If you only remember one point about evidence law in Pennsylvania, remember this: Pennsylvania evidence practice is organized under the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence. Relevance starts at Pa. R.E. 401, 403; hearsay starts at Pa. R.E. 801, 802. Procedure, examples, and the opinions below hang off Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence. Authenticity is a separate fight under Pa. R.E. 901, 902. Depositions at trial: Pa. R.C.P. 4007 and 4020 govern civil depositions and trial use. Pa. R.Crim.P. 573 addresses criminal discovery; deposition testimony at trial requires Pa. R.E. 804(b)(1) when unavailability is established.
Hearsay: start with the definition
Most hearsay objections in Pennsylvania are won or lost on the definition, not on an exception. Under Pa. R.E. 801, 802, hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Non-hearsay purposes — verbal acts, effect on the listener, notice, circumstantial evidence of state of mind, and impeachment — remain available when the proponent can articulate them without asking the jury to believe the declarant.
Layered hearsay (hearsay within hearsay) requires an exception or exclusion for each layer. Machine-generated data and non-assertive conduct sit outside the hearsay definition in FRE-aligned jurisdictions, but they still need authenticity and, often, expert or business-records foundations.
Pennsylvania hearsay opinions
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Appellee v. Leroy STALLWORTH, Appella — Saylor, J., concurring in part and dissenting
…to shoot and kill or otherwise harm her, would appear to be hearsay and therefore inadmissible unless they fall within an exception to the hearsay rule.1 The majority concludes, however, that the state*378ments are not hearsay because they were presented solely to show the victim’s state of mind, and not to prove the truth of the matter asserted (that Appellant threatened the v…
Practitioners open COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Appellee v. Leroy STALLWORTH, Appella — Saylor, J., concurring in part and dissenting when Pennsylvania hearsay turns on the distinction in this sentence: "to shoot and kill or otherwise harm her, would appear to be hearsay and therefore inadmissible unless they fall within an exception to the hearsay rule.1 The majority concludes, however, that the state*378ments are not hearsay because they were presented solely to show the victim" Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Scott A. LAICH, Appellant
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Scott A. LAICH, Appellant, 566 Pa. 19 (2001)
…hite’s testimony regarding her conversation with Omatick on hearsay grounds. The trial court ruled that White’s testimony containing Omatick’s hearsay statement was admissible because it was relevant to show Omatick’s state of mind regarding her relationship with Appellant. (N.T., 8/4/97, at 71-72.) In his brief to this Court, Appellant contends that the trial court abused its…
Practitioners open COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Scott A. LAICH, Appellant when Pennsylvania hearsay turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Omatick on hearsay grounds. The trial court ruled that White’s testimony containing Omatick’s hearsay statement was admissible because it was relevant to show Omatick’s state of mind regarding her relationship with Appellant. (N.T., 8/4/97, at 71-72." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Arthur Lee “Buster” WARD, Appellant
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Arthur Lee “Buster” WARD, Appellant, 529 Pa. 506 (1992)
…n that the testimony was irrelevant and that it constituted hearsay. The offer of proof showed that the detective would testify that appellant was a police informant who had given information leading to several arrests the week before the fire. The testimony was offered to support the defense that others had a motive to commit the arson in retaliation against appellant for info…
Practitioners open COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Arthur Lee “Buster” WARD, Appellant when Pennsylvania hearsay turns on the distinction in this sentence: "The offer of proof showed that the detective would testify that appellant was a police informant who had given information leading to several arrests the week before the fire." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. George W. DUGAN, Appellant — Spaeth, J., concurring
…Appellant does not argue that the drawing was inadmissible hearsay. To the contrary, he concedes that “[ojbjection was not made to its use by victim in identifying [appellant] ..” Appellant’s Brief at 3. Accordingly, we should not discuss whether the drawing was inadmissible hearsay. As a general rule we should only respond to issues raised by the parties. Appellant does argue…
Pennsylvania opinions such as COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. George W. DUGAN, Appellant — Spaeth, J., concurring are cited where hearsay is disputed. The court stated: "Appellant does not argue that the drawing was inadmissible hearsay. To the contrary, he concedes that “[ojbjection was not made to its use by victim in identifying [appellant] ..” Appellant’s Brief at 3." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Joseph Bernard FITZPATRICK, III, Appellant
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Joseph Bernard FITZPATRICK, III, Appellant, 204 A.3d 527 (2019)
…zpatrick maintains that the trial court improperly admitted hearsay evidence and erroneously applied the coordinate jurisdiction rule. We affirm. The trial court aptly summarized the procedural history and facts of this case as follows: On June 6, 2012, emergency personnel were dispatched to 2288 Old Forge Road in Chanceford Township, which is located in York County, Pennsylvan…
Pennsylvania opinions such as COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Joseph Bernard FITZPATRICK, III, Appellant are cited where hearsay is disputed. The court stated: "zpatrick maintains that the trial court improperly admitted hearsay evidence and erroneously applied the coordinate jurisdiction rule. We affirm. The trial court aptly summarized the procedural history and facts of this case as follows: On June 6, 2012, emergency personnel were d" That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Com. v. Copenhaver, J.
Com. v. Copenhaver, J., 316 A.3d 1020 (2024)
…hat C.C. told her under the “tender years” exception to the hearsay rule embodied in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5985.1—was non-frivolous. Accordingly, we remanded to the trial court for further proceedings on the tender years issue and denied counsel’s application to withdraw. ____________________________________________ * Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. J-S06013-2…
On hearsay, Com. v. Copenhaver, J. speaks to the Pennsylvania dispute in this passage: "C.C. told her under the “tender years” exception to the hearsay rule embodied in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5985.1—was non-frivolous. Accordingly, we remanded to the trial court for further proceedings on the tender years issue and denied counsel’s application to withdraw." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE, BUREAU OF LIQUOR CONTROL ENFORCEMENT, Appellant, v. 139 HORSESHOE CORP. T/A York Road Tavern
…n documents and testimony as exceptions to the rule against hearsay. I On January 24, 1989, the Bureau charged Licensee with an April 28, 1988 violation of the Liquor Code for allegedly serving an underage patron. At a June 1989 hearing before the OALJ, the Bureau was granted a continuance because a witness failed to appear. At the September 27, 1989 continued hearing, the Bure…
PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE, BUREAU OF LIQUOR CONTROL ENFORCEMENT, Appellant, v. 139 HORSESHOE CORP. T/A York Road Tavern is worth reading on Pennsylvania hearsay because the court put the point in its own words: "I On January 24, 1989, the Bureau charged Licensee with an April 28, 1988 violation of the Liquor Code for allegedly serving an underage patron. At a June 1989 hearing before the OALJ, the Bureau was granted a continuance because a witness failed to appear." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Michael STRUNK, Appellant — Cercone, J., dissenting
…eous: first, because these out-of-court statements were not hearsay, with respect to one of the material facts, because they were not being offered to prove the truth of the assertions; and, second, because these statements were against the *218pecuniary and penal interests of an unavailable declarant, they were admissible as an exception to the hearsay prohibition.2 Initially,…
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Michael STRUNK, Appellant — Cercone, J., dissenting is worth reading on Pennsylvania hearsay because the court put the point in its own words: "eous: first, because these out-of-court statements were not hearsay, with respect to one of the material facts, because they were not being offered to prove the truth of the assertions; and, second, because these statements were against the *218pecuniary and penal interests of an" Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Walking through Pennsylvania facts
Use this walkthrough to see which Pennsylvania authority does the work at each step.
