Supreme Court of the United States, 2019

The Court vacated and remanded, ruling that the Crow Tribe's 1868 Treaty hunting right survived Wyoming statehood. The Court found Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians repudiated Ward v. Race Horse and issue preclusion from Crow Tribe of Indians v.

The Supreme Court held that a trademark licensee's rights survive a debtor's rejection of a licensing agreement in bankruptcy because rejection constitutes breach under 11 U.S.C. §365(g), not rescission. The Court also found the case was not moot because Mission asserted a claim for money damages.

The Court clarified the “clear evidence” standard for pre‑emption, holding that it requires a manufacturer to have fully informed the FDA of the warning’s justification and to have received FDA’s indication that it would not approve the label change, and it ruled that the pre‑emption question is a matter of law for a…

Justice Thomas, in a concurring opinion, explains that Merck's impossibility pre‑emption defense fails because the Supreme Court’s “physical impossibility” test is inappropriate and because FDA communications do not constitute “law” with pre‑emptive effect.

The Court held that a debtor’s rejection of an executory trademark licensing agreement under §365 of the Bankruptcy Code is a breach, not a rescission, so the licensee’s rights to use the trademark survive; it reversed the First Circuit and remanded for further proceedings.

Justice Sotomayor concurs with the Court’s holding that a debtor’s rejection of a trademark license under 11 U.S.C. §365(a) is a breach of contract, and she highlights two observations: trademark licensees do not automatically retain all post‑rejection rights, and trademark licenses are treated differently from other…

Justice Gorsuch dissents, arguing the Court should dismiss the petition as improvidently granted because the case is moot and Mission lacks a viable damages claim. He stresses that the Constitution limits judicial power to actual cases or controversies and that petitioning the court is protected by the First Amendment…

The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of certiorari, leaving in place the lower courts' orders vacating stays of execution for Christopher Lee Price. The Court, in a brief order, declined to grant a stay and emphasized that the district court lacked jurisdiction and that the petitioner's claims were…

The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of certiorari. Justice Alito, joined by Justices Thomas and Kavanaugh, dissented, questioning whether the First Amendment requires prisons to entertain grievance filings that contain veiled threats toward guards and criticizing the Ninth Circuit’s ruling.

The Court held that the False Claims Act’s two statutory limitations periods apply to relator‑initiated qui tam actions even when the Government does not intervene, and that a private relator is not "the official of the United States" whose knowledge triggers the three‑year period.

In a dissent, the Justice argues that the Supreme Court should not have granted certiorari, vacated the Eighth Circuit's judgment, and remanded the case, asserting there was no new development warranting such action.

Justice Breyer dissents, arguing that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to review the district court's order compelling arbitration because the Federal Arbitration Act’s §16(b) bars appeals of such interlocutory orders.

The Supreme Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act does not permit an ambiguous arbitration agreement to supply the 'contractual basis' needed to compel class arbitration, reversing the Ninth Circuit's affirmance of an order compelling classwide arbitration between Lamps Plus and employee Frank Varela.

Justice Thomas concurs in the Court’s judgment that the arbitration agreement between Lamps Plus and Varela does not permit class arbitration, emphasizing that silence on class arbitration cannot be read as consent and that California’s contra proferentem rule conflicts with the FAA.

Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, dissents from the Supreme Court’s order granting the State’s application to vacate the district court’s stay of execution.

The Court held that the Baze-Glossip framework governs all Eighth Amendment method-of-execution challenges — facial and as-applied alike — so an inmate must identify a feasible, readily implemented alternative that would significantly reduce a substantial risk of severe pain and that the State refused to adopt without…

Justice Kagan, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Breyer, Alito, and Kavanaugh, held that a vocational expert’s refusal to provide underlying private survey data upon request does not categorically prevent her testimony from constituting substantial evidence in a Social Security disability…

The Court held that the Baze‑Glossip test governs all Eighth Amendment method‑of‑execution challenges, including as‑applied claims, and that Bucklew failed to satisfy that test because he did not identify a feasible, readily implemented alternative that would significantly reduce a substantial risk of severe pain.

The opinion excerpt contains Justice Thomas's concurrence, Justice Sotomayor's dissent, and Justice Kavanaugh's (truncated) concurrence. The concurring justice affirms the majority's reasoning that a method of execution violates the Eighth Amendment only when deliberately designed to cause pain, while the dissent…

Justice Alito, joined by Justices Thomas and Gorsuch, dissents from the Court’s order staying Patrick Murphy’s execution. He argues that the stay was improper because Murphy’s religious‑liberty claims were raised untimely and relied on an equal‑treatment theory not raised in the district court.

