Start with Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. In Rhode Island, Rhode Island evidence practice is organized under the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. Relevance starts at R.I. R. Evid. 401, 403; hearsay starts at R.I. R. Evid. 801, 802. That is the question this guide answers for evidence law. Authenticity is a separate fight under R.I. R. Evid. 901, 902. Depositions at trial: R.I. R. Civ. P. 30 and 32 govern civil depositions and trial use. R.I. R. Crim. P. 16 controls criminal discovery; prior testimony may be admitted under R.I. R. Evid. 804(b)(1).
General standards of admissibility
Rhode Island starts every evidence dispute with relevance and unfair prejudice. Under R.I. R. Evid. 401, 403, evidence is relevant when it has any tendency to make a fact of consequence more or less probable, and relevant evidence is still excluded when its probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. Preliminary questions of admissibility are for the court; conditional relevance and limited-purpose instructions keep otherwise-usable proof from becoming a Trojan horse for propensity or truth-of-the-matter use.
Rhode Island courts cite federal advisory-committee notes. The state's compact judiciary means evidence rulings propagate quickly through superior court practice.
Practice tip: articulate the theory of relevance in one sentence before citing the exception. Lawyers who lead with "it's a business record" without explaining what fact the record proves often lose the 403 balance even when the hearsay foundation is clean.
Character evidence
Character evidence in Rhode Island is governed by R.I. R. Evid. 404, 405. The default rule is familiar: evidence of a person's character or character trait is not admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character or trait. The same body of law then carves out the classic exceptions — essential-element character, accused-opens-the-door reputation or opinion, and other-acts evidence offered for a non-propensity purpose such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake.
Other-acts notice, 403 balancing, and limiting instructions do most of the real work. In criminal cases, prosecutors who dump prior misconduct without a specific non-propensity theory invite reversal; defense counsel who open the door to good-character testimony without anticipating rebuttal create the very propensity inference the rules were designed to police.
Rhode Island character-evidence opinions
STATE v. Marcelino Collazo GOMEZ
STATE v. Marcelino Collazo GOMEZ, 2004 R.I. LEXIS 99 (2004)
…ons to Gonzalez’s murder weighed in favor of admitting such character evidence. According to Gomez, in November 1997 Rivera was convicted of “bashing out the window of his girlfriend with a baseball bat,” and in December he attempted “to strangle his girlfriend with a telephone cord.” In denying the defendant’s request, the trial justice explained: “Relevant evidence is that ev…
Practitioners open STATE v. Marcelino Collazo GOMEZ when Rhode Island character evidence turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Gonzalez’s murder weighed in favor of admitting such character evidence. According to Gomez, in November 1997 Rivera was convicted of “bashing out the window of his girlfriend with a baseball bat,” and in December he attempted “to strangle his girlfriend with a telephone cord." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
STATE v. Jose GARCIA — Weisberger, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part
…rors may believe that the prior crimes or bad acts denote a propensity in a defendant to commit the crime with which he or she is charged. In these circumstances the potential for prejudice outweighs the probative value of such evidence, and it is therefore inadmissible. State v. Brown, 626 A.2d 228, 233 (R.I.1993); State v. Chartier, 619 A.2d 1119, 1122 (R.I.1993).” In the cas…
On character evidence, STATE v. Jose GARCIA — Weisberger, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part speaks to the Rhode Island dispute in this passage: "In these circumstances the potential for prejudice outweighs the probative value of such evidence, and it is therefore inadmissible. State v. Brown, 626 A.2d 228, 233 (R.I.1993); State v. Chartier, 619 A.2d 1119, 1122 (R.I.1993)." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
STATE v. Kailash MOHAPATRA — Robinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part
…f evidence) is to exclude evidence of a defendant’s alleged propensity to commit crime; our system seeks to focus the attention of the finders of fact on the evidence pertinent to the particular crime of which the defendant is presently charged.10 Rule 404(b) essentially codifies the longstanding rule that evidence of a criminal defendant’s propensity to commit crime is inadmis…
On character evidence, STATE v. Kailash MOHAPATRA — Robinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part speaks to the Rhode Island dispute in this passage: "f evidence) is to exclude evidence of a defendant’s alleged propensity to commit crime; our system seeks to focus the attention of the finders of fact on the evidence pertinent to the particular crime of which the defendant is presently charged.10 Rule 404(b) essentially codifies" The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
STATE v. Thomas OLIVIERA
STATE v. Thomas OLIVIERA, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 575 (1987)
…e erroneously refused to allow the jury to hear “pertinent” character evidence. He also contends that the prosecution discriminated against male members of the jury panel in exercising its peremptory challenges in violation of the equal-protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. We affirm the conviction. I THE DEFENDANT’S MILITARY RECORD WA…
Practitioners open STATE v. Thomas OLIVIERA when Rhode Island character evidence turns on the distinction in this sentence: "He also contends that the prosecution discriminated against male members of the jury panel in exercising its peremptory challenges in violation of the equal-protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. We affirm the conviction." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
STATE v. Jose A. RODRIGUEZ — Robinson, J., concurring
STATE v. Jose A. RODRIGUEZ — Robinson, J., concurring, 2010 R.I. LEXIS 87 (2010)
…regardless of any relevancy that it might have to show the propensity of a defendant to have committed the charged crime.”) (Emphasis added.). The majority summarizes defendant’s position with respect to Rule 404(b) as follows: “[A]ny evidence of prior criminal activity is presumed inadmissible under Rule 404(b) as inherently prejudicial.” The majority then states that “[s]ueh…
On character evidence, STATE v. Jose A. RODRIGUEZ — Robinson, J., concurring speaks to the Rhode Island dispute in this passage: "Emphasis added.). The majority summarizes defendant’s position with respect to Rule 404(b) as follows: “[A]ny evidence of prior criminal activity is presumed inadmissible under Rule 404(b) as inherently prejudicial." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
How the Rhode Island rule applies
Apply the Rhode Island authorities in order. The facts are simplified so the statute and the standard are visible.
A lawyer in Rhode Island wants to offer a medical record, a party email, and a statement the declarant made while believing death was imminent.
- Clear relevance and unfair prejudice under R.I. R. Evid. 401, 403.
- If the email is the opposing party's, test R.I. R. Evid. 801(d)(2) before the hearsay definition in R.I. R. Evid. 801, 802.
- For the medical record, lay the business-records foundation in R.I. R. Evid. 803(6) and the treatment purpose in R.I. R. Evid. 803(4).
- For the deathbed statement, meet R.I. R. Evid. 804(b)(2), then authenticate every exhibit under R.I. R. Evid. 901, 902.
Rhode Island keeps hearsay, character, and authenticity on different rules inside the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. Winning one does not win the others.
