Alaska's rule on evidence law turns on a feature the national template does not capture: Alaska evidence practice is organized under the Alaska Rules of Evidence. Relevance starts at Alaska R. Evid. 401, 403; hearsay starts at Alaska R. Evid. 801, 802. The controlling authority is Alaska Rules of Evidence. Authenticity is a separate fight under Alaska R. Evid. 901, 902. Depositions at trial: Alaska R. Civ. P. 30 and 32 control civil depositions and their use at trial, including impeachment and substantive admission when a hearsay exception applies. Criminal cases use Alaska R. Crim. P. 16 for discovery; depositions of witnesses at trial are uncommon but prior recorded testimony may be offered under Alaska R. Evid. 804(b)(1) when declarant unavailability is shown.
Contents
- General standards of admissibility
- Character evidence
- Hearsay: start with the definition
- Party admissions
- Business records
- Important hearsay exceptions that do not require unavailability
- Declarant unavailable
- Dying declarations
- Medical diagnosis or treatment statements
- Use of depositions at trial
- Authenticity: why it matters and how to prove it
- Practice checklist
- Frequently asked questions
Worked example under Alaska law
The illustration below uses only rules already stated for Alaska. It is a research hypothetical, not a prediction of what a court will do.
A lawyer in Alaska wants to offer a medical record, a party email, and a statement the declarant made while believing death was imminent.
- Clear relevance and unfair prejudice under Alaska R. Evid. 401, 403.
- If the email is the opposing party's, test Alaska R. Evid. 801(d)(2) before the hearsay definition in Alaska R. Evid. 801, 802.
- For the medical record, lay the business-records foundation in Alaska R. Evid. 803(6) and the treatment purpose in Alaska R. Evid. 803(4).
- For the deathbed statement, meet Alaska R. Evid. 804(b)(2), then authenticate every exhibit under Alaska R. Evid. 901, 902.
Alaska keeps hearsay, character, and authenticity on different rules inside the Alaska Rules of Evidence. Winning one does not win the others.
General standards of admissibility
Alaska starts every evidence dispute with relevance and unfair prejudice. Under Alaska R. Evid. 401, 403, evidence is relevant when it has any tendency to make a fact of consequence more or less probable, and relevant evidence is still excluded when its probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. Preliminary questions of admissibility are for the court; conditional relevance and limited-purpose instructions keep otherwise-usable proof from becoming a Trojan horse for propensity or truth-of-the-matter use.
Alaska incorporates selected federal privileges and occasionally cites federal advisory-committee notes. Check Alaska R. Evid. 501 for privilege scope in civil cases.
Practice tip: articulate the theory of relevance in one sentence before citing the exception. Lawyers who lead with "it's a business record" without explaining what fact the record proves often lose the 403 balance even when the hearsay foundation is clean.
Character evidence
Character evidence in Alaska is governed by Alaska R. Evid. 404, 405. The default rule is familiar: evidence of a person's character or character trait is not admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character or trait. The same body of law then carves out the classic exceptions — essential-element character, accused-opens-the-door reputation or opinion, and other-acts evidence offered for a non-propensity purpose such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake.
Other-acts notice, 403 balancing, and limiting instructions do most of the real work. In criminal cases, prosecutors who dump prior misconduct without a specific non-propensity theory invite reversal; defense counsel who open the door to good-character testimony without anticipating rebuttal create the very propensity inference the rules were designed to police.
Alaska character-evidence opinions
Kenneth L. BINGAMAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee
Kenneth L. BINGAMAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee, 2003 Alas. App. LEXIS 159 (2003)
…'s other erimes of domestic violence from the normal bar on character evidence ("propensity" evidence) codified in Evidence Rule 404(b)(1). In other words, Rule 404(b)(4) authorizes a court to admit evidence of a defendant's other crimes involving domestic violence even though the only relevance of this evidence is to prove that the defendant characteristically engages in simil…
Alaska opinions such as Kenneth L. BINGAMAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee are cited where character evidence is disputed. The court stated: "'s other erimes of domestic violence from the normal bar on character evidence ('propensity' evidence) codified in Evidence Rule 404(b)(1). In other words, Rule 404(b)(4) authorizes a court to admit evidence of a defendant's other crimes involving domestic violence even though th" That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Albert L. ALLEN, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee
Albert L. ALLEN, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee, 1997 Alas. App. LEXIS 38 (1997)
…, p. 820-21 & n. 1. One might argue that these two types of character evidence did not really round out the picture — that if the question is to identify the initial aggressor, the characters of both the defendant and the victim (for violence or for peacefulness) are equally relevant. This was the view espoused by Professor John Wigmore. Wigmore on Evidence (Tillers rev’n 1983)…
Albert L. ALLEN, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee is worth reading on Alaska character evidence because the court put the point in its own words: "One might argue that these two types of character evidence did not really round out the picture — that if the question is to identify the initial aggressor, the characters of both the defendant and the victim (for violence or for peacefulness) are equally relevant." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Ralph G. HESS, Petitioner, v. STATE of Alaska, Respondent
Ralph G. HESS, Petitioner, v. STATE of Alaska, Respondent, 2001 Alas. LEXIS 37 (2001)
…e also Roger C. Park, The Crime Bill of 1994 and the Law of Character Evidence: Congress Was Right About Consent Defense Cases, 22 Fordham Urb. LJ. 271, 272 (1995) ("Common sense tells us that evidence of propensity to rape has probative value."). 14 . The issue here therefore differs from that in Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 110 S.Ct. 668, 107 L.Ed.2d 708 (1990), wh…
Ralph G. HESS, Petitioner, v. STATE of Alaska, Respondent is worth reading on Alaska character evidence because the court put the point in its own words: "Roger C. Park, The Crime Bill of 1994 and the Law of Character Evidence: Congress Was Right About Consent Defense Cases, 22 Fordham Urb. LJ. 271, 272 (1995) ('Common sense tells us that evidence of propensity to rape has probative value.'). 14 ." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Patrick PLETNIKOFF, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee
Patrick PLETNIKOFF, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee, 1986 Alas. App. LEXIS 259 (1986)
…ter time. Second, the court has limited discretion to admit character evidence for other purposes, if its probative value outweighs the considerations set out in Rule 403, i.e., the creation of unfair prejudice, the confusion of issues and the delay of the trial. Moor v. State, 709 P.2d 498, 504-06 (Alaska App.1985); Lerchen-stein v. State, 697 P.2d 312, 315 (Alaska App.1985),…
Practitioners open Patrick PLETNIKOFF, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee when Alaska character evidence turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Second, the court has limited discretion to admit character evidence for other purposes, if its probative value outweighs the considerations set out in Rule 403, i.e., the creation of unfair prejudice, the confusion of issues and the delay of the trial. Moor v. State, 709 P." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Tracy J. McGILL, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee
Tracy J. McGILL, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee, 2001 Alas. App. LEXIS 35 (2001)
…ed in the constitution, and that any potential for abuse of character evidence can be adequately addressed by the rules of evidence. 20 We conclude that McGill has not shown any error, much less plain error. Judge Pengilly also ruled that on cross-examination, the State could ask McGill about the same prior acts of McGill's that the State used to impeach Davis during her cross-…
