Start with Arizona Rules of Evidence. In Arizona, Arizona evidence practice is organized under the Arizona Rules of Evidence. Relevance starts at Ariz. R. Evid. 401, 403; hearsay starts at Ariz. R. Evid. 801, 802. That is the question this guide answers for evidence law. Authenticity is a separate fight under Ariz. R. Evid. 901, 902. Depositions at trial: Ariz. R. Civ. P. 32(a) lists permissible uses of deposition testimony in civil trials, including impeachment and former testimony when the declarant is unavailable. In criminal cases, Ariz. R. Crim. P. 15.1 limits discovery depositions, but prior sworn testimony may be admitted under Ariz. R. Evid. 804(b)(1) when statutory unavailability criteria are met.
General standards of admissibility
Arizona starts every evidence dispute with relevance and unfair prejudice. Under Ariz. R. Evid. 401, 403, evidence is relevant when it has any tendency to make a fact of consequence more or less probable, and relevant evidence is still excluded when its probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. Preliminary questions of admissibility are for the court; conditional relevance and limited-purpose instructions keep otherwise-usable proof from becoming a Trojan horse for propensity or truth-of-the-matter use.
Arizona has localized rules on medical-expense affidavits and insurance references in civil cases. Always check the current Arizona Supreme Court order for the latest rule amendments.
Practice tip: articulate the theory of relevance in one sentence before citing the exception. Lawyers who lead with "it's a business record" without explaining what fact the record proves often lose the 403 balance even when the hearsay foundation is clean.
Character evidence
Character evidence in Arizona is governed by Ariz. R. Evid. 404, 405. The default rule is familiar: evidence of a person's character or character trait is not admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character or trait. The same body of law then carves out the classic exceptions — essential-element character, accused-opens-the-door reputation or opinion, and other-acts evidence offered for a non-propensity purpose such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake.
Other-acts notice, 403 balancing, and limiting instructions do most of the real work. In criminal cases, prosecutors who dump prior misconduct without a specific non-propensity theory invite reversal; defense counsel who open the door to good-character testimony without anticipating rebuttal create the very propensity inference the rules were designed to police.
Arizona character-evidence opinions
STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Todd M. WILLIAMS, Appellant
STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Todd M. WILLIAMS, Appellant, 209 Ariz. 228 (2004)
…rant sexual propensity exception to the prohibition against character evidence, codified in Arizona Rule of Evidence 404(c), encompasses sexual assaults against adults when the defendant claims the victims consented.” 209 Ariz. at 47, ¶ 1, 97 P.3d at 866. Our supreme court ultimately concluded that, because A.R.S. § 13-1420(C)(3) included sexual assault as a “sexual offense,” c…
Practitioners open STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Todd M. WILLIAMS, Appellant when Arizona character evidence turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Arizona Rule of Evidence 404(c), encompasses sexual assaults against adults when the defendant claims the victims consented.” 209 Ariz. at 47, ¶ 1, 97 P.3d at 866. Our supreme court ultimately concluded that, because A.R.S." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. David Heran AGUILAR, Appellant
STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. David Heran AGUILAR, Appellant, 209 Ariz. 40 (2004)
…rant sexual propensity exception to the prohibition against character evidence, codified in Arizona Rule of Evidence 404(c), encompasses sexual assaults against adults when the defendant claims the victims consented. We hold that it can. I. ¶ 2 In a single indictment, the Maricopa County Grand Jury charged David Heran Aguilar with sexually assaulting four women between November…
Practitioners open STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. David Heran AGUILAR, Appellant when Arizona character evidence turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Arizona Rule of Evidence 404(c), encompasses sexual assaults against adults when the defendant claims the victims consented. We hold that it can. I." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Jonathan Charles TREADAWAY, Jr., Appellant — Holohan, J., dissenting
…mony was not admissible. If the majority suggests that such character evidence is somehow admissible because it comes from some psychiatrist, I disagree. In fact.the case cited by defendant disposes of that position. Freeman v. State, 486 P.2d 967 (Alaska 1971). Interestingly, this area of sexual deviancy which perplexes the majority is described as character evidence. “It appe…
STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Jonathan Charles TREADAWAY, Jr., Appellant — Holohan, J., dissenting is worth reading on Arizona character evidence because the court put the point in its own words: "If the majority suggests that such character evidence is somehow admissible because it comes from some psychiatrist, I disagree. In fact.the case cited by defendant disposes of that position. Freeman v. State, 486 P.2d 967 (Alaska 1971)." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Jose Nunez GARCIA, Appellant
STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Jose Nunez GARCIA, Appellant, 200 Ariz. 471 (2001)
…on in child molestation cases to the general rule excluding character evidence. It held that prior acts committed by a defendant against the same victim may be admitted to show the defendant’s disposition toward that particular victim. In a case involving a sex offense committed against a child, evidence of a prior similar sex offense committed against the same child is admissi…
Arizona opinions such as STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Jose Nunez GARCIA, Appellant are cited where character evidence is disputed. The court stated: "It held that prior acts committed by a defendant against the same victim may be admitted to show the defendant’s disposition toward that particular victim." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
STATE of Arizona, Appellee/Cross-Appellant, v. Jake Hurt HUGHES, Appellant/Cross-Appellee
…or leniency and sentenced defendant to death. DISCUSSION I. Character Evidence Before trial, defendant filed a motion to determine the admissibility of other crimes, wrongs, and acts sought to be introduced by the state. As described by the prosecution, these included: [Ejvery other bad act, and every statement that your client made that I have disclosed to you. That would incl…
Arizona opinions such as STATE of Arizona, Appellee/Cross-Appellant, v. Jake Hurt HUGHES, Appellant/Cross-Appellee are cited where character evidence is disputed. The court stated: "DISCUSSION I. Character Evidence Before trial, defendant filed a motion to determine the admissibility of other crimes, wrongs, and acts sought to be introduced by the state." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Jose Vicente Montano VEGA, Appellant — Thompson, J., concurring
…ble as showing a conspiratorial scheme and not inadmissible character evidence in People v. Kynette, 15 Cal.2d 731, 104 P.2d 794, 802 (1940), overruled on other grounds by People v. Sharer, 61 Cal.2d 869, 40 Cal.Rptr. 851, 395 P.2d 899 (1964). Similarly, a prior Arizona case noted in Gamer allowed evidence of prior sex acts as to the same victim as showing a “system, plan or sc…
Arizona opinions such as STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Jose Vicente Montano VEGA, Appellant — Thompson, J., concurring are cited where character evidence is disputed. The court stated: "People v. Kynette, 15 Cal.2d 731, 104 P.2d 794, 802 (1940), overruled on other grounds by People v. Sharer, 61 Cal.2d 869, 40 Cal.Rptr. 851, 395 P.2d 899 (1964)." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
How the Arizona rule applies
Apply the Arizona authorities in order. The facts are simplified so the statute and the standard are visible.
A lawyer in Arizona wants to offer a medical record, a party email, and a statement the declarant made while believing death was imminent.
- Clear relevance and unfair prejudice under Ariz. R. Evid. 401, 403.