Hearsay: start with the definition
Most hearsay objections in Rhode Island are won or lost on the definition, not on an exception. Under R.I. R. Evid. 801, 802, hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Non-hearsay purposes — verbal acts, effect on the listener, notice, circumstantial evidence of state of mind, and impeachment — remain available when the proponent can articulate them without asking the jury to believe the declarant.
Layered hearsay (hearsay within hearsay) requires an exception or exclusion for each layer. Machine-generated data and non-assertive conduct sit outside the hearsay definition in FRE-aligned jurisdictions, but they still need authenticity and, often, expert or business-records foundations.
Rhode Island hearsay opinions
STATE v. Raymond LYNCH
STATE v. Raymond LYNCH, 854 A.2d 1022 (2004)
…imony of the School Psychologist The defendant alleges that hearsay statements Mary made to Mary-Ellen Tillotson, a certified school psychologist, were improperly admitted in violation of Rule 803(4) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence because there was no evidence that Mary sought a medical (or mental health) diagnosis from Ms. Tillotson. Ms. Tillotson testified that on Sept…
On hearsay, STATE v. Raymond LYNCH speaks to the Rhode Island dispute in this passage: "Mary made to Mary-Ellen Tillotson, a certified school psychologist, were improperly admitted in violation of Rule 803(4) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence because there was no evidence that Mary sought a medical (or mental health) diagnosis from Ms. Tillotson. Ms." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
STATE v. Allen M. BRASH Et Al.
STATE v. Allen M. BRASH Et Al., 1986 R.I. LEXIS 533 (1986)
…that are dispos-itive of this appeal. They are the alleged hearsay-bolstering testimony from Agent Bubela and Lieutenant Moffatt about their conversations with Salisbury and the admission into evidence of the Lawton Farm testimony and guns. We begin by recognizing that the question of whether evidence is relevant and therefore admissible is a determination resting within the s…
Rhode Island opinions such as STATE v. Allen M. BRASH Et Al. are cited where hearsay is disputed. The court stated: "They are the alleged hearsay-bolstering testimony from Agent Bubela and Lieutenant Moffatt about their conversations with Salisbury and the admission into evidence of the Lawton Farm testimony and guns." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
In Re JEAN MARIE W. Et Al.
In Re JEAN MARIE W. Et Al., 1989 R.I. LEXIS 102 (1989)
…mother argues that this testimony constituted inadmissible hearsay because it introduced her daughter’s out-of-court statements and other assertive conduct to prove the truth of what they asserted without falling within any recognized exception to the hearsay rule. The mother’s first hearsay objections involve the testimony of two witnesses regarding their observations of Jean…
Rhode Island opinions such as In Re JEAN MARIE W. Et Al. are cited where hearsay is disputed. The court stated: "mother argues that this testimony constituted inadmissible hearsay because it introduced her daughter’s out-of-court statements and other assertive conduct to prove the truth of what they asserted without falling within any recognized exception to the hearsay rule. The mother’s f" That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
In Re JESSICA C. Et Al.
In Re JESSICA C. Et Al., 1997 R.I. LEXIS 79 (1997)
…nded that the trial justice had improperly admitted certain hearsay statements made by the children and had erroneously permitted several witnesses to offer an opinion on the credibility of the children. The respondent also argued that the trial justice had committed reversible error by qualifying one of the state’s witnesses as an expert and by permitting that witness to testi…
Practitioners open In Re JESSICA C. Et Al. when Rhode Island hearsay turns on the distinction in this sentence: "nded that the trial justice had improperly admitted certain hearsay statements made by the children and had erroneously permitted several witnesses to offer an opinion on the credibility of the children. The respondent also argued that the trial justice had committed reversible e" Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
STATE v. David R. POULIN
STATE v. David R. POULIN, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1656 (1980)
…he testimony of three witnesses that contained inadmissible hearsay evidence. In addition to his hearsay contentions, Poulin asserts that the testimony of the complainant’s mother, Sandra, included highly prejudicial allusions to assaults on the complainant other than those charged in the state’s information. Poulin lived with the complainant’s family for two and one-half years…
STATE v. David R. POULIN is worth reading on Rhode Island hearsay because the court put the point in its own words: "In addition to his hearsay contentions, Poulin asserts that the testimony of the complainant’s mother, Sandra, included highly prejudicial allusions to assaults on the complainant other than those charged in the state’s information." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
STATE v. Eugene PINA
STATE v. Eugene PINA, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 792 (1983)
…On appeal defendant argued that Dr. Murray’s testimony was hearsay and did not fall within the medical-diagnosis exception to the hearsay rule. The defendant also argued that the admission of Dr. Murray’s testimony was highly prejudicial. We agree with the above contentions. Doctor Murray’s testimony of Madeline’s case history consisting of her out-of-court statements is clear…
On hearsay, STATE v. Eugene PINA speaks to the Rhode Island dispute in this passage: "On appeal defendant argued that Dr. Murray’s testimony was hearsay and did not fall within the medical-diagnosis exception to the hearsay rule. The defendant also argued that the admission of Dr. Murray’s testimony was highly prejudicial. We agree with the above contentions." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
In Re DANIEL
In Re DANIEL, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 800 (1983)
…idence linking him to the offense consisted of inadmissible hearsay. We agree. Because the Family Court justice determined that the three-year-old victim was incompetent to testify, the evidence linking Daniel to the crime consisted of the testimony of the mother and a police officer. The mother stated that at approximately 5:55 p.m. on April 23, 1979, she left her home. Upon r…
On hearsay, In Re DANIEL speaks to the Rhode Island dispute in this passage: "We agree. Because the Family Court justice determined that the three-year-old victim was incompetent to testify, the evidence linking Daniel to the crime consisted of the testimony of the mother and a police officer. The mother stated that at approximately 5:55 p.m." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Party admissions
Statements of an opposing party are among the most important routes around the hearsay bar. Rhode Island treats them under R.I. R. Evid. 801(d)(2). Nothing about the statement need be against interest, contemporaneous, or based on personal knowledge — the theory is adversarial, not reliability-based. A party cannot complain that his own words are unreliable when offered against him.
Scope questions dominate practice: the party's own statement; adopted statements (including silence in circumstances where a reasonable person would deny); statements by authorized speakers; agent or employee statements on matters within the scope of the relationship; and, in criminal conspiracy cases, coconspirator statements during and in furtherance of the conspiracy. A defendant generally cannot introduce his own exculpatory out-of-court statement as a "party admission" against himself — the rule runs one way.