Practitioners open Tracy J. McGILL, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee when Alaska character evidence turns on the distinction in this sentence: "We conclude that McGill has not shown any error, much less plain error." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Oscar Flores SALUD, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee
Oscar Flores SALUD, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee, 1981 Alas. App. LEXIS 141 (1981)
…aracter trait. 2 In this case the prosecution did introduce character evidence, through the testimony of Chief Rhines, that Salud had a reputation in Kodiak as being a violent person. The state claims that Salud offered evidence of his reputation as a peaceful person and that it was therefore permitted to rebut this evidence of good character by showing that Salud had a reputat…
Practitioners open Oscar Flores SALUD, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee when Alaska character evidence turns on the distinction in this sentence: "In this case the prosecution did introduce character evidence, through the testimony of Chief Rhines, that Salud had a reputation in Kodiak as being a violent person." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Russell G. JOHNSON and John J. Johnson, Appellants, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee
…of admissibility: If there is a reasonable probability that character evidence might legitimately help the defense, invasion of the privacy of the victim is warranted. If the evidence is of minimal probative value and is not reasonably likely to assist the defense, invasion of the privacy of the victim is unwarranted. Id. Although it may be arguable that the type of showing tha…
On character evidence, Russell G. JOHNSON and John J. Johnson, Appellants, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee speaks to the Alaska dispute in this passage: "If there is a reasonable probability that character evidence might legitimately help the defense, invasion of the privacy of the victim is warranted." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Douglas GARNER, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee
Douglas GARNER, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee, 1986 Alas. App. LEXIS 205 (1986)
…at a later time, but (2) the court has discretion to admit character evidence for other purposes, if its probative value outweighs the considerations set out in Rule 403, i.e. confusion of issues and delay of the trial. Moor v. State, 709 P.2d 498 (Alaska App., 1985); Lerchenstein v. State, 697 P.2d 312, 315-16 (Alaska App. 1985) petition for hearing granted, (Alaska, June 25,…
Douglas GARNER, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee is worth reading on Alaska character evidence because the court put the point in its own words: "Rule 403, i.e. confusion of issues and delay of the trial. Moor v. State, 709 P.2d 498 (Alaska App., 1985); Lerchenstein v. State, 697 P.2d 312, 315-16 (Alaska App." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Hearsay: start with the definition
Most hearsay objections in Alaska are won or lost on the definition, not on an exception. Under Alaska R. Evid. 801, 802, hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Non-hearsay purposes — verbal acts, effect on the listener, notice, circumstantial evidence of state of mind, and impeachment — remain available when the proponent can articulate them without asking the jury to believe the declarant.
Layered hearsay (hearsay within hearsay) requires an exception or exclusion for each layer. Machine-generated data and non-assertive conduct sit outside the hearsay definition in FRE-aligned jurisdictions, but they still need authenticity and, often, expert or business-records foundations.
Alaska hearsay opinions
Glenn Matthew FRINK, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee
Glenn Matthew FRINK, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee, 1979 Alas. LEXIS 651 (1979)
…e murder, urging four grounds of error: first, inadmissible hearsay and character evidence was presented to the grand jury and the remaining evidence was insufficient for indictment; second, the prosecutor’s failure to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury requires dismissal of the indictment; third, the trial court incorrectly admitted the results of a search of defen…
Glenn Matthew FRINK, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee is worth reading on Alaska hearsay because the court put the point in its own words: "e murder, urging four grounds of error: first, inadmissible hearsay and character evidence was presented to the grand jury and the remaining evidence was insufficient for indictment; second, the prosecutor’s failure to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury requires dismi" Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Judith BRODERICK, Parent and Guardian of J.S.J., a Minor Child, Appellant, v. KING’S WAY ASSEMBLY OF GOD CHURCH
…Alaska R.Civ.P. 56(e). Specifically, opinion testimony and hearsay statements that would be inadmissible at trial are inadmissible in a motion for summary judgment. See Williford v. L.J. Carr Investments, Inc., 783 P.2d 235, 238 n. 8 (Alaska 1989); National Indemnity Co. v. Flesher, 469 P.2d 360, 368 (Alaska 1970). Ill A Our sole task in this appeal is to determine whether Bro…
Alaska opinions such as Judith BRODERICK, Parent and Guardian of J.S.J., a Minor Child, Appellant, v. KING’S WAY ASSEMBLY OF GOD CHURCH are cited where hearsay is disputed. The court stated: "Alaska R.Civ.P. 56(e). Specifically, opinion testimony and hearsay statements that would be inadmissible at trial are inadmissible in a motion for summary judgment. See Williford v. L.J. Carr Investments, Inc., 783 P.2d 235, 238 n. 8 (Alaska 1989); National Indemnity Co. v." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
STATE of Alaska, Appellant, v. David Neil PARKS, Appellee
STATE of Alaska, Appellant, v. David Neil PARKS, Appellee, 1968 Alas. LEXIS 153 (1968)
…ss the indictment on the ground that it was based solely on hearsay testimony, a fact that was conceded by the state. The trial court dismissed the indictment, stating that it did so "under the authority of the minority rule and the indications of the Supreme Court in the Merrill case and in the Shelton case *." The state has appealed, claiming that the indictment was suffi…
On hearsay, STATE of Alaska, Appellant, v. David Neil PARKS, Appellee speaks to the Alaska dispute in this passage: "The trial court dismissed the indictment, stating that it did so 'under the authority of the minority rule and the indications of the Supreme Court in the Merrill case and in the Shelton case *." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Ronald F. WYATT, Petitioner, v. STATE of Alaska, Respondent
Ronald F. WYATT, Petitioner, v. STATE of Alaska, Respondent, 1999 Alas. LEXIS 74 (1999)
…atement did not fall within the Alaska Evidence Rule 803(3) hearsay exception for state of mind, the error was harmless. Ronald petitioned for hearing, arguing that such a hearsay statement implicated his right to confrontation and that the error must be “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” We agree that if the court of appeals had been correct in its determination that the st…
Practitioners open Ronald F. WYATT, Petitioner, v. STATE of Alaska, Respondent when Alaska hearsay turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Alaska Evidence Rule 803(3) hearsay exception for state of mind, the error was harmless. Ronald petitioned for hearing, arguing that such a hearsay statement implicated his right to confrontation and that the error must be “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Ryan John SANDERS, Petitioner, v. STATE of Alaska, Respondent
Ryan John SANDERS, Petitioner, v. STATE of Alaska, Respondent, 2015 Alas. LEXIS 133 (2015)
…self-defense and heat of passion. The defendant invoked the hearsay exceptions for a declarant's then existing state of mind, an unavailable declarant's statement against penal interest, and the residual exception for unavailable declarants, as well as his constitutional right to present a defense. The superior court denied the motion. The jury, presented with no evidence of th…
On hearsay, Ryan John SANDERS, Petitioner, v. STATE of Alaska, Respondent speaks to the Alaska dispute in this passage: "The defendant invoked the hearsay exceptions for a declarant's then existing state of mind, an unavailable declarant's statement against penal interest, and the residual exception for unavailable declarants, as well as his constitutional right to present a defense." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Alvin E. WASSILLIE, Petitioner, v. STATE of Alaska, Respondent.
