Start with Ohio Rules of Evidence. In Ohio, Ohio evidence practice is organized under the Ohio Rules of Evidence. Relevance starts at Ohio Evid. R. 401, 403; hearsay starts at Ohio Evid. R. 801, 802. That is the question this guide answers for evidence law. Authenticity is a separate fight under Ohio Evid. R. 901, 902. Depositions at trial: Ohio Civ. R. 30 and 32 govern civil depositions and trial use. Ohio Crim. R. 16 addresses criminal discovery; deposition testimony at trial requires Ohio Evid. R. 804(B)(1) when unavailability is shown.
General standards of admissibility
Ohio starts every evidence dispute with relevance and unfair prejudice. Under Ohio Evid. R. 401, 403, evidence is relevant when it has any tendency to make a fact of consequence more or less probable, and relevant evidence is still excluded when its probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. Preliminary questions of admissibility are for the court; conditional relevance and limited-purpose instructions keep otherwise-usable proof from becoming a Trojan horse for propensity or truth-of-the-matter use.
Ohio uses "Evid. R." abbreviation and capitalizes subdivisions (e.g., 804(B)). Ohio Evid. R. 407 and Evid. R. 411 contain localized provisions on subsequent measures and insurance.
Practice tip: articulate the theory of relevance in one sentence before citing the exception. Lawyers who lead with "it's a business record" without explaining what fact the record proves often lose the 403 balance even when the hearsay foundation is clean.
Character evidence
Character evidence in Ohio is governed by Ohio Evid. R. 404, 405. The default rule is familiar: evidence of a person's character or character trait is not admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character or trait. The same body of law then carves out the classic exceptions — essential-element character, accused-opens-the-door reputation or opinion, and other-acts evidence offered for a non-propensity purpose such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake.
Other-acts notice, 403 balancing, and limiting instructions do most of the real work. In criminal cases, prosecutors who dump prior misconduct without a specific non-propensity theory invite reversal; defense counsel who open the door to good-character testimony without anticipating rebuttal create the very propensity inference the rules were designed to police.
Ohio character-evidence opinions
The State of Ohio v. Barnes
The State of Ohio v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St. 3d 21 (2002)
…1008, 1012. Evid.R. 404 and 405 govern the introduction of character evidence. Evid.R. 404(A) specifies when character evidence is admissible and provides: “Evidence of a person’s character or a trait of his character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, subject to the following exceptions: “(2) Character…
The State of Ohio v. Barnes is worth reading on Ohio character evidence because the court put the point in its own words: "Evid.R. 404 and 405 govern the introduction of character evidence. Evid.R." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
The State of Ohio, Appellant, v. Morris, Appellee
The State of Ohio, Appellant, v. Morris, Appellee, 132 Ohio St. 3d 337 (2012)
…over defendant’s objection because it was not objectionable character evidence. Rather, the court concluded that the testimony was relevant evidence.under Evid.R. 401 and 402 and not unfairly prejudicial or otherwise subject to exclusion.
Ohio opinions such as The State of Ohio, Appellant, v. Morris, Appellee are cited where character evidence is disputed. The court stated: "Rather, the court concluded that the testimony was relevant evidence.under Evid.R. 401 and 402 and not unfairly prejudicial or otherwise subject to exclusion." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
State v. Barnes
State v. Barnes, 2002 Ohio 68 (2002)
…1012. {¶ 8} Evid.R. 404 and 405 govern the introduction of character evidence. Evid.R. 404(A) specifies when character evidence is admissible and provides: “Evidence of a person’s character or a trait of his character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, subject to the following exceptions: “ * “(2) Cha…
Ohio opinions such as State v. Barnes are cited where character evidence is disputed. The court stated: "Evid.R. 404 and 405 govern the introduction of character evidence. Evid.R." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
State v. Hartman (Slip Opinion)
State v. Hartman (Slip Opinion), 161 Ohio St. 3d 214 (2020)
…ounsel sought to have B.T.’s testimony excluded as improper character evidence. He argued that the allegations involving B.T. were too distinct from those involved in the current case to have any probative value. The state countered that both assaults had occurred while the victims were sleeping and that this amounted to a “behavioral fingerprint” identifying Hartman as the per…
On character evidence, State v. Hartman (Slip Opinion) speaks to the Ohio dispute in this passage: "B.T.’s testimony excluded as improper character evidence. He argued that the allegations involving B.T. were too distinct from those involved in the current case to have any probative value." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. SMITH, Appellant
The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. SMITH, Appellant, 84 Ohio App. 3d 647 (1992)
…d, except that the state may present such evidence to rebut character evidence contra first offered by the accused. The basic thrust of Evid.R. 404 concerns the “propensity rule,” which is a basic principle that evidence of a person’s character trait is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity with his character on a particular occasion. It prohibit…
On character evidence, The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. SMITH, Appellant speaks to the Ohio dispute in this passage: "The basic thrust of Evid.R. 404 concerns the “propensity rule,” which is a basic principle that evidence of a person’s character trait is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity with his character on a particular occasion." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. GRUBB, Appellant
The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. GRUBB, Appellant, 111 Ohio App. 3d 277 (1996)
…ir marriage he assaulted Deidra. Evid.R. 404 provides: “(A) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person’s character or a trait of his character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, subject to the following exceptions: “(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of his character offered b…
Ohio opinions such as The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. GRUBB, Appellant are cited where character evidence is disputed. The court stated: "Deidra. Evid.R. 404 provides: “(A) Character evidence generally." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. BUSH, Appellant — Grady, J., concurring
The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. BUSH, Appellant — Grady, J., concurring, 119 Ohio App. 3d 146 (1997)
…king of inferences with the bar against the introduction of character evidence created by Evid.R. 404(A). Judge Young’s resolution of the first assignment of error, that evidence of Bush’s behavior thirty minutes earlier is admissible to demonstrate a propensity to use force, employs the very inferential pattern prohibited by Evid.R. 404(B). However, I find no violation of the…
On character evidence, The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. BUSH, Appellant — Grady, J., concurring speaks to the Ohio dispute in this passage: "Evid.R. 404(A). Judge Young’s resolution of the first assignment of error, that evidence of Bush’s behavior thirty minutes earlier is admissible to demonstrate a propensity to use force, employs the very inferential pattern prohibited by Evid.R. 404(B)." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. MANNING, Appellant
The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. MANNING, Appellant, 74 Ohio App. 3d 19 (1991)
…anning notes correctly that the general prohibition against character evidence does not preclude her from addressing her perception of Todd Manning’s propensity for violence as part of her claim of self-defense. Evid.R. 404(A)(2) and 404(B). She erroneously reasons, however, that Evid.R. 405(B) provides an unconditional right to prove such a propensity with evidence of prior cr…
On character evidence, The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. MANNING, Appellant speaks to the Ohio dispute in this passage: "Todd Manning’s propensity for violence as part of her claim of self-defense. Evid.R. 404(A)(2) and 404(B). She erroneously reasons, however, that Evid.R." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
How the Ohio rule applies
Apply the Ohio authorities in order. The facts are simplified so the statute and the standard are visible.
