Supreme Court of the United States
Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education
March 29, 2005544 U.S. 167
Summary
The Supreme Court held that the private right of action implied by Title IX encompasses claims of retaliation: when a funding recipient retaliates against a person because he has complained about sex discrimination, that retaliation is intentional 'discrimination' 'on the basis of sex' under 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a), and a complainant who is only an 'indirect victim' of the underlying discrimination may invoke the right. Because the prohibition lies in the statute's own text rather than in regulations, the Court framed its holding as consistent with its limits on privately enforcing regulations, and it concluded that the Spending Clause notice requirement is satisfied because retaliation is intentional conduct violating the statute's clear terms. Reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, the Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit and remanded for further proceedings. Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Kennedy, dissented, contending that retaliation is not discrimination on the basis of sex, that Congress must speak unambiguously when imposing spending conditions, and that § 901 evinces no intent to create a retaliation remedy.
Holding
- Whether Title IX's implied private right of action encompasses claims of retaliation for complaints about sex discrimination.. It does: the private right of action encompasses retaliation claims where the funding recipient retaliates against an individual because he has complained about sex discrimination.
- Whether the retaliation prohibition derives from Title IX's statutory text rather than from Department of Education regulations, as the Board urged.. Title IX's text itself prohibits retaliation for complaints of sex discrimination; the Court does not rely on the Department of Education's antiretaliation regulation at all, and the holding is therefore 'in step with' the principle that private parties may not enforce regulations covering conduct the statute does not prohibit.
- Whether a complainant who is an 'indirect victim'—not the subject of the original sex discrimination—may invoke Title IX's private right of action.. He may: the broadly worded statute does not require that the victim of the retaliation also be the victim of the discrimination that is the subject of the original complaint; where retaliation occurs because the complainant speaks out about sex discrimination, the 'on the basis of sex' requirement is satisfied and the complainant is himself a victim of discriminatory retaliation.
- Whether the Spending Clause notice requirement bars a private damages action for retaliation because Title IX nowhere expressly mentions retaliation.. It does not: retaliation is 'intentional conduct that violates the clear terms of the statute,' so Title IX itself supplied sufficient notice; the nearly thirty-year-old implementing regulations and the Courts of Appeals' pre-existing interpretations meant the Board could not realistically have supposed it remained free to retaliate against those who reported sex discrimination.
Docket 02-1672
Cited authorities
- CA10
- CA11
- Pub. L. 92-318, 86
- 20 U.S.C. § 1681
- Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
- 20 U.S.C. § 1681
- 20 U.S.C. § 1681
- 78 Stat. 257
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