Alvin E. WASSILLIE, Petitioner, v. STATE of Alaska, Respondent., 411 P.3d 595 (2018)
…endant argues that the indictment was based on inadmissible hearsay evidence-an incident report prepared by a staff member at the halfway house, relaying another resident's description of the defendant's conduct and introduced to the grand jury through the testimony of an uninvolved supervisor. The State counters that the incident report falls under the business records excepti…
On hearsay, Alvin E. WASSILLIE, Petitioner, v. STATE of Alaska, Respondent. speaks to the Alaska dispute in this passage: "endant argues that the indictment was based on inadmissible hearsay evidence-an incident report prepared by a staff member at the halfway house, relaying another resident's description of the defendant's conduct and introduced to the grand jury through the testimony of an uninvol" The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Lance D. LINTON, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee
Lance D. LINTON, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee, 1994 Alas. App. LEXIS 39 (1994)
…appeals, contending that the trial court erred in admitting hearsay evidence at trial and in denying Linton’s pretrial motions to suppress evidence and to dismiss his mdictment. We affirm. FACTS In 1972, Linton married Elfriede Goltz in Germany, where Linton was stationed with the Army. In the years that followed, Linton and Elfriede had two children. Linton was eventually tran…
Alaska opinions such as Lance D. LINTON, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee are cited where hearsay is disputed. The court stated: "Linton’s pretrial motions to suppress evidence and to dismiss his mdictment. We affirm. FACTS In 1972, Linton married Elfriede Goltz in Germany, where Linton was stationed with the Army. In the years that followed, Linton and Elfriede had two children." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
STATE of Alaska, Appellant, v. Timothy TAYLOR and Sidney Lee Vail, Appellees
…that the state had presented to the grand jury inadmissible hearsay testimony without a showing of compelling justification. From this dismissal, the state has-appealed. 3 The principal witness before the grand jury was Kodiak police officer Charles Bailey. Regarding the charge of assault with a dangerous weapon, Bailey testified that Vail had admitted that he and Taylor had as…
STATE of Alaska, Appellant, v. Timothy TAYLOR and Sidney Lee Vail, Appellees is worth reading on Alaska hearsay because the court put the point in its own words: "From this dismissal, the state has-appealed. 3 The principal witness before the grand jury was Kodiak police officer Charles Bailey." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Party admissions
Statements of an opposing party are among the most important routes around the hearsay bar. Alaska treats them under Alaska R. Evid. 801(d)(2). Nothing about the statement need be against interest, contemporaneous, or based on personal knowledge — the theory is adversarial, not reliability-based. A party cannot complain that his own words are unreliable when offered against him.
Scope questions dominate practice: the party's own statement; adopted statements (including silence in circumstances where a reasonable person would deny); statements by authorized speakers; agent or employee statements on matters within the scope of the relationship; and, in criminal conspiracy cases, coconspirator statements during and in furtherance of the conspiracy. A defendant generally cannot introduce his own exculpatory out-of-court statement as a "party admission" against himself — the rule runs one way.
Alaska party-admission opinions
Joseph CONTRERAS and Ricky Glen Grumbles, Petitioners, v. STATE of Alaska, Respondent
…eral acceptance” standard is appropriate when reviewing the admission of new types of scientific evidence: 1) the standard is judicially manageable; 2) the standard saves judicial time and resources; 3) the standard assures that juries will not be misled by unproven, unsound “scientific” procedures, thus safeguarding the court’s truth-finding role; and 4) the standard assures f…
Practitioners open Joseph CONTRERAS and Ricky Glen Grumbles, Petitioners, v. STATE of Alaska, Respondent when Alaska party admissions turns on the distinction in this sentence: "eral acceptance” standard is appropriate when reviewing the admission of new types of scientific evidence: 1) the standard is judicially manageable; 2) the standard saves judicial time and resources; 3) the standard assures that juries will not be misled by unproven, unsound “sci" Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
SPENARD ACTION COMMITTEE, Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. LOT 3, BLOCK 1, EVERGREEN SUBDIVISION, Appellee and
…arily determined. Id. at 193. However, Scott applies to the admission of a criminal conviction of a party. Lot 3 argues, and the superior court ruled, that L.H.’s conviction is not admissible under Scott due to the lack of privity between L.H. and Lot 3. The rule of privity “states that the only persons bound by a judgment are those who are parties to the action or in privity w…
SPENARD ACTION COMMITTEE, Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. LOT 3, BLOCK 1, EVERGREEN SUBDIVISION, Appellee and is worth reading on Alaska party admissions because the court put the point in its own words: "Id. at 193. However, Scott applies to the admission of a criminal conviction of a party. Lot 3 argues, and the superior court ruled, that L.H.’s conviction is not admissible under Scott due to the lack of privity between L.H. and Lot 3." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
AMY S. v. State of Alaska, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & SOCIAL SERVICES, OFFICE OF CHILDREN'S SERVICES
…on, and hospital doctors determined he met the criteria for admission. Jack, Zoltan's father, had legal custody, and Jack's consent was needed for medical treatment. Jack refused consent because he believed there was no private insurance coverage for the $2,000 per day treatment, and he wanted time to figure out how to pay for it. Zoltan nonetheless was admitted, and the Depart…
Practitioners open AMY S. v. State of Alaska, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & SOCIAL SERVICES, OFFICE OF CHILDREN'S SERVICES when Alaska party admissions turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Jack, Zoltan's father, had legal custody, and Jack's consent was needed for medical treatment. Jack refused consent because he believed there was no private insurance coverage for the $2,000 per day treatment, and he wanted time to figure out how to pay for it." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Donald W. ZOERB, Jr., Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. CHUGACH ELECTRIC ASSOCIATION, INC., an Alaska Electric
…e error,” arguing that this testimony was admissible as the admission of a party-opponent under Alaska Evidence Rule 801(d)(2)(D). Zoerb’s contention that the testimony is a party admission under Evidence Rule 801(d)(2)(D) is immaterial. The question here is whether the profferred testimony was so prejudicial as to outweigh its probativeness. See Alaska R.Evid. 403. Whether the…
Practitioners open Donald W. ZOERB, Jr., Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. CHUGACH ELECTRIC ASSOCIATION, INC., an Alaska Electric when Alaska party admissions turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Alaska Evidence Rule 801(d)(2)(D). Zoerb’s contention that the testimony is a party admission under Evidence Rule 801(d)(2)(D) is immaterial. The question here is whether the profferred testimony was so prejudicial as to outweigh its probativeness. See Alaska R.Evid. 403." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Richard C. BRANDON, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee
Richard C. BRANDON, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee, 1989 Alas. App. LEXIS 60 (1989)
…randon’s later statements would be cumulative and therefore admission of these statements would be harmless error. We will deal with the state’s harmless error contention after addressing another issue that Brandon raises. Brandon argues that Judge Moody erred in allowing the police officers who searched Brandon’s residence to testify to statements allegedly made by R.B. Accord…
On party admissions, Richard C. BRANDON, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee speaks to the Alaska dispute in this passage: "We will deal with the state’s harmless error contention after addressing another issue that Brandon raises. Brandon argues that Judge Moody erred in allowing the police officers who searched Brandon’s residence to testify to statements allegedly made by R.B." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
YVONNE S., Appellant, v. WESLEY H., Appellee
YVONNE S., Appellant, v. WESLEY H., Appellee, 2011 Alas. LEXIS 1 (2011)
…d Wesley's statements, though potentially non-hearsay party admissions, do not support Yvonne's allegations. See Alaska Evidence Rules 801(d)(2), 802. Although Wesley and Allison do not explicitly deny Yvonne's allegation that they live in different sides of a duplex, they disagree with Yvonne that Allison is unsupervised. Wesley stated in his affidavit that he discusses homewo…
Practitioners open YVONNE S., Appellant, v. WESLEY H., Appellee when Alaska party admissions turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Wesley's statements, though potentially non-hearsay party admissions, do not support Yvonne's allegations. See Alaska Evidence Rules 801(d)(2), 802." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Charlie Willie Steven v. State of Alaska
Charlie Willie Steven v. State of Alaska, 539 P.3d 880 (2023)