A lawyer in Pennsylvania wants to offer a medical record, a party email, and a statement the declarant made while believing death was imminent.
- Clear relevance and unfair prejudice under Pa. R.E. 401, 403.
- If the email is the opposing party's, test Pa. R.E. 803(25) before the hearsay definition in Pa. R.E. 801, 802.
- For the medical record, lay the business-records foundation in Pa. R.E. 803(6) and the treatment purpose in Pa. R.E. 803(4).
- For the deathbed statement, meet Pa. R.E. 804(b)(2), then authenticate every exhibit under Pa. R.E. 901, 902.
Pennsylvania keeps hearsay, character, and authenticity on different rules inside the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence. Winning one does not win the others.
Party admissions
Statements of an opposing party are among the most important routes around the hearsay bar. Pennsylvania treats them under Pa. R.E. 803(25). Nothing about the statement need be against interest, contemporaneous, or based on personal knowledge — the theory is adversarial, not reliability-based. A party cannot complain that his own words are unreliable when offered against him.
Scope questions dominate practice: the party's own statement; adopted statements (including silence in circumstances where a reasonable person would deny); statements by authorized speakers; agent or employee statements on matters within the scope of the relationship; and, in criminal conspiracy cases, coconspirator statements during and in furtherance of the conspiracy. A defendant generally cannot introduce his own exculpatory out-of-court statement as a "party admission" against himself — the rule runs one way.
Pennsylvania party-admission opinions
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Appellee v. Leroy STALLWORTH, Appella — Saylor, J., concurring in part and dissenting
…is problematic, however. While Pennsylvania law permits the admission of evidence of prior incidents, within the context of a marital relationship as well as elsewhere, in which the accused threatened, assaulted, or quarreled with the decedent, for the purpose of proving ill will, motive, or malice, such evidence remains subject to the general rules of competency and relevance.…
Pennsylvania opinions such as COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Appellee v. Leroy STALLWORTH, Appella — Saylor, J., concurring in part and dissenting are cited where party admissions is disputed. The court stated: "is problematic, however. While Pennsylvania law permits the admission of evidence of prior incidents, within the context of a marital relationship as well as elsewhere, in which the accused threatened, assaulted, or quarreled with the decedent, for the purpose of proving ill will" That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. David CHMIEL, Appellant
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. David CHMIEL, Appellant, 558 Pa. 478 (1999)
…counsel for Chmiel at his first trial? We conclude that the admission of such testimony was error and therefore reverse. I. Background David Chmiel was charged with stabbing to death three elderly siblings, Angelina, Victor, and James Lunario, while robbing their home in Throop, Lackawanna County, in the early morning hours of September 21, 1983. In 1984, a jury convicted Chmie…
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. David CHMIEL, Appellant is worth reading on Pennsylvania party admissions because the court put the point in its own words: "We conclude that the admission of such testimony was error and therefore reverse. I." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Scott A. LAICH, Appellant
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Scott A. LAICH, Appellant, 566 Pa. 19 (2001)
…a defendant’s out-of-court statements fall within the party admission exception to the hearsay rule. Commonwealth v. Smith, 518 Pa. 15, 540 A.2d 246, 257 (1988). The issue in this case, therefore, is whether Omatick’s statement to White satisfied the hearsay rule. Both the trial court and the Superior Court found that Omatick’s statements to White met the state of mind exceptio…
Practitioners open COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Scott A. LAICH, Appellant when Pennsylvania party admissions turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Commonwealth v. Smith, 518 Pa. 15, 540 A.2d 246, 257 (1988). The issue in this case, therefore, is whether Omatick’s statement to White satisfied the hearsay rule." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Joseph Robert FOLGER, A Minor, by His P/N/G, Robert J. FOLGER and Mary T. Folger, and Robert J. Fol — Joyce, J
…erning PCR test results constituted double hearsay and that admission of the evidence constituted reversible error. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. ¶2 The Majority correctly notes that, “[mjedical records are admissible under the hearsay rules as evidence of facts contained therein but not as evidence of medical opinion or diagnosis.” Majority Opinion at 1055 (citing Commo…
Joseph Robert FOLGER, A Minor, by His P/N/G, Robert J. FOLGER and Mary T. Folger, and Robert J. Fol — Joyce, J is worth reading on Pennsylvania party admissions because the court put the point in its own words: "PCR test results constituted double hearsay and that admission of the evidence constituted reversible error. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Edward DURKIN, James Durkin, Jr. and Herve Filion, Individually and Doing Business as Snow Shoe Farms, Appellants
…ial was to begin, appellees filed a motion in limine to bar admission of a statement made by Dr. Seeber to the Durkins the day following the death of their horse, indicating that the horse had died from a drug overdose, and a taped statement that Dr. Seeber had made to an insurance carrier investigator in February of 1972 while he was an employee and shareholder of Equine Clini…
On party admissions, Edward DURKIN, James Durkin, Jr. and Herve Filion, Individually and Doing Business as Snow Shoe Farms, Appellants speaks to the Pennsylvania dispute in this passage: "Dr. Seeber to the Durkins the day following the death of their horse, indicating that the horse had died from a drug overdose, and a taped statement that Dr." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Scott McNAUGHTON, Appellant — Cercone, J., dissenting
…o found Scott in possession of the contraband and heard his admission, but by offering the physician’s report thereof as a hearsay excep*317tion under the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act, supra. The report was authenticated at the hearing by Dr. Kenneth Director, the resident in charge of the in-patient ward into which Scott had been admitted at WPIC. Over the objectio…
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Scott McNAUGHTON, Appellant — Cercone, J., dissenting is worth reading on Pennsylvania party admissions because the court put the point in its own words: "Scott in possession of the contraband and heard his admission, but by offering the physician’s report thereof as a hearsay excep*317tion under the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act, supra. The report was authenticated at the hearing by Dr." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Business records
The business-records exception under Pa. R.E. 803(6) is the everyday path for medical charts, employment files, bank statements, and maintenance logs. The foundation requires a record made at or near the time by — or from information transmitted by — someone with knowledge; kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity; and made as a regular practice. A custodian or other qualified witness (or a qualifying certification where the jurisdiction allows it) lays the foundation. The opponent may still attack lack of trustworthiness when the source or method of preparation indicates unreliability — litigation-driven reports are the classic failure mode.
