Supreme Court of the United States
Jeff Premo v. Randy Joseph Moore
January 19, 2011178 L. Ed. 2d 649
Summary
The Supreme Court held that the Oregon postconviction court's rejection of Randy Moore's ineffective-assistance claim—that counsel should have moved to suppress his confession to police before advising him to accept a no-contest plea to felony murder—was not an unreasonable application of Strickland under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Counsel's choice was defensible because a second, admissible confession witnessed by Moore's brother and his accomplice's girlfriend made suppression futile, and under Hill v. Lockhart the state court could reasonably find Moore would have accepted the favorable statutory-minimum plea even if the police confession were suppressed. The Court further held that Arizona v. Fulminante supplies no governing rule here: it says nothing about Strickland performance or plea-bargain prejudice and is not a per se rule of prejudice for suppressible confessions. The Ninth Circuit's contrary judgment was reversed and the case remanded; Justice Ginsburg concurred in the judgment on the narrower ground that Moore never claimed he would have rejected the plea and opted for trial.
Holding
- Whether counsel's failure to move to suppress Moore's confession to police before advising him on the plea bargain was deficient performance under Strickland.. No. The state court's determination that counsel performed adequately—or at least that it was reasonable to so conclude—was not an unreasonable application of Strickland: counsel's choice rested on the independent, reasonable judgment that suppression would have been futile given Moore's second, admissible confession to which two witnesses could testify, and the state court would not have been unreasonable to accept that explanation.
- Whether the state court's Strickland determinations were 'contrary to' Arizona v. Fulminante.. No. A state-court adjudication of counsel's performance under the Sixth Amendment cannot be 'contrary to' Fulminante, which involved admission of an involuntary confession in violation of the Fifth Amendment and says nothing about the Strickland standard of effectiveness; nor does Fulminante contemplate prejudice in the plea-bargain context or constitute a per se rule of prejudice for suppressible confessions.
- Whether the state court's determination that Moore suffered no Strickland prejudice from counsel's failure to suppress was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.. No. Under Hill v. Lockhart Moore had to demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial; the state court reasonably could have determined Moore would have accepted the plea even if his second confession had been ruled inadmissible, and Moore's failure to make the Hill showing forecloses relief under AEDPA.
Docket No. 09-658