Nevada evidence practice is organized under the Nevada Revised Statutes Title 4 (NRS chs. 47–52). Relevance starts at NRS §§ 48.025, 48.035; hearsay starts at NRS §§ 48.125, 48.135. That is what separates Nevada evidence law from a generic national summary. Read Nevada Revised Statutes Title 4 (NRS chs. 47–52) before the background sections below. Authenticity is a separate fight under NRS §§ 52.005, 52.015. Depositions at trial: NRS §§ 50.045–50.135 and Nev. R. Civ. P. 32 govern civil depositions and trial use. Criminal discovery follows Nev. Rev. Stat. ch. 174; deposition testimony at trial requires NRS § 48.235 former-testimony foundation with unavailability under § 48.225.
Character evidence
Character evidence in Nevada is governed by NRS §§ 48.045, 48.055. The default rule is familiar: evidence of a person's character or character trait is not admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character or trait. The same body of law then carves out the classic exceptions — essential-element character, accused-opens-the-door reputation or opinion, and other-acts evidence offered for a non-propensity purpose such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake.
Other-acts notice, 403 balancing, and limiting instructions do most of the real work. In criminal cases, prosecutors who dump prior misconduct without a specific non-propensity theory invite reversal; defense counsel who open the door to good-character testimony without anticipating rebuttal create the very propensity inference the rules were designed to police.
Nevada character-evidence opinions
LAWRENCE D. HALL, Appellant, v. SSF, INC., a Nevada Corporation, Dba THE LIMELITE, PAUL SONNER, JOHN HANDKA, A
…the evidence was inadmissible as irrelevant and as improper character evidence. The district judge permitted Hall to make an offer of proof on this issue, which Hall did. The decision to admit or exclude testimony rests within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed unless it is manifestly wrong. Daly v. State, 99 Nev. 564, 567, 665 P.2d 798, 801 (1983…
Nevada opinions such as LAWRENCE D. HALL, Appellant, v. SSF, INC., a Nevada Corporation, Dba THE LIMELITE, PAUL SONNER, JOHN HANDKA, A are cited where character evidence is disputed. The court stated: "The district judge permitted Hall to make an offer of proof on this issue, which Hall did. The decision to admit or exclude testimony rests within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed unless it is manifestly wrong. Daly v. State, 99 Nev." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
DONALD LEE BIGPOND, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent
DONALD LEE BIGPOND, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent, 128 Nev. 108 (2012)
…use it “sounds much more like the kind of inadmissible, bad character evidence prohibited by NRS 48.045(1)”). These disparate lines of authority may cause confusion about the scope and meaning of NRS 48.045(2). Therefore, we now clarify that evidence of “other crimes, wrongs or acts” may be admitted under NRS 48.045(2) for a relevant nonpropensity purpose other than those liste…
Practitioners open DONALD LEE BIGPOND, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent when Nevada character evidence turns on the distinction in this sentence: "NRS 48.045(1)”). These disparate lines of authority may cause confusion about the scope and meaning of NRS 48.045(2). Therefore, we now clarify that evidence of “other crimes, wrongs or acts” may be admitted under NRS 48." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
RANDY RICHMOND, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent
RANDY RICHMOND, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent, 118 Nev. 924 (2002)
…ual propensity, which we held in Braunstein is inadmissible character evidence. Notably, McCormick on Evidence explains how the motive exception in cases involving sex crimes — to show a propensity for sexual aberration — is not applicable, as compared to its use in other crimes: Unlike the other purposes for other-crimes evidence, the sex-crime exception flaunts the general pr…
Practitioners open RANDY RICHMOND, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent when Nevada character evidence turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Braunstein is inadmissible character evidence." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
SHAWN TIMOTHY NEWMAN, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent
SHAWN TIMOTHY NEWMAN, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent, 129 Nev. 222 (2013)
…pinion,” NRS 48.055; “when a defendant chooses to introduce character evidence in the form of reputation or opinion evidence, the prosecution is similarly limited in its rebuttal evidence and can only inquire into specific acts of conduct on cross-examination.” Jezdik v. State, 121 Nev. 129, 136, 110 P.3d 1058, 1063 (2005); see NRS 48.055(1). And, under the collateral-fact rule…
Practitioners open SHAWN TIMOTHY NEWMAN, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent when Nevada character evidence turns on the distinction in this sentence: "NRS 48.055; “when a defendant chooses to introduce character evidence in the form of reputation or opinion evidence, the prosecution is similarly limited in its rebuttal evidence and can only inquire into specific acts of conduct on cross-examination.” Jezdik v. State, 121 Nev." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
LINDA JOYCE ARMSTRONG, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent
LINDA JOYCE ARMSTRONG, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent, 110 Nev. 1322 (1994)
…all, the principal purposes for restrictions on the use of character evidence at trial are to prevent the dangers of unfair prejudice and of misleading the jury. See NRS 48.035(1). Thus, on the information before us, it is clear that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in allowing the prior employer’s testimony regarding the defendant’s performance while in his office…
On character evidence, LINDA JOYCE ARMSTRONG, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent speaks to the Nevada dispute in this passage: "all, the principal purposes for restrictions on the use of character evidence at trial are to prevent the dangers of unfair prejudice and of misleading the jury. See NRS 48.035(1). Thus, on the information before us, it is clear that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion i" The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Hearsay: start with the definition
Most hearsay objections in Nevada are won or lost on the definition, not on an exception. Under NRS §§ 48.125, 48.135, hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Non-hearsay purposes — verbal acts, effect on the listener, notice, circumstantial evidence of state of mind, and impeachment — remain available when the proponent can articulate them without asking the jury to believe the declarant.
Layered hearsay (hearsay within hearsay) requires an exception or exclusion for each layer. Machine-generated data and non-assertive conduct sit outside the hearsay definition in FRE-aligned jurisdictions, but they still need authenticity and, often, expert or business-records foundations.
