Arizona Supreme Court

State of Arizona, Appellee v. John Montenegro Cruz, Appellant

April 21, 2008218 Ariz. 149

Summary

The court affirmed Cruz’s first-degree murder conviction and death sentence after rejecting challenges concerning venue, jury selection and sequestration, evidentiary rulings, mistrial motions, courtroom restraints, and capital sentencing. It held that the extensive publicity did not establish presumed or actual prejudice, that the jury remained impartial, and that the challenged statements and evidence were properly admitted or excluded. The court also upheld the use of the peace-officer status both as an element of the charged murder and as the capital aggravator, and found no abuse of discretion in the jury’s death sentence.

Holding

  • Change of venue and jury sequestration. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to change venue or sequester the jury. The publicity was extensive but not so unfair, inflammatory, pervasive, or carnival-like that prejudice could be presumed, and Cruz showed no actual prejudice among the jurors who served. Frequent admonitions and the absence of evidence that jurors violated them also supported denial of sequestration.
  • Challenges for cause, peremptory strikes, and capital-case application of the prejudice rule. The court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to strike the challenged jurors for cause, and Cruz failed to establish fundamental error concerning the foreperson. The rule requiring a showing of prejudice when a defendant uses a peremptory strike to remove a juror who should have been excused applies in both capital and noncapital cases. The denial of additional peremptory strikes likewise was not reversible without prejudice.
  • Constitutionality of the judgment-of-acquittal procedure. The judgment-of-acquittal procedure is constitutional. A judge’s ruling on whether substantial evidence supports conviction does not impose an increased or aggravated punishment, and the ruling resolves a legal sufficiency question while leaving factual determinations concerning guilt and punishment to the jury.
  • Pretrial sentencing information and parole-related testimony. The trial court was not required to decide before trial whether Cruz would receive natural life or life with parole, and it properly excluded speculative testimony about how a parole authority might act decades later. The jury was adequately informed of the three sentencing possibilities.
  • Admission and exclusion of statements and hearsay evidence. The court properly admitted Cruz’s pre-custody statement asking officers to kill him because it was volunteered outside custody and qualified as a party admission. It properly excluded the statement blaming Arturo Sandoval because Cruz had time for reflection and the statement did not qualify as an excited utterance or complete the admitted statement. It also properly excluded Lisa L.’s statement under the residual hearsay exception because it lacked reliable guarantees.
  • Mistrial motions and alleged trial irregularities. The trial court properly denied the mistrial motions. The record did not establish juror misconduct, prejudicial exposure to newspaper material, an impermissible change in the prosecution’s theory, prejudice from the witness’s testimony or courtroom contact, incompetent testimony, or fundamental error from the firearms testimony.

Docket CR-05-0163-AP

Cited authorities

  • Ariz. R.Crim. P. 10.3(b)
  • Ariz. R.Crim. P. 19.4
  • Ariz. R.Crim. P. 24.1(c)(3)
  • Rule 20 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure
  • Rule 801(d)(2) of the Arizona Rules of Evidence
  • Rule 803(2) of the Arizona Rules of Evidence
  • Rule 803(2)
  • Rule 106 of the Arizona Rules of Evidence

Cited by

Read full opinionPDF