…f completeness, and –9– 2764 Evidence Rule 106 required the admission of the redacted portions together with the portions introduced by the State. The State responds that the redacted portions were hearsay if offered by Steven and therefore inadmissible. For support, the State relies on prior cases from this Court characterizing Alaska Evidence Rule 106 as a rule of timing rath…
On party admissions, Charlie Willie Steven v. State of Alaska speaks to the Alaska dispute in this passage: "Evidence Rule 106 required the admission of the redacted portions together with the portions introduced by the State. The State responds that the redacted portions were hearsay if offered by Steven and therefore inadmissible." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Business records
The business-records exception under Alaska R. Evid. 803(6) is the everyday path for medical charts, employment files, bank statements, and maintenance logs. The foundation requires a record made at or near the time by — or from information transmitted by — someone with knowledge; kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity; and made as a regular practice. A custodian or other qualified witness (or a qualifying certification where the jurisdiction allows it) lays the foundation. The opponent may still attack lack of trustworthiness when the source or method of preparation indicates unreliability — litigation-driven reports are the classic failure mode.
Do not confuse authenticity with the business-records exception. You still need to show the exhibit is what you claim it is; the hearsay exception then answers why the out-of-court assertions inside it may be considered for their truth.
Alaska business-records opinions
Gary E. DOBOS and Julma L. Swartout, Appellants/Cross-Appellees, v. Rick D. and Eva INGERSOLL, as Parents of
…rt notes, opinions, and diagnoses, fall squarely within the business records exception to the hearsay rule. That exception provides: A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, optmions, or diagnosis, made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge acquired of a regularly conducted busines…
On business records, Gary E. DOBOS and Julma L. Swartout, Appellants/Cross-Appellees, v. Rick D. and Eva INGERSOLL, as Parents of speaks to the Alaska dispute in this passage: "rt notes, opinions, and diagnoses, fall squarely within the business records exception to the hearsay rule. That exception provides: A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, optmions, or diagnosis, made at or near the time by, o" The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Dora NOFFKE, Appellant, v. Jose PEREZ and Neyda Perez, Appellees
Dora NOFFKE, Appellant, v. Jose PEREZ and Neyda Perez, Appellees, 2008 Alas. LEXIS 37 (2008)
…call a records custodian to establish that a document is a business record, then waiving foundation objections serves no purpose. Noffke also contends that once she learned that the trial court would require testimony to establish that the proposed exhibits were business records, despite the earlier stipulation on foundation, she should have been granted the requested one-day…
Practitioners open Dora NOFFKE, Appellant, v. Jose PEREZ and Neyda Perez, Appellees when Alaska business records turns on the distinction in this sentence: "call a records custodian to establish that a document is a business record, then waiving foundation objections serves no purpose. Noffke also contends that once she learned that the trial court would require testimony to establish that the proposed exhibits were business records," Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
STATE of Alaska, Petitioner and Cross-Respondent, v. Kenneth E. HUGGINS and Terrence Connors, Respondents and
…in any form of a public office or agency setting forth its regularly conducted and regularly recorded activities, or matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law and as to which there was a duty to report, or factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law. (b) The following are not within this exception to the hearsay rule: (i) i…
Alaska opinions such as STATE of Alaska, Petitioner and Cross-Respondent, v. Kenneth E. HUGGINS and Terrence Connors, Respondents and are cited where business records is disputed. The court stated: "in any form of a public office or agency setting forth its regularly conducted and regularly recorded activities, or matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law and as to which there was a duty to report, or factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to a" That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Alvin E. WASSILLIE, Petitioner, v. STATE of Alaska, Respondent.
Alvin E. WASSILLIE, Petitioner, v. STATE of Alaska, Respondent., 411 P.3d 595 (2018)
…The State counters that the incident report falls under the business records exception to the hearsay rule, and that even if it is inadmissible hearsay the conviction should not be reversed because any error in the grand jury proceeding was later made harmless by the error-free trial. We hold that the incident report does not fall under the business records exception to the hea…
Alvin E. WASSILLIE, Petitioner, v. STATE of Alaska, Respondent. is worth reading on Alaska business records because the court put the point in its own words: "State counters that the incident report falls under the business records exception to the hearsay rule, and that even if it is inadmissible hearsay the conviction should not be reversed because any error in the grand jury proceeding was later made harmless by the error-free trial." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Michael L. ROCKWELL, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee
Michael L. ROCKWELL, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee, 2008 Alas. App. LEXIS 29 (2008)
…lic records exception. In Harris, the record at issue was a business record. 31 The State argues that “[t]here is no sound reason for treating the public records differently.” Harris was charged with forging traveler’s checks. 32 During his trial, Harris objected to a bank officer’s identification of stamps on the face of traveler’s checks, and his testimony that the stamps wer…
Alaska opinions such as Michael L. ROCKWELL, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee are cited where business records is disputed. The court stated: "In Harris, the record at issue was a business record. 31 The State argues that “[t]here is no sound reason for treating the public records differently.” Harris was charged with forging traveler’s checks." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
John D. HAYES, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee
John D. HAYES, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee, 1978 Alas. LEXIS 674 (1978)
…, were introduced in evidence. They plainly fall within the business records exception to the hearsay rule. Civil Rule 44(a)(1). 2 . Reese v. Geiermann, 574 P.2d 445, 446 (Alaska 1978); City of Anchorage v. Nesbett, 530 P.2d 1324, 1336 (Alaska 1975). We reject Hayes’ suggestion that the admission of hearsay evidence constitutes “plain error” which we should consider even though…
Alaska opinions such as John D. HAYES, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee are cited where business records is disputed. The court stated: "They plainly fall within the business records exception to the hearsay rule. Civil Rule 44(a)(1). 2 . Reese v. Geiermann, 574 P.2d 445, 446 (Alaska 1978); City of Anchorage v. Nesbett, 530 P.2d 1324, 1336 (Alaska 1975)." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
David R. WILSON, Sr., Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee
David R. WILSON, Sr., Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee, 1988 Alas. App. LEXIS 58 (1988)
…ially concluded that the exhibits were admissible as either business records of the state or public records. A.R.E. 803(6) and (8). 6 Thereafter, Wilson convinced the trial court that the exhibits were police reports, inadmissible under Rule 803(8). The court then amended its ruling to admit the exhibits under Rule 803(1), (6) and (23). Wilson now argues that because Rule 803(8…
Practitioners open David R. WILSON, Sr., Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee when Alaska business records turns on the distinction in this sentence: "A.R.E. 803(6) and (8). 6 Thereafter, Wilson convinced the trial court that the exhibits were police reports, inadmissible under Rule 803(8). The court then amended its ruling to admit the exhibits under Rule 803(1), (6) and (23)." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Elmer PRATT, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. Willis F. KIRKPATRICK, Director, Division of Banking, Securities &
…, the United States Supreme Court held that the contents of business records are ordinarily not privileged because they are created voluntarily and without compulsion. Recently, the Court reiterated this view in a case concerning a sole proprietorship's business records and documents. In United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 104 S.Ct. 1237, 79 L.Ed.2d 552 (1984), the Court held t…
Practitioners open Elmer PRATT, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. Willis F. KIRKPATRICK, Director, Division of Banking, Securities & when Alaska business records turns on the distinction in this sentence: "United States Supreme Court held that the contents of business records are ordinarily not privileged because they are created voluntarily and without compulsion. Recently, the Court reiterated this view in a case concerning a sole proprietorship's business records and documents." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Important hearsay exceptions that do not require unavailability
Three present-sense and mental-state exceptions carry most of the remaining traffic in Alaska trial practice.