Nevada hearsay opinions
GLENFORD EDWARD ENNIS, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent
GLENFORD EDWARD ENNIS, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent, 122 Nev. 694 (2006)
…ford, the United States Supreme Court held that testimonial hearsay statements made by an unavailable witness must be subject to a prior opportunity for cross-examination in order to be admissible.[2] Ennis now contends that statements by the officers and family members constituted testimonial hearsay that would have been excluded under Crawford. Because Crawford was decided af…
Practitioners open GLENFORD EDWARD ENNIS, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent when Nevada hearsay turns on the distinction in this sentence: "United States Supreme Court held that testimonial hearsay statements made by an unavailable witness must be subject to a prior opportunity for cross-examination in order to be admissible." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
TIMMY J. WEBER, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent
TIMMY J. WEBER, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent, 121 Nev. 554 (2005)
…ying Weber's motion to sever. II. The improper admission of hearsay evidence Weber contends that the district court improperly admitted hearsay testimony during trial. He objects to the following testimony by Robin Thornton, relating what Kim told Thornton on the day of Kim's murder. She had told me that a boy had called for [M.]; that T.J. had answered it and went crazy, cusse…
On hearsay, TIMMY J. WEBER, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent speaks to the Nevada dispute in this passage: "Weber's motion to sever. II. The improper admission of hearsay evidence Weber contends that the district court improperly admitted hearsay testimony during trial. He objects to the following testimony by Robin Thornton, relating what Kim told Thornton on the day of Kim's murder." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
ANGELO PANTANO, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent
ANGELO PANTANO, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent, 122 Nev. 782 (2006)
…a parent regarding a sexual assault constitute testimonial hearsay under the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford v. Washington. 1 For the reasons stated below, we affirm. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Respondent Angelo Pantano digitally penetrated his seven-year-old female cousin, D.D., while visiting at her home in Las Vegas. *786 Several days elapsed before D.D…
ANGELO PANTANO, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent is worth reading on Nevada hearsay because the court put the point in its own words: "United States Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford v. Washington. 1 For the reasons stated below, we affirm. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Respondent Angelo Pantano digitally penetrated his seven-year-old female cousin, D.D., while visiting at her home in Las Vegas." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
RAMON FRANCO and VALENTINO RODRIGUEZ FRANCO, Appellants, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent
…conclude that the district court erred in admitting several hearsay statements made by Ramon’s wife, Kim. In addition, the prosecutor engaged in misconduct when it used a statement ostensibly admitted only against Valentino against Ramon, and in commenting upon the failure of Ramon’s wife to testify. We cannot say that these errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and w…
Practitioners open RAMON FRANCO and VALENTINO RODRIGUEZ FRANCO, Appellants, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent when Nevada hearsay turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Ramon’s wife, Kim. In addition, the prosecutor engaged in misconduct when it used a statement ostensibly admitted only against Valentino against Ramon, and in commenting upon the failure of Ramon’s wife to testify." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
ROBERTO HERNANDEZ MIRANDA, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent
ROBERTO HERNANDEZ MIRANDA, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent, 101 Nev. 562 (1985)
…statements on the ground that they constituted inadmissible hearsay. At trial and again on appeal, Miranda argues that the district court should have admitted Anderson’s statements pursuant to NRS 51.315(1). This statute permits a district court to admit the out-of-court statement of a non-testifying party, when the declarant is not available to testify at trial and when the na…
On hearsay, ROBERTO HERNANDEZ MIRANDA, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent speaks to the Nevada dispute in this passage: "At trial and again on appeal, Miranda argues that the district court should have admitted Anderson’s statements pursuant to NRS 51.315(1)." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
ROBERT GORDON JOHNSTONE, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent — Batjer, J., dissenting
…married couple and as a consequence I respectfully dissent. Hearsay is inadmissible as evidence except as provided in NRS Chapter 51, NRS Title 14 and the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure. In an apparent effort to avoid a conflict between the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, United States Constitution, and the hearsay rule, the exceptions set forth in NRS 51.075 to N…
On hearsay, ROBERT GORDON JOHNSTONE, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent — Batjer, J., dissenting speaks to the Nevada dispute in this passage: "I respectfully dissent. Hearsay is inadmissible as evidence except as provided in NRS Chapter 51, NRS Title 14 and the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Party admissions
Statements of an opposing party are among the most important routes around the hearsay bar. Nevada treats them under NRS § 48.145. Nothing about the statement need be against interest, contemporaneous, or based on personal knowledge — the theory is adversarial, not reliability-based. A party cannot complain that his own words are unreliable when offered against him.
Scope questions dominate practice: the party's own statement; adopted statements (including silence in circumstances where a reasonable person would deny); statements by authorized speakers; agent or employee statements on matters within the scope of the relationship; and, in criminal conspiracy cases, coconspirator statements during and in furtherance of the conspiracy. A defendant generally cannot introduce his own exculpatory out-of-court statement as a "party admission" against himself — the rule runs one way.
