Supreme Court of the United States, 2007

The Court held that Texas’s special‑issue sentencing scheme violates the Eighth Amendment and that the supplemental nullification instruction does not cure the constitutional defect; consequently the state court’s application of the Almanza rule requiring proof of egregious harm was improper, so the death‑sentence…

Justice Stevens’s majority opinion held that Texas’s special-issue instructions prevented the sentencing jury from giving meaningful mitigating effect to Abdul-Kabir’s evidence of childhood neglect, abandonment, and possible neurological damage.

The dissent argues that the state courts reasonably rejected the petitioners’ challenges to Texas’s capital-sentencing instructions because the governing precedent was unsettled when those courts ruled.

Justice Alito, dissenting, argues that the petitioner failed to preserve his federal constitutional claim regarding jury instructions because he did not object to the trial court's proposed instructions intended to cure the defect.

The Court held that the Texas capital-sentencing instructions did not give the jury a meaningful means to consider and give mitigating effect to evidence concerning Abdul-Kabir's childhood neglect, abandonment, and impaired impulse control.

Justice Thomas, dissenting, would have treated the statutory sentencing scheme as constitutionally infirm because it permits a judge to find facts that increase the sentence beyond the maximum authorized by the jury's verdict or the defendant's admissions.

Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, dissented from the Court’s conclusion that attempted burglary categorically qualifies as a violent felony under the residual provision of the Armed Career Criminal Act.

The Court held that the National Bank Act itself preempts Michigan's licensing, reporting, and visitorial requirements for mortgage lending conducted through a national bank's operating subsidiary.

Justice Stevens, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Scalia, dissents from the Court’s decision that the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency’s regulation pre‑empted Michigan’s mortgage‑broker licensing statutes.

Justice Breyer dissents from the denial of certiorari, arguing that the Court should expedite review of whether the Military Commissions Act of 2006 deprives federal courts of jurisdiction to consider habeas claims from Guantanamo detainees and if that deprivation is constitutional.

The Court, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, held that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to enter judgment for relator James Stone under the False Claims Act's then-applicable public-disclosure bar.

Justice Ginsburg, writing for a unanimous Court, held that a district court may dismiss an action for forum non conveniens without first resolving subject-matter or personal jurisdiction. Such dismissal is a threshold, nonmerits determination that does not exercise substantive law-declaring power.

Justice Ginsburg, dissenting, argues that the AEDPA statute of limitations tolling period should continue while a petition for certiorari is pending before the Supreme Court.

Justice Thomas delivered the Court's opinion affirming the Eleventh Circuit. The Court held that AEDPA's one-year limitations period is not tolled under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) while the Supreme Court considers a petition for certiorari reviewing the denial of state postconviction relief.

The Court, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, affirmed the judgment that Wallace's Fourth Amendment false-arrest claim under § 1983 was untimely. The limitations period began when Wallace became detained pursuant to legal process, not when his conviction was overturned or the charges were dismissed.

Chief Justice Roberts, writing for a unanimous Court, rejected three procedural requirements the Sixth Circuit had imposed under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense, so prisoners need not specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints.

Justice Scalia, dissenting, argues that an indictment for attempt must explicitly allege all elements (intent and overt act) rather than relying on the word 'attempt' to convey those elements.

Justice Stevens, writing for eight Justices, held that an indictment charging attempted unlawful reentry need not separately allege a particular overt act or expressly recite the substantial-step requirement.

The Court held that an indictment charging attempted illegal reentry need not allege a specific overt act because the word “attempt” implicitly includes the overt‑act element, and therefore reversed the Ninth Circuit’s judgment.

Justice Scalia concurred in the denial of certiorari, expressing concern that the Court's recent decision in Resendiz-Ponce effectively revolutionizes indictment requirements by treating certain crimes as self-defining.

Justice Souter, joined by Justices Scalia and Alito, concurs with the majority that the same causation standard governs both employer negligence and employee contributory negligence under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, and agrees that the case should be remanded to the Missouri Court of Appeals to determine…

The Court vacated the judgment, holding that FELA requires the same standard of causation for railroad negligence and employee contributory negligence. The Court declined to address the substantive standard of causation itself, noting Missouri's different standards were impermissible.

The Court held that the Federal Employers' Liability Act requires the same causation standard for railroad negligence and employee contributory negligence. It vacated the Missouri Court of Appeals' judgment because Missouri applied different standards, leaving that court to determine whether the instructional error…

Justice Thomas dissents in MedImmune v. Genentech, arguing that a patent licensee in good standing lacks Article III standing to seek declaratory relief challenging patent validity without breaching the license. He contends the majority incorrectly extended Steffel v.

The Court, in an opinion by Justice Scalia joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Alito, held that Article III did not require MedImmune to breach or terminate its patent license before seeking a declaration that the licensed patent was invalid, unenforceable, or…

The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Quebec Bank of Toronto's suit against Hellman, Assignee, holding that a promissory note delivered conditionally for a specific purpose did not transfer title when that purpose was not fulfilled.