- If the email is the opposing party's, test Ariz. R. Evid. 801(d)(2) before the hearsay definition in Ariz. R. Evid. 801, 802.
- For the medical record, lay the business-records foundation in Ariz. R. Evid. 803(6) and the treatment purpose in Ariz. R. Evid. 803(4).
- For the deathbed statement, meet Ariz. R. Evid. 804(b)(2), then authenticate every exhibit under Ariz. R. Evid. 901, 902.
Arizona keeps hearsay, character, and authenticity on different rules inside the Arizona Rules of Evidence. Winning one does not win the others.
Hearsay: start with the definition
Most hearsay objections in Arizona are won or lost on the definition, not on an exception. Under Ariz. R. Evid. 801, 802, hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Non-hearsay purposes — verbal acts, effect on the listener, notice, circumstantial evidence of state of mind, and impeachment — remain available when the proponent can articulate them without asking the jury to believe the declarant.
Layered hearsay (hearsay within hearsay) requires an exception or exclusion for each layer. Machine-generated data and non-assertive conduct sit outside the hearsay definition in FRE-aligned jurisdictions, but they still need authenticity and, often, expert or business-records foundations.
Arizona hearsay opinions
The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Michael Eugene ROBINSON, Appellant
The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Michael Eugene ROBINSON, Appellant, 153 Ariz. 191 (1987)
…ions: (1) whether A.R.S. § 13-1416 (Supp.1986), a statutory hearsay exception, unconstitutionally infringes on this court’s rulemaking powers; (2) whether the challenged hearsay statements could have been admitted under the Arizona Rules of Evidence; and (3) whether the imposition of consecutive sentences violated A.R.S. § 13-604(H). Rule 31.19(c)(4), Ariz.R. Crim.P., 17 A.R.S.…
The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Michael Eugene ROBINSON, Appellant is worth reading on Arizona hearsay because the court put the point in its own words: "Supp.1986), a statutory hearsay exception, unconstitutionally infringes on this court’s rulemaking powers; (2) whether the challenged hearsay statements could have been admitted under the Arizona Rules of Evidence; and (3) whether the imposition of consecutive sentences violated A." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Ignacio Gonzalez VALENCIA, Appellant
STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Ignacio Gonzalez VALENCIA, Appellant, 186 Ariz. 493 (1996)
…ersible error because: (1) the statements were inadmissible hearsay, and (2) the statements violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. The state argues that the statements were admissible under the residual hearsay exception, that they did not offend defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights, and that in any event, defendant waived his hearsay and Confrontation Clause object…
On hearsay, STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Ignacio Gonzalez VALENCIA, Appellant speaks to the Arizona dispute in this passage: "ersible error because: (1) the statements were inadmissible hearsay, and (2) the statements violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. The state argues that the statements were admissible under the residual hearsay exception, that they did not offend defendant’s Sixth A" The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
In Re the Marriage of Maria FUENTES, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Hector FUENTES, Respondent-Appellant
…tenance. He contends that this information was inadmissible hearsay and lacking in foundation. Maria responds that the evidence was not hearsay and was appropriately admitted. “We will not disturb a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence absent a clear abuse of discretion and resulting prejudice.” Jimenez v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 206 Ariz. 424, 427, ¶ 10, 79 P.3…
Arizona opinions such as In Re the Marriage of Maria FUENTES, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Hector FUENTES, Respondent-Appellant are cited where hearsay is disputed. The court stated: "He contends that this information was inadmissible hearsay and lacking in foundation. Maria responds that the evidence was not hearsay and was appropriately admitted." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
STATE of Arizona, Appellee/Cross-Appellant. v. Oreste FULMINANTE, Appellant/Cross-Appellee
…agree with Defendant’s argument that admission of Jeneane’s hearsay statements, reflecting her belief about Defendant’s future conduct, was prejudicial error. We therefore need not address the serious issues arising from the state’s failure to timely disclose the discovery of physical evidence. 1 For purposes of judicial economy, we also discuss other issues likely to recur on…
STATE of Arizona, Appellee/Cross-Appellant. v. Oreste FULMINANTE, Appellant/Cross-Appellee is worth reading on Arizona hearsay because the court put the point in its own words: "Defendant’s argument that admission of Jeneane’s hearsay statements, reflecting her belief about Defendant’s future conduct, was prejudicial error." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
STATE of Arizona, Appellee, Cross-Appellant, v. Scott Jay WILLIAMS, Appellant, Cross-Appellee
…t the confession had not been true was allowed in evidence. HEARSAY On appeal, the defendant first argues that the tape-recorded statements, the diagram and the excerpts from the diary constituted hearsay and were therefore, inadmissible.5 A. Tapes Three tape-recorded conversations Rita Sipler had with police officers were introduced into evidence. Two of the conversations occu…
Arizona opinions such as STATE of Arizona, Appellee, Cross-Appellant, v. Scott Jay WILLIAMS, Appellant, Cross-Appellee are cited where hearsay is disputed. The court stated: "HEARSAY On appeal, the defendant first argues that the tape-recorded statements, the diagram and the excerpts from the diary constituted hearsay and were therefore, inadmissible.5 A." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Stephanie Lynn BASS, Appellant
STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Stephanie Lynn BASS, Appellant, 198 Ariz. 571 (2000)
…hat the trial court erred in allowing Farrell to relate the hearsay statements of the bystanders. The court of appeals initially reversed Bass’ conviction finding that the instruction on superseding cause confused the criminal standard with negligence law in the field of torts. The appeals court upheld the admission of the bystander hearsay, as testified to by Farrell, concludi…
Arizona opinions such as STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Stephanie Lynn BASS, Appellant are cited where hearsay is disputed. The court stated: "Farrell to relate the hearsay statements of the bystanders. The court of appeals initially reversed Bass’ conviction finding that the instruction on superseding cause confused the criminal standard with negligence law in the field of torts." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Daniel Aaron LOPEZ, Appellant
The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Daniel Aaron LOPEZ, Appellant, 217 Ariz. 433 (2008)
…argument that the court abused its discretion by admitting hearsay statements of one of the victims, Desiree. In a separate, contemporaneously filed memorandum decision, we address other issues that do not meet the criteria for publication. See Ariz. R. Sup.Ct. 111(b), (h); Ariz. R.Crim. P. 31.26. For the reasons stated in our memorandum decision, we reduce one aggravated assa…
Practitioners open The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Daniel Aaron LOPEZ, Appellant when Arizona hearsay turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Desiree. In a separate, contemporaneously filed memorandum decision, we address other issues that do not meet the criteria for publication. See Ariz. R. Sup.Ct. 111(b), (h); Ariz. R.Crim. P. 31.26." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Party admissions
Statements of an opposing party are among the most important routes around the hearsay bar. Arizona treats them under Ariz. R. Evid. 801(d)(2). Nothing about the statement need be against interest, contemporaneous, or based on personal knowledge — the theory is adversarial, not reliability-based. A party cannot complain that his own words are unreliable when offered against him.