Rhode Island party-admission opinions
Joseph DeCHRISTOFARO Et Al. v. Edward W. MACHALA D.B.A. Bryik Builders
Joseph DeCHRISTOFARO Et Al. v. Edward W. MACHALA D.B.A. Bryik Builders, 685 A.2d 258 (1996)
…n arising from the same house-construction project, (3) the admission of expert testimony regarding costs of construction of the house, and (4) the admission into evidence of a compilation of invoices and payments related to the construction. For the reasons stated below, we reverse the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict on the conversion coun…
Joseph DeCHRISTOFARO Et Al. v. Edward W. MACHALA D.B.A. Bryik Builders is worth reading on Rhode Island party admissions because the court put the point in its own words: "n arising from the same house-construction project, (3) the admission of expert testimony regarding costs of construction of the house, and (4) the admission into evidence of a compilation of invoices and payments related to the construction. For the reasons stated below, we reve" Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
FONDEDILE, S.A. v. C.E. MAGUIRE, INC. A/K/A Maguire Group, Inc., Et Al.
FONDEDILE, S.A. v. C.E. MAGUIRE, INC. A/K/A Maguire Group, Inc., Et Al., 1992 R.I. LEXIS 103 (1992)
…ment by a party-opponent is insufficient in itself to be an admission under Rule 801(d)(2). Consequently the statement cannot be introduced as an admission by Ma-guire because the statement cannot be attributed to Maguire. In the alternative, plaintiff asserts that the notes are admissible under Rule 803(6), the business-records exception to hearsay. To be admissible under Rule…
Practitioners open FONDEDILE, S.A. v. C.E. MAGUIRE, INC. A/K/A Maguire Group, Inc., Et Al. when Rhode Island party admissions turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Rule 801(d)(2). Consequently the statement cannot be introduced as an admission by Ma-guire because the statement cannot be attributed to Maguire. In the alternative, plaintiff asserts that the notes are admissible under Rule 803(6), the business-records exception to hearsay." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
State v. Bernard A. Tribble.
State v. Bernard A. Tribble., 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1107 (1981)
…is mind, are admissible.” The trial justice’s denial of the admission of the proffered evidence forms the basis of defendant’s appeal. On appeal, the state contends that the trial justice properly excluded the proffered evidence and in support of this contention, the state relies primarily upon State v. Infantolino, 116 R.I. 303, 355 A.2d 722 (1976). *1083 In that case, the def…
Rhode Island opinions such as State v. Bernard A. Tribble. are cited where party admissions is disputed. The court stated: "The trial justice’s denial of the admission of the proffered evidence forms the basis of defendant’s appeal. On appeal, the state contends that the trial justice properly excluded the proffered evidence and in support of this contention, the state relies primarily upon State v." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Catherine Scittarelli v. the Providence Gas Company v. the Hardwick Stove Company.
…, the statement in and of itself does not amount to a party admission of negligence. McCormick’s Handbook of the Law of Evidence, § 263 at 631-32, § 267 at 640 (2d ed. Cleary 1972). The plaintiff also contends that she has established defendant’s negligence by excluding all other possible explanations for the accident. By stipulation the parties eliminated any negligence on the…
On party admissions, Catherine Scittarelli v. the Providence Gas Company v. the Hardwick Stove Company. speaks to the Rhode Island dispute in this passage: "McCormick’s Handbook of the Law of Evidence, § 263 at 631-32, § 267 at 640 (2d ed. Cleary 1972). The plaintiff also contends that she has established defendant’s negligence by excluding all other possible explanations for the accident." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
STATE v. Curley SNELL
STATE v. Curley SNELL, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 27 (2006)
…(2) thereby caused substantial injury to the party seeking admission of such evidence.” State v. Calitri, 459 A.2d 478, 480 (R.I.1983). With respect to the “substantial injury” inquiry, the question to be addressed is “whether the rejected evidence reasonably could have altered the result.” State v. Burke, 522 A.2d 725, 730 (R.I.1987). “Proffered evidence is considered probati…
Practitioners open STATE v. Curley SNELL when Rhode Island party admissions turns on the distinction in this sentence: "State v. Calitri, 459 A.2d 478, 480 (R.I.1983). With respect to the “substantial injury” inquiry, the question to be addressed is “whether the rejected evidence reasonably could have altered the result.” State v. Burke, 522 A.2d 725, 730 (R.I.1987)." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Paula A. BEATON v. Philip MALOUIN
Paula A. BEATON v. Philip MALOUIN, 2004 R.I. LEXIS 72 (2004)
…ied his brakes. Counsel argued that the answers constituted admissions or previous inconsistent statements of defendant. To support his argument, plaintiff pointed to Rule 33(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. 3 Noting that the Rules of Civil Procedure do not govern the admissibility of evidence, the trial justice found that admissibility was controlled by,the R…
Practitioners open Paula A. BEATON v. Philip MALOUIN when Rhode Island party admissions turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Counsel argued that the answers constituted admissions or previous inconsistent statements of defendant. To support his argument, plaintiff pointed to Rule 33(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
STATE v. Gloria CALITRI
STATE v. Gloria CALITRI, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 867 (1983)
…(2) thereby caused substantial injury to the party seeking admission of such evidence. State v. Barnville, supra. Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bar, we find no reversible error. Two different types of judicial discretion exist. The first type, which is unre-viewable, accords to trial justices freedom of choice in areas unhampered by legal rules. For example,…
Practitioners open STATE v. Gloria CALITRI when Rhode Island party admissions turns on the distinction in this sentence: "State v. Barnville, supra. Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bar, we find no reversible error. Two different types of judicial discretion exist. The first type, which is unre-viewable, accords to trial justices freedom of choice in areas unhampered by legal rules." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Israel Wilson v. the Hampden Fire Insurance Company.
Israel Wilson v. the Hampden Fire Insurance Company., 4 R.I. 159 (1856)
…e defendants why their motion should be granted. First. The admission of improper testimony complained of consisted, in allowing the plaintiff to rebut an inference which the jury might draw to his disadvantage from evidence put in by the defendants, unless the defendants would consent to withdraw that evidence, which was clearly irrelevant to any issue arising on the trial. It…
Rhode Island opinions such as Israel Wilson v. the Hampden Fire Insurance Company. are cited where party admissions is disputed. The court stated: "e defendants why their motion should be granted. First. The admission of improper testimony complained of consisted, in allowing the plaintiff to rebut an inference which the jury might draw to his disadvantage from evidence put in by the defendants, unless the defendants would c" That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Business records
The business-records exception under R.I. R. Evid. 803(6) is the everyday path for medical charts, employment files, bank statements, and maintenance logs. The foundation requires a record made at or near the time by — or from information transmitted by — someone with knowledge; kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity; and made as a regular practice. A custodian or other qualified witness (or a qualifying certification where the jurisdiction allows it) lays the foundation. The opponent may still attack lack of trustworthiness when the source or method of preparation indicates unreliability — litigation-driven reports are the classic failure mode.
Do not confuse authenticity with the business-records exception. You still need to show the exhibit is what you claim it is; the hearsay exception then answers why the out-of-court assertions inside it may be considered for their truth.
Rhode Island business-records opinions
STATE v. Louis John MANOCCHIO Et Al.