Do not confuse authenticity with the business-records exception. You still need to show the exhibit is what you claim it is; the hearsay exception then answers why the out-of-court assertions inside it may be considered for their truth.
Pennsylvania business-records opinions
In RE: A.J.R.-H. and I.G.R.-H. Appeal Of: K.J.R., Mother — Mundy, J., concurring
…y of the 167 exhibits the orphans' court admitted under the business records exception to the hearsay doctrine. I write separately to emphasize that the exhibits may indeed have been admissible had the proper foundation been established. The Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6108(b), codifies the following exception to the rule against hearsay. § 6108. Busi…
In RE: A.J.R.-H. and I.G.R.-H. Appeal Of: K.J.R., Mother — Mundy, J., concurring is worth reading on Pennsylvania business records because the court put the point in its own words: "I write separately to emphasize that the exhibits may indeed have been admissible had the proper foundation been established. The Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6108(b), codifies the following exception to the rule against hearsay. § 6108." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Fauceglia v. Harry, Appellant
Fauceglia v. Harry, Appellant, 409 Pa. 155 (1962)
…as exceptions to the hearsay rule under either the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act of May 4, 1939, P. L. 42, No. 35, §§1-4, 28 P.S. §91a-d, or the Federal Official Records Act of May 24, 1951, P. L. 393, §§1-8, 28 P.S. §§121-128. Appellees contend *158 that the army medical records are inadmissible because the identity of the individual who made these records has not…
Practitioners open Fauceglia v. Harry, Appellant when Pennsylvania business records turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act of May 4, 1939, P. L. 42, No. 35, §§1-4, 28 P.S. §91a-d, or the Federal Official Records Act of May 24, 1951, P. L. 393, §§1-8, 28 P.S. §§121-128." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
BAYVIEW LOAN SERVICING LLC, Appellee v. James Bernard WICKER and Beryl G. Wicker, Appellants
…ranted review to consider the application of Pennsylvania's business records exception to the rule against hearsay, pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 803(6) and the Uniform Business Records *476 as Evidence Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6108. The parties before the Court agree that current Pennsylvania precedent allows a records custodian to authenticate documents even if the witne…
On business records, BAYVIEW LOAN SERVICING LLC, Appellee v. James Bernard WICKER and Beryl G. Wicker, Appellants speaks to the Pennsylvania dispute in this passage: "Pennsylvania's business records exception to the rule against hearsay, pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 803(6) and the Uniform Business Records *476 as Evidence Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6108." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Thomas L. KRAVONTKA, Appellant
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Thomas L. KRAVONTKA, Appellant, 384 Pa. Super. 346 (1989)
…er admission of blood alcohol test results, pursuant to the business records exception to the hearsay rule, without the presence of the lab technician who performed the blood analysis violated his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. In addition, he questions: Whether a proper foundation was laid for the admission of the results of his blood alcohol test; and whether the res…
Pennsylvania opinions such as COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Thomas L. KRAVONTKA, Appellant are cited where business records is disputed. The court stated: "er admission of blood alcohol test results, pursuant to the business records exception to the hearsay rule, without the presence of the lab technician who performed the blood analysis violated his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. In addition, he questions: Whether a proper" That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Mary GANSTER, Frances S. Cannon, Frank Janicki and Catherine Janicki, His Wife, Appellants, v. WESTERN PENNSYLVANIA
…all to turn on the water at the Ganster home. The company’s business records showed that when the water had been turned on at the curb, their employee had also gathered a sample of surface water on the property. This sample, according to the water company’s records, had been taken to the lab for analysis. According to the trial record, the following then occurred: Q What were t…
Pennsylvania opinions such as Mary GANSTER, Frances S. Cannon, Frank Janicki and Catherine Janicki, His Wife, Appellants, v. WESTERN PENNSYLVANIA are cited where business records is disputed. The court stated: "Ganster home. The company’s business records showed that when the water had been turned on at the curb, their employee had also gathered a sample of surface water on the property. This sample, according to the water company’s records, had been taken to the lab for analysis." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Alfonso F. CARTER, Appellant
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Alfonso F. CARTER, Appellant, 2004 Pa. Super. 420 (2004)
…regularly conducted activity, commonly referred to as the "business records exception" to the hearsay rule. ¶ 9 "Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." Pa.R.E. 801 ("Definitions"). "A statement' is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal…Pennsylvania opinions such as COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Alfonso F. CARTER, Appellant are cited where business records is disputed. The court stated: "Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.' Pa.R.E. 801 ('Definitions')." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
William Powell, Petitioner v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, Respondent
…involved with respect to a technical parole violation, the business records hearsay exception may be pertinent. As this court pointed out recently in Whitmore v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 94 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 569, 504 A.2d 401 (1986), the Judi *11 cial Code, in 42 Pa. C. S. §6108(b) provides that such a record shall be competent evidence if the custodian o…
William Powell, Petitioner v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, Respondent is worth reading on Pennsylvania business records because the court put the point in its own words: "As this court pointed out recently in Whitmore v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 94 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 569, 504 A.2d 401 (1986), the Judi *11 cial Code, in 42 Pa. C. S." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
MB FINANCIAL BANK, Appellant v. Lawrence J. RAO, Jr.
MB FINANCIAL BANK, Appellant v. Lawrence J. RAO, Jr., 201 A.3d 784 (2018)
…on appeal: 1. Whether the Lost Note Affidavit constituted a business record pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 6108 and the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence and whether the [c]ourt properly ruled it and associated testimony inadmissible. 2. Whether [MB Financial]'s witness at trial, Ms. Johnson, was competent to testify at trial as to matters including the Lost Note Affidavit and the other…
MB FINANCIAL BANK, Appellant v. Lawrence J. RAO, Jr. is worth reading on Pennsylvania business records because the court put the point in its own words: "Whether the Lost Note Affidavit constituted a business record pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 6108 and the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence and whether the [c]ourt properly ruled it and associated testimony inadmissible. 2. Whether [MB Financial]'s witness at trial, Ms." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Important hearsay exceptions that do not require unavailability
Three present-sense and mental-state exceptions carry most of the remaining traffic in Pennsylvania trial practice.
Excited utterance — Pa. R.E. 803(2). A statement relating to a startling event or condition, made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused. Timing is elastic; composure defeats the exception even minutes after the event, while visible distress can preserve it for hours.
Present sense impression — Pa. R.E. 803(1). A statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while or immediately after the declarant perceived it. Contemporaneity is strict — seconds and minutes, not hours — and excitement is not required.
Then-existing mental, emotional, or physical condition — Pa. R.E. 803(3). Statements of then-existing state of mind (including intent and plan) come in; statements of memory or belief offered to prove the fact remembered generally do not. Intent-to-meet-another-person cases remain the hardest applications.