A lawyer in Ohio wants to offer a medical record, a party email, and a statement the declarant made while believing death was imminent.
- Clear relevance and unfair prejudice under Ohio Evid. R. 401, 403.
- If the email is the opposing party's, test Ohio Evid. R. 801(d)(2) before the hearsay definition in Ohio Evid. R. 801, 802.
- For the medical record, lay the business-records foundation in Ohio Evid. R. 803(6) and the treatment purpose in Ohio Evid. R. 803(4).
- For the deathbed statement, meet Ohio Evid. R. 804(b)(2), then authenticate every exhibit under Ohio Evid. R. 901, 902.
Ohio keeps hearsay, character, and authenticity on different rules inside the Ohio Rules of Evidence. Winning one does not win the others.
Hearsay: start with the definition
Most hearsay objections in Ohio are won or lost on the definition, not on an exception. Under Ohio Evid. R. 801, 802, hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Non-hearsay purposes — verbal acts, effect on the listener, notice, circumstantial evidence of state of mind, and impeachment — remain available when the proponent can articulate them without asking the jury to believe the declarant.
Layered hearsay (hearsay within hearsay) requires an exception or exclusion for each layer. Machine-generated data and non-assertive conduct sit outside the hearsay definition in FRE-aligned jurisdictions, but they still need authenticity and, often, expert or business-records foundations.
Ohio hearsay opinions
The State of Ohio v. DeMarco
The State of Ohio v. DeMarco, 31 Ohio St. 3d 191 (1987)
…his court is whether the trial court permitted inadmissible hearsay evidence. Appellant argues that the major portions of the testimony of the Aetna claims adjuster Patricia Page, Bank One of Akron auditor Alvin Lindeman, and police investigator Detective Robert Kingzett were inadmissible hearsay, based on information received from unidentified sources of unknown reliability; s…
On hearsay, The State of Ohio v. DeMarco speaks to the Ohio dispute in this passage: "his court is whether the trial court permitted inadmissible hearsay evidence. Appellant argues that the major portions of the testimony of the Aetna claims adjuster Patricia Page, Bank One of Akron auditor Alvin Lindeman, and police investigator Detective Robert Kingzett were ina" The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
The State of Ohio, and Cross-Appellee v. Kidder, and
The State of Ohio, and Cross-Appellee v. Kidder, and, 32 Ohio St. 3d 279 (1987)
…deputy sheriffs about Kidder’s veracity,1 (2) the deputies’ hearsay statements regarding the victim’s emotional state during the confrontation,2 and (3) statements of Kidder relating to dropping the charges *284against him and efforts to “plea bargain.”3 We find that the jury was indeed permitted to consider inadmissible hearsay statements made by the interrogating officers, bu…
On hearsay, The State of Ohio, and Cross-Appellee v. Kidder, and speaks to the Ohio dispute in this passage: "Kidder’s veracity,1 (2) the deputies’ hearsay statements regarding the victim’s emotional state during the confrontation,2 and (3) statements of Kidder relating to dropping the charges *284against him and efforts to “plea bargain." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
The STATE of Ohio v. RICHCREEK
The STATE of Ohio v. RICHCREEK, 196 Ohio App. 3d 505 (2011)
…er raped me.” Defense counsel objected to this testimony on hearsay grounds. After the prosecutor responded that “it’s not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted necessarily but to show what [A.M.] did,” the court overruled the objection. Bissett then testified that AM.’s message said that she had been in the basement where Richcreek’s bedroom was and that he “corne…
Practitioners open The STATE of Ohio v. RICHCREEK when Ohio hearsay turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Defense counsel objected to this testimony on hearsay grounds. After the prosecutor responded that “it’s not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted necessarily but to show what [A.M.] did,” the court overruled the objection. Bissett then testified that AM." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Cincinnati Insurance Company, Appellee, v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., Appellant
…ot feel that they constitute the necessary exception to the hearsay rule. “The Court: Overruled.” Following the conclusion of plaintiff’s case, defendant sought to introduce the deposition of Margaret Thaxton to prove when Mrs. Dixon first saw smoke coming out of the car. The court refused to admit Mrs. Thax-ton’s deposition, as the testimony related to assumption of the risk,…
Ohio opinions such as Cincinnati Insurance Company, Appellee, v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., Appellant are cited where hearsay is disputed. The court stated: "The Court: Overruled.” Following the conclusion of plaintiff’s case, defendant sought to introduce the deposition of Margaret Thaxton to prove when Mrs. Dixon first saw smoke coming out of the car. The court refused to admit Mrs." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Mastran v. Urichich
Mastran v. Urichich, 37 Ohio St. 3d 44 (1988)
…efendant may be admitted in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule, pursuant to Evid. R. 801(D) (2). We hold that they may not be so admitted. I Mastran argues that Nick remained as a party in the case after the declaration of mistrial with respect to him; therefore, Mastran contends, his out-of-court statements may be proven as an admission by a party pursuant to Evid. R…
On hearsay, Mastran v. Urichich speaks to the Ohio dispute in this passage: "Evid. R. 801(D) (2). We hold that they may not be so admitted." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
In Re: J.S.
In Re: J.S., 2007 Ohio 4551 (2007)
…t. J.S. contends that the trial court admitted inadmissible hearsay during the delinquency hearing and that its adjudication was against the manifest weight of the evidence. For the following reasons, the trial court's *Page 2 judgment will be affirmed. {¶ 2} The state's evidence at the adjudication hearing revealed the following facts. {¶ 3} K.K., who was born on August 31, 19…
In Re: J.S. is worth reading on Ohio hearsay because the court put the point in its own words: "J.S. contends that the trial court admitted inadmissible hearsay during the delinquency hearing and that its adjudication was against the manifest weight of the evidence. For the following reasons, the trial court's *Page 2 judgment will be affirmed." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
In the Matter of Antwan, Treyel, Devounte, and Dariyon Miller.