STATE v. Louis John MANOCCHIO Et Al., 1985 R.I. LEXIS 568 (1985)
…ds set forth in Federal Rule 803(6) for the introduction of business records as evidence in criminal cases and adopted by this court in State v. Acquisto, — R.I. —, 463 A.2d 122 (1983), we are of the opinion that the trial justice did not err in admitting the autopsy report as a full exhibit. Rule 803(6) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides as follows: “The following are n…
STATE v. Louis John MANOCCHIO Et Al. is worth reading on Rhode Island business records because the court put the point in its own words: "Federal Rule 803(6) for the introduction of business records as evidence in criminal cases and adopted by this court in State v. Acquisto, — R.I. —, 463 A.2d 122 (1983), we are of the opinion that the trial justice did not err in admitting the autopsy report as a full exhibit." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
STATE v. Edward ACQUISTO
STATE v. Edward ACQUISTO, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 1012 (1983)
…ey do not meet the common-law standards for introduction of business records. The defendant cites Quint v. Pawtuxet Valley Bus Lines, 114 R.I. 473, 481, 335 A.2d 328, 333 (1975), as setting forth the following common-law requirements for admissibility of business records: “The record maker and each human link in the chain of information, if living and competent, had to testify…
On business records, STATE v. Edward ACQUISTO speaks to the Rhode Island dispute in this passage: "The defendant cites Quint v. Pawtuxet Valley Bus Lines, 114 R.I. 473, 481, 335 A." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
STATE v. Hervey MOMPLAISIR
STATE v. Hervey MOMPLAISIR, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 36 (2003)
…d (6), the medical diagnosis or treatment exception and the business records exception to the hearsay rule. 4 The state objected on the ground that the physician’s *72 notation was highly suspect because it indicated that Perales was beaten, not with a flashlight, as Perales testified at trial, but with a club. 5 In line with the prosecution’s objection, the trial justice also…
Practitioners open STATE v. Hervey MOMPLAISIR when Rhode Island business records turns on the distinction in this sentence: "The state objected on the ground that the physician’s *72 notation was highly suspect because it indicated that Perales was beaten, not with a flashlight, as Perales testified at trial, but with a club." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
State vs. Daniel Jamgochian
State vs. Daniel Jamgochian, 109 R.I. 46 (1971)
…nds that G. L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment) §9-19-13 3 precludes business records kept in the regular course of business from being admitted in evidence in criminal cases. He relies on the language of the statute which expressly authorizes use of business records in civil proceedings. 4 He also relies on the decision of this court in State v. Guaraneri, 59 R. I. 173, 194 A. 589. In…
State vs. Daniel Jamgochian is worth reading on Rhode Island business records because the court put the point in its own words: "G. L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment) §9-19-13 3 precludes business records kept in the regular course of business from being admitted in evidence in criminal cases. He relies on the language of the statute which expressly authorizes use of business records in civil proceedings." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Carmen P. BOSCIA v. Jami C. SHARPLES Et Al.
Carmen P. BOSCIA v. Jami C. SHARPLES Et Al., 2004 R.I. LEXIS 172 (2004)
…he medical records could have been admitted pursuant to the business records exception to the hearsay rule, Rule 803(6) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. 6 State v. Belanger, 792 A.2d 60, 64 (R.I.2002) (per curiam) (holding medical expert was properly cross-examined on data in a medical report because the type of report fell within Rule 803(6) and contained “the type of da…
Practitioners open Carmen P. BOSCIA v. Jami C. SHARPLES Et Al. when Rhode Island business records turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Rule 803(6) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. 6 State v. Belanger, 792 A.2d 60, 64 (R.I." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
State v. Jose Pupo Carrera.
State v. Jose Pupo Carrera., 1987 R.I. LEXIS 525 (1987)
…ognized by Rhode Island law. In order to be admissible as a business record, a document must meet the requirements of Rule 803(6) of the Federal Rules of Evidence adopted by this court in State v. Acquisto, 463 A.2d 122 (R.I. 1983). 3 A fundamental prerequisite to the admission of any business record is an adequate foundation. There was no evidence that the *336 discharge summa…
Practitioners open State v. Jose Pupo Carrera. when Rhode Island business records turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Rhode Island law. In order to be admissible as a business record, a document must meet the requirements of Rule 803(6) of the Federal Rules of Evidence adopted by this court in State v. Acquisto, 463 A.2d 122 (R.I. 1983)." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Rhode Island Managed Eye Care, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Rhode Island
…ndant cross-appealed, challenging the admittance of certain business records into evidence. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court. I Facts and Procedural History Blue Cross is a not-for-profit corporation that contracts with physicians, hospitals and laboratories to provide prepaid healthcare plans, under which members receive m…
Practitioners open Rhode Island Managed Eye Care, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Rhode Island when Rhode Island business records turns on the distinction in this sentence: "For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Dennis MARTIN, in His Capacity as Executor of the Estate of Camella L. Martin v. Michael LAWRENCE, Alias; Et Al.
…t forth a four-part test for the admissibility of a hearsay business record: “First, the record must be regularly maintained in the course of a regularly conducted business activity. Second, the source of the information must be a person with knowledge. Third, the information must be recorded contemporaneously with the event or occurrence, and fourth, the party introducing the…
Dennis MARTIN, in His Capacity as Executor of the Estate of Camella L. Martin v. Michael LAWRENCE, Alias; Et Al. is worth reading on Rhode Island business records because the court put the point in its own words: "First, the record must be regularly maintained in the course of a regularly conducted business activity. Second, the source of the information must be a person with knowledge." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Important hearsay exceptions that do not require unavailability
Three present-sense and mental-state exceptions carry most of the remaining traffic in Rhode Island trial practice.
Excited utterance — R.I. R. Evid. 803(2). A statement relating to a startling event or condition, made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused. Timing is elastic; composure defeats the exception even minutes after the event, while visible distress can preserve it for hours.
Present sense impression — R.I. R. Evid. 803(1). A statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while or immediately after the declarant perceived it. Contemporaneity is strict — seconds and minutes, not hours — and excitement is not required.
Then-existing mental, emotional, or physical condition — R.I. R. Evid. 803(3). Statements of then-existing state of mind (including intent and plan) come in; statements of memory or belief offered to prove the fact remembered generally do not. Intent-to-meet-another-person cases remain the hardest applications.
Declarant unavailable
When the declarant is unavailable under R.I. R. Evid. 804(a), Rhode Island opens a second suite of exceptions. Unavailability typically includes privilege, refusal to testify despite court order, lack of memory, death or then-existing infirmity, and absence despite reasonable efforts to procure attendance. The proponent bears the burden of proving unavailability with specific facts — a bare assertion that the witness "could not be found" is not enough.
