Supreme Court of the United States, 2007

The Court held that trading drugs for a firearm does not constitute "using" a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). The Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded for further proceedings. Justice Ginsburg concurred in the judgment, arguing Smith v. United States should be overruled.

Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion held that the crack-cocaine Sentencing Guidelines are advisory and that a sentencing court may consider disagreement with the Guidelines' crack/powder disparity when determining an appropriate sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), even in an ordinary case.

Justice Scalia concurred in Kimbrough, joining the majority opinion while reiterating that United States v. Booker permits district courts to reject the Sentencing Guidelines based on § 3553(a) considerations. He argued that treating Guidelines as binding would violate the Sixth Amendment.

Justice Stevens's majority opinion held that all sentences, whether within or outside the advisory Guidelines range, receive deferential abuse-of-discretion review. Appellate courts may consider the extent of a variance but may not require extraordinary circumstances, apply rigid percentage-based formulas, or presume…

Justice Thomas dissents, arguing the Court's post-Booker advisory sentencing regime lacks a statutory foundation and forces judicial policy-making rather than law application. He maintains the Booker remedy was too broad and that Congress intended the Guidelines to be mandatory under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b).

The Court, in an opinion by Justice Souter joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer, and Alito, held that receiving a firearm in exchange for drugs is not “use” of the firearm under 18 U.S.C. §924(c)(1)(A).

Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, wrote a statement respecting the denial of certiorari. He noted that the timely petition could not be reviewed before the state-set execution date, though a reprieve was granted.

Justice Stevens dissents, joining Justice Breyer’s dissent entirely. He argues that racial classifications for integration differ from those for segregation, criticizes the rigid application of strict scrutiny, and contends that the Chief Justice misinterprets Brown v. Board of Education.

The Court, through Justice Kennedy, overruled Dr. Miles and held that vertical agreements establishing minimum resale prices must be evaluated under the rule of reason rather than treated as per se unlawful under § 1 of the Sherman Act.

Justice Kennedy concurred in part and in the judgment, agreeing the individual racial classifications for student assignment are unconstitutional under strict scrutiny. He found the plans were not narrowly tailored (Jefferson County's ambiguity; Seattle's white/non-white crude categories).

Justice Breyer, dissenting in Joined by Justice Stevens, Justice Souter, and Justice Ginsburg, argues that school districts may voluntarily use race-conscious criteria to integrate public schools.

The Court held that the challenges were justiciable and that Seattle’s and Jefferson County’s use of individual racial classifications in student assignments failed strict scrutiny.

Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment, arguing that taxpayer standing under Flast v. Cohen rests on an untenable concept of "psychic injury" that violates Article III standing requirements.

Justice Souter dissents, arguing that taxpayers have standing to challenge executive branch expenditures under the Establishment Clause. He contends the plurality's distinction between legislative and executive spending is arbitrary and that Flast v. Cohen applies equally.

Justice Breyer dissents, arguing that Section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act applies to all federal agency actions, including the EPA’s transfer of NPDES permitting authority under the Clean Water Act, even if the action is nondiscretionary.

Justice Stevens dissents, arguing that the Endangered Species Act applies to all federal agency actions, including mandatory transfers under the Clean Water Act. He contends the majority misinterpreted precedent and regulations to limit the statute's reach to discretionary acts.

Justice Alito's majority opinion held that the Endangered Species Act's consultation and no-jeopardy requirements apply only to discretionary federal agency actions. The Court deferred to the implementing agencies' regulation and held that transferring Clean Water Act permitting authority to a State is…

The Court reversed the Seventh Circuit's judgment permitting federal taxpayer standing to challenge conferences conducted under the President's Faith-Based and Community Initiatives program.

Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion held that a securities-fraud complaint satisfies the PSLRA's strong-inference requirement only if the inference of scienter is cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing nonfraudulent inference.

The Court, in an opinion by Justice Breyer, held that appellate courts may apply a nonbinding presumption of reasonableness to a sentence within a properly calculated advisory Guidelines range.