Excited utterance — Alaska R. Evid. 803(2). A statement relating to a startling event or condition, made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused. Timing is elastic; composure defeats the exception even minutes after the event, while visible distress can preserve it for hours.
Present sense impression — Alaska R. Evid. 803(1). A statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while or immediately after the declarant perceived it. Contemporaneity is strict — seconds and minutes, not hours — and excitement is not required.
Then-existing mental, emotional, or physical condition — Alaska R. Evid. 803(3). Statements of then-existing state of mind (including intent and plan) come in; statements of memory or belief offered to prove the fact remembered generally do not. Intent-to-meet-another-person cases remain the hardest applications.
Declarant unavailable
When the declarant is unavailable under Alaska R. Evid. 804(a), Alaska opens a second suite of exceptions. Unavailability typically includes privilege, refusal to testify despite court order, lack of memory, death or then-existing infirmity, and absence despite reasonable efforts to procure attendance. The proponent bears the burden of proving unavailability with specific facts — a bare assertion that the witness "could not be found" is not enough.
Former testimony under Alaska R. Evid. 804(b)(1) is the workhorse once unavailability is shown: testimony given as a witness at a trial, hearing, or lawful deposition, offered against a party who had an opportunity and similar motive to develop it by direct, cross, or redirect. Criminal confrontation analysis runs in parallel and is not satisfied merely because a hearsay exception applies.
Dying declarations
Dying declarations under Alaska R. Evid. 804(b)(2) remain a narrow but decisive exception in homicide and, in many jurisdictions, civil cases involving the cause or circumstances of what the declarant believed to be impending death. The foundational showing is the declarant's belief that death was imminent — not that death in fact followed within any particular time — plus a statement concerning the cause or circumstances of what the declarant believed to be the impending death. Courts police coaching and narrative expansions aggressively.
Alaska dying-declaration opinions
Wilfred POULIN, Appellant, v. Dr. Harvey ZARTMAN, Appellee; Dr. Harvey ZARTMAN, Cross-Appellant, v. Wilfred POULIN
…n against pecuniary interest, or highly necessary, e. g., a dying declaration, an exception to the hearsay rule allows the evidence to be admitted. Historically, medical treaties were thought to be either untrustworthy or insufficiently necessary to warrant their admission as direct evidence. Those claiming that such treatises are untrustworthy bolster their contention with the…
Wilfred POULIN, Appellant, v. Dr. Harvey ZARTMAN, Appellee; Dr. Harvey ZARTMAN, Cross-Appellant, v. Wilfred POULIN is worth reading on Alaska dying declaration because the court put the point in its own words: "Historically, medical treaties were thought to be either untrustworthy or insufficiently necessary to warrant their admission as direct evidence." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Oliver Floyd LEMON, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee
Oliver Floyd LEMON, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee, 1973 Alas. LEXIS 336 (1973)
…ed States, 156 U.S. 237, 15 S.Ct. 337, 39 L.Ed. 409 (1895) (dying declarations). And the Court has explicitly noted that where the right to cross-examine is afforded, the fact that the testimony may be in violation of the hearsay rule does not render it per se a violation of the confrontation clause. While it may be readily conceded that hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clau…
Alaska opinions such as Oliver Floyd LEMON, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee are cited where dying declaration is disputed. The court stated: "States, 156 U.S. 237, 15 S.Ct. 337, 39 L.Ed. 409 (1895) (dying declarations)." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Twyla Mae RUBEY, Appellant, v. CITY OF FAIRBANKS, Appellee — Witz, J., dissenting
…on does not prescribe what kinds of testimonial statements (dying declarations, or the like) shall be given infra-judicially, — this depends on the law of Evidence *. Y J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1397, at 131 (3d ed.1940). . VI J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1766, at 177-78 (3d ed.1940). . 387 P.2d 289, 293 (Alaska 1963). . United States v. Markis, 352 F.2d 860, 863-864 (2d Cir. 1965),…
Alaska opinions such as Twyla Mae RUBEY, Appellant, v. CITY OF FAIRBANKS, Appellee — Witz, J., dissenting are cited where dying declaration is disputed. The court stated: "Evidence *. Y J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1397, at 131 (3d ed.1940). . VI J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1766, at 177-78 (3d ed.1940). . 387 P.2d 289, 293 (Alaska 1963). . United States v. Markis, 352 F.2d 860, 863-864 (2d Cir." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Elliott P. JOHNSON, Petitioner, v. STATE of Alaska, Respondent — Connor, J., concurring
…ements on January 5, 1976, and afterward were admissible as dying declarations. However, I think this case can be brought within the traditional criterion of “abandoned hope” which was stated in Hewitt v. State, 514 P.2d 6, 8 (Alaska 1973). In the case at bar the declarant did not have the same motive to fabricate as did the declar-ant in Hewitt. Moreover, the circumstances her…
Practitioners open Elliott P. JOHNSON, Petitioner, v. STATE of Alaska, Respondent — Connor, J., concurring when Alaska dying declaration turns on the distinction in this sentence: "January 5, 1976, and afterward were admissible as dying declarations. However, I think this case can be brought within the traditional criterion of “abandoned hope” which was stated in Hewitt v. State, 514 P.2d 6, 8 (Alaska 1973)." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Medical diagnosis or treatment statements
Statements made for medical diagnosis or treatment under Alaska R. Evid. 803(4) cover medical history, past or present symptoms, and their general cause when reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. The exception is not limited to treating physicians; statements to nurses, EMTs, and consulting clinicians can qualify when the diagnostic purpose is genuine. Fault and identity remain the usual battleground: "I was hit by a car" is often pertinent; "the light was green" usually is not; abuser identity in child-abuse and domestic-violence cases is heavily litigated.