The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, holding that a person who disseminates false or misleading statements with intent to defraud can be liable under Rule 10b‑5(a) and (c), §10(b) and §17(a)(1) even if he is not the “maker” of the statement under Janus.

The Court held that 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(3) requires that a service packet mailed to a foreign minister under the FSIA be addressed to the minister's office in the foreign state, not their embassy in the United States. The Court reversed and remanded the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

The Court held that service of process on a foreign state under 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(3) must be mailed directly to the foreign minister’s office in the minister’s home country, not to the foreign state’s embassy in the United States, and therefore reversed the appellate court’s judgment and remanded for further…

Justice Thomas dissents, arguing that service of process on a foreign state may be properly effected by mailing a packet to the foreign minister’s address at the state’s embassy in Washington, D.C., and that the majority’s bright‑line rule requiring service at the minister’s office in the foreign state is unsupported…

The Court vacated the Ninth Circuit’s judgment and remanded the case for the lower courts to determine whether the named plaintiffs have Article III standing under the Stored Communications Act in light of Spokeo.

The Court held that a law firm that conducts nonjudicial foreclosures is not a "debt collector" under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act’s primary definition, and therefore is subject only to the Act’s §1692f(6) prohibitions. The decision affirmed the Tenth Circuit’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s FDCPA claim.

Justice Sotomayor concurs with the Court’s interpretation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act’s definition of “debt collector” to include entities that enforce security interests, such as nonjudicial foreclosures.

The Court vacated the Ninth Circuit’s judgment and remanded the case for lower courts to determine whether the named plaintiffs have Article III standing under the Stored Communications Act in light of Spokeo, without deciding the fairness of the cy pres settlement.

Justice Thomas, dissenting, argues that the plaintiffs have standing under the Stored Communications Act and that the class certification and settlement should be reversed because the settlement provides only cy pres payments and no direct relief to class members, violating Rule 23 requirements.

The Court affirmed the Third Circuit, holding that under maritime tort law a product manufacturer must warn when its product requires incorporation of a part, the manufacturer knows the integrated product is likely dangerous, and the manufacturer has no reason to believe users will realize the danger.

The Court held that aliens who fall within the specified categories of 8 U.S.C. §1226(c)(1) remain subject to mandatory detention without a bond hearing even if immigration officials did not arrest them immediately upon release from criminal custody.

Justice Sotomayor denied Keith Tharpe’s petition for certiorari, concluding that the Eleventh Circuit’s procedural rulings denying a certificate of appealability were likely correct and that the Court need not address the merits of his juror‑bias claim.

The Supreme Court denied the petitions for writs of certiorari filed by Morris County Board of Chosen Freeholders and others. The denial was based on factual uncertainty about the historic preservation program and the lack of a developed body of case law following Trinity Lutheran.

The Supreme Court held that damages awarded under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act for lost wages are "compensation" taxable under the Railroad Retirement Tax Act. The Court also rejected the argument that the §104(a)(2) exemption for personal‑injury damages applies to RRTA taxes.

The Supreme Court held that the Copyright Act’s authorization of 'full costs' under 17 U.S.C. § 505 does not expand the awardable expenses beyond the six categories specified in the general costs statute, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1821 and 1920.

The Court held that under 17 U.S.C. §411(a) registration is complete only when the Copyright Office registers the claim, not when the applicant files an application. Accordingly, a copyright owner may not sue for infringement until registration is granted, and the Eleventh Circuit’s judgment affirming dismissal was…

The Supreme Court held that the presumption of prejudice recognized in Roe v. Flores-Ortega applies even when a defendant who directed counsel to appeal has signed an appeal waiver, because no waiver bars every appellate claim and counsel's failure to file a notice of appeal despite express instructions forfeits a…

The Court held that the International Organizations Immunities Act’s “same immunity” language refers to the current, restrictive foreign sovereign immunity regime embodied in the FSIA, not the virtually absolute immunity of 1945. Accordingly, the International Finance Corporation is not absolutely immune from suit.

The Court held that the Eighth Amendment’s bar on executing mentally incompetent prisoners does not turn on a prisoner’s memory of the crime or on a diagnosis of psychotic delusions as opposed to dementia.

The Supreme Court held that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f)’s 14‑day deadline for filing a petition for permission to appeal a class‑certification order is not subject to equitable tolling, and therefore reversed and remanded the Ninth Circuit’s decision.