Declarant unavailable
When the declarant is unavailable under Pa. R.E. 804(a), Pennsylvania opens a second suite of exceptions. Unavailability typically includes privilege, refusal to testify despite court order, lack of memory, death or then-existing infirmity, and absence despite reasonable efforts to procure attendance. The proponent bears the burden of proving unavailability with specific facts — a bare assertion that the witness "could not be found" is not enough.
Former testimony under Pa. R.E. 804(b)(1) is the workhorse once unavailability is shown: testimony given as a witness at a trial, hearing, or lawful deposition, offered against a party who had an opportunity and similar motive to develop it by direct, cross, or redirect. Criminal confrontation analysis runs in parallel and is not satisfied merely because a hearsay exception applies.
Dying declarations
Dying declarations under Pa. R.E. 804(b)(2) remain a narrow but decisive exception in homicide and, in many jurisdictions, civil cases involving the cause or circumstances of what the declarant believed to be impending death. The foundational showing is the declarant's belief that death was imminent — not that death in fact followed within any particular time — plus a statement concerning the cause or circumstances of what the declarant believed to be the impending death. Courts police coaching and narrative expansions aggressively.
Pennsylvania dying-declaration opinions
Commonwealth v. Gardner, Appellant
Commonwealth v. Gardner, Appellant, 282 Pa. 458 (1925)
…f the confession. If the above-mentioned statement, and the dying declaration of the girl (later considered) are to be excluded, or are insufficient to show criminal agency, the Commonwealth is here unable to prove corpus delicti, except the fact that the bullet wound in the stomach may be consistent with crime. The matters that were being detailed by the witnesses were the inc…
Commonwealth v. Gardner, Appellant is worth reading on Pennsylvania dying declaration because the court put the point in its own words: "Commonwealth is here unable to prove corpus delicti, except the fact that the bullet wound in the stomach may be consistent with crime." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Louis R. RIGGINS, Appellant (Two Cases)
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Louis R. RIGGINS, Appellant (Two Cases), 478 Pa. 222 (1978)
…an angry argument. *227 The first contention relates to the dying declarations made by the victim. Appellant concedes that these declarations were clearly admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule. He argues, however, that the dying declarations were the only testimony identifying him as the perpetrator of the act and that these declarations constitute insufficient evidenc…
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Louis R. RIGGINS, Appellant (Two Cases) is worth reading on Pennsylvania dying declaration because the court put the point in its own words: "The first contention relates to the dying declarations made by the victim. Appellant concedes that these declarations were clearly admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Commonwealth v. Stallone, Appellant
Commonwealth v. Stallone, Appellant, 281 Pa. 41 (1924)
…entitled. Appellant also assigns for error the admission of dying declarations of Ralph Lettieri who was shot by defendant at the time Semenza was killed. This assignment raises the question whether the dying declarations of one of two persons, mortally injured in the same affray, are admissible in evidence in a trial for the murder of the other. While there are decisions to th…
On dying declaration, Commonwealth v. Stallone, Appellant speaks to the Pennsylvania dispute in this passage: "Appellant also assigns for error the admission of dying declarations of Ralph Lettieri who was shot by defendant at the time Semenza was killed." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Commonwealth v. Edwards, Appellant
Commonwealth v. Edwards, Appellant, 431 Pa. 44 (1968)
…t at the hospital was also admitted under the exception for dying declarations. Appellant contends that none of these statements should have been admitted. It was perfectly proper for the trial court to admit the disputed statements into evidence. This aspect of this case is controlled by the recent case of Commonwealth v. Cheeks, 423 Pa. 67, 223 A. 2d 291 (1966). We quote at l…
Practitioners open Commonwealth v. Edwards, Appellant when Pennsylvania dying declaration turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Appellant contends that none of these statements should have been admitted. It was perfectly proper for the trial court to admit the disputed statements into evidence. This aspect of this case is controlled by the recent case of Commonwealth v. Cheeks, 423 Pa. 67, 223 A." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Commonwealth v. Bryson
Commonwealth v. Bryson, 276 Pa. 566 (1923)
…hospital, and a few hours before her death, deceased made a dying declaration in the presence of Dr. Hutchison, the district attorney, and four other witnesses. The *570physician told deceased her condition was critical; the latter replied she knew she was going to die, and requested to see her mother; then the district attorney asked her if she desired to make a statement, whi…
On dying declaration, Commonwealth v. Bryson speaks to the Pennsylvania dispute in this passage: "Dr. Hutchison, the district attorney, and four other witnesses." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Brown versus The Commonwealth
Brown versus The Commonwealth, 73 Pa. 321 (1873)
…er this head is ranged the reception under objection of the dying declarations of Mrs. Kraemer, the wife of the murdered man. “ The dying declarations of a person who expects to die, respecting the circumstances under which he received a mortal injury, are constantly admitted in criminal prosecutions, where the death is the subject of criminal inquiry, though the prosecution be…
Practitioners open Brown versus The Commonwealth when Pennsylvania dying declaration turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Mrs. Kraemer, the wife of the murdered man." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Aaron GRIFFIN, Appellant
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Aaron GRIFFIN, Appellant, 453 Pa. Super. 657 (1996)
…; however, the trial court admitted the statement under the dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule. The admissibility of a dying declaration depends on all surrounding circumstances. Commonwealth v. Knable, 369 Pa. 171, 175, 85 A.2d 114, 117 (1952). A statement may be considered a dying declaration, and hence admissible notwithstanding its hearsay attributes, if the de…
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Aaron GRIFFIN, Appellant is worth reading on Pennsylvania dying declaration because the court put the point in its own words: "The admissibility of a dying declaration depends on all surrounding circumstances. Commonwealth v. Knable, 369 Pa. 171, 175, 85 A.2d 114, 117 (1952)." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Commonwealth v. Knable, Appellant
Commonwealth v. Knable, Appellant, 369 Pa. 171 (1952)
…t raises two important questions: (1) Was Lemin’s so-called dying declaration, “Don’t let her get away with it”, improperly admitted in evidence, and (2) was it reversible error for the trial judge to go into the jury room in the absence of the defendant? We shall discuss these seriatim. Defendant admittedly shot Lemin in the abdomen with a revolver about five fifteen p.m. on A…
On dying declaration, Commonwealth v. Knable, Appellant speaks to the Pennsylvania dispute in this passage: "Was Lemin’s so-called dying declaration, “Don’t let her get away with it”, improperly admitted in evidence, and (2) was it reversible error for the trial judge to go into the jury room in the absence of the defendant?" The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Medical diagnosis or treatment statements
Statements made for medical diagnosis or treatment under Pa. R.E. 803(4) cover medical history, past or present symptoms, and their general cause when reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. The exception is not limited to treating physicians; statements to nurses, EMTs, and consulting clinicians can qualify when the diagnostic purpose is genuine. Fault and identity remain the usual battleground: "I was hit by a car" is often pertinent; "the light was green" usually is not; abuser identity in child-abuse and domestic-violence cases is heavily litigated.