Nevada party-admission opinions
MARGARET RUDIN, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent
MARGARET RUDIN, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent, 120 Nev. 121 (2004)
…primarily upon: (1) Cantrell’s testimony concerning Rudin’s admissions and conduct before and after Ron’s disappearance, (2) Lovato’s testimony concerning what he observed while working in Rudin’s home, (3) ballistic evidence indicating that Ron had been shot with his own .22 caliber Ruger handgun, and (4) forensic evidence suggesting that Ron had been shot inside the master be…
On party admissions, MARGARET RUDIN, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent speaks to the Nevada dispute in this passage: "Cantrell’s testimony concerning Rudin’s admissions and conduct before and after Ron’s disappearance, (2) Lovato’s testimony concerning what he observed while working in Rudin’s home, (3) ballistic evidence indicating that Ron had been shot with his own ." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
The TRUCKEE-CARSON IRRIGATION DISTRICT, Appellant, v. CECIL WYATT, Jr., Respondent — Mann, J., dissenting
…struction No. 14 advises the jury that evidence of the oral admissions of a party, other than his own testimony in the trial, ought to be viewed by them with caution. The majority state that the instruction may have been merely an instruction by the judge calculated to call the jury’s attention to special facts. In my opinion, this is a function of the trial judge which the Con…
Nevada opinions such as The TRUCKEE-CARSON IRRIGATION DISTRICT, Appellant, v. CECIL WYATT, Jr., Respondent — Mann, J., dissenting are cited where party admissions is disputed. The court stated: "No. 14 advises the jury that evidence of the oral admissions of a party, other than his own testimony in the trial, ought to be viewed by them with caution." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
DENA PALMER, Appellant, v. PIONEER INN ASSOCIATES, LTD., a Limited Partnership, Respondent
…contact with an employee “whose statement may constitute an admission on the part of the organization”? *945 2. If so, does Nevada interpret that portion of the commentary by analogy to Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(D), by application of agency principles, or by a different analysis? These questions concern the interpretation of SCR 182, which is based on ABA Model Rule 4.2, as appli…
DENA PALMER, Appellant, v. PIONEER INN ASSOCIATES, LTD., a Limited Partnership, Respondent is worth reading on Nevada party admissions because the court put the point in its own words: "If so, does Nevada interpret that portion of the commentary by analogy to Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(D), by application of agency principles, or by a different analysis?" Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
MITCHELL ERIC DETTLOFF v. THE STATE OF NEVADA
MITCHELL ERIC DETTLOFF v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, 120 Nev. 588 (2004)
…ndictment against him because it was based upon the State’s admission of evidence designed solely to inflame the grand jury, to wit: family photographs of the victims, the funeral program, the false testimony described above, and statements concerning the retention of counsel in lieu of contacting police. He also argues that the grand jury instructions related to uncharged crim…
On party admissions, MITCHELL ERIC DETTLOFF v. THE STATE OF NEVADA speaks to the Nevada dispute in this passage: "State’s admission of evidence designed solely to inflame the grand jury, to wit: family photographs of the victims, the funeral program, the false testimony described above, and statements concerning the retention of counsel in lieu of contacting police." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
ROBERT TURNER, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent
ROBERT TURNER, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent, 98 Nev. 103 (1982)
…prior testimony given by the defendant which constituted an admission. [H]aving voluntarily gone on the witness stand in her own behalf on the former trial, and there made statements against her interest, it was entirely competent for the state, on the second trial, to prove those statements as admissions voluntarily made. Admissions made under such circumstances may be proven…
ROBERT TURNER, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent is worth reading on Nevada party admissions because the court put the point in its own words: "H]aving voluntarily gone on the witness stand in her own behalf on the former trial, and there made statements against her interest, it was entirely competent for the state, on the second trial, to prove those statements as admissions voluntarily made." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
JOHN NEIL LEVI, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent
JOHN NEIL LEVI, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent, 95 Nev. 746 (1979)
…of the truth of the matters stated therein as opposed to admission for impeachment only is not constitutionally adequate. The same contention was tendered to the United States Supreme Court and, by that Court, rejected. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970). The California Supreme Court had ruled that the confrontation clause precluded the…
Practitioners open JOHN NEIL LEVI, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent when Nevada party admissions turns on the distinction in this sentence: "The same contention was tendered to the United States Supreme Court and, by that Court, rejected. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970)." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
A concrete Nevada scenario
Here is one way the Nevada pieces fit together. Change any fact and the statute may point somewhere else.
A lawyer in Nevada wants to offer a medical record, a party email, and a statement the declarant made while believing death was imminent.
- Clear relevance and unfair prejudice under NRS §§ 48.025, 48.035.
- If the email is the opposing party's, test NRS § 48.145 before the hearsay definition in NRS §§ 48.125, 48.135.
- For the medical record, lay the business-records foundation in NRS § 48.205 and the treatment purpose in NRS § 48.185.
- For the deathbed statement, meet NRS § 48.215, then authenticate every exhibit under NRS §§ 52.005, 52.015.
Nevada keeps hearsay, character, and authenticity on different rules inside the Nevada Revised Statutes Title 4 (NRS chs. 47–52). Winning one does not win the others.
Business records
The business-records exception under NRS § 48.205 is the everyday path for medical charts, employment files, bank statements, and maintenance logs. The foundation requires a record made at or near the time by — or from information transmitted by — someone with knowledge; kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity; and made as a regular practice. A custodian or other qualified witness (or a qualifying certification where the jurisdiction allows it) lays the foundation. The opponent may still attack lack of trustworthiness when the source or method of preparation indicates unreliability — litigation-driven reports are the classic failure mode.
Do not confuse authenticity with the business-records exception. You still need to show the exhibit is what you claim it is; the hearsay exception then answers why the out-of-court assertions inside it may be considered for their truth.
Nevada business-records opinions
DAISY TRUST v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.
DAISY TRUST v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., 445 P.3d 846 (2019)
…eddie Mac's ownership interest where properly authenticated business records otherwise establish that ownership interest. Because the loan servicer in this case introduced such records, we affirm the judgment of the district court, which determined Freddie Mac owned the subject loan at the time of the HOA's foreclosure sale, such that the HOA sale purchaser took title to the pr…
Practitioners open DAISY TRUST v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. when Nevada business records turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Mac's ownership interest where properly authenticated business records otherwise establish that ownership interest." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
MARLO THOMAS, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent
MARLO THOMAS, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent, 114 Nev. 1127 (1998)
…uments were properly authenticated to be admitted under the business records hearsay exception in NRS 51.135, which provides: A memorandum, report, record or compilation of data, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, all in the course of a regularly conducted act…
MARLO THOMAS, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent is worth reading on Nevada business records because the court put the point in its own words: "uments were properly authenticated to be admitted under the business records hearsay exception in NRS 51.135, which provides: A memorandum, report, record or compilation of data, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from" Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
ROBERTO HERNANDEZ MIRANDA, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent
ROBERTO HERNANDEZ MIRANDA, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent, 101 Nev. 562 (1985)
…should have admitted the transcribed statements under the “business records” exception to the hearsay rule contained in NRS 51.135(1).1 The business records exception to the hearsay rule generally permits a party to introduce into evidence reports made during the regularly conducted course of business. Therefore, the police report itself, which was made when Fernando gave his…
Practitioners open ROBERTO HERNANDEZ MIRANDA, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent when Nevada business records turns on the distinction in this sentence: "NRS 51.135(1).1 The business records exception to the hearsay rule generally permits a party to introduce into evidence reports made during the regularly conducted course of business." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
JEFFREY DeROSA, Petitioner, v. THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, in and for CARSON CITY, and
…ts and declaration could have been admitted pursuant to the business record exception. See NRS 51.135. 4 In Thomas’s case, the city argues for application of the public record exception. See NRS 51.155. 5 Both hearsay exceptions are “firmly rooted.” See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 n.8 (1980). *232 First, we reject the state’s argument that the evidence could have been admi…
Nevada opinions such as JEFFREY DeROSA, Petitioner, v. THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, in and for CARSON CITY, and are cited where business records is disputed. The court stated: "See NRS 51.135. 4 In Thomas’s case, the city argues for application of the public record exception. See NRS 51.155. 5 Both hearsay exceptions are “firmly rooted.” See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 n.8 (1980)." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
A.L.M.N., INC., a Nevada Corporation, Dba LA MIRAGE HOTEL & CASINO; ROBERT L. MAYER, Trustee of the Robert L. Mayer
…85), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1031 (1986), we noted that “the business records exception to the hearsay rule generally permits a party to introduce as evidence reports made during the regularly conducted course of business.” The district court concluded, however, that these logs were not made in the regular course of business. We agree. In Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943),…
Practitioners open A.L.M.N., INC., a Nevada Corporation, Dba LA MIRAGE HOTEL & CASINO; ROBERT L. MAYER, Trustee of the Robert L. Mayer when Nevada business records turns on the distinction in this sentence: "U.S. 1031 (1986), we noted that “the business records exception to the hearsay rule generally permits a party to introduce as evidence reports made during the regularly conducted course of business." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
ROBERT GORDON JOHNSTONE, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent — Batjer, J., dissenting
…ast transcript were admissible on the defendant’s behalf as business records to impeach the credibility of the complaining witness who was the declarant. Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 803(6). I further believe that the excluded statements are inadmissible within NRS 51.075, which is a recognized exception of the hearsay rule independent of the business or public record except…
Practitioners open ROBERT GORDON JOHNSTONE, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent — Batjer, J., dissenting when Nevada business records turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 803(6). I further believe that the excluded statements are inadmissible within NRS 51." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Important hearsay exceptions that do not require unavailability
Three present-sense and mental-state exceptions carry most of the remaining traffic in Nevada trial practice.