Former testimony under R.I. R. Evid. 804(b)(1) is the workhorse once unavailability is shown: testimony given as a witness at a trial, hearing, or lawful deposition, offered against a party who had an opportunity and similar motive to develop it by direct, cross, or redirect. Criminal confrontation analysis runs in parallel and is not satisfied merely because a hearsay exception applies.
Dying declarations
Dying declarations under R.I. R. Evid. 804(b)(2) remain a narrow but decisive exception in homicide and, in many jurisdictions, civil cases involving the cause or circumstances of what the declarant believed to be impending death. The foundational showing is the declarant's belief that death was imminent — not that death in fact followed within any particular time — plus a statement concerning the cause or circumstances of what the declarant believed to be the impending death. Courts police coaching and narrative expansions aggressively.
Rhode Island dying-declaration opinions
STATE v. Paul J. GAZERRO and Scott T. Badessa
STATE v. Paul J. GAZERRO and Scott T. Badessa, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1820 (1980)
…ates for the admissibility of a declarant’s statements as a dying declaration, including the consciousness of impending death, had been satisfied. 2 The defendants assert that this ruling was erroneous. On review, we must determine from the record whether the evidence supports the trial justice’s findings. We therefore shall set out the factual circumstances that led up to the…
STATE v. Paul J. GAZERRO and Scott T. Badessa is worth reading on Rhode Island dying declaration because the court put the point in its own words: "The defendants assert that this ruling was erroneous. On review, we must determine from the record whether the evidence supports the trial justice’s findings." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
State vs. Alva C. Nordstrom
State vs. Alva C. Nordstrom, 104 R.I. 471 (1968)
…ere was made and rejected. In allowing into evidence of the dying declaration of a murder victim this court said: “The defendant further contends that the admission of this evidence violates his constitutional right to be confronted by his witnesses. But this is not so. The *478 deceased is not the witness; nor are his statements, merely as statements, reproduced in evidence. W…
State vs. Alva C. Nordstrom is worth reading on Rhode Island dying declaration because the court put the point in its own words: "In allowing into evidence of the dying declaration of a murder victim this court said: “The defendant further contends that the admission of this evidence violates his constitutional right to be confronted by his witnesses. But this is not so." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
State vs. William Edward Bradshaw
State vs. William Edward Bradshaw, 101 R.I. 233 (1966)
…ivan, 20 R. I. 114, did not qualify for admission under the dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule because there was no showing that Crilley believed he was in the immediate presence of death, or that his death was impending, or that he was about to die. Even if not admissible as a dying declaration, it was nonetheless proper to allow the testimony because what was sai…
State vs. William Edward Bradshaw is worth reading on Rhode Island dying declaration because the court put the point in its own words: "R. I. 114, did not qualify for admission under the dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule because there was no showing that Crilley believed he was in the immediate presence of death, or that his death was impending, or that he was about to die." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
STATE v. William B. BURKE and Richard R. St. Pierre
STATE v. William B. BURKE and Richard R. St. Pierre, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 103 (1990)
…intended reach of the exception. “Unlike the exception for dying declarations contained in proposed [Federal] rule 804(b)(2), this exception applies in all criminal and civil cases, and is not limited to the cause or circumstances of the declarant’s impending death. “Application of this exception to criminal cases goes beyond the scope of Massachusetts statute from which this…
Practitioners open STATE v. William B. BURKE and Richard R. St. Pierre when Rhode Island dying declaration turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Unlike the exception for dying declarations contained in proposed [Federal] rule 804(b)(2), this exception applies in all criminal and civil cases, and is not limited to the cause or circumstances of the declarant’s impending death." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
State v. Tony E. Lemon.
State v. Tony E. Lemon., 1984 R.I. LEXIS 526 (1984)
…e of murder on the. bases of alibi testimony and possibly a dying declaration of the victim which had not implicated defendant. After giving his statement concerning the charge of murder on October 21, 1978, defendant led the police in a search for the murder weapon. When the police had concluded their investigation of the alleged murder, they then took steps on the same day to…
Rhode Island opinions such as State v. Tony E. Lemon. are cited where dying declaration is disputed. The court stated: "After giving his statement concerning the charge of murder on October 21, 1978, defendant led the police in a search for the murder weapon." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
STATE v. Stephen PAILIN
STATE v. Stephen PAILIN, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 133 (1990)
…nation that Strong’s comments to the bouncers constituted a dying declaration that conformed to the dictates of Rule 804(b)(2) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. Prior to trial, defendant moved to preclude the prosecution’s use of these statements made by Strong. At a pretrial hearing, the trial justice listened to testimony from the club’s bouncers concerning Strong’s utte…
Practitioners open STATE v. Stephen PAILIN when Rhode Island dying declaration turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Strong’s comments to the bouncers constituted a dying declaration that conformed to the dictates of Rule 804(b)(2) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. Prior to trial, defendant moved to preclude the prosecution’s use of these statements made by Strong." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
State v. Tyrone Scholl.
State v. Tyrone Scholl., 1995 R.I. LEXIS 179 (1995)
…. Cleary 1972)). The guarantee of reliability inherent in a dying declaration is based upon the belief that most people are inclined to tell the truth if they are aware of their impending death. See id. Before such hearsay evidence becomes admissible, it must be found to satisfy the requirements of Rule 804(b)(2) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. That rule reads: “(b) Hear…
Rhode Island opinions such as State v. Tyrone Scholl. are cited where dying declaration is disputed. The court stated: "Cleary 1972)). The guarantee of reliability inherent in a dying declaration is based upon the belief that most people are inclined to tell the truth if they are aware of their impending death. See id." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
STATE v. Estuardo GASPARICO
STATE v. Estuardo GASPARICO, 694 A.2d 1204 (1997)
…d that Edgardo's statements might have been admissible as a dying declaration pursuant to Rule 804(b)(2) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. We need not address the applicability of that exception to the facts presented in view of our concluding that the statements were properly admitted under the excited utterance exception, although arguably the statements would have been…
Practitioners open STATE v. Estuardo GASPARICO when Rhode Island dying declaration turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Edgardo's statements might have been admissible as a dying declaration pursuant to Rule 804(b)(2) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Medical diagnosis or treatment statements
Statements made for medical diagnosis or treatment under R.I. R. Evid. 803(4) cover medical history, past or present symptoms, and their general cause when reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. The exception is not limited to treating physicians; statements to nurses, EMTs, and consulting clinicians can qualify when the diagnostic purpose is genuine. Fault and identity remain the usual battleground: "I was hit by a car" is often pertinent; "the light was green" usually is not; abuser identity in child-abuse and domestic-violence cases is heavily litigated.