In the Matter of Antwan, Treyel, Devounte, and Dariyon Miller., 2007 Ohio 2170 (2007)
…error: {¶ 23} "[1.] The juvenile court erred by permitting hearsay testimony from the subject children into the adjudicatory hearing absent a showing of Evidence Rule 807 exceptions. {¶ 24} "[2.] The juvenile court erred by permitting impermissible hearsay into the proceedings contained in the deposition of Dr. Sandra McPherson." *Page 7 {¶ 25} Both of Miller's assignments of…
In the Matter of Antwan, Treyel, Devounte, and Dariyon Miller. is worth reading on Ohio hearsay because the court put the point in its own words: "The juvenile court erred by permitting hearsay testimony from the subject children into the adjudicatory hearing absent a showing of Evidence Rule 807 exceptions. {¶ 24} '[2." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
State v. Ivery
State v. Ivery, 278 N.E.3d 936 (2026)
…ng as State’s exhibit No. 1. Appellant promptly objected on hearsay and Confrontation Clause grounds. The State responded that the “911 calls are generally admissible” because they “have been found to be non-testimonial[]” and the person calling “is giving information to what they believe is an ongoing emergency.” (Tr. 50.) The trial court overruled the objection, and the State…
On hearsay, State v. Ivery speaks to the Ohio dispute in this passage: "State’s exhibit No. 1. Appellant promptly objected on hearsay and Confrontation Clause grounds." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Party admissions
Statements of an opposing party are among the most important routes around the hearsay bar. Ohio treats them under Ohio Evid. R. 801(d)(2). Nothing about the statement need be against interest, contemporaneous, or based on personal knowledge — the theory is adversarial, not reliability-based. A party cannot complain that his own words are unreliable when offered against him.
Scope questions dominate practice: the party's own statement; adopted statements (including silence in circumstances where a reasonable person would deny); statements by authorized speakers; agent or employee statements on matters within the scope of the relationship; and, in criminal conspiracy cases, coconspirator statements during and in furtherance of the conspiracy. A defendant generally cannot introduce his own exculpatory out-of-court statement as a "party admission" against himself — the rule runs one way.
Ohio party-admission opinions
The State of Ohio, Appellee, v. Woods, Appellant
The State of Ohio, Appellee, v. Woods, Appellant, 48 Ohio App. 3d 1 (1988)
…cords with the pre-Rules, common-law standard governing the admission of “past recollection recorded” established by the Supreme Court of Ohio in State v. Scott (1972), 31 Ohio St. 2d 1, 60 O.O. 2d 1, 285 N.E. 2d 344. The court in Scott recognized a “past recollection recorded” exception to the common-law proscription against the admission of hearsay evidence when a witness has…
The State of Ohio, Appellee, v. Woods, Appellant is worth reading on Ohio party admissions because the court put the point in its own words: "Rules, common-law standard governing the admission of “past recollection recorded” established by the Supreme Court of Ohio in State v. Scott (1972), 31 Ohio St. 2d 1, 60 O.O. 2d 1, 285 N.E. 2d 344." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
State v. Shaw
State v. Shaw, 2013 Ohio 5292 (2013)
…). Evid.R. 802 contains the general prohibition against the admission of hearsay. However, exceptions to this general prohibition are enumerated in Evid.R. 803. {¶20} The state concedes that all of the statements made by Turner are hearsay. That concession is correct. The statements were not made by Turner, they -6- were made by Tracee. Furthermore, they were offered to prove t…
State v. Shaw is worth reading on Ohio party admissions because the court put the point in its own words: "Evid.R. 802 contains the general prohibition against the admission of hearsay. However, exceptions to this general prohibition are enumerated in Evid.R. 803. {¶20} The state concedes that all of the statements made by Turner are hearsay. That concession is correct." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
The State of Ohio, Appellee, v. Jurek, Appellant
The State of Ohio, Appellee, v. Jurek, Appellant, 52 Ohio App. 3d 30 (1989)
…defendant’s five assignments of error relate solely to the admission of tape recordings made by an attorney who acted as a police informant during the four-month investigation. The defendant argues that the trial court erred in (a) denying his .motion to suppress because the recording by a police informer violated his Fourth Amendment right against illegal searches and Sixth A…
On party admissions, The State of Ohio, Appellee, v. Jurek, Appellant speaks to the Ohio dispute in this passage: "The defendant argues that the trial court erred in (a) denying his ." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Edge v. Fairview Hosp.
Edge v. Fairview Hosp., 2011 Ohio 2148 (2011)
…hearsay rule as set forth in Evid.R. 803(6), as well as the admission of a party-opponent exception under Evid.R. 801(D)(2). On April 27, 2010, the trial court granted the defendants’ motion in a journal entry as follows: “Defendant Fairview Hospital’s Motion in Limine to exclude any evidence, testimony or reference related to Dr. Verrees’s interpretation of the 9-25-07 plain f…
Edge v. Fairview Hosp. is worth reading on Ohio party admissions because the court put the point in its own words: "Evid.R. 803(6), as well as the admission of a party-opponent exception under Evid.R. 801(D)(2)." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Pontius v. Riverside Radiology & Interventional Assocs., Inc.