Scope questions dominate practice: the party's own statement; adopted statements (including silence in circumstances where a reasonable person would deny); statements by authorized speakers; agent or employee statements on matters within the scope of the relationship; and, in criminal conspiracy cases, coconspirator statements during and in furtherance of the conspiracy. A defendant generally cannot introduce his own exculpatory out-of-court statement as a "party admission" against himself — the rule runs one way.
Arizona party-admission opinions
STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. John Montenegro CRUZ, Appellant
STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. John Montenegro CRUZ, Appellant, 218 Ariz. 149 (2008)
…t the statement acknowledges guilt, it qualifies as a party admission under Rule 801(d)(2) of the Arizona Rules of Evidence. The trial court did not err by allowing its admission. 4. “Arturo Sandoval” statement ¶ 52 Soon after he was detained at the crime scene, Cruz complained of chest pains, and paramedics were called. During the trip to the hospital, Cruz told a paramedic th…
On party admissions, STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. John Montenegro CRUZ, Appellant speaks to the Arizona dispute in this passage: "Rule 801(d)(2) of the Arizona Rules of Evidence. The trial court did not err by allowing its admission. 4. “Arturo Sandoval” statement ¶ 52 Soon after he was detained at the crime scene, Cruz complained of chest pains, and paramedics were called." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Darrel Peter PANDELI, AKA Darrel Peter Florian, Appellant
…, 764 P.2d 1111, 1113 (1988) (defendant successfully sought admission of roommate’s statements pursuant to Rule 804(b)(3) after roommate asserted Fifth Amendment privilege). ¶ 22 Here, the defendant is the declarant seeking admission of his own statements to police without taking the stand to testify. The State contends the defendant cannot refuse to testify and yet offer his o…
Practitioners open STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Darrel Peter PANDELI, AKA Darrel Peter Florian, Appellant when Arizona party admissions turns on the distinction in this sentence: "P.2d 1111, 1113 (1988) (defendant successfully sought admission of roommate’s statements pursuant to Rule 804(b)(3) after roommate asserted Fifth Amendment privilege)." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Rachel and Augustine DIAZ, Wife and Husband, Parents of Leonardo M. Diaz, Deceased, Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. MAGMA
…Diazes argue the alleged comment was admissible as a party admission, Rule 801(d)(2)(D), Ariz.R.Evid. 17A A.R.S., and therefore, first-hand knowledge and reliability were not required, citing Shuck v. Texaco Refining & Marketing, 178 Ariz. 295, 872 P.2d 1247 (App.1994) (admitting unidentified employee’s statement to plaintiff). The proponent of a party admission must show that…
Practitioners open Rachel and Augustine DIAZ, Wife and Husband, Parents of Leonardo M. Diaz, Deceased, Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. MAGMA when Arizona party admissions turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Diazes argue the alleged comment was admissible as a party admission, Rule 801(d)(2)(D), Ariz.R.Evid. 17A A.R.S., and therefore, first-hand knowledge and reliability were not required, citing Shuck v. Texaco Refining & Marketing, 178 Ariz. 295, 872 P.2d 1247 (App." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Robert L. STARKOVICH and Lois H. Starkovich, His Wife; John Chopas and Claire M. Chopas, His Wife, Individually and
…, in refusing an instruction on the pleadings of a party as admissions, in denying their motion to strike plaintiff’s testimony and denying their motion for a directed verdict. It is a rule to which we find no dissent that • in the absence of a proper objection to the introduction of evidence on the ground that it is inadmissible under the pleadings because of a variance, the v…
Arizona opinions such as Robert L. STARKOVICH and Lois H. Starkovich, His Wife; John Chopas and Claire M. Chopas, His Wife, Individually and are cited where party admissions is disputed. The court stated: ", in refusing an instruction on the pleadings of a party as admissions, in denying their motion to strike plaintiff’s testimony and denying their motion for a directed verdict. It is a rule to which we find no dissent that • in the absence of a proper objection to the introductio" That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Josef P. CRUZ, Appellant
STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Josef P. CRUZ, Appellant, 128 Ariz. 538 (1981)
…y, because the statement allegedly made by appellant was an admission by a party-opponent, admissible under 17A A.R.S. Rules of Evidence, rule 801(d)(2)(A). Further, the state argues that since Viviana Cruz testified and denied having told Rosemary Santana that appellant made such a statement, Viviana Cruz was properly impeached by showing prior inconsistent statements, which w…
On party admissions, STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Josef P. CRUZ, Appellant speaks to the Arizona dispute in this passage: "A A.R.S. Rules of Evidence, rule 801(d)(2)(A)." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Hattie WOLFSWINKEL, as Administratrix of the Estate of Clarence Wolfswinkel, Deceased, and Clifford L. Wolfswinkel
…for the traveling public, was admissible in evidence, as an admission of the railroad company that it was a hazardous crossing, and for the purpose of showing the railroad company had knowledge of that fact. It is clear from the avowal that the assistant district division engineer was delegated by the Division Superintendent to join McBride in the inspection of this crossing. T…
On party admissions, Hattie WOLFSWINKEL, as Administratrix of the Estate of Clarence Wolfswinkel, Deceased, and Clifford L. Wolfswinkel speaks to the Arizona dispute in this passage: "It is clear from the avowal that the assistant district division engineer was delegated by the Division Superintendent to join McBride in the inspection of this crossing." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Raymond FLOWER, Appellant
The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Raymond FLOWER, Appellant, 161 Ariz. 283 (1989)
…lower raises the following issues on appeal: 1. The court’s admission of portions of Flower’s statement made to Detective Lowe violated Flower’s fifth amendment right against self-incrimination because his right to silence was not honored and because the prosecutor did not disclose his intent to use the statement until after the trial had begun. 2. The court’s admission of Lacy…
The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Raymond FLOWER, Appellant is worth reading on Arizona party admissions because the court put the point in its own words: "Flower’s statement made to Detective Lowe violated Flower’s fifth amendment right against self-incrimination because his right to silence was not honored and because the prosecutor did not disclose his intent to use the statement until after the trial had begun. 2." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Business records
The business-records exception under Ariz. R. Evid. 803(6) is the everyday path for medical charts, employment files, bank statements, and maintenance logs. The foundation requires a record made at or near the time by — or from information transmitted by — someone with knowledge; kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity; and made as a regular practice. A custodian or other qualified witness (or a qualifying certification where the jurisdiction allows it) lays the foundation. The opponent may still attack lack of trustworthiness when the source or method of preparation indicates unreliability — litigation-driven reports are the classic failure mode.
Do not confuse authenticity with the business-records exception. You still need to show the exhibit is what you claim it is; the hearsay exception then answers why the out-of-court assertions inside it may be considered for their truth.