Excited utterance — NRS § 48.165. A statement relating to a startling event or condition, made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused. Timing is elastic; composure defeats the exception even minutes after the event, while visible distress can preserve it for hours.
Present sense impression — NRS § 48.155. A statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while or immediately after the declarant perceived it. Contemporaneity is strict — seconds and minutes, not hours — and excitement is not required.
Then-existing mental, emotional, or physical condition — NRS § 48.175. Statements of then-existing state of mind (including intent and plan) come in; statements of memory or belief offered to prove the fact remembered generally do not. Intent-to-meet-another-person cases remain the hardest applications.
Declarant unavailable
When the declarant is unavailable under NRS § 48.225, Nevada opens a second suite of exceptions. Unavailability typically includes privilege, refusal to testify despite court order, lack of memory, death or then-existing infirmity, and absence despite reasonable efforts to procure attendance. The proponent bears the burden of proving unavailability with specific facts — a bare assertion that the witness "could not be found" is not enough.
Former testimony under NRS § 48.235 is the workhorse once unavailability is shown: testimony given as a witness at a trial, hearing, or lawful deposition, offered against a party who had an opportunity and similar motive to develop it by direct, cross, or redirect. Criminal confrontation analysis runs in parallel and is not satisfied merely because a hearsay exception applies.
Dying declarations
Dying declarations under NRS § 48.215 remain a narrow but decisive exception in homicide and, in many jurisdictions, civil cases involving the cause or circumstances of what the declarant believed to be impending death. The foundational showing is the declarant's belief that death was imminent — not that death in fact followed within any particular time — plus a statement concerning the cause or circumstances of what the declarant believed to be the impending death. Courts police coaching and narrative expansions aggressively.
Nevada dying-declaration opinions
JOSEPH LOUIS MARESCA, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent
JOSEPH LOUIS MARESCA, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent, 103 Nev. 669 (1987)
…braced a fear of dying, and thus to admit the statements as dying declarations, 3 these statements could certainly be admitted under NRS 51.315(1). 4 We have previously held that a statement could be admitted under NRS 51.315 where the persons making the statement had no involvement with the police, the defendant, or the victims; where neither the declarants nor the police had…
Practitioners open JOSEPH LOUIS MARESCA, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent when Nevada dying declaration turns on the distinction in this sentence: "NRS 51.315(1). 4 We have previously held that a statement could be admitted under NRS 51." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
JERRY HARKINS, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent
JERRY HARKINS, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent, 122 Nev. 974 (2006)
…t danger. 2 We first conclude that Deriso’s statement was a dying declaration and, as such, the statement’s admission did not violate Harkins’ Sixth Amendment right to confrontation as defined in Crawford. Dying declarations were recognized at common law as an exception to the right to confrontation, and that exception was not repudiated by the Sixth Amendment. We also take thi…
Practitioners open JERRY HARKINS, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent when Nevada dying declaration turns on the distinction in this sentence: "We first conclude that Deriso’s statement was a dying declaration and, as such, the statement’s admission did not violate Harkins’ Sixth Amendment right to confrontation as defined in Crawford." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
In the Matter of the Application of CARL D. WHEELER for a Writ of Habeas Corpus
In the Matter of the Application of CARL D. WHEELER for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, 81 Nev. 495 (1965)
…y of a police officer who related what is claimed to be the dying declaration of the deceased that Wheeler shot him without provocation. It was contended below, and here, that such evidence, standing alone, does not meet the constitutional standard of evident proof or great presumption. The foundation for the officer’s testimony is questioned, and also the credit to be accorded…
On dying declaration, In the Matter of the Application of CARL D. WHEELER for a Writ of Habeas Corpus speaks to the Nevada dispute in this passage: "Wheeler shot him without provocation. It was contended below, and here, that such evidence, standing alone, does not meet the constitutional standard of evident proof or great presumption." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
THE STATE OF NEVADA v. FRED ROBERTS, J. P. SEVENER, and T. F. GORMAN
THE STATE OF NEVADA v. FRED ROBERTS, J. P. SEVENER, and T. F. GORMAN, 28 Nev. 350 (1905)
…court erred in admitting in evidence the following written dying declaration of the deceased: "My name is Jack Welsh. I am 20 years old. My home is in Palisade. I have no brothers. I know who shot me when I see them. The heaviest and shortest one. of the *370lot shot me. There were five men who attacked me. Al. Waldman was with me. There were five men that attack me. 'Give me…
Practitioners open THE STATE OF NEVADA v. FRED ROBERTS, J. P. SEVENER, and T. F. GORMAN when Nevada dying declaration turns on the distinction in this sentence: "My name is Jack Welsh. I am 20 years old. My home is in Palisade. I have no brothers. I know who shot me when I see them. The heaviest and shortest one. of the *370lot shot me. There were five men who attacked me. Al. Waldman was with me. There were five men that attack me." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
RAYMOND WALLACE SHUMAN, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent
RAYMOND WALLACE SHUMAN, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent, 94 Nev. 265 (1978)
…the grounds (1) that the trial court erred in admitting the dying declarations of the deceased and (2) that imposition of the death penalty constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Conti-tution and article 1, section 6, of the Nevada Constitution. A. The Dying Declarations. 1. Bejarno suffered third-degre…
RAYMOND WALLACE SHUMAN, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent is worth reading on Nevada dying declaration because the court put the point in its own words: "United States Conti-tution and article 1, section 6, of the Nevada Constitution. A. The Dying Declarations. 1." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
KEVIN LAMAR LAY, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent
KEVIN LAMAR LAY, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent, 116 Nev. 1185 (2000)
…d Giddens consistently told her that the victim had made no dying declaration. Giddens told her “that the victim could not speak, that he did not say anything to her, that he had a tube down his throat, and that there was so much going on it was a chaotic scene that she didn’t have the time to ask him anything.” Brookins last interviewed Giddens a day or so before Giddens was t…
