Supreme Court of South Carolina

State v. Huntington

State v. Mary Huntington

5 S.C.L. 111

Decided January 15, 1813

No negative treatmentNo negative treatment found: no reversal on appeal and no treated citing cases.

Download PDF

SummaryHoldingsLater treatmentOpinion of the Court

Summary

The court refused to reverse the Court of General Sessions and held that justices of the peace had authority to inquire into forcible entry and detainer proceedings. It reasoned that the statutory restriction on justices' jurisdiction over tort actions applied only to civil suits, not criminal proceedings, and that the relevant English statutes were in force in South Carolina. There were no separate opinions.

Holdings

  • Whether the statutory prohibition against justices of the peace hearing actions arising merely from tort deprived them of jurisdiction over forcible entry and detainer proceedings.. The prohibition applied only to civil suits and did not deprive justices of the peace of authority over criminal proceedings concerning forcible entry and detainer. *112
  • Whether justices of the peace had statutory authority to conduct inquisitions concerning forcible entry and detainer under the English statutes in force in South Carolina.. Justices of the peace possessed the same authority exercised by their counterparts in England to inquire into forcible entry and detainer, under English statutes made expressly or virtually applicable in South Carolina. *112

Written by LawDiver's case analysis.

How later courts treated this case

Treatment rows appear when later opinions record how they used this case.

See all citing casesFilter by court, year and treatment in LawDiver. Free, no login.

In this case

Opinion of the Court

Bkevakd, J.

This a motion to reverse the decision of the Court of General‘Sessions for Charleston district.

The question before the District.Court arose upon an inquisition taken for a forcible entry and detainer, by two justices of peace, and removed by certiorari.

The question submitted is, whether justices of peace have authority to inquire concerning forcible entries and detainers.

The objection to their jurisdiction, in this respect, in the argument of this motion, was founded on an act of assembly of February, 1791, which declares, “ that no action of trespass, trover, detinue, slander, or assault and battery, or other action, arising merely from tort, shall be cognizable by a justice of peace in this State.”

*112This objection* in my opinion, is invalid : because the act of 1791, relates to civil suits only, and has no application to criminal proceedings.

It was not objected, in argument, that thé statutes which are in force on this subject, do not authorize justices of peace in this State, to take inquisitions, or indictments of forcible entry and de-tainer ; but as this question seems to be involved, T will briefly state my opinion thereon, and the reasons in support of it.

My opinion is, that justices of peace hav„e the power which the' same magistrates have in England, in relation to this matter, and in virtue of the same statutes, which are all either expressly, or virtually, made of force here.

An act of 1731, P. L. 127, provides for the summoning and ob--taining juries of inquest, on forcible entries and detainers, and other special inquests. This act appears to be in confirmation of the statute 8 H. 6 c. 9, which is not made of force expressly by the' act of assembly of 1712. But that act, P. L. 98, declares, that all the statutes referred to by the statutes made of force, arid which statutes made of force, are explanatory, or confirmatory of those referred to, &c., shall be considered ah virtually made of force* The statute 15 R. 2 c. 2, is also made of force expressly. P. L.-37. This statute cannot be fully understood, without referring to a former statute, 5 R. 2 stat. 1 c. 8, which defines the offences of forcible entry and detainer : for, at common law, a man might lawfully regain possession of lands of which he had been disseised by force. 1 Hawk. P. C. c. 64, sec. 1. The statute 5 R. 2, may,, therefore, well be considered as virtually of force, although not expressly. made so by act of assembly. . '

The other judges of the same opinion.

Motion refused.

Geimkb,. J., absent.

Research the next case the same way

Everything on this page, for any of 10 million opinions.

  • Search every way lawyers do

    Citation, case name, boolean with /s and /p, or a plain-English question. Free, no login.

  • See what still holds

    Every case shows how later courts treated it: followed, distinguished, limited or overruled.

  • Check a brief before you file

    CiteCheck reads your brief and flags cites that don't exist, don't match, or aren't good law.

  • Use it where you work

    The LawDiver connector brings real caselaw into Claude, ChatGPT and Cursor. An API for builders.

Try CiteCheck free or create a free account for AI research and saved folders

Related landmark cases

All landmark cases·Browse by topic