Arizona business-records opinions
STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Harold Vincent McGANN, Appellant
STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Harold Vincent McGANN, Appellant, 132 Ariz. 296 (1982)
…the evidence of the back-billing by Chevron fits within the business records exception of Rule 803(6). The exception does not apply to this case for two reasons. First, the station manager was not a custodian of Chevron’s records or an otherwise qualified Chevron employee as required by Rule 803(6)(e). Second, the evidence involves two levels of hearsay, and the second does not…
On business records, STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Harold Vincent McGANN, Appellant speaks to the Arizona dispute in this passage: "Chevron fits within the business records exception of Rule 803(6). The exception does not apply to this case for two reasons. First, the station manager was not a custodian of Chevron’s records or an otherwise qualified Chevron employee as required by Rule 803(6)(e)." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Steven James KING, Appellant
The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Steven James KING, Appellant, 213 Ariz. 632 (2006)
…nial under Crawford and are admissible under the public and business records exceptions to the hearsay rule. Their admission, therefore, did not violate King’s Confrontation Clause rights. This court has jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-120.21(A)(1). Facts and Procedural Background ¶ 3 The facts are not in dispute. King was stopped after a police officer saw him driving err…
Practitioners open The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Steven James KING, Appellant when Arizona business records turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Crawford and are admissible under the public and business records exceptions to the hearsay rule. Their admission, therefore, did not violate King’s Confrontation Clause rights. This court has jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-120.21(A)(1)." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Kyle BOHSANCURT, Petitioner/Appellee, v. the Honorable Mitchell EISENBERG, Magistrate of the Tucson City Court
…of Crawford and are admissible under the public records and business records exceptions to the hearsay rule. Therefore, we reverse the superior court’s ruling and remand the case for further proceedings. BACKGROUND ¶2 The underlying facts are undisputed. Bohsaneurt was cited for driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI) while impaired to the slightest degree in violati…
On business records, Kyle BOHSANCURT, Petitioner/Appellee, v. the Honorable Mitchell EISENBERG, Magistrate of the Tucson City Court speaks to the Arizona dispute in this passage: "Crawford and are admissible under the public records and business records exceptions to the hearsay rule. Therefore, we reverse the superior court’s ruling and remand the case for further proceedings. BACKGROUND ¶2 The underlying facts are undisputed." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
TRANSAMERICA INSURANCE COMPANY, a California Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James G. TROUT and Jane Doe Trout
…Brown and Holmes reports, over Trout’s objection, under the business records exception, Rule 803(6), Arizona Rules of Evidence. This was clearly error. Rule 803(6) provides that the admission of business records or reports is not barred by the hearsay rule if the records are made by a person with first hand knowledge acquired in the course of a regularly conducted business acti…
TRANSAMERICA INSURANCE COMPANY, a California Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James G. TROUT and Jane Doe Trout is worth reading on Arizona business records because the court put the point in its own words: "Brown and Holmes reports, over Trout’s objection, under the business records exception, Rule 803(6), Arizona Rules of Evidence. This was clearly error." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
The STATE of Arizona, Appellee/Respondent, v. David Molina MORALES, Appellant/Petitioner
…he state was sufficient to satisfy the requirements for the business records exception to the hearsay rule. Rule 803(6), Ariz.R.Evid., *364 17A A.R.S. The fact that the source of appellant’s identity is not noted in the records does not render that information inadmissible. The case cited by appellant in support of his contention is inapplicable. The testimony found inadmissibl…
On business records, The STATE of Arizona, Appellee/Respondent, v. David Molina MORALES, Appellant/Petitioner speaks to the Arizona dispute in this passage: "Rule 803(6), Ariz.R.Evid., *364 17A A.R.S. The fact that the source of appellant’s identity is not noted in the records does not render that information inadmissible. The case cited by appellant in support of his contention is inapplicable." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Rudolph Noel PETZOLDT, Appellant
The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Rudolph Noel PETZOLDT, Appellant, 172 Ariz. 272 (1991)
…hat the trial court erred when it admitted the notebooks as business records. We do not agree. We begin by recognizing that the notebooks are hearsay because they were offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted within them, that is, that there were marijuana transactions between Figueroa-Soto and Petzoldt. Ariz.R.Evid. 801, 17A A.R.S. But if the notebooks fall within an…
Practitioners open The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Rudolph Noel PETZOLDT, Appellant when Arizona business records turns on the distinction in this sentence: "We do not agree. We begin by recognizing that the notebooks are hearsay because they were offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted within them, that is, that there were marijuana transactions between Figueroa-Soto and Petzoldt. Ariz.R.Evid. 801, 17A A.R.S." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Effie L. KEMP, Administratrix of the Estate of William T. Kemp, Deceased, Appellant, v. PINAL COUNTY, a Political
…judge properly admitted certain evidence under the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act. 1 Plaintiff, appellant here, seeks damages for wrongful death. Plaintiff’s decedent was killed in a single car accident at the dead-end of a “T” intersection of two public highways in Pinal County which occurred at about 4 o’clock in the morning of February 6, 1965. Plaintiff presented…
Effie L. KEMP, Administratrix of the Estate of William T. Kemp, Deceased, Appellant, v. PINAL COUNTY, a Political is worth reading on Arizona business records because the court put the point in its own words: "Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act. 1 Plaintiff, appellant here, seeks damages for wrongful death." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Important hearsay exceptions that do not require unavailability
Three present-sense and mental-state exceptions carry most of the remaining traffic in Arizona trial practice.
Excited utterance — Ariz. R. Evid. 803(2). A statement relating to a startling event or condition, made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused. Timing is elastic; composure defeats the exception even minutes after the event, while visible distress can preserve it for hours.
Present sense impression — Ariz. R. Evid. 803(1). A statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while or immediately after the declarant perceived it. Contemporaneity is strict — seconds and minutes, not hours — and excitement is not required.
Then-existing mental, emotional, or physical condition — Ariz. R. Evid. 803(3). Statements of then-existing state of mind (including intent and plan) come in; statements of memory or belief offered to prove the fact remembered generally do not. Intent-to-meet-another-person cases remain the hardest applications.
Declarant unavailable
When the declarant is unavailable under Ariz. R. Evid. 804(a), Arizona opens a second suite of exceptions. Unavailability typically includes privilege, refusal to testify despite court order, lack of memory, death or then-existing infirmity, and absence despite reasonable efforts to procure attendance. The proponent bears the burden of proving unavailability with specific facts — a bare assertion that the witness "could not be found" is not enough.
Former testimony under Ariz. R. Evid. 804(b)(1) is the workhorse once unavailability is shown: testimony given as a witness at a trial, hearing, or lawful deposition, offered against a party who had an opportunity and similar motive to develop it by direct, cross, or redirect. Criminal confrontation analysis runs in parallel and is not satisfied merely because a hearsay exception applies.
Dying declarations
Dying declarations under Ariz. R. Evid. 804(b)(2) remain a narrow but decisive exception in homicide and, in many jurisdictions, civil cases involving the cause or circumstances of what the declarant believed to be impending death. The foundational showing is the declarant's belief that death was imminent — not that death in fact followed within any particular time — plus a statement concerning the cause or circumstances of what the declarant believed to be the impending death. Courts police coaching and narrative expansions aggressively.