KEVIN LAMAR LAY, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent is worth reading on Nevada dying declaration because the court put the point in its own words: "Giddens consistently told her that the victim had made no dying declaration." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
BARNELL BISHOP, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent
BARNELL BISHOP, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent, 92 Nev. 510 (1976)
…ng his photographic identification of appellant, qualify as dying declarations, but even if they technically qualify they should not have been admitted because the circumstances under which they were made offered no such strong assurance of accuracy and reliability to qualify as an adequate substitute for cross examination under NRS 51.075(1). Although the Sixth Amendment’s gua…
BARNELL BISHOP, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent is worth reading on Nevada dying declaration because the court put the point in its own words: "ng his photographic identification of appellant, qualify as dying declarations, but even if they technically qualify they should not have been admitted because the circumstances under which they were made offered no such strong assurance of accuracy and reliability to qualify as" Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Medical diagnosis or treatment statements
Statements made for medical diagnosis or treatment under NRS § 48.185 cover medical history, past or present symptoms, and their general cause when reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. The exception is not limited to treating physicians; statements to nurses, EMTs, and consulting clinicians can qualify when the diagnostic purpose is genuine. Fault and identity remain the usual battleground: "I was hit by a car" is often pertinent; "the light was green" usually is not; abuser identity in child-abuse and domestic-violence cases is heavily litigated.
Nevada medical-statement opinions
RICHARD ALLAN WALKER, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent; RICHARD ALLAN WALKER, Appellant, v. THE STATE
…court had ruled that this evidence did not fall within the medical diagnosis exception to the hearsay rule. Walker contends that Dr. Pitterman’s determination of Walker’s blood alcohol level during the evening of April 13, 1992, was reliable because it was based upon hospital records, and therefore was admissible pursuant to the general exception to the rule against hearsay. S…
On medical diagnosis hearsay, RICHARD ALLAN WALKER, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent; RICHARD ALLAN WALKER, Appellant, v. THE STATE speaks to the Nevada dispute in this passage: "Walker contends that Dr. Pitterman’s determination of Walker’s blood alcohol level during the evening of April 13, 1992, was reliable because it was based upon hospital records, and therefore was admissible pursuant to the general exception to the rule against hearsay." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
ALLEN KOERSCHNER, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent; ALLEN KOERSCHNER, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF
…stay. NRS 51.115 provides: Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof are not inadmissible under the hearsay rule insofar as they were reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. We conclude that…
On medical diagnosis hearsay, ALLEN KOERSCHNER, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent; ALLEN KOERSCHNER, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF speaks to the Nevada dispute in this passage: "stay. NRS 51.115 provides: Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof are not inadmissible under the" The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
MARTHA HELEN FELIX, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent; FRANCISCO J. ONTIVEROS, Appellant, v. THE STATE
…to NRS 51.115 as statements made in the course of securing medical diagnosis or treatment. 6 The incriminating statements Patricia allegedly made to Bay were made during an interview especially requested by the prosecuting attorney, and Bay took careful notes to report back to him. Bay indicated that she did not take notes when conducting treatment sessions. Patricia’s initial…
Nevada opinions such as MARTHA HELEN FELIX, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent; FRANCISCO J. ONTIVEROS, Appellant, v. THE STATE are cited where medical diagnosis hearsay is disputed. The court stated: "NRS 51.115 as statements made in the course of securing medical diagnosis or treatment. 6 The incriminating statements Patricia allegedly made to Bay were made during an interview especially requested by the prosecuting attorney, and Bay took careful notes to report back to him." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
SUSAN DeBOER, in Her Capacity as the Legal Guardian of GAYLE SAVAGE, an Adult Ward v. SENIOR BRIDGES OF SPARKS
…ed under ordinary negligence principles because it involved medical diagnosis and judgment); Coleman v. Deno, 813 So. 2d 303, 315 (La. 2002) (claims against a healthcare facility not arising in medical malpractice are governed by general tort law); Dorris v. Detroit Osteopathic Hosp., 594 N.W.2d 455, 465 (Mich. 1999) (ordinary negligence claims “raise issues that are within the…
Nevada opinions such as SUSAN DeBOER, in Her Capacity as the Legal Guardian of GAYLE SAVAGE, an Adult Ward v. SENIOR BRIDGES OF SPARKS are cited where medical diagnosis hearsay is disputed. The court stated: "Coleman v. Deno, 813 So. 2d 303, 315 (La. 2002) (claims against a healthcare facility not arising in medical malpractice are governed by general tort law); Dorris v. Detroit Osteopathic Hosp., 594 N.W.2d 455, 465 (Mich." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Ogunbanwo (Olaitan) Vs. State
Ogunbanwo (Olaitan) Vs. State (2021)
…ose, or that Dr. Roitman relied on the statements to form a medical diagnosis or treatment plan.3 See NRS 3Appellant cites several cases for the proposition that a defendant's out-of-court statements are admissible as nonhearsay to provide a factual basis for an expert's opinion. However, these cases are distinguishable in that none concluded that a defendant's own out-of-court…
Nevada opinions such as Ogunbanwo (Olaitan) Vs. State are cited where medical diagnosis hearsay is disputed. The court stated: "Dr. Roitman relied on the statements to form a medical diagnosis or treatment plan.3 See NRS 3Appellant cites several cases for the proposition that a defendant's out-of-court statements are admissible as nonhearsay to provide a factual basis for an expert's opinion." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Kang, M.D. Vs. Dist. Ct. (Snovitch)
Kang, M.D. Vs. Dist. Ct. (Snovitch) (2020)
…sional negligence simply because the alleged facts "involve medical diagnosis, treatment, or judgment." See Szymborski v. Spring Mountain Treatrnent Ctr., 133 Nev. 638, 648, 403 P.3d 1280, 1288 (2017) (A claim is grounded in medical malpractice and must adhere to NRS 41A.071 where the facts underlying the claim involve medical diagnosis, treatment, or judgment and the standards…
Kang, M.D. Vs. Dist. Ct. (Snovitch) is worth reading on Nevada medical diagnosis hearsay because the court put the point in its own words: "See Szymborski v. Spring Mountain Treatrnent Ctr., 133 Nev. 638, 648, 403 P.3d 1280, 1288 (2017) (A claim is grounded in medical malpractice and must adhere to NRS 41A." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
SZYMBORSKI VS. SPRING MTN. TREATMENT CTR.