Pennsylvania medical-statement opinions
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Joshua Anthony BELKNAP, Appellant
…s from the hearsay rule statements made for the purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment (the “medical treatment exception”), and provides as follows. Rule 803. Exceptions to the Rule Against Hearsay — Regardless of Whether the Declarant Is Available as a Witness The following are not excluded by the rule against hearsay, regardless of whether the declarant is available as a…
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Joshua Anthony BELKNAP, Appellant is worth reading on Pennsylvania medical diagnosis hearsay because the court put the point in its own words: "s from the hearsay rule statements made for the purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment (the “medical treatment exception”), and provides as follows. Rule 803. Exceptions to the Rule Against Hearsay — Regardless of Whether the Declarant Is Available as a Witness The following" Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Howard Norman SMITH, Jr., Appellant
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Howard Norman SMITH, Jr., Appellant, 545 Pa. 487 (1996)
…enerally associated with statements made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment. The truth is that statements regarding the identity of an assailant or abuser are of legal and not medical significance. *495Appellant’s Brief at 11-12. To the extent that Appellant is arguing that the child’s identification of her abuser is not pertinent to her medical treatment or diag…
Practitioners open COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Howard Norman SMITH, Jr., Appellant when Pennsylvania medical diagnosis hearsay turns on the distinction in this sentence: "The truth is that statements regarding the identity of an assailant or abuser are of legal and not medical significance. *495Appellant’s Brief at 11-12." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Stephen P. FLANAGAN, Appellant, v. Alexander LABE, M.D., Samuel M. Wilson, M.D., Erwin A. Cohen, M.D
…that care. The court reasoned that the latter called for a medical diagnosis which a nurse is precluded by statute from rendering. Finding that the exclusion of this testimony prevented Flanagan from stating a *257 prima facie case of malpractice, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the hospital. It is undisputed that Stephan is a well educated and highly experience…
Stephen P. FLANAGAN, Appellant, v. Alexander LABE, M.D., Samuel M. Wilson, M.D., Erwin A. Cohen, M.D is worth reading on Pennsylvania medical diagnosis hearsay because the court put the point in its own words: "The court reasoned that the latter called for a medical diagnosis which a nurse is precluded by statute from rendering." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Rodger A. FREED, Appellee v. GEISINGER MEDICAL CENTER, and HealthSouth Corporation, Formerly Known — Eakin, J
…recluded from offering expert opinion testimony regarding a medical diagnosis, thereby extending the constraints of The Professional Nursing Law1 to the courtroom. The Superior Court noted Pennsylvania’s liberal standard for qualifying an expert witness, set forth in Pa.R.E. 702, and the application of this standard in qualifying non-medical expert witnesses to give medical opi…
Pennsylvania opinions such as Rodger A. FREED, Appellee v. GEISINGER MEDICAL CENTER, and HealthSouth Corporation, Formerly Known — Eakin, J are cited where medical diagnosis hearsay is disputed. The court stated: "The Professional Nursing Law1 to the courtroom. The Superior Court noted Pennsylvania’s liberal standard for qualifying an expert witness, set forth in Pa.R.E." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Jean Baker WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. Edward J. McCLAIN, M.D., Appellee
Jean Baker WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. Edward J. McCLAIN, M.D., Appellee, 513 Pa. 300 (1987)
…act free from doubt). In DiGiacomo, supra, we held that the medical diagnosis of a licensed physician was inadmissible because the unavailability of the physician for cross-examination raised doubts as to the reliability of the diagnosis contained in the report. DiGiacomo, 463 Pa. at 455-56, 345 A.2d at 608. The social worker’s report in this case contains opinion evidence. 3 I…
Pennsylvania opinions such as Jean Baker WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. Edward J. McCLAIN, M.D., Appellee are cited where medical diagnosis hearsay is disputed. The court stated: "In DiGiacomo, supra, we held that the medical diagnosis of a licensed physician was inadmissible because the unavailability of the physician for cross-examination raised doubts as to the reliability of the diagnosis contained in the report. DiGiacomo, 463 Pa. at 455-56, 345 A." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Use of depositions at trial
Pa. R.C.P. 4007 and 4020 govern civil depositions and trial use. Pa. R.Crim.P. 573 addresses criminal discovery; deposition testimony at trial requires Pa. R.E. 804(b)(1) when unavailability is established.
Deposition use is always a two-layer problem: procedural permission to read or play the deposition, plus a hearsay path (often former testimony, party admission, or impeachment). Counsel who satisfy the civil or criminal procedure rule but skip the evidence-rule foundation invite a sustained objection; counsel who have a hearsay exception but failed to preserve the deposition under the procedural rule face the same result. Video designations, counter-designations, and completeness objections should be teed up before the jury is seated.
Pennsylvania deposition / former-testimony opinions
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Paul LUDWIG, Appellant
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Paul LUDWIG, Appellant, 366 Pa. Super. 361 (1987)
…ight of confrontation does not prevent the use of videotape depositions of a witness who is unavailable for trial, where the depositions were taken in the presence of the accused and the witness was subjected to cross-examination. Commonwealth v. Stasko, 471 Pa. 373, 370 A.2d 350 (1977). Similarly, because the right of confrontation is not absolute, certain hearsay evidence has…
Pennsylvania opinions such as COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Paul LUDWIG, Appellant are cited where deposition / former testimony is disputed. The court stated: "Commonwealth v. Stasko, 471 Pa. 373, 370 A.2d 350 (1977)." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
William CRUZ and George L. Rodriguez, M.D., Petitioners, v. WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEAL BOARD (PHILADELPHIA CLUB)
…s and Park over Provider’s objection. The WCJ also admitted deposition testimony from Dr. Stanley R. Askin over Provider’s objection. Because Dr. Askin’s testimony was taken on February 7, 1996 in a concurrent modification petition, Provider received no notice of the deposition and was not represented. Relying principally on the opinions of Drs. Askin and Park, the WCJ found Pr…
Practitioners open William CRUZ and George L. Rodriguez, M.D., Petitioners, v. WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEAL BOARD (PHILADELPHIA CLUB) when Pennsylvania deposition / former testimony turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Park over Provider’s objection. The WCJ also admitted deposition testimony from Dr. Stanley R. Askin over Provider’s objection. Because Dr." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Geraldine BEAUMONT, Administratrix of the Estate of James Beaumont, Deceased, v. ETL SERVICES, INC. and John R
…ediately after reading damage testimony from the deceased’s deposition into the record, counsel rested. A lengthy exchange then transpired between the court and counsel, the pertinent portions of which are reproduced hereinafter: The Court: How can you not put in the circumstances of the accident? Mr. Olshock: I would demur to the evidence. He hasn’t proved his case. Mr. Loughr…
On deposition / former testimony, Geraldine BEAUMONT, Administratrix of the Estate of James Beaumont, Deceased, v. ETL SERVICES, INC. and John R speaks to the Pennsylvania dispute in this passage: "A lengthy exchange then transpired between the court and counsel, the pertinent portions of which are reproduced hereinafter: The Court: How can you not put in the circumstances of the accident?" The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Duane STAYS, Appellant
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Duane STAYS, Appellant, 2012 Pa. Super. 61 (2012)
…f perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition, or (b) is a writing signed and adopted by the declarant, or (c) is a verbatim contemporaneous recording of an oral statement. Pa.R.E. Rule 803.1(1). Thus, pursuant to this rule, inconsistent statements made by a witness prior to the proceeding at which he is then testifying are admissible as substantive evi…
Pennsylvania opinions such as COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Duane STAYS, Appellant are cited where deposition / former testimony is disputed. The court stated: "f perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition, or (b) is a writing signed and adopted by the declarant, or (c) is a verbatim contemporaneous recording of an oral statement. Pa.R.E. Rule 803.1(1). Thus, pursuant to this rule, inconsistent statements made b" That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Smith against Price
Smith against Price, 8 Watts 447 (1839)
…e son was competent as direct and independent proof. Like a deposition, it could not be used while he was present; and his unsworn declarations were more palpably'incompetent still. The testimony ought to have been rejected. Judgment reversed, and a venire de novo awarded.