Rhode Island medical-statement opinions
STATE v. Raymond LYNCH
STATE v. Raymond LYNCH, 854 A.2d 1022 (2004)
…ions to this rule. Rule 803(4), "Statements for Purposes of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment," allows *1031 hearsay statements to be admitted into evidence if the statements were: "made for the purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external…
On medical diagnosis hearsay, STATE v. Raymond LYNCH speaks to the Rhode Island dispute in this passage: "ions to this rule. Rule 803(4), 'Statements for Purposes of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment,' allows *1031 hearsay statements to be admitted into evidence if the statements were: 'made for the purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or pr" The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
State v. Nakeda Brown.
State v. Nakeda Brown., 2010 R.I. LEXIS 120 (2010)
…ng that such testimony was a statement made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment, admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule under Rule 803(4) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. The trial justice said that the medical-diagnosis exception applies in this case because “if somebody said they were hit by an object * or kicked with a foot, that would make some…
State v. Nakeda Brown. is worth reading on Rhode Island medical diagnosis hearsay because the court put the point in its own words: "Rule 803(4) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
STATE v. Hervey MOMPLAISIR
STATE v. Hervey MOMPLAISIR, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 36 (2003)
…exhibit was admissible pursuant to Rule 803(4) and (6), the medical diagnosis or treatment exception and the business records exception to the hearsay rule. 4 The state objected on the ground that the physician’s *72 notation was highly suspect because it indicated that Perales was beaten, not with a flashlight, as Perales testified at trial, but with a club. 5 In line with the…
Rhode Island opinions such as STATE v. Hervey MOMPLAISIR are cited where medical diagnosis hearsay is disputed. The court stated: "Rule 803(4) and (6), the medical diagnosis or treatment exception and the business records exception to the hearsay rule." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
In Re JEAN MARIE W. Et Al.
In Re JEAN MARIE W. Et Al., 1989 R.I. LEXIS 102 (1989)
…ows for the admission of “[s]tatements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing * the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.” R.I.R. Evid. 803(4). The statements do not have to be made to a physician, Advisory Committee’s Note to Rule 803(4); rather their adm…
In Re JEAN MARIE W. Et Al. is worth reading on Rhode Island medical diagnosis hearsay because the court put the point in its own words: "ows for the admission of “[s]tatements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing * the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.” R.I.R. Evid. 803(4). The statemen" Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
STATE v. Maurice BURGESS
STATE v. Maurice BURGESS, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 1095 (1983)
…r the patient’s statements will assist or be helpful in the diagnosis or treatment of the ailment. Id. at 534-35, 253 A.2d at 619. These hearsay statements are admissible “because a person will presumably be truthful to a physician from whom he expects to receive medical attention.” State v. Pina, R.I., 455 A.2d 313, 315 (1983). State v. Pina, like the case at bar, involved a s…
STATE v. Maurice BURGESS is worth reading on Rhode Island medical diagnosis hearsay because the court put the point in its own words: "Id. at 534-35, 253 A.2d at 619. These hearsay statements are admissible “because a person will presumably be truthful to a physician from whom he expects to receive medical attention.” State v. Pina, R.I., 455 A.2d 313, 315 (1983). State v." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
In Re JESSICA C. Et Al.
In Re JESSICA C. Et Al., 1997 R.I. LEXIS 79 (1997)
…the hearsay rule because Tovar was not qualified to make a medical diagnosis. Under Rule 803(4), “[s]tatements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment” are admissible. Admissibility, however, “hinge[s] on whether what has been related by the patient will assist or is helpful in the diagnosis or treatment of [the patient’s] ailment.” State v. Ucero, 450 A.2d 809, 81…
In Re JESSICA C. Et Al. is worth reading on Rhode Island medical diagnosis hearsay because the court put the point in its own words: "Tovar was not qualified to make a medical diagnosis. Under Rule 803(4), “[s]tatements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment” are admissible." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Use of depositions at trial
R.I. R. Civ. P. 30 and 32 govern civil depositions and trial use. R.I. R. Crim. P. 16 controls criminal discovery; prior testimony may be admitted under R.I. R. Evid. 804(b)(1).
Deposition use is always a two-layer problem: procedural permission to read or play the deposition, plus a hearsay path (often former testimony, party admission, or impeachment). Counsel who satisfy the civil or criminal procedure rule but skip the evidence-rule foundation invite a sustained objection; counsel who have a hearsay exception but failed to preserve the deposition under the procedural rule face the same result. Video designations, counter-designations, and completeness objections should be teed up before the jury is seated.
Rhode Island deposition / former-testimony opinions
Beverly OUELLETTE v. Orin v. CARDE Et Al.
Beverly OUELLETTE v. Orin v. CARDE Et Al., 1992 R.I. LEXIS 169 (1992)
…of error concerns the reading of Fire Marshal Irving Owen’s deposition testimony into the record. At trial plaintiff requested that Marshal Owen’s deposition be read into the record. The evening before the deposition was to be read to the jury, the trial justice reviewed the deposition and ruled on each of the objections and motions made by the defense counsel at the taking of…
Beverly OUELLETTE v. Orin v. CARDE Et Al. is worth reading on Rhode Island deposition / former testimony because the court put the point in its own words: "Fire Marshal Irving Owen’s deposition testimony into the record. At trial plaintiff requested that Marshal Owen’s deposition be read into the record." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
ESTATE OF Alice L. SWEENEY v. Edward O. CHARPENTIER Et Al.
ESTATE OF Alice L. SWEENEY v. Edward O. CHARPENTIER Et Al., 1996 R.I. LEXIS 144 (1996)
…at “some of the statements that [plaintiff] made during the deposition are indicative of her being a little confused and disoriented.” For example, plaintiff testified that Mr. Charpentier told her on several occasions during the time they resided together that the home belonged to the Charpentiers and not to plaintiff and stated that Mr. Charpentier made her feel unwelcome and…
ESTATE OF Alice L. SWEENEY v. Edward O. CHARPENTIER Et Al. is worth reading on Rhode Island deposition / former testimony because the court put the point in its own words: "For example, plaintiff testified that Mr. Charpentier told her on several occasions during the time they resided together that the home belonged to the Charpentiers and not to plaintiff and stated that Mr." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Maryann G. MARTINEZ Et Al. v. Genevieve S. KURDZIEL Et Al.
Maryann G. MARTINEZ Et Al. v. Genevieve S. KURDZIEL Et Al., 1992 R.I. LEXIS 171 (1992)
…: “To require a defendant to go to another state to conduct depositions of the *673 plaintiff’s doctors because the plaintiff will not produce the doctors and instead intends to introduce their affidavits, the Court feels is manifestly unjust and violates fundamental fairness, due process and equal protection. The defendant’s motion in limine as it relates to the introduction o…
On deposition / former testimony, Maryann G. MARTINEZ Et Al. v. Genevieve S. KURDZIEL Et Al. speaks to the Rhode Island dispute in this passage: "Court feels is manifestly unjust and violates fundamental fairness, due process and equal protection." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Norma MEDEIROS Et Al. v. James YASHAR, M.D.
