug conspiracy. The statute incorporates the common-law understanding of conspiracy, under which the criminal agreement itself supplies the required act, and omits…

The Court held that Florida's challenged House and Senate districts did not violate § 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Satisfaction of the Gingles preconditions does not alone establish dilution, and § 2 does not require maximizing majority-minority districts.

The Court, in an opinion by Justice Kennedy joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Souter, and Thomas, upheld California's capital-sentencing factors concerning the circumstances of the crime, prior violent criminal activity, and the defendant's age against Eighth Amendment vagueness…

The Court held that Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) permits admission only of individually self-inculpatory statements, not non-self-inculpatory remarks merely embedded in a generally inculpatory narrative.

Justice Thomas, writing for seven Justices, held that neither the Insanity Defense Reform Act nor general federal criminal practice requires instructing a jury about the consequences of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity.

The Court, in an opinion by Justice Thomas joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter, held that negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims are cognizable under FELA but must satisfy the common-law zone-of-danger test.

The Court, in an opinion by Justice O'Connor joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, held that after a knowing and voluntary Miranda waiver, officers may continue questioning unless the suspect unambiguously requests counsel.

Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, held that development-permit exactions must have an essential nexus to legitimate governmental interests and be roughly proportional to the proposed development's impacts.

The Court held that a § 1983 damages claim whose success would necessarily imply the invalidity of an outstanding conviction or sentence is not cognizable unless that conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.

The Court held that the Insanity Defense Reform Act does not require a federal district court to instruct the jury about the consequences of a not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity verdict, and that no such instruction is required as a matter of general federal criminal practice.

The Court, in an opinion by Justice Kennedy, upheld the Secretary’s interpretation of Medicare’s anti-redistribution regulation to prohibit reimbursement of educational costs previously borne by a hospital’s affiliated medical school.

Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion held that § 7(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act applies to the benefits adjudications at issue and places the burden of persuasion, not merely production, on the party seeking benefits.

Justice Blackmun delivered the unanimous opinion affirming the Supreme Court of Hawaii. The Court held that the Railway Labor Act does not pre-empt Norris’s state-law public-policy and whistleblower claims because those claims enforce rights independent of his collective-bargaining agreement and require only factual…

The Court affirmed the denial of federal habeas relief, holding that failure to comply with the Interstate Agreement on Detainers' 120-day trial requirement is not cognizable under § 2254 when the defendant did not object when the trial date was set and suffered no prejudice from the delay.

The Court, in an opinion by Justice Scalia joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Ginsburg, held that the FCC lacked authority under § 203(b)(2) of the Communications Act to make tariff filing optional for all nondominant long-distance carriers.

The Supreme Court affirmed Romano's Oklahoma death sentence for the Sarfaty murder, holding that admission at sentencing of the judgment imposing a prior death sentence on him for the Thompson murder violated neither the Eighth nor the Fourteenth Amendment.

Justice Stevens, writing for a unanimous Court, held that Ladue's near-total prohibition of residential signs violated the First Amendment even assuming its exemptions were free of impermissible content or viewpoint discrimination.

The Court unanimously held that California law, rather than a special federal common-law rule, governs whether corporate officers’ knowledge is imputed to a failed savings and loan and to the FDIC suing as its receiver on state-law tort claims.

The Court unanimously held that federal labor law pre-empts the California Labor Commissioner's policy of refusing to enforce statutory wage-payment claims for employees covered by collective-bargaining agreements containing arbitration clauses.

The Court held that retroactive application of the 1987 amendment restricting the estate-tax deduction for sales of securities to employee stock-ownership plans satisfied due process.

The Court held that Florida's reprimand of Ibanez for advertising her CPA and CFP credentials violated the First Amendment because the Board failed to substantiate its claims that the truthful designations were misleading. The Court unanimously rejected the sanction concerning her active CPA license.

The Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Stevens and joined by Rehnquist, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter and Ginsburg, held that attorney's fees for identifying other responsible parties are recoverable as necessary costs of response under CERCLA, but attorney's fees for litigation and for negotiating the EPA consent…

The Court held that a prison official violates the Eighth Amendment by deliberate indifference only when the official actually knows of and disregards a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate, although knowledge may be inferred from circumstantial evidence, including the obviousness and persistence of the risk.

The Supreme Court held that Montana's Dangerous Drug Tax, assessed on marijuana the Kurth family possessed before it was seized and destroyed upon their arrests, was fairly characterized as punishment and therefore violated the Double Jeopardy Clause as a second punishment for the same conduct for which the Kurths had…

Justice Souter delivered a unanimous opinion affirming the Tenth Circuit’s judgment. The Court held that an order vacating a dismissal based on a settlement agreement does not satisfy the three‑pronged Cohen collateral‑order test and therefore is not appealable as a final decision under 28 U.S.C. §1291.

The Court, in an opinion authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist and joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas, held that a prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction that was valid under Scott v.

The Court, in a plurality opinion authored by Justice O'Connor and joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justices Souter and Ginsburg, held that a public employer who reasonably relies on a third‑party report that an employee engaged in unprotected speech may lawfully discipline the employee even if the employee's actual…

The Court, in an opinion authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist and joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas and Ginsburg, held that 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) does not give a defendant the right to collaterally attack prior state convictions used for sentence enhancement, except where the conviction was obtained in…

The Supreme Court held that conviction for possession of an unregistered machinegun under 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) requires the Government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew of the weapon's characteristics that brought it within the Act's definition of a firearm.

The Supreme Court held that the price received at a noncollusive real estate mortgage foreclosure sale conducted in compliance with state law conclusively satisfies the Bankruptcy Code's requirement under 11 U.S.C.

Justice Scalia, writing for a unanimous Court, held that a federal court does not possess inherent or ancillary jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement merely because the agreement produced dismissal of a federal lawsuit.

The Supreme Court held that Clarkstown's flow control ordinance, which requires all solid waste generated or collected in the town to be deposited at the town's designated Route 303 transfer station, violates the dormant Commerce Clause because it discriminates against interstate commerce: the article of commerce is…

The Supreme Court denied Grant Anderson’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis for an extraordinary writ and barred him from filing any further extraordinary writ petitions unless he pays the docketing fee and complies with Rule 33.

The Court held per curiam that Miranda custody depends on the objective circumstances of interrogation, not an officer's undisclosed belief that the person questioned is or is not a suspect.

Justice Stevens, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg, held that § 101 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 does not apply to preenactment conduct.