Smith against Price is worth reading on Pennsylvania deposition / former testimony because the court put the point in its own words: "Like a deposition, it could not be used while he was present; and his unsworn declarations were more palpably'incompetent still. The testimony ought to have been rejected. Judgment reversed, and a venire de novo awarded." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
George A. Wells, Administrator of Helene Roberts, now to use of John Welles Hollenback and L. D. Shoemaker v. The
…tient. In the present case the witness was examined and his deposition taken at a time anterior to the passage of the act of 1895, and at that time he was perfectly competent to testify to the matter in question. Subsequently, and before the trial in court, the witness, Dr. Crawford, died, and in 1895, also before the trial, the act above quoted was passed. On the trial the dep…
On deposition / former testimony, George A. Wells, Administrator of Helene Roberts, now to use of John Welles Hollenback and L. D. Shoemaker v. The speaks to the Pennsylvania dispute in this passage: "In the present case the witness was examined and his deposition taken at a time anterior to the passage of the act of 1895, and at that time he was perfectly competent to testify to the matter in question. Subsequently, and before the trial in court, the witness, Dr." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Stearns versus The Merchants' Bank
Stearns versus The Merchants' Bank, 53 Pa. 490 (1867)
…fendant to discredit the plaintiff’s witness by producing a deposition of the witness in which he gave a different account from what he testified on the trial, and this was clearly admissible by all the authorities : Wertz v. May, 9 Harris 274. The present case is a peculiar one. It was an action of assumpsit on a promissory note made by the defendants to the order of Champlin…
Practitioners open Stearns versus The Merchants' Bank when Pennsylvania deposition / former testimony turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Wertz v. May, 9 Harris 274. The present case is a peculiar one." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Farmers’ & Merchants’ Deposit Company v. McAvoy, Appellant
Farmers’ & Merchants’ Deposit Company v. McAvoy, Appellant, 87 Pa. Super. 569 (1925)
…iscovered that Wall was the real owner of the check. In the depositions taken it appears that the bank was the owner of the check at the time the suit was brought and that after it concluded that it could not collect the judgment, Wall paid the amount of the check with interest and costs to the hank and is now the owner of the judgment. There is an allegation in the petition th…
Farmers’ & Merchants’ Deposit Company v. McAvoy, Appellant is worth reading on Pennsylvania deposition / former testimony because the court put the point in its own words: "Wall paid the amount of the check with interest and costs to the hank and is now the owner of the judgment." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Authenticity: why it matters and how to prove it
Authenticity is not a hearsay doctrine and it is not optional. Under Pa. R.E. 901, 902, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is. Self-authenticating categories — certified public records, newspapers, acknowledged documents, trade inscriptions, and (where adopted) certified domestic records of a regularly conducted activity — shorten the path, but most trial exhibits still need a sponsoring witness, distinctive characteristics, chain of custody, or process-or-system evidence.
Pennsylvania pharmaceutical, construction, and criminal trials turn on authenticated medical records, corporate emails, and police video under Pa. R.E. 901–902.
Why authenticity gets its own section in every Pennsylvania trial notebook:
- It is a condition precedent. An unauthenticated exhibit never reaches the relevance, hearsay, or privilege analysis in a useful way — the jury never properly considers it.
- Digital evidence multiplies the failure modes. Screenshots, social-media posts, text threads, and cloud downloads require hash values, account attribution, metadata, or a percipient witness who saw the content created or received.
- Chain of custody is authenticity by another name. Drugs, firearms, biological samples, and seized devices are excluded when the links from seizure to lab to courtroom are broken, even if a hearsay exception would otherwise apply to a lab report.
- Business-records shortcuts do not replace authentication. A custodian can explain record-keeping practices and still fail if nobody can say the particular PDF or printout is the record of this patient, this account, or this machine.
- Self-authentication is narrow. Counsel who wave a notarization or a letterhead and skip the rest of Rule 901-style analysis often lose when the document's contents are disputed.
Practical authentication checklist for Pennsylvania trials: identify the exhibit; choose a 901 method or a 902 category; line up the sponsoring witness or certificate; preserve chain-of-custody testimony for physical and digital items; and separate the authenticity objection from any hearsay objection so the court rules on each.