Alaska medical-statement opinions
Gary SLUKA, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee; Ella WATTS, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee
…dmissible. Rule 803(4) provides: Statements for Purposes of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment. Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent *399to diagnosis or treatment [ar…
Alaska opinions such as Gary SLUKA, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee; Ella WATTS, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee are cited where medical diagnosis hearsay is disputed. The court stated: "Rule 803(4) provides: Statements for Purposes of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
MARTHA S. v. STATE of Alaska, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & SOCIAL SERVICES, OFFICE OF CHILDREN'S SERVICES, Appellee
…aska Evidence Rule 808(4) as statements for the purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment, and the admission of OCS permanency supervisor Judith Ringstad's testimony admitted under Alaska Evidence Rule 808(1) as a present sense impression. Martha and William also appeal the adjudication of Andy and Allie as children in need of aid under multiple subsections of AS 47.10.011. Th…
MARTHA S. v. STATE of Alaska, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & SOCIAL SERVICES, OFFICE OF CHILDREN'S SERVICES, Appellee is worth reading on Alaska medical diagnosis hearsay because the court put the point in its own words: "Evidence Rule 808(4) as statements for the purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment, and the admission of OCS permanency supervisor Judith Ringstad's testimony admitted under Alaska Evidence Rule 808(1) as a present sense impression." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Leslie WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. UTILITY EQUIPMENT, INC., Appellee
Leslie WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. UTILITY EQUIPMENT, INC., Appellee, 1992 Alas. LEXIS 101 (1992)
…s about falling off the truck were not admissible under the medical diagnosis *1116 exception to the hearsay rule because “whether it was a fall from the truck or slipping on the ice, those are not relevant to the nature of the diagnosis or treatment. ..." The evidence rule which governs is Rule 803(4) which provides that: Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or tr…
Alaska opinions such as Leslie WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. UTILITY EQUIPMENT, INC., Appellee are cited where medical diagnosis hearsay is disputed. The court stated: "s about falling off the truck were not admissible under the medical diagnosis *1116 exception to the hearsay rule because “whether it was a fall from the truck or slipping on the ice, those are not relevant to the nature of the diagnosis or treatment. ...' The evidence rule which" That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Elliott P. JOHNSON, Petitioner, v. STATE of Alaska, Respondent
Elliott P. JOHNSON, Petitioner, v. STATE of Alaska, Respondent, 1978 Alas. LEXIS 664 (1978)
…they were admissible as statements made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment. We have concluded that the court erred in denying the motion insofar as these statements pertained to the identity of the assailant. The other two statements were made on January 2 and 5, 1976 just prior to and three days subsequent to the victim undergoing surgery. The trial judge found…
On medical diagnosis hearsay, Elliott P. JOHNSON, Petitioner, v. STATE of Alaska, Respondent speaks to the Alaska dispute in this passage: "We have concluded that the court erred in denying the motion insofar as these statements pertained to the identity of the assailant. The other two statements were made on January 2 and 5, 1976 just prior to and three days subsequent to the victim undergoing surgery." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Dennis DAVISON v. STATE of Alaska
Dennis DAVISON v. STATE of Alaska, 2012 Alas. LEXIS 114 (2012)
…m Were Not Admissible As Statements Made For The Purpose Of Medical Diagnosis Or Treatment, But The Error Was Harmless As To The Conviction. Hearsay-an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted in that statement-is not admissible at trial9 Alaska Evidence Rule 808(4) creates an exception to this rule for statements made for the purpose of medical…
Dennis DAVISON v. STATE of Alaska is worth reading on Alaska medical diagnosis hearsay because the court put the point in its own words: "Were Not Admissible As Statements Made For The Purpose Of Medical Diagnosis Or Treatment, But The Error Was Harmless As To The Conviction." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Use of depositions at trial
Alaska R. Civ. P. 30 and 32 control civil depositions and their use at trial, including impeachment and substantive admission when a hearsay exception applies. Criminal cases use Alaska R. Crim. P. 16 for discovery; depositions of witnesses at trial are uncommon but prior recorded testimony may be offered under Alaska R. Evid. 804(b)(1) when declarant unavailability is shown.
Deposition use is always a two-layer problem: procedural permission to read or play the deposition, plus a hearsay path (often former testimony, party admission, or impeachment). Counsel who satisfy the civil or criminal procedure rule but skip the evidence-rule foundation invite a sustained objection; counsel who have a hearsay exception but failed to preserve the deposition under the procedural rule face the same result. Video designations, counter-designations, and completeness objections should be teed up before the jury is seated.