Pontius v. Riverside Radiology & Interventional Assocs., Inc., 2016 Ohio 1515 (2016)
…d have been presented on the issue of Dr. Schultz's alleged admissions. The trial court reaffirmed its ruling of August 3, 2015. {¶ 12} Following an unfavorable verdict on August 20, 2015, and a corresponding final judgment entry on August 31, 2015, Pontius, on September 29, 2015, filed a notice of appeal. II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR {¶ 13} Pontius asserts a single assignment of er…
Practitioners open Pontius v. Riverside Radiology & Interventional Assocs., Inc. when Ohio party admissions turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Dr. Schultz's alleged admissions. The trial court reaffirmed its ruling of August 3, 2015. {¶ 12} Following an unfavorable verdict on August 20, 2015, and a corresponding final judgment entry on August 31, 2015, Pontius, on September 29, 2015, filed a notice of appeal. II." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
State of Ohio v. Dean D. Small
State of Ohio v. Dean D. Small, 2007 Ohio 6771 (2007)
…ed, (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in the admission of evidence, (3) prosecutorial misconduct did not deprive *Page 2 defendant of a fair trial, and (4) the sufficiency and manifest weight of the evidence support defendant's convictions, we affirm. {¶ 2} By indictment filed on March 17, 2006, defendant was charged with one count of aggravated murder in violati…
Practitioners open State of Ohio v. Dean D. Small when Ohio party admissions turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Page 2 defendant of a fair trial, and (4) the sufficiency and manifest weight of the evidence support defendant's convictions, we affirm." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Dorsten, Appellant, v. Lawrence Et Al., Appellees
Dorsten, Appellant, v. Lawrence Et Al., Appellees, 20 Ohio App. 2d 297 (1969)
…admitted in evidence over objection of the losing party its admission is prejudicial error. Lewis v. Woodland, 101 Ohio App. 442. Defendant contends that the rule announced in Vencill v. Cornwell, 103 Ohio App. 217 applies. In Vencill, supra, the court held that where an exhibit consists of several items of evidence, part admissible and part inadmissible, the entire exhibit mus…
On party admissions, Dorsten, Appellant, v. Lawrence Et Al., Appellees speaks to the Ohio dispute in this passage: "Lewis v. Woodland, 101 Ohio App. 442. Defendant contends that the rule announced in Vencill v. Cornwell, 103 Ohio App. 217 applies." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Philip Yoder v. Steve T. Hurst
Philip Yoder v. Steve T. Hurst, 2007 Ohio 4861 (2007)
…ended that the statements were admissible as party-opponent admissions. See Evid.R. 801(D)(2). Although it is true that relevant party-opponent admissions are admissible non-hearsay, Mr. Yutzy's testimony was inadmissible because he did not actually hear the statements about which he intended to testify. (Tr. 253, 254.) This has nothing to do with the hearsay rule; rather, it g…
Practitioners open Philip Yoder v. Steve T. Hurst when Ohio party admissions turns on the distinction in this sentence: "See Evid.R. 801(D)(2). Although it is true that relevant party-opponent admissions are admissible non-hearsay, Mr. Yutzy's testimony was inadmissible because he did not actually hear the statements about which he intended to testify. (Tr. 253, 254." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Business records
The business-records exception under Ohio Evid. R. 803(6) is the everyday path for medical charts, employment files, bank statements, and maintenance logs. The foundation requires a record made at or near the time by — or from information transmitted by — someone with knowledge; kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity; and made as a regular practice. A custodian or other qualified witness (or a qualifying certification where the jurisdiction allows it) lays the foundation. The opponent may still attack lack of trustworthiness when the source or method of preparation indicates unreliability — litigation-driven reports are the classic failure mode.
Do not confuse authenticity with the business-records exception. You still need to show the exhibit is what you claim it is; the hearsay exception then answers why the out-of-court assertions inside it may be considered for their truth.
Ohio business-records opinions
The State of Ohio, Appellee, v. Hood, Appellant
The State of Ohio, Appellee, v. Hood, Appellant, 135 Ohio St. 3d 137 (2012)
…records—Cell-phone records, if properly authenticated, are business records and are not testimonial under Crawford v. Washington— Lack of authentication of records, not their hearsay nature, makes admission of records unconstitutional under Confrontation Clause— Authentication may be provided only by custodian or other witness who is qualified to testify that records were kept…
The State of Ohio, Appellee, v. Hood, Appellant is worth reading on Ohio business records because the court put the point in its own words: "Cell-phone records, if properly authenticated, are business records and are not testimonial under Crawford v." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
The State of Ohio v. Tims
The State of Ohio v. Tims, 9 Ohio St. 2d 136 (1967)
…ence under the provisions of Section 2317.40, Revised Code (Business Records as Evidence Act). The pertinent part of this section reads as follows: “A record of an act, condition, or event, in so far as relevant, is competent evidence if the custodian or the person who made such record or under whose supervision such record was made testifies to its identity and the mode of its…
On business records, The State of Ohio v. Tims speaks to the Ohio dispute in this passage: "Section 2317.40, Revised Code (Business Records as Evidence Act)." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
The State of Ohio v. Walker
The State of Ohio v. Walker, 53 Ohio St. 2d 192 (1978)
…contends that the two pages of the permanent log book is a business record within the meaning of B. C. 2317.40, and that as such, is inadmissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule based on this court’s holding in State v. Tims (1967), 9 Ohio St. 2d 136. Appellee, on the other hand, contends that the log book is an official report kept by officers of this state as…
Ohio opinions such as The State of Ohio v. Walker are cited where business records is disputed. The court stated: "B. C. 2317.40, and that as such, is inadmissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule based on this court’s holding in State v. Tims (1967), 9 Ohio St. 2d 136." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
The State of Ohio, Appellee, v. Knox, Appellant
The State of Ohio, Appellee, v. Knox, Appellant, 18 Ohio App. 3d 36 (1984)
…admitting telephone company computer printouts through the business records exception to the hearsay rule without proper foundation being laid.” The computer printouts in this case were admitted under the business records exception, Evid. R. 803(6), which excepts from the hearsay rule: “ * [A] data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, or conditions, made at or near th…
On business records, The State of Ohio, Appellee, v. Knox, Appellant speaks to the Ohio dispute in this passage: "The computer printouts in this case were admitted under the business records exception, Evid. R." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
LAMBERT, Appellant, v. GOODYEAR TIRE AND RUBBER COMPANY, Appellee — Harsha, J., dissenting
…(6) recognizes an exception to the hearsay rule for certain business records, which are defined as: “[A] memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, or conditions, made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular…
Practitioners open LAMBERT, Appellant, v. GOODYEAR TIRE AND RUBBER COMPANY, Appellee — Harsha, J., dissenting when Ohio business records turns on the distinction in this sentence: "(6) recognizes an exception to the hearsay rule for certain business records, which are defined as: “[A] memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, or conditions, made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with kn" Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Ohio Receivables, L.L.C. v. Williams
Ohio Receivables, L.L.C. v. Williams, 2013 Ohio 960 (2013)
…y Civ.R. 56, (2) personal knowledge gained from a review of business records, without the presentation of evidence about the creation of those records, was insufficient, and (3) Ohio Receivables’s “mere acquisition” of documents from other companies did not make those documents business 3 records of Ohio Receivables within the meaning of the business records exception to the he…
Ohio opinions such as Ohio Receivables, L.L.C. v. Williams are cited where business records is disputed. The court stated: "y Civ.R. 56, (2) personal knowledge gained from a review of business records, without the presentation of evidence about the creation of those records, was insufficient, and (3) Ohio Receivables’s “mere acquisition” of documents from other companies did not make those documents b" That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
State v. Lawson
State v. Lawson, 2020 Ohio 3008 (2020)
…witness can testify as to the maintenance of the records as business records created and maintained in the ordinary course of business. Having read the memorandums, I'm inclined to agree, if the State did that, that would be enough to admit the evidence. So unless something new happens, that would be the ruling of the Court, deny the motion in limine if she presents the authent…
State v. Lawson is worth reading on Ohio business records because the court put the point in its own words: "Having read the memorandums, I'm inclined to agree, if the State did that, that would be enough to admit the evidence." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
State v. Lawson
State v. Lawson, 2020 Ohio 3004 (2020)
…witness can testify as to the maintenance of the records as business records created and maintained in the ordinary course of business. Having read the memorandums, I'm inclined to agree, if the State did that, that would be enough to admit the evidence. So unless something new happens, that would be the ruling of the Court, deny the motion in limine if she presents the authent…
On business records, State v. Lawson speaks to the Ohio dispute in this passage: "Having read the memorandums, I'm inclined to agree, if the State did that, that would be enough to admit the evidence." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Important hearsay exceptions that do not require unavailability
Three present-sense and mental-state exceptions carry most of the remaining traffic in Ohio trial practice.