Norma MEDEIROS Et Al. v. James YASHAR, M.D., 1991 R.I. LEXIS 33 (1991)
…rial justice improperly admitted portions of the videotaped deposition of the defendant’s expert witness, (2) that the trial justice improperly allowed testimony to be introduced on the “community standards” of the extent of disclosure necessary for an informed-consent decision, and (3) that the plaintiff failed to state a prima facie informed-consent case. For the reasons that…
Practitioners open Norma MEDEIROS Et Al. v. James YASHAR, M.D. when Rhode Island deposition / former testimony turns on the distinction in this sentence: "rial justice improperly admitted portions of the videotaped deposition of the defendant’s expert witness, (2) that the trial justice improperly allowed testimony to be introduced on the “community standards” of the extent of disclosure necessary for an informed-consent decision," Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Rhode Island Joint Reinsurance Association v. Brenda Ricci
Rhode Island Joint Reinsurance Association v. Brenda Ricci (2026)
…any witnesses; because Mr. Christian was not available, his deposition was offered by RIJRA and read into the record. During deliberations, the jury sent the trial justice the following question: “With regard to the first question on the verdict form. What is considered to be alleged damage? For example, is the alleged damage that which is contained in Exhibit I, the Performanc…
Practitioners open Rhode Island Joint Reinsurance Association v. Brenda Ricci when Rhode Island deposition / former testimony turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Mr. Christian was not available, his deposition was offered by RIJRA and read into the record. During deliberations, the jury sent the trial justice the following question: “With regard to the first question on the verdict form. What is considered to be alleged damage?" Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
State v. David B. Oakes.
State v. David B. Oakes., 1983 R.I. LEXIS 863 (1983)
…a justice of the Superior Court allowing Oakes to take the deposition of a witness but denying Oakes the right to videotape such deposition at his own expense. Counsel argued orally before the court on April 4, 1983. After consideration of the arguments of counsel and memoranda filed by the parties, we are of the opinion that the Superior Court justice erred in failing to allo…
Practitioners open State v. David B. Oakes. when Rhode Island deposition / former testimony turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Superior Court allowing Oakes to take the deposition of a witness but denying Oakes the right to videotape such deposition at his own expense. Counsel argued orally before the court on April 4, 1983." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Woodland Manor III Associates, L.P. v. Timothy R.E. Keeny, in His Capacity as Director of Department of
…" between DEPCO and Plaintiff. Plaintiff served a notice of deposition upon Ms. Martin, and later Mr. McJennette. The Defendant and the Attorney General filed the above-mentioned motions. Discussion Rule 26(B) (1) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure discusses the scope of examination of a deposition. It provides, in pertinent part, that: Unless otherwise ordered by t…
Woodland Manor III Associates, L.P. v. Timothy R.E. Keeny, in His Capacity as Director of Department of is worth reading on Rhode Island deposition / former testimony because the court put the point in its own words: "DEPCO and Plaintiff. Plaintiff served a notice of deposition upon Ms. Martin, and later Mr. McJennette. The Defendant and the Attorney General filed the above-mentioned motions." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Authenticity: why it matters and how to prove it
Authenticity is not a hearsay doctrine and it is not optional. Under R.I. R. Evid. 901, 902, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is. Self-authenticating categories — certified public records, newspapers, acknowledged documents, trade inscriptions, and (where adopted) certified domestic records of a regularly conducted activity — shorten the path, but most trial exhibits still need a sponsoring witness, distinctive characteristics, chain of custody, or process-or-system evidence.
Rhode Island maritime, healthcare, and municipal cases require authenticated hospital records, harbor reports, and electronic communications under R.I. R. Evid. 901–902.
Why authenticity gets its own section in every Rhode Island trial notebook:
- It is a condition precedent. An unauthenticated exhibit never reaches the relevance, hearsay, or privilege analysis in a useful way — the jury never properly considers it.
- Digital evidence multiplies the failure modes. Screenshots, social-media posts, text threads, and cloud downloads require hash values, account attribution, metadata, or a percipient witness who saw the content created or received.
- Chain of custody is authenticity by another name. Drugs, firearms, biological samples, and seized devices are excluded when the links from seizure to lab to courtroom are broken, even if a hearsay exception would otherwise apply to a lab report.
- Business-records shortcuts do not replace authentication. A custodian can explain record-keeping practices and still fail if nobody can say the particular PDF or printout is the record of this patient, this account, or this machine.
- Self-authentication is narrow. Counsel who wave a notarization or a letterhead and skip the rest of Rule 901-style analysis often lose when the document's contents are disputed.
Practical authentication checklist for Rhode Island trials: identify the exhibit; choose a 901 method or a 902 category; line up the sponsoring witness or certificate; preserve chain-of-custody testimony for physical and digital items; and separate the authenticity objection from any hearsay objection so the court rules on each.
Rhode Island authenticity opinions
Mark P. DePASQUALE v. Thomas M. HARRINGTON, Deputy Director, Division of Motor Vehicles, Department of
…ent hearsay evidence and additionally had not been properly authenticated. We conclude that petitioner’s arguments are not persuasive. Section 31-11-3, which grants the Registry the authority to suspend the driver’s license of a Rhode Island citizen on the basis of an out-of-state conviction, provides: “The registry is authorized to suspend or revoke the license of any resident…
Practitioners open Mark P. DePASQUALE v. Thomas M. HARRINGTON, Deputy Director, Division of Motor Vehicles, Department of when Rhode Island authentication turns on the distinction in this sentence: "We conclude that petitioner’s arguments are not persuasive." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
STATE v. Evelyn K. PULPHUS
STATE v. Evelyn K. PULPHUS, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 1075 (1983)
…ster Mall branch, on the ground that they were not properly authenticated because they had an incorrect date. The trial justice denied the motion and admitted the photographs. On appeal, Pulphus claims that the trial justice erred by denying her motion to exclude the photographs. For the admission of photographic evidence, we have always required that an adequate foundation be…
Practitioners open STATE v. Evelyn K. PULPHUS when Rhode Island authentication turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Mall branch, on the ground that they were not properly authenticated because they had an incorrect date. The trial justice denied the motion and admitted the photographs. On appeal, Pulphus claims that the trial justice erred by denying her motion to exclude the photographs." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
STATE v. Viroth PHANNAVONG
STATE v. Viroth PHANNAVONG, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 87 (2011)
…s admission as a full exhibit, arguing that it could not be authenticated properly. At a conference at sidebar, the trial justice noted that the map was not a self-authenticating document. He stated, “anybody could come in with a document and say, ‘Oh, I pulled this up from the [ijnternet.’ How do I know [it is] right?” In excluding the exhibit, the trial justice reasoned that…
Practitioners open STATE v. Viroth PHANNAVONG when Rhode Island authentication turns on the distinction in this sentence: "At a conference at sidebar, the trial justice noted that the map was not a self-authenticating document. He stated, “anybody could come in with a document and say, ‘Oh, I pulled this up from the [ijnternet.’ How do I know [it is] right?" Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Damaso HERNANDEZ v. JS PALLET CO., INC.