Alaska deposition / former-testimony opinions
Fern PALFY, Appellant, v. Julian C. RICE, Appellee; Julian C. RICE, Cross-Appellant, v. Fern PALFY, Cross-Appellee
…t did not avail herself of it. There was no error here. The Deposition of William Jacobson. At the trial appellant attempted to introduce into evidence a deposition of William Jacobson. Jacobson is an accountant who had worked on the books of A.V.T. at about the time Mr. Rice asked Mrs. Palfy to loan $30,000 to A.V.T. Jacobson testified in his deposition that at that time A.V.T…
Practitioners open Fern PALFY, Appellant, v. Julian C. RICE, Appellee; Julian C. RICE, Cross-Appellant, v. Fern PALFY, Cross-Appellee when Alaska deposition / former testimony turns on the distinction in this sentence: "There was no error here. The Deposition of William Jacobson. At the trial appellant attempted to introduce into evidence a deposition of William Jacobson. Jacobson is an accountant who had worked on the books of A.V.T. at about the time Mr. Rice asked Mrs." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Jack B. BUSTER, Appellant, v. James R. GALE, Thomas A. Westerhof and Mary E. Westerhof, Appellees
…May 1985. The assignment was certified and recorded. In his deposition, Robert Baines stated that alter Gale and the Westerhofs had defaulted on their payments in September 1986, he “closed the escrow and took possession of the original deed of trust note.” 1 Baines also stated in his deposition that he gave the note to Buster in May 1988. The location of the note after this ti…
Alaska opinions such as Jack B. BUSTER, Appellant, v. James R. GALE, Thomas A. Westerhof and Mary E. Westerhof, Appellees are cited where deposition / former testimony is disputed. The court stated: "May 1985. The assignment was certified and recorded. In his deposition, Robert Baines stated that alter Gale and the Westerhofs had defaulted on their payments in September 1986, he “closed the escrow and took possession of the original deed of trust note." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Shabd-Sangeet KHALSA, Appellant, v. Lars CHOSE, Tamasine Drisdale, Gordon Stein, and Mandala Custom Homes, Appellees
…ary 2008 to sign medical release forms, present herself for deposition, and submit to medical and psychological testing, cautioning her that if she did not comply with discovery orders the superior court could impose sanctions, including dismissal of her claims. When Khalsa did not sign the medical release forms, the superior court found that her refusal was willful noncomplian…
Alaska opinions such as Shabd-Sangeet KHALSA, Appellant, v. Lars CHOSE, Tamasine Drisdale, Gordon Stein, and Mandala Custom Homes, Appellees are cited where deposition / former testimony is disputed. The court stated: "ary 2008 to sign medical release forms, present herself for deposition, and submit to medical and psychological testing, cautioning her that if she did not comply with discovery orders the superior court could impose sanctions, including dismissal of her claims. When Khalsa did n" That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Larry Paul HAMILTON, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee
Larry Paul HAMILTON, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee, 1989 Alas. App. LEXIS 40 (1989)
…ntial distance from the court house, the court might permit depositions or telephone interrogations in preference to requiring the state to pay to bring the declarants to the sentencing hearing. Compare Alaska R.Civ.P. 991 with Alaska R.Crim.P. 38.1.2 Some reasonable opportunity for cross-ex-*1363animation should be provided, however, where possible.3 Where the declarants are t…
Larry Paul HAMILTON, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee is worth reading on Alaska deposition / former testimony because the court put the point in its own words: "Compare Alaska R.Civ.P. 991 with Alaska R.Crim.P. 38.1.2 Some reasonable opportunity for cross-ex-*1363animation should be provided, however, where possible." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
John v. BOZARTH, Appellant, v. ATLANTIC RICHFIELD OIL COMPANY, INC., Appellee
…h challenges the allowance of costs for certain unspecified depositions, arguing that “[deposition costs may be awarded only where the depositions are actually used at trial, or where depositions were actually relied upon in ruling on a pre-trial motion.” Civil Rule 79(b) allows as awardable costs “the necessary expense of taking depositions for use at trial and producing exhib…
John v. BOZARTH, Appellant, v. ATLANTIC RICHFIELD OIL COMPANY, INC., Appellee is worth reading on Alaska deposition / former testimony because the court put the point in its own words: "h challenges the allowance of costs for certain unspecified depositions, arguing that “[deposition costs may be awarded only where the depositions are actually used at trial, or where depositions were actually relied upon in ruling on a pre-trial motion.” Civil Rule 79(b) allows" Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Edward Leslie STORES, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee
Edward Leslie STORES, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee, 1980 Alas. LEXIS 742 (1980)
…whether it was proper to admit into evidence the videotaped deposition of a key prosecution witness who was out of the state at the time of trial. In March, 1977, Edward Stores was charged with one count of rape.1 The state’s case consisted primarily of the testimony of three witnesses. The prosecutrix, a high school student, testified that the defendant, a stranger, approached…
Alaska opinions such as Edward Leslie STORES, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee are cited where deposition / former testimony is disputed. The court stated: "In March, 1977, Edward Stores was charged with one count of rape.1 The state’s case consisted primarily of the testimony of three witnesses." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Authenticity: why it matters and how to prove it
Authenticity is not a hearsay doctrine and it is not optional. Under Alaska R. Evid. 901, 902, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is. Self-authenticating categories — certified public records, newspapers, acknowledged documents, trade inscriptions, and (where adopted) certified domestic records of a regularly conducted activity — shorten the path, but most trial exhibits still need a sponsoring witness, distinctive characteristics, chain of custody, or process-or-system evidence.
Remote villages, tribal courts, and federal–state overlap make authentication of documents, recordings, and native-language interpreters a recurring trial issue. Alaska courts expect a foundation witness or certification path under Alaska R. Evid. 901–902 before admitting electronic and documentary proof.
Why authenticity gets its own section in every Alaska trial notebook:
- It is a condition precedent. An unauthenticated exhibit never reaches the relevance, hearsay, or privilege analysis in a useful way — the jury never properly considers it.
- Digital evidence multiplies the failure modes. Screenshots, social-media posts, text threads, and cloud downloads require hash values, account attribution, metadata, or a percipient witness who saw the content created or received.
- Chain of custody is authenticity by another name. Drugs, firearms, biological samples, and seized devices are excluded when the links from seizure to lab to courtroom are broken, even if a hearsay exception would otherwise apply to a lab report.
- Business-records shortcuts do not replace authentication. A custodian can explain record-keeping practices and still fail if nobody can say the particular PDF or printout is the record of this patient, this account, or this machine.
- Self-authentication is narrow. Counsel who wave a notarization or a letterhead and skip the rest of Rule 901-style analysis often lose when the document's contents are disputed.
Practical authentication checklist for Alaska trials: identify the exhibit; choose a 901 method or a 902 category; line up the sponsoring witness or certificate; preserve chain-of-custody testimony for physical and digital items; and separate the authenticity objection from any hearsay objection so the court rules on each.
Alaska authenticity opinions
Jack B. BUSTER, Appellant, v. James R. GALE, Thomas A. Westerhof and Mary E. Westerhof, Appellees
…oyed them.... Evidence Rule 901 states the general rule for authenticating documents: The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.... The basic requirement of authentication was defined as follows in McQueeney v. Wil…
Practitioners open Jack B. BUSTER, Appellant, v. James R. GALE, Thomas A. Westerhof and Mary E. Westerhof, Appellees when Alaska authentication turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Evidence Rule 901 states the general rule for authenticating documents: The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims..." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Dora NOFFKE, Appellant, v. Jose PEREZ and Neyda Perez, Appellees
Dora NOFFKE, Appellant, v. Jose PEREZ and Neyda Perez, Appellees, 2008 Alas. LEXIS 37 (2008)
…. Dobos v. Ingersoll, 9 P.3d 1020, 1028 (Alaska 2000). 9 . "Authentication” is defined as "the act of proving that something (as a document) is true or genuine, esp. so that it may be admitted as evidence; the condition of being so proved.” Black's Law Dictionary 142 (8th ed.2004). 10 . “Foundation” is defined as "[t]he basis on which something is supported; esp. evidence or te…
Practitioners open Dora NOFFKE, Appellant, v. Jose PEREZ and Neyda Perez, Appellees when Alaska authentication turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Dobos v. Ingersoll, 9 P.3d 1020, 1028 (Alaska 2000). 9 . 'Authentication” is defined as 'the act of proving that something (as a document) is true or genuine, esp. so that it may be admitted as evidence; the condition of being so proved.” Black's Law Dictionary 142 (8th ed.2004)." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Joseph MURAT, Appellant, v. F/V SHELIKOF STRAIT; Kodiak Fisheries Co., Inc.; Andreas Arnsten, a Partnership
…to their motion for summary judgment. No effort was made to authenticate these documents, and no affidavits were filed in support of the motion. Murat timely objected to the court’s consideration of the unauthenticated documents, based on the requirement of Civil Rule 56(e) that summary judgments be supported only by admissible evidence. See Brock v. Rogers & Babler, Inc., 536…
Practitioners open Joseph MURAT, Appellant, v. F/V SHELIKOF STRAIT; Kodiak Fisheries Co., Inc.; Andreas Arnsten, a Partnership when Alaska authentication turns on the distinction in this sentence: "No effort was made to authenticate these documents, and no affidavits were filed in support of the motion." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Karl C. MORGAN, Appellant, v. MUNICIPALITY OF ANCHORAGE, Appellee
Karl C. MORGAN, Appellant, v. MUNICIPALITY OF ANCHORAGE, Appellee, 1982 Alas. App. LEXIS 282 (1982)
…ue is moot. We remand the case to allow the municipality to authenticate the breathalyzer documents. In the event that the breathalyzer documents are properly authenticated, the conviction and sentence are affirmed. In the event the breathalyzer documents are not authenticated, Morgan may apply to the trial court for appropriate relief. The ease is REMANDED.