Pennsylvania authenticity opinions
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Tyler Kristian MANGEL, Matthew Robert Craft Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Tyler
…whether the Commonwealth had satisfied the requirements for authentication of the proffered Facebook records. Id. at 11. The Commonwealth argues that "this ruling was made by the trial court solely based upon the direct testimony of Detective Styn." Id. The Commonwealth contends that "[w]hat evidence the [Commonwealth] may or may not have connecting [Mangel and Craft] to the cr…
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Tyler Kristian MANGEL, Matthew Robert Craft Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Tyler is worth reading on Pennsylvania authentication because the court put the point in its own words: "Commonwealth had satisfied the requirements for authentication of the proffered Facebook records. Id. at 11. The Commonwealth argues that 'this ruling was made by the trial court solely based upon the direct testimony of Detective Styn.' Id." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Shauntell Bree DANZEY, Appellant
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Shauntell Bree DANZEY, Appellant, 210 A.3d 333 (2019)
…tions and related testimony when the Commonwealth failed to authenticate such evidence under Pa.R.E. 901 by establishing [Appellant's] authorship of such communications? II. In a prosecution for harassment and stalking, did not the trial court err in admitting an irrelevant social media communication (Exhibit 16) that was posted after the purported [V]ictim died? Appellant's Br…
Pennsylvania opinions such as COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Shauntell Bree DANZEY, Appellant are cited where authentication is disputed. The court stated: "Commonwealth failed to authenticate such evidence under Pa.R.E. 901 by establishing [Appellant's] authorship of such communications?" That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Walter BROOKS, Appellant
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Walter BROOKS, Appellant, 352 Pa. Super. 394 (1986)
…issues for our review: (1) whether, due to a lack of proper authentication, the trial court erred in admitting into evidence two Commonwealth exhibits, an envelope and a letter; (2) whether the trial court erred in denying appellant’s motion for a mistrial; and (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict. Appellant Brooks and co-conspirator Mervin Fortune wer…
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Walter BROOKS, Appellant is worth reading on Pennsylvania authentication because the court put the point in its own words: "Commonwealth exhibits, an envelope and a letter; (2) whether the trial court erred in denying appellant’s motion for a mistrial; and (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Michael Timothy McKELLICK — Donohue, J., dissenting
…could provide the basic foundational testimony required to authenticate the videodisk to permit its admission into evidence, including that it fairly and accurately depicts the events occurring during the traffic stop.1 With *993all due respect to the learned Majority, it affirmed the trial court’s decision to admit the videodisk principally by ignoring long-established eviden…
Pennsylvania opinions such as COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Michael Timothy McKELLICK — Donohue, J., dissenting are cited where authentication is disputed. The court stated: "could provide the basic foundational testimony required to authenticate the videodisk to permit its admission into evidence, including that it fairly and accurately depicts the events occurring during the traffic stop.1 With *993all due respect to the learned Majority, it affirme" That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Commonwealth v. Harold Roller, Appellant
Commonwealth v. Harold Roller, Appellant, 100 Pa. Super. 125 (1930)
…ility of such evidence; and sec- j ond, the adequacy of the authentication of the evidence j offered. As to the general relevancy and admissibility of such evidence it is a matter of common knowledge that motion pictures are no longer a novelty. They are constantly used for commercial and scientific purposes. The talking motion picture, or movietone, as it is technically known,…
Practitioners open Commonwealth v. Harold Roller, Appellant when Pennsylvania authentication turns on the distinction in this sentence: "As to the general relevancy and admissibility of such evidence it is a matter of common knowledge that motion pictures are no longer a novelty. They are constantly used for commercial and scientific purposes." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Montague, Appellant, v. Farmers National Bank of Watsontown, Pa. — Weight, J., dissenting
…s bond shall not become obligatory until it shall have been authenticated by a certificate endorsed thereon and duly signed by the Trustee of the Mortgage”; “Trustees Certificate. This is one of the bonds described in the within mentioned mortgage. Farmers National Bank, Watsontown, Penna. E. D. Deitrick, Trust Officer”. *618The mortgage in question (Exhibit A) sets forth that…
Pennsylvania opinions such as Montague, Appellant, v. Farmers National Bank of Watsontown, Pa. — Weight, J., dissenting are cited where authentication is disputed. The court stated: "Trustee of the Mortgage”; “Trustees Certificate. This is one of the bonds described in the within mentioned mortgage. Farmers National Bank, Watsontown, Penna. E. D. Deitrick, Trust Officer”." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Com. v. Fischer, N.
Com. v. Fischer, N., 2024 Pa. Super. 313 (2024)
…he elements of the criminal offenses”). Importantly, Victim authenticated each of the eleven email exhibits prior to their admission into evidence, confirming that the printouts were identical to the messages she received from Appellant on the dates in question. N.T., 2/1/23, at 35-37, 40-42, 50-51, 62-63, 67-69, 72, 76, 91-92, 96-97, 100-02, 108-09. Appellant further argues th…
Com. v. Fischer, N. is worth reading on Pennsylvania authentication because the court put the point in its own words: "Importantly, Victim authenticated each of the eleven email exhibits prior to their admission into evidence, confirming that the printouts were identical to the messages she received from Appellant on the dates in question. N.T." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
In Re: Order Approving the Amendment of Pa Rule of Evidence 901
In Re: Order Approving the Amendment of Pa Rule of Evidence 901 (2020)
ARTICLE IX. AUTHENTICATION AND IDENTIFICATION Rule 901. Authenticating or Identifying Evidence (a) In General. Unless stipulated, to satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is. (b)…
Practitioners open In Re: Order Approving the Amendment of Pa Rule of Evidence 901 when Pennsylvania authentication turns on the distinction in this sentence: "ARTICLE IX. AUTHENTICATION AND IDENTIFICATION Rule 901. Authenticating or Identifying Evidence (a) In General." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Practice checklist
- State the relevance theory in one sentence before naming an exception.
- Run the 403 / unfair-prejudice balance explicitly for other-acts and graphic exhibits.
- For character or other-acts evidence, identify the non-propensity purpose and request a limiting instruction on the record.
- Decide whether an out-of-court statement is hearsay for the purpose offered before hunting exceptions.
- Lay business-records foundations with time, knowledge, regular practice, and custodial qualifications — or a qualifying certification.
- Prove unavailability with specific facts before offering former testimony or dying declarations.
- Treat deposition use as procedure-plus-hearsay; designate and counter-designate early.
- Authenticate every exhibit under Pa. R.E. 901, 902 (or the self-authentication path) before arguing hearsay.
- Preserve chain of custody for physical and digital evidence with named custodians.
- Search LawDiver for recent Pennsylvania appellate evidence opinions before mediation or motions in limine.
Contents
- General standards of admissibility
- Character evidence
- Hearsay: start with the definition
- Party admissions
- Business records
- Important hearsay exceptions that do not require unavailability
- Declarant unavailable
- Dying declarations
- Medical diagnosis or treatment statements
- Use of depositions at trial
- Authenticity: why it matters and how to prove it
- Practice checklist
- Frequently asked questions
General standards of admissibility
Pennsylvania starts every evidence dispute with relevance and unfair prejudice. Under Pa. R.E. 401, 403, evidence is relevant when it has any tendency to make a fact of consequence more or less probable, and relevant evidence is still excluded when its probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. Preliminary questions of admissibility are for the court; conditional relevance and limited-purpose instructions keep otherwise-usable proof from becoming a Trojan horse for propensity or truth-of-the-matter use.
Pennsylvania places party-opponent statements in Pa. R.E. 803(25), not 801(d)(2). Pa. R.E. uses the "Pa. R.E." abbreviation in Bluebook form.
Practice tip: articulate the theory of relevance in one sentence before citing the exception. Lawyers who lead with "it's a business record" without explaining what fact the record proves often lose the 403 balance even when the hearsay foundation is clean.