Excited utterance — Ohio Evid. R. 803(2). A statement relating to a startling event or condition, made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused. Timing is elastic; composure defeats the exception even minutes after the event, while visible distress can preserve it for hours.
Present sense impression — Ohio Evid. R. 803(1). A statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while or immediately after the declarant perceived it. Contemporaneity is strict — seconds and minutes, not hours — and excitement is not required.
Then-existing mental, emotional, or physical condition — Ohio Evid. R. 803(3). Statements of then-existing state of mind (including intent and plan) come in; statements of memory or belief offered to prove the fact remembered generally do not. Intent-to-meet-another-person cases remain the hardest applications.
Declarant unavailable
When the declarant is unavailable under Ohio Evid. R. 804(a), Ohio opens a second suite of exceptions. Unavailability typically includes privilege, refusal to testify despite court order, lack of memory, death or then-existing infirmity, and absence despite reasonable efforts to procure attendance. The proponent bears the burden of proving unavailability with specific facts — a bare assertion that the witness "could not be found" is not enough.
Former testimony under Ohio Evid. R. 804(b)(1) is the workhorse once unavailability is shown: testimony given as a witness at a trial, hearing, or lawful deposition, offered against a party who had an opportunity and similar motive to develop it by direct, cross, or redirect. Criminal confrontation analysis runs in parallel and is not satisfied merely because a hearsay exception applies.
Dying declarations
Dying declarations under Ohio Evid. R. 804(b)(2) remain a narrow but decisive exception in homicide and, in many jurisdictions, civil cases involving the cause or circumstances of what the declarant believed to be impending death. The foundational showing is the declarant's belief that death was imminent — not that death in fact followed within any particular time — plus a statement concerning the cause or circumstances of what the declarant believed to be the impending death. Courts police coaching and narrative expansions aggressively.
Ohio dying-declaration opinions
State v. Kennedy
State v. Kennedy, 134 Ohio St.3d 1450 (2013)
…Accordingly, we overrule the first assignment of error. B. Dying Declaration {¶37} In his second assignment of error, Kennedy contends that the trial court erred by allowing Officer Schultz to testify as to what Stuckey said about who had shot him, in violation of the rules of evidence and in violation of his right, secured by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitut…
On dying declaration, State v. Kennedy speaks to the Ohio dispute in this passage: "Accordingly, we overrule the first assignment of error. B." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
The State of Ohio, Appellee, v. Karcher, Appellant
The State of Ohio, Appellee, v. Karcher, Appellant, 155 Ohio St. 253 (1951)
…he statement of Alice Bailey to Dr. Ramsayer qualified as a dying declaration. The General Assembly has taken cognizance of extrajudicial declarations relating to the crime of abortion in the adoption of Section 12412-1, General Code, which, in part, is as follows: “And on such trial the dying declaration of a woman who dies in consequence of the miscarriage or attempt to produ…
Practitioners open The State of Ohio, Appellee, v. Karcher, Appellant when Ohio dying declaration turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Alice Bailey to Dr. Ramsayer qualified as a dying declaration." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
The STATE of Ohio v. RAY
The STATE of Ohio v. RAY, 189 Ohio App. 3d 292 (2010)
…mas Ray as the individual who shot him in the neck were not dying declarations that are admissible pursuant to Crawford v. Washington (2004), 541 U.S. 36[, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177] and Ohio Rule of Evidence 804(B)(2).” {¶ 26} Its second assignment of error states: {¶ 27} “The trial court abused its discretion when it ruled that some of Mr. Crutchfield’s statements ident…
Practitioners open The STATE of Ohio v. RAY when Ohio dying declaration turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Ray as the individual who shot him in the neck were not dying declarations that are admissible pursuant to Crawford v. Washington (2004), 541 U.S. 36[, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177] and Ohio Rule of Evidence 804(B)(2)." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Colletti v. The State of Ohio
Colletti v. The State of Ohio, 12 Ohio App. 104 (1919)
…sent when the jury viewed the premises. 2. That the alleged dying declarations of the decedent were not submitted in proper form, and were not admissible. 3. That the defendant did not have a public trial. 4. Errors in the charge of the court to the jury. *106With regard to the first error complained of, the record at page 2 shows that before the statements of the prosecutor an…
On dying declaration, Colletti v. The State of Ohio speaks to the Ohio dispute in this passage: "That the alleged dying declarations of the decedent were not submitted in proper form, and were not admissible. 3. That the defendant did not have a public trial. 4. Errors in the charge of the court to the jury." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
The State of Ohio, Appellee, v. Woods, Appellant
The State of Ohio, Appellee, v. Woods, Appellant, 47 Ohio App. 2d 144 (1972)
…ade by the deceased which neither met the requirements of a dying declaration nor a spontaneous exclamation under the doctrine of res gestae. “2. The court issued an order refusing to allow the testimony of one Alex Mate, a witness for the defendant, to be presented to the jury for its consideration, which order prevented the defendant from having a fair trial. “3. Errors of la…
On dying declaration, The State of Ohio, Appellee, v. Woods, Appellant speaks to the Ohio dispute in this passage: "The court issued an order refusing to allow the testimony of one Alex Mate, a witness for the defendant, to be presented to the jury for its consideration, which order prevented the defendant from having a fair trial. “3." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
State v. Taylor
State v. Taylor, 2018 Ohio 2921 (2018)
…rejects both arguments because Mr. Knaff’s statement was a dying declaration. 4 {¶12} A trial court’s evidentiary rulings are usually reviewed for an abuse of discretion, but when the ruling implicates the Confrontation Clause, it is reviewed de novo. State v. McKelton, 148 Ohio St.3d 261, 2016-Ohio-5735, ¶ 97. {¶13} Hearsay is defined as “a statement, other than one made by t…
Ohio opinions such as State v. Taylor are cited where dying declaration is disputed. The court stated: "Mr. Knaff’s statement was a dying declaration. 4 {¶12} A trial court’s evidentiary rulings are usually reviewed for an abuse of discretion, but when the ruling implicates the Confrontation Clause, it is reviewed de novo. State v. McKelton, 148 Ohio St.3d 261, 2016-Ohio-5735, ¶ 97." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
The State of Ohio, Appellee, v. Knight, Appellant
The State of Ohio, Appellee, v. Knight, Appellant, 20 Ohio App. 3d 289 (1984)
…rred in ruling that a hearsay statement was admissible as a dying declaration. 5 Evid. R. 804(B) provides in part that: “The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness: << * “(2) In a prosecution for homicide or in a civil action or proceeding, a statement made by a declarant while believing that his death was imminent, concer…