SZYMBORSKI VS. SPRING MTN. TREATMENT CTR., 2017 NV 80 (2017)
…o ordinary negligence because the claim "was not related to medical diagnosis, judgment, or treatment." Id. at 408, 282 P.3d at 731-32. Thus, the mere fact that Szymborski's claims are brought against Spring Mountain, a 2As written at the time of filing, NRS 41A.071 only applied to actions for medical or dental malpractice. Egan v. Chambers, 129 Nev. 239, 243, 299 P.3d 364, 367…
On medical diagnosis hearsay, SZYMBORSKI VS. SPRING MTN. TREATMENT CTR. speaks to the Nevada dispute in this passage: "Id. at 408, 282 P.3d at 731-32. Thus, the mere fact that Szymborski's claims are brought against Spring Mountain, a 2As written at the time of filing, NRS 41A.071 only applied to actions for medical or dental malpractice. Egan v. Chambers, 129 Nev. 239, 243, 299 P." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Use of depositions at trial
NRS §§ 50.045–50.135 and Nev. R. Civ. P. 32 govern civil depositions and trial use. Criminal discovery follows Nev. Rev. Stat. ch. 174; deposition testimony at trial requires NRS § 48.235 former-testimony foundation with unavailability under § 48.225.
Deposition use is always a two-layer problem: procedural permission to read or play the deposition, plus a hearsay path (often former testimony, party admission, or impeachment). Counsel who satisfy the civil or criminal procedure rule but skip the evidence-rule foundation invite a sustained objection; counsel who have a hearsay exception but failed to preserve the deposition under the procedural rule face the same result. Video designations, counter-designations, and completeness objections should be teed up before the jury is seated.
Nevada deposition / former-testimony opinions
JAMES CHAVEZ, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent
JAMES CHAVEZ, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent, 125 Nev. 328 (2009)
…103 (1 Hayw. 1794), when a North Carolina court held that “depositions could be read against an accused only if they were taken in his presence.” 541 U.S. at 49. Face-to-face confrontation is the foundation upon which the United States Supreme Court’s Confrontation Clause jurisprudence evolved. In Crawford, the Court held that the Confrontation Clause bars “admission of testim…
On deposition / former testimony, JAMES CHAVEZ, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent speaks to the Nevada dispute in this passage: "Hayw. 1794), when a North Carolina court held that “depositions could be read against an accused only if they were taken in his presence.” 541 U.S. at 49." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
CITY OF LAS VEGAS, Appellant, v. THE HONORABLE JESSIE WALSH, JUDGE OF THE LAS VEGAS MUNICIPAL COURT, and MIKE WAYNE
…ed in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions,” “statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.” 12 Several courts have issued opinions since Crawford, addressing the admissibility of hearsay statem…
Nevada opinions such as CITY OF LAS VEGAS, Appellant, v. THE HONORABLE JESSIE WALSH, JUDGE OF THE LAS VEGAS MUNICIPAL COURT, and MIKE WAYNE are cited where deposition / former testimony is disputed. The court stated: "ed in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions,” “statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.” 1" That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
ADELAIDE BROWN and PAT JOHNSON, Heirs of Decedent Sophie Stokmans, Appellants, v. DR. ALBERT CAPANNA, Respondent
…Later, Brown and Johnson received more information through depositions of expert witnesses possibly indicating that Capanna had been negligent in his examination of and advice to Stokmans before the surgery. Based on this new information, Brown and Johnson sought leave to amend the complaint to include new negligence causes of action. The district court denied their motion. NR…
On deposition / former testimony, ADELAIDE BROWN and PAT JOHNSON, Heirs of Decedent Sophie Stokmans, Appellants, v. DR. ALBERT CAPANNA, Respondent speaks to the Nevada dispute in this passage: "Later, Brown and Johnson received more information through depositions of expert witnesses possibly indicating that Capanna had been negligent in his examination of and advice to Stokmans before the surgery." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
MARRITTE FUNCHES, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent. MARRITTE FUNCHES, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF
…ut has been unable to procure his attendance or to take his deposition. 2. A declarant is not “unavailable as a witness” if his exemption, refusal, inability or absence is due to the procurement or wrongdoing of the proponent of his statement for the purpose or preventing the witness from attending or testifying. Funches was charged in the information with premeditated first de…
Nevada opinions such as MARRITTE FUNCHES, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent. MARRITTE FUNCHES, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF are cited where deposition / former testimony is disputed. The court stated: "A declarant is not “unavailable as a witness” if his exemption, refusal, inability or absence is due to the procurement or wrongdoing of the proponent of his statement for the purpose or preventing the witness from attending or testifying." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
John B. QUINN, an individual Michael T. Zeller, an individual Michael L. Fazio, an individual and Ian S. Shelton, an
…compel an out-of-state2 attorney to appear in Nevada for a deposition as a nonparty witness in a civil action pending in Nevada state court where the attorney has appeared pro hac vice in the action. We conclude that it does not. Because the district court lacked authority to compel the out-of-state nonparty witnesses to be deposed, we grant the writ petition and vacate the di…
Practitioners open John B. QUINN, an individual Michael T. Zeller, an individual Michael L. Fazio, an individual and Ian S. Shelton, an when Nevada deposition / former testimony turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Nevada for a deposition as a nonparty witness in a civil action pending in Nevada state court where the attorney has appeared pro hac vice in the action. We conclude that it does not." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
ANTHONY FREDERICK PASSARELLI, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent
ANTHONY FREDERICK PASSARELLI, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent, 93 Nev. 292 (1977)
…ther hearing of the same or a different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with law in the course of another proceeding, is not inadmissible under the hearsay rule if: “1. The declarant is unavailable as a witness; . . .” 2 NRS 51.055(l)(c) provides: “1. A declarant is ‘unavailable as a witness’ if he is: “(c) Unable to be present or to testify at that hearing b…