Alaska opinions such as Karl C. MORGAN, Appellant, v. MUNICIPALITY OF ANCHORAGE, Appellee are cited where authentication is disputed. The court stated: "We remand the case to allow the municipality to authenticate the breathalyzer documents. In the event that the breathalyzer documents are properly authenticated, the conviction and sentence are affirmed." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
STATE of Alaska, Petitioner and Cross-Respondent, v. Kenneth E. HUGGINS and Terrence Connors, Respondents and
…is holding that the documents were excludable as improperly authenticated under Alaska Rule of Evidence 902. The following day Judge Blair issued a memorandum opinion in Connors, which followed his Huggins decision. The state petitioned for a hearing in this court and the two eases were consolidated. The state sought review of the portion of Judge Blair’s order concerning Alask…
On authentication, STATE of Alaska, Petitioner and Cross-Respondent, v. Kenneth E. HUGGINS and Terrence Connors, Respondents and speaks to the Alaska dispute in this passage: "Alaska Rule of Evidence 902. The following day Judge Blair issued a memorandum opinion in Connors, which followed his Huggins decision. The state petitioned for a hearing in this court and the two eases were consolidated." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Gary GANT, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee
Gary GANT, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee, 1986 Alas. App. LEXIS 208 (1986)
…t to rely on this conviction. The state served Gant with an authenticated copy of a docket abstract from the Circuit Court of Baltimore, Maryland. The abstract reflected Gant’s conviction of burglary on February 10, 1971. Gant filed an objection to the state’s notice, contending that the docket abstract was legally insufficient as evidence of a prior conviction. Gant claimed th…
On authentication, Gary GANT, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee speaks to the Alaska dispute in this passage: "The state served Gant with an authenticated copy of a docket abstract from the Circuit Court of Baltimore, Maryland. The abstract reflected Gant’s conviction of burglary on February 10, 1971." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Aaron Guy SELMAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee
Aaron Guy SELMAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee, 1966 Alas. LEXIS 173 (1966)
…witnesses are subscribed there for one purpose, namely, to authenticate the signature of the person purportingly executing it— ⅞: ⅜ ⅜ ⅜ ⅜ MR. McGRATH: * and this man can’t get up and authenticate his own power of attorney, or else it wotild be a meaningless function. MR TALLMAN: The Court records are down in the Clerk’s office, and they’ll indicate whether or not subpoenas…
Alaska opinions such as Aaron Guy SELMAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee are cited where authentication is disputed. The court stated: "MR. McGRATH: * and this man can’t get up and authenticate his own power of attorney, or else it wotild be a meaningless function." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Carl Edgar MONTAGUE, Appellant, v. Benjamin G. SMEDLEY, Corrections Superintendent, State Correctional Center
…d a crime under the law of that state, and the copy must be authenticated by the executive authority making the demand. 7 We recently noted in Kostic v. Smedley 8 that judicial review of extradition statutes was to be limited to: (1) whether a crime has been charged in the demanding state, (2) whether the person in custody and seeking habeas corpus is the one charged with such…
Practitioners open Carl Edgar MONTAGUE, Appellant, v. Benjamin G. SMEDLEY, Corrections Superintendent, State Correctional Center when Alaska authentication turns on the distinction in this sentence: "d a crime under the law of that state, and the copy must be authenticated by the executive authority making the demand. 7 We recently noted in Kostic v. Smedley 8 that judicial review of extradition statutes was to be limited to: (1) whether a crime has been charged in the demand" Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Practice checklist
- State the relevance theory in one sentence before naming an exception.
- Run the 403 / unfair-prejudice balance explicitly for other-acts and graphic exhibits.
- For character or other-acts evidence, identify the non-propensity purpose and request a limiting instruction on the record.
- Decide whether an out-of-court statement is hearsay for the purpose offered before hunting exceptions.
- Lay business-records foundations with time, knowledge, regular practice, and custodial qualifications — or a qualifying certification.
- Prove unavailability with specific facts before offering former testimony or dying declarations.
- Treat deposition use as procedure-plus-hearsay; designate and counter-designate early.
- Authenticate every exhibit under Alaska R. Evid. 901, 902 (or the self-authentication path) before arguing hearsay.
- Preserve chain of custody for physical and digital evidence with named custodians.
- Search LawDiver for recent Alaska appellate evidence opinions before mediation or motions in limine.
Frequently asked questions
What is the primary evidence source in Alaska?
Alaska applies the Alaska Rules of Evidence. Alaska's rules track the FRE closely and were among the early state adoptions; Alaska R. Evid. 401–902 largely mirror federal numbering and substance.
How do Alaska courts decide relevance and unfair prejudice?
Under Alaska R. Evid. 401, 403, evidence must make a fact of consequence more or less probable, and the court may exclude relevant evidence when unfair prejudice, confusion, or waste of time substantially outweighs its probative value.
Are party admissions hearsay in Alaska?
Party-opponent statements under Alaska R. Evid. 801(d)(2) are generally excluded from the hearsay ban (or treated as an exception, depending on local drafting). They may be offered against the party who made or adopted them without showing unavailability.
What foundation is required for business records?
Under Alaska R. Evid. 803(6), show a record made at or near the time from someone with knowledge, kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity, as a regular practice, through a custodian, qualified witness, or allowed certification — subject to trustworthiness attack.
When can I use a deposition at trial in Alaska?
Alaska R. Civ. P. 30 and 32 control civil depositions and their use at trial, including impeachment and substantive admission when a hearsay exception applies. Criminal cases use Alaska R. Crim. P. 16 for discovery; depositions of witnesses at trial are uncommon but prior recorded testimony may be offered under Alaska R. Evid. 804(b)(1) when declarant unavailability is shown.
Why is authenticity separate from hearsay?
Authenticity asks whether the item is what you claim it is; hearsay asks whether out-of-court assertions inside it may be used for their truth. You can lose on either ground independently. Alaska authenticity practice starts with Alaska R. Evid. 901, 902.
Where do dying declarations and medical statements fit?
Dying declarations under Alaska R. Evid. 804(b)(2) require belief in impending death and concern the cause or circumstances of that believed death. Medical statements under Alaska R. Evid. 803(4) require a genuine diagnostic or treatment purpose and reasonable pertinence to care.