The State of Ohio, Appellee, v. Knight, Appellant is worth reading on Ohio dying declaration because the court put the point in its own words: "rred in ruling that a hearsay statement was admissible as a dying declaration. 5 Evid. R. 804(B) provides in part that: “The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness: << * “(2) In a prosecution for homicide or in a civil actio" Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
SHINKMAN v. STATE
SHINKMAN v. STATE, 7 Ohio Law. Abs. 518 (1929)
…ration, certain testimonies which the State claimed to be a dying declaration and erred in this respect because: (a) There was no competent preliminary proof to show that the deceased, Phillip (Funnyface) Corry had abandoned all hope of recovery at the time of the declaration. (b) It permitted Lieutenant Story, police lieutenant of the City of Cleveland, to testify that in his…
On dying declaration, SHINKMAN v. STATE speaks to the Ohio dispute in this passage: "State claimed to be a dying declaration and erred in this respect because: (a) There was no competent preliminary proof to show that the deceased, Phillip (Funnyface) Corry had abandoned all hope of recovery at the time of the declaration." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Medical diagnosis or treatment statements
Statements made for medical diagnosis or treatment under Ohio Evid. R. 803(4) cover medical history, past or present symptoms, and their general cause when reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. The exception is not limited to treating physicians; statements to nurses, EMTs, and consulting clinicians can qualify when the diagnostic purpose is genuine. Fault and identity remain the usual battleground: "I was hit by a car" is often pertinent; "the light was green" usually is not; abuser identity in child-abuse and domestic-violence cases is heavily litigated.
Ohio medical-statement opinions
The State of Ohio v. Dever
The State of Ohio v. Dever, 64 Ohio St. 3d 401 (1992)
…hearsay exception involving statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment, including the motivational component of Evid.R. 803(4), the effect of Ohio’s Evid.R. 102 on Evid.R. 803(4), and the admissibility of statements by a child identifying the perpetrator in an abuse prosecution. B Evid.R. 803(4) allows into evidence, as an exception to the hearsay rule, “[st…
Practitioners open The State of Ohio v. Dever when Ohio medical diagnosis hearsay turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Evid.R. 803(4), the effect of Ohio’s Evid.R. 102 on Evid.R. 803(4), and the admissibility of statements by a child identifying the perpetrator in an abuse prosecution. B Evid.R." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
The State of Ohio, Appellee, v. Arnold, Appellant
The State of Ohio, Appellee, v. Arnold, Appellant, 126 Ohio St. 3d 290 (2010)
…to interviewers at child-advocacy centers that are made for medical diagnosis and treatment are nontestimonial and are admissible without offending the Confrontation Clause. Thus, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals to the extent that M.A.’s statements to Marshall for the purpose of medical treatment and diagnosis were properly admitted. We further hold that statemen…
The State of Ohio, Appellee, v. Arnold, Appellant is worth reading on Ohio medical diagnosis hearsay because the court put the point in its own words: "Confrontation Clause. Thus, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals to the extent that M.A.’s statements to Marshall for the purpose of medical treatment and diagnosis were properly admitted." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. CLARY, Appellant
The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. CLARY, Appellant, 73 Ohio App. 3d 42 (1991)
…rough a physician when the testimony was not pertinent to a medical diagnosis or treatment. “III. Appellant’s conviction was not supported by sufficient credible evidence and was against the manifest weight of the evidence. This deprived appellant of Due Process of Law as guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section…
Practitioners open The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. CLARY, Appellant when Ohio medical diagnosis hearsay turns on the distinction in this sentence: "III. Appellant’s conviction was not supported by sufficient credible evidence and was against the manifest weight of the evidence." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
State v. L.E.F.
State v. L.E.F., 2014 Ohio 4585 (2014)
…the videotaped interview were not made for the purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and, therefore, were hearsay that did not fall within the hearsay exception under Evid.R. 803(4). Hearsay is "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." Evid.R. 801(C). Pursuan…
On medical diagnosis hearsay, State v. L.E.F. speaks to the Ohio dispute in this passage: "Evid.R. 803(4). Hearsay is 'a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.' Evid.R. 801(C)." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
State v. Watts
State v. Watts, 2016 Ohio 5386 (2016)
…her questions to both L.R. and M.R. were for the purpose of medical diagnosis and treatment. Combes explained that "it's in the child's best interest to have as few interviews as possible for mental health purposes." (Tr. Vol. I at 35.) After she conducted her interviews with L.R. and M.R., other members of the girls' treatment team had access to the interviews and could use th…
Practitioners open State v. Watts when Ohio medical diagnosis hearsay turns on the distinction in this sentence: "L.R. and M.R. were for the purpose of medical diagnosis and treatment. Combes explained that 'it's in the child's best interest to have as few interviews as possible for mental health purposes.' (Tr. Vol. I at 35.) After she conducted her interviews with L.R. and M.R." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
In re CORRY M.
In re CORRY M., 134 Ohio App. 3d 274 (1999)
…orth in Evid.R. 803(4), as a statement made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. Second, appellant argued that the child’s statements were admissible pursuant to a relatively new hearsay exception, set forth in Evid.R. 807, allowing for the admissibility of a child’s out-of-court statement in certain circumstances involving allegations of abuse. Based upon the limite…
Ohio opinions such as In re CORRY M. are cited where medical diagnosis hearsay is disputed. The court stated: "Evid.R. 803(4), as a statement made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. Second, appellant argued that the child’s statements were admissible pursuant to a relatively new hearsay exception, set forth in Evid.R." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
In re T.L.
In re T.L., 2011 Ohio 4709 (2011)
…803(4) BECAUSE THE STATEMENTS WERE NOT MADE FOR PURPOSES OF MEDICAL DIAGNOSIS OR TREATMENT.” {¶10} The juvenile argues that the trial court erred by admitting statements made by the child to Jill Mearing, an intake social worker for Medina County Jobs and Family Services (“JFS”). This Court disagrees. 4 {¶11} The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution accords a crimi…
Practitioners open In re T.L. when Ohio medical diagnosis hearsay turns on the distinction in this sentence: "BECAUSE THE STATEMENTS WERE NOT MADE FOR PURPOSES OF MEDICAL DIAGNOSIS OR TREATMENT.” {¶10} The juvenile argues that the trial court erred by admitting statements made by the child to Jill Mearing, an intake social worker for Medina County Jobs and Family Services (“JFS”)." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Use of depositions at trial
Ohio Civ. R. 30 and 32 govern civil depositions and trial use. Ohio Crim. R. 16 addresses criminal discovery; deposition testimony at trial requires Ohio Evid. R. 804(B)(1) when unavailability is shown.