The Court held that 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) barred appellate review of Powerex's challenge to the remand because the District Court relied on a ground colorably characterized as lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

The Court, in an opinion by Justice Thomas, held that the statutory deadline for filing a civil notice of appeal is jurisdictional. Bowles's notice, filed within the period erroneously authorized by the District Court but outside the statutory reopening period, therefore did not confer appellate jurisdiction.

The Court held that Washington’s statute requiring public‑sector unions to obtain affirmative consent from nonmembers before using their agency fees for election‑related expenditures does not violate the First Amendment, vacated the Washington Supreme Court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings.

Justice Thomas delivered the Court's opinion holding that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act's immovable-property exception permits suits seeking declarations that tax liens on foreign-government property used to house diplomatic employees are valid.

Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Breyer, dissents, arguing that the FSIA’s exception for rights in immovable property does not waive sovereign immunity for suits to establish tax liens because Congress did not expressly waive immunity for tax litigation.

The Court held that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) does not grant immunity to foreign sovereigns from suits to declare the validity of tax liens on their U.S. property used for housing employees.

The Court held that Washington may require public-sector unions to obtain nonmembers' affirmative authorization before spending their agency fees for election-related purposes. Justice Scalia explained that unions have no constitutional entitlement to nonmembers' fees and that the Court's agency-fee decisions…

Justice Scalia's opinion held that federal courts reviewing state convictions under § 2254 must apply Brecht's substantial-and-injurious-effect standard whether or not the state appellate court recognized the constitutional error and reviewed its harmlessness under Chapman. AEDPA did not eliminate that requirement.

Justice Stevens concurs in part and dissents in part, urging that the Court answer whether the constitutional error was harmless under Brecht v. Abrahamson. He argues the exclusion of Maples’ testimony was not harmless given the jury’s long deliberations and the nature of the error, concluding the judgment should be…

Justice Breyer, concurring in part and dissenting in part, agrees the Brecht standard governs harmless error review but argues the Ninth Circuit must re‑examine the Chambers error determination, urging remand; Justice Stevens, in a separate concurrence‑in‑part/dissent‑in‑part, joins the majority except for Part II‑B…

The Court held per curiam that Erickson's allegations that prison officials terminated necessary hepatitis C treatment and thereby endangered his life sufficiently pleaded harm under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2).

The Supreme Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted after granting review to determine whether the Court of Appeals had improperly applied the AEDPA standard of review to a capital sentence.

The Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted to avoid disparate treatment of three similarly situated habeas petitioners, one of whom had his pre-AEDPA petition erroneously dismissed by a District Court for seeking certiorari rather than filing immediately.

Chief Justice Roberts, writing for a unanimous Court, held that the Tax Court has exclusive jurisdiction to review the Secretary of the Treasury’s refusal to abate interest under 26 U.S.C. § 6404(e)(1).

Justice Souter's opinion held that a Sherman Act § 1 complaint must contain enough factual matter to plausibly suggest an agreement; parallel conduct and conclusory assertions of conspiracy alone are insufficient.

Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Thomas and Alito, dissents from the Court's dismissal of the writ as improvidently granted. He argues that AEDPA applies to post-AEDPA habeas petitions regardless of prior District Court error and that the respondent failed to exhaust appeals of the erroneous dismissal.

Justice Thomas's opinion held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion by denying Landrigan an evidentiary hearing on his claim that counsel inadequately investigated mitigating evidence.

Justice Ginsburg's opinion held that Microsoft was not liable under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) for foreign-made computers loaded with Windows copies produced abroad from masters dispatched from the United States.

The Court held that Scott did not violate the Fourth Amendment by forcing Harris's vehicle off the road to end a dangerous high-speed chase that threatened others with serious injury.

Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas and joined by Justice Alito as to Part I, dissented from the judgments granting relief in these capital habeas cases. He argued that the governing precedents required only that jurors be able to consider mitigating evidence in some manner, and that the state courts'…