Character evidence
Character evidence in Pennsylvania is governed by Pa. R.E. 404, 405. The default rule is familiar: evidence of a person's character or character trait is not admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character or trait. The same body of law then carves out the classic exceptions — essential-element character, accused-opens-the-door reputation or opinion, and other-acts evidence offered for a non-propensity purpose such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake.
Other-acts notice, 403 balancing, and limiting instructions do most of the real work. In criminal cases, prosecutors who dump prior misconduct without a specific non-propensity theory invite reversal; defense counsel who open the door to good-character testimony without anticipating rebuttal create the very propensity inference the rules were designed to police.
Pennsylvania character-evidence opinions
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Alfredo REYES-RODRIGUEZ, Appellant
…tance in failing to request an adequate jury instruction on character evidence. We now affirm the denial of PCRA relief, as Appellant failed to meet his burden of establishing that trial counsel had no reasonable basis for failing to request the jury instruction. Appellant was charged with sexually abusing three minor half-sisters, M.A. (born in 1990), S.C. (born in 1991), and…
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Alfredo REYES-RODRIGUEZ, Appellant is worth reading on Pennsylvania character evidence because the court put the point in its own words: "We now affirm the denial of PCRA relief, as Appellant failed to meet his burden of establishing that trial counsel had no reasonable basis for failing to request the jury instruction. Appellant was charged with sexually abusing three minor half-sisters, M.A. (born in 1990), S.C." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Thomas DILLON, Appellant
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Thomas DILLON, Appellant, 592 Pa. 351 (2007)
…a person in order to show action in conformity therewith." Character evidence (whether good or bad) is, of course, relevant in criminal prosecutions; that is why an accused has the right to introduce evidence of good character for relevant character traits. See Pa.R.E. 404(a)(1). Evidence of *137 separate or unrelated "crimes, wrongs, or acts," however, has long been deemed in…
Practitioners open COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Thomas DILLON, Appellant when Pennsylvania character evidence turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Character evidence (whether good or bad) is, of course, relevant in criminal prosecutions; that is why an accused has the right to introduce evidence of good character for relevant character traits. See Pa.R.E. 404(a)(1)." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Charles Ray HICKS, Appellant — Saylor, J., concurring
…ward J. Imwinkelried, An Evidentiary Paradox: Defending the Character Evidence Prohibition by Upholding a Non-Character Theory of Logical Relevance, The Doctrine of Chances, 40 U. Rich. L. Rev. 419, 439 (2006) (explaining that the doctrine of chances focuses on the objective improbability of coincidence). As explained by a leading commentator, per the doctrine of chances: To de…
Pennsylvania opinions such as COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Charles Ray HICKS, Appellant — Saylor, J., concurring are cited where character evidence is disputed. The court stated: "J. Imwinkelried, An Evidentiary Paradox: Defending the Character Evidence Prohibition by Upholding a Non-Character Theory of Logical Relevance, The Doctrine of Chances, 40 U. Rich. L. Rev." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. John MINICH, Appellee
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. John MINICH, Appellee, 2010 Pa. Super. 66 (2010)
…le of Evidence (Pa.R.E.) 608, which deals specifically with character evidence relating to the truthfulness of a witness, and Pa.R.E. 404(a)(2)®, which addresses the admissibility of evidence of a “pertinent trait of character” of a victim who testifies at trial. Because we conclude that Pa.R.E. 608 codifies Pennsylvania law defining the limits of permissible evidence to impeac…
On character evidence, COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. John MINICH, Appellee speaks to the Pennsylvania dispute in this passage: "Evidence (Pa.R.E.) 608, which deals specifically with character evidence relating to the truthfulness of a witness, and Pa.R.E. 404(a)(2)®, which addresses the admissibility of evidence of a “pertinent trait of character” of a victim who testifies at trial." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Devon THOMPSON, Appellant — Joyce, J., dissenting
…R.E. 404, with certain enumerated exceptions, provides that character evidence cannot be used to prove conduct. Under this rule, evidence that an employee had a character trait of absent-mindedness would not be admissible to prove that on a particular occasion he or she failed to fasten the safety latch on a piece of equipment. Comments to Pa.R.E. 404 ¶ 8 The above Comments amp…
Pennsylvania opinions such as COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Devon THOMPSON, Appellant — Joyce, J., dissenting are cited where character evidence is disputed. The court stated: "R.E. 404, with certain enumerated exceptions, provides that character evidence cannot be used to prove conduct." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. James WATTLEY, Appellant
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. James WATTLEY, Appellant, 2005 Pa. Super. 272 (2005)
…aw has limited the exceptions of Rule 404(b) (pertaining to character evidence) to apply only to admission of evidence concerning prior bad acts, and 2) that the evidence in question should not have been allowed in to bolster his daughter’s credibility. (Id. at 8-9). After meticulous review, we conclude both that the courts have not limited the applicability of *685Rule 404(b)…
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. James WATTLEY, Appellant is worth reading on Pennsylvania character evidence because the court put the point in its own words: "Rule 404(b) (pertaining to character evidence) to apply only to admission of evidence concerning prior bad acts, and 2) that the evidence in question should not have been allowed in to bolster his daughter’s credibility. (Id. at 8-9)." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Frequently asked questions
What is the primary evidence source in Pennsylvania?
Pennsylvania applies the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence. Pennsylvania adopted FRE-based rules effective 1998; Pa. R.E. 401–902 govern trials in courts of common pleas with Pennsylvania commentary.
How do Pennsylvania courts decide relevance and unfair prejudice?
Under Pa. R.E. 401, 403, evidence must make a fact of consequence more or less probable, and the court may exclude relevant evidence when unfair prejudice, confusion, or waste of time substantially outweighs its probative value.
Are party admissions hearsay in Pennsylvania?
Party-opponent statements under Pa. R.E. 803(25) are generally excluded from the hearsay ban (or treated as an exception, depending on local drafting). They may be offered against the party who made or adopted them without showing unavailability.
What foundation is required for business records?
Under Pa. R.E. 803(6), show a record made at or near the time from someone with knowledge, kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity, as a regular practice, through a custodian, qualified witness, or allowed certification — subject to trustworthiness attack.
When can I use a deposition at trial in Pennsylvania?
Pa. R.C.P. 4007 and 4020 govern civil depositions and trial use. Pa. R.Crim.P. 573 addresses criminal discovery; deposition testimony at trial requires Pa. R.E. 804(b)(1) when unavailability is established.
Why is authenticity separate from hearsay?
Authenticity asks whether the item is what you claim it is; hearsay asks whether out-of-court assertions inside it may be used for their truth. You can lose on either ground independently. Pennsylvania authenticity practice starts with Pa. R.E. 901, 902.
Where do dying declarations and medical statements fit?
Dying declarations under Pa. R.E. 804(b)(2) require belief in impending death and concern the cause or circumstances of that believed death. Medical statements under Pa. R.E. 803(4) require a genuine diagnostic or treatment purpose and reasonable pertinence to care.