Deposition use is always a two-layer problem: procedural permission to read or play the deposition, plus a hearsay path (often former testimony, party admission, or impeachment). Counsel who satisfy the civil or criminal procedure rule but skip the evidence-rule foundation invite a sustained objection; counsel who have a hearsay exception but failed to preserve the deposition under the procedural rule face the same result. Video designations, counter-designations, and completeness objections should be teed up before the jury is seated.
Ohio deposition / former-testimony opinions
The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. ROWE, Appellant
The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. ROWE, Appellant, 92 Ohio App. 3d 652 (1993)
…ourt erred when it admitted, over defendant’s objections, a deposition of an essential witness for the state when the state failed to establish, by detailed sworn testimony, that the witness was unavailable thereby violating the Rules of Evidence and the Confrontation Clause provisions of the state and federal Constitutions. “Assignment of Error Number Two “The state engaged in…
Ohio opinions such as The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. ROWE, Appellant are cited where deposition / former testimony is disputed. The court stated: "Rules of Evidence and the Confrontation Clause provisions of the state and federal Constitutions." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
The State of Ohio v. Young — Celebrezze, J., concurring
The State of Ohio v. Young — Celebrezze, J., concurring, 5 Ohio St. 3d 221 (1983)
…ther hearing of the same or a different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with law in the course of the same or another proceeding, if the party against whom the testimony is now offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination. Testi…
Ohio opinions such as The State of Ohio v. Young — Celebrezze, J., concurring are cited where deposition / former testimony is disputed. The court stated: "ther hearing of the same or a different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with law in the course of the same or another proceeding, if the party against whom the testimony is now offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an oppo" That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Pettiford, Appellee, v. Aggarwal, Appellant
Pettiford, Appellee, v. Aggarwal, Appellant, 126 Ohio St. 3d 413 (2010)
…re — Summary judgment — Contradiction between affidavit and deposition testimony of expert witness — Explanation required. (No. 2009-1602 — Submitted May 11, 2010 — Decided July 14, 2010.) APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Montgomery County, No. 22736, 186 Ohio App.3d 705, 2009-Ohio-3642. __________________ SYLLABUS OF THE COURT An affidavit of a retained, nonparty expert co…
Ohio opinions such as Pettiford, Appellee, v. Aggarwal, Appellant are cited where deposition / former testimony is disputed. The court stated: "Summary judgment — Contradiction between affidavit and deposition testimony of expert witness — Explanation required. (No. 2009-1602 — Submitted May 11, 2010 — Decided July 14, 2010.) APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Montgomery County, No. 22736, 186 Ohio App." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
The State of Ohio v. Savage
The State of Ohio v. Savage, 30 Ohio St. 3d 1 (1987)
…objection to the competency of a witness so as to allow his deposition to be taken in a cause, is a waiver during the whole progress of the cause, and the objection cannot be insisted on when the witness is called to give a second deposition in the same cause.” Choteau, supra, paragraph two of the syllabus. In that case, one of the party defendants, William H. Campbell, was dep…
Ohio opinions such as The State of Ohio v. Savage are cited where deposition / former testimony is disputed. The court stated: "Choteau, supra, paragraph two of the syllabus. In that case, one of the party defendants, William H." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
MacDonald v. Authentic Invests., L.L.C.
MacDonald v. Authentic Invests., L.L.C., 2016 Ohio 4640 (2016)
…ary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence, and written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in the action, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Accordingly, summary…
MacDonald v. Authentic Invests., L.L.C. is worth reading on Ohio deposition / former testimony because the court put the point in its own words: "ary judgment 'shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence, and written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in the action, show that there is no genuine issue as to any materi" Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Disciplinary Counsel v. Character
Disciplinary Counsel v. Character, 129 Ohio St. 3d 60 (2011)
…eduled interviews and was late for appointments and for her deposition. She also failed to make a timely, orderly, and organized production of her files and other documents. {¶ 33} The board found by clear and convincing evidence that respondent’s conduct violated DR 1-102(A)(3) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude) and (A)(4), 1-102(…
On deposition / former testimony, Disciplinary Counsel v. Character speaks to the Ohio dispute in this passage: "She also failed to make a timely, orderly, and organized production of her files and other documents." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Creak, Appellant, v. Montville Plastics and Rubber, Inc., Appellee, Et Al.
…ished to waive the rule-required reading and signing of his deposition, nor did either counsel waive that requirement. On April 16, 1987, Dr. Novosel departed for a scheduled vacation in Florida. On April 17, 1987, the transcription of Dr. Novosel’s deposition was completed and made available for the doctor’s signature. On April 20, 1987, the transcript, *168 which had not been…
Creak, Appellant, v. Montville Plastics and Rubber, Inc., Appellee, Et Al. is worth reading on Ohio deposition / former testimony because the court put the point in its own words: "On April 16, 1987, Dr. Novosel departed for a scheduled vacation in Florida. On April 17, 1987, the transcription of Dr. Novosel’s deposition was completed and made available for the doctor’s signature." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Authenticity: why it matters and how to prove it
Authenticity is not a hearsay doctrine and it is not optional. Under Ohio Evid. R. 901, 902, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is. Self-authenticating categories — certified public records, newspapers, acknowledged documents, trade inscriptions, and (where adopted) certified domestic records of a regularly conducted activity — shorten the path, but most trial exhibits still need a sponsoring witness, distinctive characteristics, chain of custody, or process-or-system evidence.
Ohio manufacturing, insurance, and criminal cases hinge on authenticated medical records, factory maintenance logs, and police body-camera video under Ohio Evid. R. 901–902.
Why authenticity gets its own section in every Ohio trial notebook:
- It is a condition precedent. An unauthenticated exhibit never reaches the relevance, hearsay, or privilege analysis in a useful way — the jury never properly considers it.
- Digital evidence multiplies the failure modes. Screenshots, social-media posts, text threads, and cloud downloads require hash values, account attribution, metadata, or a percipient witness who saw the content created or received.
- Chain of custody is authenticity by another name. Drugs, firearms, biological samples, and seized devices are excluded when the links from seizure to lab to courtroom are broken, even if a hearsay exception would otherwise apply to a lab report.