Arizona dying-declaration opinions
STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Ignacio Gonzalez VALENCIA, Appellant
STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Ignacio Gonzalez VALENCIA, Appellant, 186 Ariz. 493 (1996)
…tement under the residual hearsay exception clause and as a dying declaration. The court did not make any finding on the issue of whether defendant waived by misconduct any objection to this statement. We disagree that the statement was a dying declaration under Rule 804(b)(2) of the Arizona Rules of Evidence. This rule requires, inter alia, that the statement be made by a decl…
STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Ignacio Gonzalez VALENCIA, Appellant is worth reading on Arizona dying declaration because the court put the point in its own words: "The court did not make any finding on the issue of whether defendant waived by misconduct any objection to this statement. We disagree that the statement was a dying declaration under Rule 804(b)(2) of the Arizona Rules of Evidence." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Scott Alan LEHR, Appellant
STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Scott Alan LEHR, Appellant, 201 Ariz. 509 (2002)
…admits an out-of-court statement under rule 804(b)(2) (the "dying declarations” exception) ... the objecting party may introduce evidence before the jury that tends to show that the declarant did not believe her death was imminent when she made the statement, since such evidence would be relevant to *518 the weight that the jury should give the statement. 12 . The state asserts…
STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Scott Alan LEHR, Appellant is worth reading on Arizona dying declaration because the court put the point in its own words: "admits an out-of-court statement under rule 804(b)(2) (the 'dying declarations” exception) ... the objecting party may introduce evidence before the jury that tends to show that the declarant did not believe her death was imminent when she made the statement, since such evidence" Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
State v. Eisenstein
State v. Eisenstein, 72 Ariz. 320 (1951)
…eased which are narrative in their form and inadmissible as dying declarations, are generally rejected.” In the instant case, testimony was admitted establishing the fact that there was to be a meeting of deceased and defendant. The excluded portion of deceased’s declara *328 tions related to matters to be discussed and was narrative in form. The purpose of the meeting was stat…
State v. Eisenstein is worth reading on Arizona dying declaration because the court put the point in its own words: "In the instant case, testimony was admitted establishing the fact that there was to be a meeting of deceased and defendant. The excluded portion of deceased’s declara *328 tions related to matters to be discussed and was narrative in form." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Billy Ray ALEXANDER, Appellant
STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Billy Ray ALEXANDER, Appellant, 108 Ariz. 556 (1972)
…dead could no more be shown by affidavit than the fact that dying declarations could he shown by affidavit to have been made under the sense of impending death, or that the contents of a written document could be shown, supplemented by an affidavit to the effect that the document was lost. The statute says the fact of death must be satisfactorily shown to the court. [People v.…
STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Billy Ray ALEXANDER, Appellant is worth reading on Arizona dying declaration because the court put the point in its own words: "The statute says the fact of death must be satisfactorily shown to the court. [People v." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
JESUS MACIAS, Appellant, v. STATE, Respondent
JESUS MACIAS, Appellant, v. STATE, Respondent, 39 Ariz. 303 (1931)
…sufficient to justify the admission of this statement as a dying declaration. It is, of course, essential that the declarant be sufficiently in possession of his mental faculties to realize what he is saying. At 7:50 o ’clock when Doctor Bacon saw Hernandez he was dazed but conscious, and at 9 o’clock he was able to carry on a conversation with the sheriff concerning his diffi…
JESUS MACIAS, Appellant, v. STATE, Respondent is worth reading on Arizona dying declaration because the court put the point in its own words: "It is, of course, essential that the declarant be sufficiently in possession of his mental faculties to realize what he is saying." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Anthony LUZANILLA, Appellant
The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Anthony LUZANILLA, Appellant, 179 Ariz. 391 (1994)
…, 110 S.Ct. at 3149. The Court noted the excited utterance, dying declaration, and medical treatment exceptions as examples of the type of statements in which the truthfulness is “clear from the surrounding circumstances.” Id. The Court stated that “evidence admitted under the [particularized guarantees of trustworthiness] requirement must similarly be so trustworthy that adver…
The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Anthony LUZANILLA, Appellant is worth reading on Arizona dying declaration because the court put the point in its own words: "S.Ct. at 3149. The Court noted the excited utterance, dying declaration, and medical treatment exceptions as examples of the type of statements in which the truthfulness is “clear from the surrounding circumstances.” Id." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
WILLIAM HALDERMAN, and v. TERRITORY OF ARIZONA, and
WILLIAM HALDERMAN, and v. TERRITORY OF ARIZONA, and, 7 Ariz. 120 (1900)
…timony of the witness for the prosecution, supported by the dying declaration of Moore, as to the circumstances of the shooting, is to the effect that at the time the Haldermans appeared at the doors, Ainsworth and Moore were both mounted and a short distance from the house; that the Haldermans, as soon as _ they appeared, called to Ainsworth and Moore to hold up their hands, b…
WILLIAM HALDERMAN, and v. TERRITORY OF ARIZONA, and is worth reading on Arizona dying declaration because the court put the point in its own words: "timony of the witness for the prosecution, supported by the dying declaration of Moore, as to the circumstances of the shooting, is to the effect that at the time the Haldermans appeared at the doors, Ainsworth and Moore were both mounted and a short distance from the house; that" Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Carlos Billy HUGHES, Appellant
The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Carlos Billy HUGHES, Appellant, 120 Ariz. 120 (1978)
…ourt has recognized the admissibility against an accused of dying declarations, Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 151, 13 S.Ct. 50, 53, 36 L.Ed. 917, and of testimony of a deceased witness who has testified at a former trial, Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 240-244, 15 S.Ct. 337, 338-340, 39 L.Ed. 409, See also Dowdell v. United States, supra, 221 U.S. [325], at 330…
On dying declaration, The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Carlos Billy HUGHES, Appellant speaks to the Arizona dispute in this passage: "Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 151, 13 S.Ct. 50, 53, 36 L.Ed. 917, and of testimony of a deceased witness who has testified at a former trial, Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 240-244, 15 S.Ct. 337, 338-340, 39 L.Ed. 409, See also Dowdell v." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Medical diagnosis or treatment statements
Statements made for medical diagnosis or treatment under Ariz. R. Evid. 803(4) cover medical history, past or present symptoms, and their general cause when reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. The exception is not limited to treating physicians; statements to nurses, EMTs, and consulting clinicians can qualify when the diagnostic purpose is genuine. Fault and identity remain the usual battleground: "I was hit by a car" is often pertinent; "the light was green" usually is not; abuser identity in child-abuse and domestic-violence cases is heavily litigated.