On deposition / former testimony, ANTHONY FREDERICK PASSARELLI, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent speaks to the Nevada dispute in this passage: "The declarant is unavailable as a witness; . . .” 2 NRS 51.055(l)(c) provides: “1." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
BEULAJEAN MAXWELL, Appellant, v. VERNON AMARAL, Respondent
BEULAJEAN MAXWELL, Appellant, v. VERNON AMARAL, Respondent, 79 Nev. 323 (1963)
…. The questioned items are: First, the cost of the original deposition of the guest-plaintiff, which deposition was published during trial and used by defense counsel for impeachment of the guest-plaintiff during cross examination; Second, the cost of a copy of the deposition of the host-defendant, which was used by his counsel only to follow the deponent’s answers to depositio…
Nevada opinions such as BEULAJEAN MAXWELL, Appellant, v. VERNON AMARAL, Respondent are cited where deposition / former testimony is disputed. The court stated: ". The questioned items are: First, the cost of the original deposition of the guest-plaintiff, which deposition was published during trial and used by defense counsel for impeachment of the guest-plaintiff during cross examination; Second, the cost of a copy of the deposition of" That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Authenticity: why it matters and how to prove it
Authenticity is not a hearsay doctrine and it is not optional. Under NRS §§ 52.005, 52.015, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is. Self-authenticating categories — certified public records, newspapers, acknowledged documents, trade inscriptions, and (where adopted) certified domestic records of a regularly conducted activity — shorten the path, but most trial exhibits still need a sponsoring witness, distinctive characteristics, chain of custody, or process-or-system evidence.
Nevada gaming, hospitality, and DUI prosecutions require authenticated surveillance video, slot-account records, and lab certificates under NRS ch. 52 before business-record shortcuts in NRS § 48.205 apply.
Why authenticity gets its own section in every Nevada trial notebook:
- It is a condition precedent. An unauthenticated exhibit never reaches the relevance, hearsay, or privilege analysis in a useful way — the jury never properly considers it.
- Digital evidence multiplies the failure modes. Screenshots, social-media posts, text threads, and cloud downloads require hash values, account attribution, metadata, or a percipient witness who saw the content created or received.
- Chain of custody is authenticity by another name. Drugs, firearms, biological samples, and seized devices are excluded when the links from seizure to lab to courtroom are broken, even if a hearsay exception would otherwise apply to a lab report.
- Business-records shortcuts do not replace authentication. A custodian can explain record-keeping practices and still fail if nobody can say the particular PDF or printout is the record of this patient, this account, or this machine.
- Self-authentication is narrow. Counsel who wave a notarization or a letterhead and skip the rest of Rule 901-style analysis often lose when the document's contents are disputed.
Practical authentication checklist for Nevada trials: identify the exhibit; choose a 901 method or a 902 category; line up the sponsoring witness or certificate; preserve chain-of-custody testimony for physical and digital items; and separate the authenticity objection from any hearsay objection so the court rules on each.
Nevada authenticity opinions
ANDREW BARMETTLER, Appellant, v. RENO AIR, INC., Respondent; ANDREW BARMETTLER, Appellant, v. RENO AIR, INC., Respondent
…in turn. Whether the district court erred in considering unauthenticated documents when it granted partial summary judgment on March 10, 1995, as to five of Barmettler’s claims Barmettler contends that several exhibits2 were not properly authenticated; therefore, the district court erred in considering them in granting the first summary judgment motion. Further, Barmettler req…
Practitioners open ANDREW BARMETTLER, Appellant, v. RENO AIR, INC., Respondent; ANDREW BARMETTLER, Appellant, v. RENO AIR, INC., Respondent when Nevada authentication turns on the distinction in this sentence: "March 10, 1995, as to five of Barmettler’s claims Barmettler contends that several exhibits2 were not properly authenticated; therefore, the district court erred in considering them in granting the first summary judgment motion." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
KEVIN RODRIGUEZ, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent
KEVIN RODRIGUEZ, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent, 128 Nev. 155 (2012)
…In this opinion, we focus on two issues. First, we consider authentication and other evidentiary challenges to the admissibility of text messages. In particular, we conclude that text messages are *157 subject to the same authentication requirements under NRS 52.015(1) as other documents, including proof of authorship. Here, we conclude that the district court abused its discre…
Nevada opinions such as KEVIN RODRIGUEZ, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent are cited where authentication is disputed. The court stated: "In this opinion, we focus on two issues. First, we consider authentication and other evidentiary challenges to the admissibility of text messages. In particular, we conclude that text messages are *157 subject to the same authentication requirements under NRS 52." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
TERESA BAHENA, Individually and as Special Administrator for EVERTINA M. TRUJILLO TAPIA, Deceased; MARIANA BAHENA
…2007, order regarding producing a witness for deposition to authenticate the documents as verbally ruled by the discovery commissioner on December 14, 2006. The district court struck Goodyear’s answer as to liability and damages for sanctions based upon discovery abuses. After the January 9, 2007, hearing, Bahena filed a motion to establish all its damages by way of a prove-up…
Practitioners open TERESA BAHENA, Individually and as Special Administrator for EVERTINA M. TRUJILLO TAPIA, Deceased; MARIANA BAHENA when Nevada authentication turns on the distinction in this sentence: "December 14, 2006. The district court struck Goodyear’s answer as to liability and damages for sanctions based upon discovery abuses." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
CHARLES FRIAS, Dba ABC UNION CAB COMPANY, Appellants, v. AURELIO M. VALLE and CIPRIANA VALLE, Respondents
…ing into evidence thermograms lacking proper foundation and authentication. We concur. During trial, respondents were permitted to use thermograms to prove the extent of Aurelio Valle’s soft tissue injuries. It was represented to the court that thermography portrays the variations in infrared energy radiating from the skin, thus providing visual images of a complainant’s injuri…