Damaso HERNANDEZ v. JS PALLET CO., INC., 2012 R.I. LEXIS 46 (2012)
…the trial justice ruled that the document would need to be authenticated before it was admitted into evidence. The *981 next day, plaintiffs counsel responded that Findlay would be able to testify to authenticate the document as a business record— a proposal that drew no objection from defendant. 3 When Findlay appeared, his testimony was limited to describing the method used…
Rhode Island opinions such as Damaso HERNANDEZ v. JS PALLET CO., INC. are cited where authentication is disputed. The court stated: "The *981 next day, plaintiffs counsel responded that Findlay would be able to testify to authenticate the document as a business record— a proposal that drew no objection from defendant." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Thomas H. McGOVERN, III v. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., Et Al.
Thomas H. McGOVERN, III v. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., Et Al., 2014 R.I. LEXIS 83 (2014)
…ent evidence, in the form of Ms. Jackson’s affidavit and an authenticated copy of the payment history for the loan, to prove that plaintiff was in arrears on his loan as of February 2010 and failed to cure the default prior to the foreclosure sale. Faced with such evidence, plaintiff was required to come forward with competent evidence of his own to establish a genuine issue of…
On authentication, Thomas H. McGOVERN, III v. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., Et Al. speaks to the Rhode Island dispute in this passage: "Ms. Jackson’s affidavit and an authenticated copy of the payment history for the loan, to prove that plaintiff was in arrears on his loan as of February 2010 and failed to cure the default prior to the foreclosure sale." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Rhode Island Managed Eye Care, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Rhode Island
…ndation a party must prove the first three requirements and authenticate the document or record.” Id. at 94. Rule 901 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence addresses the authentication of evidence. “In making Rule 901 determinations, trial justices must decide whether there is enough support in the record to conclude that it is ‘reasonably probable’ that the evidence is what th…
On authentication, Rhode Island Managed Eye Care, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Rhode Island speaks to the Rhode Island dispute in this passage: "Id. at 94. Rule 901 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence addresses the authentication of evidence." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Roger Williams v. Joseph D. Altruda.
Roger Williams v. Joseph D. Altruda., 74 R.I. 47 (1948)
…actually wearing such a brace at the time of the trial, an authenticated photograph thereof was competent evidence for the jury to consider if they reached the question of damages. The defendant insists that the photographs were not properly authenticated and states in his brief that an examination of the transcript reveals “no testimony whatsoever * as to the accuracy, ge…
Practitioners open Roger Williams v. Joseph D. Altruda. when Rhode Island authentication turns on the distinction in this sentence: "actually wearing such a brace at the time of the trial, an authenticated photograph thereof was competent evidence for the jury to consider if they reached the question of damages. The defendant insists that the photographs were not properly authenticated and states in his brief" Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Janice ACHILLE v. COLONIAL PENN INSURANCE COMPANY
Janice ACHILLE v. COLONIAL PENN INSURANCE COMPANY, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 426 (1986)
…e introduced into evidence because it had not been properly authenticated. Shortly thereafter Janice’s attorney announced, “Plaintiff rests.” In granting the insurer’s motion for a directed verdict, the trial justice explained his action by commenting, “[T]he plaintiff has failed to prove that she is an insured under an uninsured motorist provision applying to this particular i…
Rhode Island opinions such as Janice ACHILLE v. COLONIAL PENN INSURANCE COMPANY are cited where authentication is disputed. The court stated: "Shortly thereafter Janice’s attorney announced, “Plaintiff rests." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Practice checklist
- State the relevance theory in one sentence before naming an exception.
- Run the 403 / unfair-prejudice balance explicitly for other-acts and graphic exhibits.
- For character or other-acts evidence, identify the non-propensity purpose and request a limiting instruction on the record.
- Decide whether an out-of-court statement is hearsay for the purpose offered before hunting exceptions.
- Lay business-records foundations with time, knowledge, regular practice, and custodial qualifications — or a qualifying certification.
- Prove unavailability with specific facts before offering former testimony or dying declarations.
- Treat deposition use as procedure-plus-hearsay; designate and counter-designate early.
- Authenticate every exhibit under R.I. R. Evid. 901, 902 (or the self-authentication path) before arguing hearsay.
- Preserve chain of custody for physical and digital evidence with named custodians.
- Search LawDiver for recent Rhode Island appellate evidence opinions before mediation or motions in limine.
Contents
- General standards of admissibility
- Character evidence
- Hearsay: start with the definition
- Party admissions
- Business records
- Important hearsay exceptions that do not require unavailability
- Declarant unavailable
- Dying declarations
- Medical diagnosis or treatment statements
- Use of depositions at trial
- Authenticity: why it matters and how to prove it
- Practice checklist
- Frequently asked questions
Frequently asked questions
What is the primary evidence source in Rhode Island?
Rhode Island applies the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. Rhode Island's rules track the FRE; R.I. R. Evid. 401–902 govern superior and district court trials.
How do Rhode Island courts decide relevance and unfair prejudice?
Under R.I. R. Evid. 401, 403, evidence must make a fact of consequence more or less probable, and the court may exclude relevant evidence when unfair prejudice, confusion, or waste of time substantially outweighs its probative value.
Are party admissions hearsay in Rhode Island?
Party-opponent statements under R.I. R. Evid. 801(d)(2) are generally excluded from the hearsay ban (or treated as an exception, depending on local drafting). They may be offered against the party who made or adopted them without showing unavailability.
What foundation is required for business records?
Under R.I. R. Evid. 803(6), show a record made at or near the time from someone with knowledge, kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity, as a regular practice, through a custodian, qualified witness, or allowed certification — subject to trustworthiness attack.
When can I use a deposition at trial in Rhode Island?
R.I. R. Civ. P. 30 and 32 govern civil depositions and trial use. R.I. R. Crim. P. 16 controls criminal discovery; prior testimony may be admitted under R.I. R. Evid. 804(b)(1).
Why is authenticity separate from hearsay?
Authenticity asks whether the item is what you claim it is; hearsay asks whether out-of-court assertions inside it may be used for their truth. You can lose on either ground independently. Rhode Island authenticity practice starts with R.I. R. Evid. 901, 902.
Where do dying declarations and medical statements fit?
Dying declarations under R.I. R. Evid. 804(b)(2) require belief in impending death and concern the cause or circumstances of that believed death. Medical statements under R.I. R. Evid. 803(4) require a genuine diagnostic or treatment purpose and reasonable pertinence to care.