Arizona medical-statement opinions
The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Michael Eugene ROBINSON, Appellant
The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Michael Eugene ROBINSON, Appellant, 153 Ariz. 191 (1987)
…under A.R.S. § 13-1416 and as a “statementQ for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment.” Rule 803(4). The other three hearsay statements were admitted pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-1416, which provides: A. A statement made by a minor who is under the age of ten years describing any sexual offense performed with or on the minor by another person or any act of physical abuse of the…
The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Michael Eugene ROBINSON, Appellant is worth reading on Arizona medical diagnosis hearsay because the court put the point in its own words: "A.R.S. § 13-1416 and as a “statementQ for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment.” Rule 803(4). The other three hearsay statements were admitted pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-1416, which provides: A." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Jimmie Wayne JEFFERS, Appellant
STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Jimmie Wayne JEFFERS, Appellant, 135 Ariz. 404 (1983)
…court admitted Penny’s statement to Nurse Ramirez under the medical diagnosis exception to the hearsay rule. Jeffers maintains that this was error. Rule 803 excepts from the hearsay rule statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. Subsection 4 of the rule defines such statements. It provides: Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and…
Practitioners open STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Jimmie Wayne JEFFERS, Appellant when Arizona medical diagnosis hearsay turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Penny’s statement to Nurse Ramirez under the medical diagnosis exception to the hearsay rule. Jeffers maintains that this was error. Rule 803 excepts from the hearsay rule statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Daniel Aaron LOPEZ, Appellant
The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Daniel Aaron LOPEZ, Appellant, 217 Ariz. 433 (2008)
…One exception applies to “[statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.” Ariz. R. Evid. 803(4). The rationale behind this exception is that “p…
Practitioners open The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Daniel Aaron LOPEZ, Appellant when Arizona medical diagnosis hearsay turns on the distinction in this sentence: "One exception applies to “[statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinen" Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
State v. Rivera
State v. Rivera, 139 Ariz. 409 (1984)
…ents attributing fault are not usually admissible under the medical diagnosis exception but decided that it had a responsibility to "develop rules which ultimately assist in protecting innocent victims of child abuse" and that "no apology is necessary for the policy of a minimal standard of proof." We do not reach the medical diagnosis exception since it is obviously inapplicab…
Arizona opinions such as State v. Rivera are cited where medical diagnosis hearsay is disputed. The court stated: "ents attributing fault are not usually admissible under the medical diagnosis exception but decided that it had a responsibility to 'develop rules which ultimately assist in protecting innocent victims of child abuse' and that 'no apology is necessary for the policy of a minimal" That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. John Edward SULLIVAN, Appellant
The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. John Edward SULLIVAN, Appellant, 187 Ariz. 599 (1996)
…rmits admission of hearsay statements “made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.” The rationale behind the exception is that “doctors will seek and pat…
The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. John Edward SULLIVAN, Appellant is worth reading on Arizona medical diagnosis hearsay because the court put the point in its own words: "rmits admission of hearsay statements “made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertine" Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Jay Almond THOMPSON, Appellant
The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Jay Almond THOMPSON, Appellant, 146 Ariz. 552 (1985)
…The exception applies to: “Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.” (Emphasis added) Johnson’s statement describing past symptoms was cle…
The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Jay Almond THOMPSON, Appellant is worth reading on Arizona medical diagnosis hearsay because the court put the point in its own words: "Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Stephen Duane THOMPSON, Appellant
STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Stephen Duane THOMPSON, Appellant, 169 Ariz. 471 (1991)
…e under Rule 803(4), as a statement made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment. Although the state did not argue this theory to the trial court, 4 we consider whether the trial court properly could have utilized Rule 803(4) as an alternative basis for admitting the video taped interview. See, e.g., May, 381 P.2d at 603-04. Rule 803(4) provides an exception for [s]ta…
On medical diagnosis hearsay, STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Stephen Duane THOMPSON, Appellant speaks to the Arizona dispute in this passage: "Rule 803(4), as a statement made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
In the Matter of The APPEAL IN MARICOPA COUNTY JUVENILE ACTION NO. JV-512016
In the Matter of The APPEAL IN MARICOPA COUNTY JUVENILE ACTION NO. JV-512016, 186 Ariz. 414 (1996)
…g a hearsay exception for “[statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment,” we have recognized the reliability of such statements. See Ariz.R.Evid. 803(4), 17A A.R.S. Athough the juvenile challenges the probation report and Lewis letter as unreliable sources, he does not contend that the facts reported in either document were false or misleading. We conclude th…
Arizona opinions such as In the Matter of The APPEAL IN MARICOPA COUNTY JUVENILE ACTION NO. JV-512016 are cited where medical diagnosis hearsay is disputed. The court stated: "See Ariz.R.Evid. 803(4), 17A A.R.S. Athough the juvenile challenges the probation report and Lewis letter as unreliable sources, he does not contend that the facts reported in either document were false or misleading." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Use of depositions at trial
Ariz. R. Civ. P. 32(a) lists permissible uses of deposition testimony in civil trials, including impeachment and former testimony when the declarant is unavailable. In criminal cases, Ariz. R. Crim. P. 15.1 limits discovery depositions, but prior sworn testimony may be admitted under Ariz. R. Evid. 804(b)(1) when statutory unavailability criteria are met.
Deposition use is always a two-layer problem: procedural permission to read or play the deposition, plus a hearsay path (often former testimony, party admission, or impeachment). Counsel who satisfy the civil or criminal procedure rule but skip the evidence-rule foundation invite a sustained objection; counsel who have a hearsay exception but failed to preserve the deposition under the procedural rule face the same result. Video designations, counter-designations, and completeness objections should be teed up before the jury is seated.
Arizona deposition / former-testimony opinions
STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. David Wayne GRANNIS, Appellant; STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Daniel Ethan WEBSTER
…Whether the trial court improperly admitted the telephonic deposition of a state’s witness. DISCUSSION I. Admissibility of Pornographic Homosexual Photographs Grannis and Webster- contend that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence three color photographs showing as a collage the collection of pornographic homosexual pictures found in Grannis’s closet. The pictures g…
STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. David Wayne GRANNIS, Appellant; STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Daniel Ethan WEBSTER is worth reading on Arizona deposition / former testimony because the court put the point in its own words: "Whether the trial court improperly admitted the telephonic deposition of a state’s witness. DISCUSSION I." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Gary Jay VASKO, Appellant
STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Gary Jay VASKO, Appellant, 193 Ariz. 142 (1998)
…5, 718 P.2d 489 (App.1986). Pursuant to the rules regarding depositions, for the state to obtain this order, it would have had to establish that Officer Hamilton’s testimony “is material to the case and that there is a substantial likelihood that the person will not be available at time of trial.” Rule 15.3(a)(1), Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure (emphasis added). Without a…
STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Gary Jay VASKO, Appellant is worth reading on Arizona deposition / former testimony because the court put the point in its own words: "App.1986). Pursuant to the rules regarding depositions, for the state to obtain this order, it would have had to establish that Officer Hamilton’s testimony “is material to the case and that there is a substantial likelihood that the person will not be available at time of trial." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
MISTER DONUT OF AMERICA, INC., a Delaware Corporation, Plaintiff Counter-Defendant-Appellant, v. Dean HARRIS and
…he fraud claim? 2. Did the trial court err in admitting the deposition of an absent witness pursuant to Rule 804(a)(5), Arizona Rules of Evidence, 17A A.R.S.? The facts follow. Defendants, Dean Harris, Jack Lane and their wives (Harris) became interested in acquiring a Mister Donut franchise through an advertisement in a national trade magazine. In response to Harris’s inquiry,…
Arizona opinions such as MISTER DONUT OF AMERICA, INC., a Delaware Corporation, Plaintiff Counter-Defendant-Appellant, v. Dean HARRIS and are cited where deposition / former testimony is disputed. The court stated: "Did the trial court err in admitting the deposition of an absent witness pursuant to Rule 804(a)(5), Arizona Rules of Evidence, 17A A.R.S.?" That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. John Lee SPRATT, Appellant
The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. John Lee SPRATT, Appellant, 126 Ariz. 184 (1980)
…ersal. Pursuant to A.R.S Sec. 13 — 4102, the state took the deposition of Vann, who was then living in Winslow, Aizona, on the ground that it believed he was so sick or infirm as to be unable to attend the trial. When his deposition was taken, he was cross-examined by the appellant’s attorney. At the trial, an investigator for the county attorney’s office laid the foundation fo…
On deposition / former testimony, The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. John Lee SPRATT, Appellant speaks to the Arizona dispute in this passage: "Pursuant to A.R.S Sec. 13 — 4102, the state took the deposition of Vann, who was then living in Winslow, Aizona, on the ground that it believed he was so sick or infirm as to be unable to attend the trial." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Cesar ALVARADO, Appellant
STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Cesar ALVARADO, Appellant, 158 Ariz. 89 (1988)
…f the crime; 3. The trial court erred when it permitted the deposition testimony of a witness to be introduced at trial; and 4. The trial court erred by making the sentences on the aggravated assault charges consecutive. VOLUNTARINESS OF DEFENDANT’S STATEMENT Defendant first argues that the statement that he gave to Detective Brian Rogers on January 7, 1987, was involuntary bec…
STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Cesar ALVARADO, Appellant is worth reading on Arizona deposition / former testimony because the court put the point in its own words: "The trial court erred when it permitted the deposition testimony of a witness to be introduced at trial; and 4. The trial court erred by making the sentences on the aggravated assault charges consecutive." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Barbara Ann SHEARER, Appellant
STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Barbara Ann SHEARER, Appellant, 164 Ariz. 329 (1990)
…state moved for an order allowing it to use both Shearer’s deposition and trial testimony in the new trial. The trial court entered an order admitting various portions of Shearer’s trial and deposition testimony. A second trial which commenced in October 1987 resulted in appellant’s conviction on all counts. This appeal followed. FACTS Because of the bizarre and complicated or…
Arizona opinions such as STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Barbara Ann SHEARER, Appellant are cited where deposition / former testimony is disputed. The court stated: "Shearer’s deposition and trial testimony in the new trial. The trial court entered an order admitting various portions of Shearer’s trial and deposition testimony. A second trial which commenced in October 1987 resulted in appellant’s conviction on all counts. This appeal followed." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Robert Dell ERICKSON, Appellant, v. Richard WALLER, Appellee
Robert Dell ERICKSON, Appellant, v. Richard WALLER, Appellee, 116 Ariz. 476 (1977)
…treated plaintiff, and Dr. Adolph J. Urban, a surgeon whose deposition was partially read to the jury. Defendant attacks Dr. Urban’s deposition testimony on two grounds: first, he contends that the entire deposition should have been rejected for lack of sufficient foundation showing that the witness was unavailable under Rule 32(a)(3)(B), Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure; secon…
Arizona opinions such as Robert Dell ERICKSON, Appellant, v. Richard WALLER, Appellee are cited where deposition / former testimony is disputed. The court stated: "Dr. Adolph J. Urban, a surgeon whose deposition was partially read to the jury. Defendant attacks Dr." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Authenticity: why it matters and how to prove it
Authenticity is not a hearsay doctrine and it is not optional. Under Ariz. R. Evid. 901, 902, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is. Self-authenticating categories — certified public records, newspapers, acknowledged documents, trade inscriptions, and (where adopted) certified domestic records of a regularly conducted activity — shorten the path, but most trial exhibits still need a sponsoring witness, distinctive characteristics, chain of custody, or process-or-system evidence.
Arizona trials frequently turn on body-worn camera video, border-enforcement records, and medical records from out-of-state providers. Ariz. R. Evid. 901 requires a showing that the item is what the proponent claims, and digital evidence often needs hash values, metadata, or custodian testimony.
Why authenticity gets its own section in every Arizona trial notebook:
- It is a condition precedent. An unauthenticated exhibit never reaches the relevance, hearsay, or privilege analysis in a useful way — the jury never properly considers it.
- Digital evidence multiplies the failure modes. Screenshots, social-media posts, text threads, and cloud downloads require hash values, account attribution, metadata, or a percipient witness who saw the content created or received.
- Chain of custody is authenticity by another name. Drugs, firearms, biological samples, and seized devices are excluded when the links from seizure to lab to courtroom are broken, even if a hearsay exception would otherwise apply to a lab report.
- Business-records shortcuts do not replace authentication. A custodian can explain record-keeping practices and still fail if nobody can say the particular PDF or printout is the record of this patient, this account, or this machine.
- Self-authentication is narrow. Counsel who wave a notarization or a letterhead and skip the rest of Rule 901-style analysis often lose when the document's contents are disputed.
Practical authentication checklist for Arizona trials: identify the exhibit; choose a 901 method or a 902 category; line up the sponsoring witness or certificate; preserve chain-of-custody testimony for physical and digital items; and separate the authenticity objection from any hearsay objection so the court rules on each.