Nevada opinions such as CHARLES FRIAS, Dba ABC UNION CAB COMPANY, Appellants, v. AURELIO M. VALLE and CIPRIANA VALLE, Respondents are cited where authentication is disputed. The court stated: "We concur. During trial, respondents were permitted to use thermograms to prove the extent of Aurelio Valle’s soft tissue injuries." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
THE STATE OF NEVADA, DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES AND PUBLIC SAFETY v. ROBERT ROWLAND
…e testing officer. Therefore, paragraphs 12 and 13 are self-authenticating. Moreover, the intent of paragraphs 12 and 13 is to ensure that the “appropriate information” — the test results — is provided by the testing officer once it becomes available. NAC 484.670(1).1 As noted above, the testing officer did this. Checking the boxes next to the paragraphs, even if omitted, was m…
On authentication, THE STATE OF NEVADA, DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES AND PUBLIC SAFETY v. ROBERT ROWLAND speaks to the Nevada dispute in this passage: "Therefore, paragraphs 12 and 13 are self-authenticating. Moreover, the intent of paragraphs 12 and 13 is to ensure that the “appropriate information” — the test results — is provided by the testing officer once it becomes available. NAC 484.670(1)." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
TALLEY (OMAR) v. STATE
TALLEY (OMAR) v. STATE, 141 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 61 (2025)
…RE, BELL, and STIGLICH, JJ. OPINION By the Court, BELL, J.: Authentication of evidence provides an essential safeguard to protect the fairness and accuracy of our legal process. Before evidence may SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 43t:a z - Sri-1 3 (0) 1947A be introduced in court, the evidence must be proven to be what its proponent claims the evidence to be. With new technology making…
TALLEY (OMAR) v. STATE is worth reading on Nevada authentication because the court put the point in its own words: "RE, BELL, and STIGLICH, JJ. OPINION By the Court, BELL, J.: Authentication of evidence provides an essential safeguard to protect the fairness and accuracy of our legal process." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Practice checklist
- State the relevance theory in one sentence before naming an exception.
- Run the 403 / unfair-prejudice balance explicitly for other-acts and graphic exhibits.
- For character or other-acts evidence, identify the non-propensity purpose and request a limiting instruction on the record.
- Decide whether an out-of-court statement is hearsay for the purpose offered before hunting exceptions.
- Lay business-records foundations with time, knowledge, regular practice, and custodial qualifications — or a qualifying certification.
- Prove unavailability with specific facts before offering former testimony or dying declarations.
- Treat deposition use as procedure-plus-hearsay; designate and counter-designate early.
- Authenticate every exhibit under NRS §§ 52.005, 52.015 (or the self-authentication path) before arguing hearsay.
- Preserve chain of custody for physical and digital evidence with named custodians.
- Search LawDiver for recent Nevada appellate evidence opinions before mediation or motions in limine.
Contents
- General standards of admissibility
- Character evidence
- Hearsay: start with the definition
- Party admissions
- Business records
- Important hearsay exceptions that do not require unavailability
- Declarant unavailable
- Dying declarations
- Medical diagnosis or treatment statements
- Use of depositions at trial
- Authenticity: why it matters and how to prove it
- Practice checklist
- Frequently asked questions
General standards of admissibility
Nevada starts every evidence dispute with relevance and unfair prejudice. Under NRS §§ 48.025, 48.035, evidence is relevant when it has any tendency to make a fact of consequence more or less probable, and relevant evidence is still excluded when its probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. Preliminary questions of admissibility are for the court; conditional relevance and limited-purpose instructions keep otherwise-usable proof from becoming a Trojan horse for propensity or truth-of-the-matter use.
Nevada splits authentication into NRS Title 52 while hearsay lives in ch. 48. Party-opponent statements are a dedicated statute (NRS § 48.145), not nested in a definitions rule.
Practice tip: articulate the theory of relevance in one sentence before citing the exception. Lawyers who lead with "it's a business record" without explaining what fact the record proves often lose the 403 balance even when the hearsay foundation is clean.
Frequently asked questions
What is the primary evidence source in Nevada?
Nevada applies the Nevada Revised Statutes Title 4 (NRS chs. 47–52). Nevada codified FRE-based evidence law in NRS Title 4; NRS ch. 48 uses distinct section decimals (e.g., 48.025) but tracks federal concepts.
How do Nevada courts decide relevance and unfair prejudice?
Under NRS §§ 48.025, 48.035, evidence must make a fact of consequence more or less probable, and the court may exclude relevant evidence when unfair prejudice, confusion, or waste of time substantially outweighs its probative value.
Are party admissions hearsay in Nevada?
Party-opponent statements under NRS § 48.145 are generally excluded from the hearsay ban (or treated as an exception, depending on local drafting). They may be offered against the party who made or adopted them without showing unavailability.
What foundation is required for business records?
Under NRS § 48.205, show a record made at or near the time from someone with knowledge, kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity, as a regular practice, through a custodian, qualified witness, or allowed certification — subject to trustworthiness attack.
When can I use a deposition at trial in Nevada?
NRS §§ 50.045–50.135 and Nev. R. Civ. P. 32 govern civil depositions and trial use. Criminal discovery follows Nev. Rev. Stat. ch. 174; deposition testimony at trial requires NRS § 48.235 former-testimony foundation with unavailability under § 48.225.
Why is authenticity separate from hearsay?
Authenticity asks whether the item is what you claim it is; hearsay asks whether out-of-court assertions inside it may be used for their truth. You can lose on either ground independently. Nevada authenticity practice starts with NRS §§ 52.005, 52.015.
Where do dying declarations and medical statements fit?
Dying declarations under NRS § 48.215 require belief in impending death and concern the cause or circumstances of that believed death. Medical statements under NRS § 48.185 require a genuine diagnostic or treatment purpose and reasonable pertinence to care.