Arizona authenticity opinions
STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Ronnie Lloyd CONNER, Appellant
STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Ronnie Lloyd CONNER, Appellant, 163 Ariz. 97 (1990)
…the Arizona Rules of Evidence sets out the requirements for authenticating documentary evidence. Rule 901, Ariz.R.Evid., 17A A.R.S. Subsection (a) of Rule 901 provides that prior to admission, the proponent must put forward “evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” Subsection (b) then sets forth various non-exclusive me…
STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Ronnie Lloyd CONNER, Appellant is worth reading on Arizona authentication because the court put the point in its own words: "Arizona Rules of Evidence sets out the requirements for authenticating documentary evidence. Rule 901, Ariz.R.Evid., 17A A.R.S." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. James Samuel STOTTS, AKA James Aye, Appellant
STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. James Samuel STOTTS, AKA James Aye, Appellant, 144 Ariz. 72 (1985)
…ce was unreliable hearsay and that the documents were never authenticated. Appellant, then, is making two separate objections. A hearsay objection concerns the reliability of evidence itself; an authenticity objection questions the *82 form in which the evidence is presented. See generally, Cleary, McCormick On Evidence (2d ed. 1972). Appellant, however, made no hearsay objecti…
Arizona opinions such as STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. James Samuel STOTTS, AKA James Aye, Appellant are cited where authentication is disputed. The court stated: "Appellant, then, is making two separate objections. A hearsay objection concerns the reliability of evidence itself; an authenticity objection questions the *82 form in which the evidence is presented. See generally, Cleary, McCormick On Evidence (2d ed. 1972)." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Timothy Christopher HAIGHT-GYURO, Appellant
The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Timothy Christopher HAIGHT-GYURO, Appellant, 218 Ariz. 356 (2008)
…he state contends, however, that the recording was properly authenticated pursuant to Rule 901(b)(9), Ariz. R. Evid. Rule 901(a) states that, “as a condition precedent to admissibility,” evidence must be authenticated of identified by evidence “sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” Rule 901(b) describes several methods by whi…
Practitioners open The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Timothy Christopher HAIGHT-GYURO, Appellant when Arizona authentication turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Rule 901(b)(9), Ariz. R. Evid. Rule 901(a) states that, “as a condition precedent to admissibility,” evidence must be authenticated of identified by evidence “sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Javier SOLIS, Appellant
The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Javier SOLIS, Appellant, 236 Ariz. 242 (2014)
…or convictions, but the court ruled it admissible as a self-authenticating document. The court further found that the state had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Solis had two historical prior felony convictions. Following sentencing, Solis appealed. Discussion Admissibility of Pen Pack ¶ 5 Solis first argues the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the ADOC pen p…
Arizona opinions such as The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Javier SOLIS, Appellant are cited where authentication is disputed. The court stated: "The court further found that the state had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Solis had two historical prior felony convictions. Following sentencing, Solis appealed." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
STATE of Arizona, Appellant, v. Siobhan A. IRVING, Appellee
STATE of Arizona, Appellant, v. Siobhan A. IRVING, Appellee, 165 Ariz. 219 (1990)
…ssue of whether A.R.S. § 28-110(F), which provides for self-authentication of certain Arizona Department of Transportation records, is unconstitutional. We hold that the statute is constitutional. Therefore, the superior, court’s order is reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. BACKGROUND Siobhan A. Irving, defendant, was charged w…
Practitioners open STATE of Arizona, Appellant, v. Siobhan A. IRVING, Appellee when Arizona authentication turns on the distinction in this sentence: "A.R.S. § 28-110(F), which provides for self-authentication of certain Arizona Department of Transportation records, is unconstitutional. We hold that the statute is constitutional." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Micah S. BENNETT, Appellant
The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Micah S. BENNETT, Appellant, 216 Ariz. 15 (2007)
…om the person who had prepared them and signed the attached authenticating affidavit 2 violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment 3 as explained in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). Finding no violation of Bennett’s Confrontation Clause rights, we affirm. ¶2 The facts underlying Bennett’s convictions are…
On authentication, The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Micah S. BENNETT, Appellant speaks to the Arizona dispute in this passage: "Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment 3 as explained in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). Finding no violation of Bennett’s Confrontation Clause rights, we affirm." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
STATE of Arizona, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. the Honorable N. Pike JOHNSON, Defendant-Appellee, Michael BUCCOLA, Real
…ecords section of MVD. She testified that (1) the statutory authentication required by A.R.S. section 28-110(F) was computer-generated and that the accompanying “signature” was also computer-generated; (2) she had never seen Buccola’s driver’s license report before and had no independent recollection of it; (3) she never compared the document with the data that was contained in…
Arizona opinions such as STATE of Arizona, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. the Honorable N. Pike JOHNSON, Defendant-Appellee, Michael BUCCOLA, Real are cited where authentication is disputed. The court stated: "MVD. She testified that (1) the statutory authentication required by A.R.S." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Shawn Leduro THOMPSON, Appellant
The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Shawn Leduro THOMPSON, Appellant, 166 Ariz. 526 (1990)
…hibit 3, a certified copy of a prison “pen pack,” as a self-authenticating document pursuant to Ariz.R.Evid. 902, 17A A.R.S., to establish appellant’s prior conviction. The state admits that Exhibit 3 may not have been properly admitted under Rule 902, but we agree with the state that it was admissible pursuant to Rule 901. The trial court’s ruling, even though based incorrectl…
Practitioners open The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Shawn Leduro THOMPSON, Appellant when Arizona authentication turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Ariz.R.Evid. 902, 17A A.R.S., to establish appellant’s prior conviction. The state admits that Exhibit 3 may not have been properly admitted under Rule 902, but we agree with the state that it was admissible pursuant to Rule 901." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Practice checklist
- State the relevance theory in one sentence before naming an exception.
- Run the 403 / unfair-prejudice balance explicitly for other-acts and graphic exhibits.
- For character or other-acts evidence, identify the non-propensity purpose and request a limiting instruction on the record.
- Decide whether an out-of-court statement is hearsay for the purpose offered before hunting exceptions.
- Lay business-records foundations with time, knowledge, regular practice, and custodial qualifications — or a qualifying certification.
- Prove unavailability with specific facts before offering former testimony or dying declarations.
- Treat deposition use as procedure-plus-hearsay; designate and counter-designate early.
- Authenticate every exhibit under Ariz. R. Evid. 901, 902 (or the self-authentication path) before arguing hearsay.
- Preserve chain of custody for physical and digital evidence with named custodians.
- Search LawDiver for recent Arizona appellate evidence opinions before mediation or motions in limine.
Contents
- General standards of admissibility
- Character evidence
- Hearsay: start with the definition
- Party admissions
- Business records
- Important hearsay exceptions that do not require unavailability
- Declarant unavailable
- Dying declarations
- Medical diagnosis or treatment statements
- Use of depositions at trial
- Authenticity: why it matters and how to prove it
- Practice checklist
- Frequently asked questions
Frequently asked questions
What is the primary evidence source in Arizona?
Arizona applies the Arizona Rules of Evidence. Arizona's evidence rules follow the FRE structure with Arizona-specific amendments; Ariz. R. Evid. 401–902 are the primary framework in superior and justice courts.
How do Arizona courts decide relevance and unfair prejudice?
Under Ariz. R. Evid. 401, 403, evidence must make a fact of consequence more or less probable, and the court may exclude relevant evidence when unfair prejudice, confusion, or waste of time substantially outweighs its probative value.
Are party admissions hearsay in Arizona?
Party-opponent statements under Ariz. R. Evid. 801(d)(2) are generally excluded from the hearsay ban (or treated as an exception, depending on local drafting). They may be offered against the party who made or adopted them without showing unavailability.
What foundation is required for business records?
Under Ariz. R. Evid. 803(6), show a record made at or near the time from someone with knowledge, kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity, as a regular practice, through a custodian, qualified witness, or allowed certification — subject to trustworthiness attack.
When can I use a deposition at trial in Arizona?
Ariz. R. Civ. P. 32(a) lists permissible uses of deposition testimony in civil trials, including impeachment and former testimony when the declarant is unavailable. In criminal cases, Ariz. R. Crim. P. 15.1 limits discovery depositions, but prior sworn testimony may be admitted under Ariz. R. Evid. 804(b)(1) when statutory unavailability criteria are met.
Why is authenticity separate from hearsay?
Authenticity asks whether the item is what you claim it is; hearsay asks whether out-of-court assertions inside it may be used for their truth. You can lose on either ground independently. Arizona authenticity practice starts with Ariz. R. Evid. 901, 902.
Where do dying declarations and medical statements fit?
Dying declarations under Ariz. R. Evid. 804(b)(2) require belief in impending death and concern the cause or circumstances of that believed death. Medical statements under Ariz. R. Evid. 803(4) require a genuine diagnostic or treatment purpose and reasonable pertinence to care.