- Business-records shortcuts do not replace authentication. A custodian can explain record-keeping practices and still fail if nobody can say the particular PDF or printout is the record of this patient, this account, or this machine.
- Self-authentication is narrow. Counsel who wave a notarization or a letterhead and skip the rest of Rule 901-style analysis often lose when the document's contents are disputed.
Practical authentication checklist for Ohio trials: identify the exhibit; choose a 901 method or a 902 category; line up the sponsoring witness or certificate; preserve chain-of-custody testimony for physical and digital items; and separate the authenticity objection from any hearsay objection so the court rules on each.
Ohio authenticity opinions
St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., Appellant, v. Ohio Fast Freight, Inc. Et Al., Appellees
…ather than originals and whether the exhibits were properly authenticated. Evid. R. 1003 provides that a duplicate is admissible to the same extent as an original unless a genuine question is raised as to the authenticity of the original or in circumstances where it would be unfair to admit the duplicate in lieu of the original. Evid. R. 1004 defines “duplicate” to include a ph…
St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., Appellant, v. Ohio Fast Freight, Inc. Et Al., Appellees is worth reading on Ohio authentication because the court put the point in its own words: "Evid. R. 1003 provides that a duplicate is admissible to the same extent as an original unless a genuine question is raised as to the authenticity of the original or in circumstances where it would be unfair to admit the duplicate in lieu of the original. Evid. R." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. SMITH, Appellant
The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. SMITH, Appellant, 63 Ohio App. 3d 71 (1989)
…solution batch and bottle affidavit was [sic] not properly authenticated, or certified, contrary to the mandates of Evidence Rules 902, 1005, 803(8), Criminal Rule 27 and Civil Rule 44. “2. The trial court erred in allowing the admission of the calibration test and thus, the reliability of the BAC Verifier test given to the appellant was improper without first requiring that t…
The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. SMITH, Appellant is worth reading on Ohio authentication because the court put the point in its own words: "Evidence Rules 902, 1005, 803(8), Criminal Rule 27 and Civil Rule 44. “2." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. CLITES, Appellant
The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. CLITES, Appellant, 73 Ohio App. 3d 36 (1991)
…correctness of the copies. Evid.R. 902(4), concerning self-authentication of documents, provides that no extrinsic evidence of authenticity is required for copies of official records “ * certified as correct by the custodian or other person authorized to make the certification, by certificate complying with paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of this rule or complying with any law…
Practitioners open The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. CLITES, Appellant when Ohio authentication turns on the distinction in this sentence: "correctness of the copies. Evid.R. 902(4), concerning self-authentication of documents, provides that no extrinsic evidence of authenticity is required for copies of official records “ * certified as correct by the custodian or other person authorized to make the certificatio" Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
CITY OF AURORA, Appellee, v. LESKY, Appellant
CITY OF AURORA, Appellee, v. LESKY, Appellant, 79 Ohio App. 3d 568 (1992)
…he basis of inadequate certification of public records, for authentication purposes, pursuant to Evid.R. 901 and 902. The trial court overruled appellant’s objections to the admission of these state’s exhibits. Thereafter, appellant pleaded no contest and was found guilty only on the charge of operating a vehicle with a prohibited level of alcohol on his breath. Appellant now a…
On authentication, CITY OF AURORA, Appellee, v. LESKY, Appellant speaks to the Ohio dispute in this passage: "Evid.R. 901 and 902. The trial court overruled appellant’s objections to the admission of these state’s exhibits. Thereafter, appellant pleaded no contest and was found guilty only on the charge of operating a vehicle with a prohibited level of alcohol on his breath." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Ocwen Loan Servicing, L.L.C. v. Graf
Ocwen Loan Servicing, L.L.C. v. Graf, 2018 Ohio 2411 (2018)
…was not based on his own personal knowledge and that the unauthenticated screen shot attached to his affidavit contains inadmissible hearsay. Accordingly, Ocwen maintained Graf's affidavit does not contain admissible evidence to rebut Rosenthal's averment that "the mortgaged property is not within 200 miles of the mortgagee, its servicer or a branch office of either." (Rosenth…
Practitioners open Ocwen Loan Servicing, L.L.C. v. Graf when Ohio authentication turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Accordingly, Ocwen maintained Graf's affidavit does not contain admissible evidence to rebut Rosenthal's averment that 'the mortgaged property is not within 200 miles of the mortgagee, its servicer or a branch office of either." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. MOCK, Appellant
The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. MOCK, Appellant, 85 Ohio App. 3d 332 (1993)
…gues that Exhibits 6 and 7 contain no seal which would self-authenticate the alleged ODH permits and, moreover, there has been no other evidence presented *335 by the state proving that these permits are authentic. Thus, appellant argues, if the permits are not authentic, the breath tests were not performed by a senior operator or under the direction of a senior operator and th…
Ohio opinions such as The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. MOCK, Appellant are cited where authentication is disputed. The court stated: "Exhibits 6 and 7 contain no seal which would self-authenticate the alleged ODH permits and, moreover, there has been no other evidence presented *335 by the state proving that these permits are authentic." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Fowler v. Fimiani
Fowler v. Fimiani, 2017 Ohio 9333 (2017)
…lyn’s summary-judgment 4 motion as not having been properly authenticated. Thereafter, Carolyn filed a reply brief along with a motion to supplement her summary-judgment motion by including an affidavit authenticating the documents she submitted on summary judgment. {¶16} The trial court entered judgment granting Carolyn’s motion to supplement her motion for summary judgment; d…
Ohio opinions such as Fowler v. Fimiani are cited where authentication is disputed. The court stated: "Thereafter, Carolyn filed a reply brief along with a motion to supplement her summary-judgment motion by including an affidavit authenticating the documents she submitted on summary judgment." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
State v. Ivery
State v. Ivery, 278 N.E.3d 936 (2026)
…tate repeated its argument that the 911 recordings had been authenticated as business records and that 911 calls “are generally admissible in court.” (Tr. 115.) The State continued: These calls, like I said earlier when they’re coming in, people are, in fact, watching this as it’s happening. These Instagram posts are happening in real — they’re not calling days later to report…
Practitioners open State v. Ivery when Ohio authentication turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Tr. 115.) The State continued: These calls, like I said earlier when they’re coming in, people are, in fact, watching this as it’s happening." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Practice checklist
- State the relevance theory in one sentence before naming an exception.
- Run the 403 / unfair-prejudice balance explicitly for other-acts and graphic exhibits.
- For character or other-acts evidence, identify the non-propensity purpose and request a limiting instruction on the record.
- Decide whether an out-of-court statement is hearsay for the purpose offered before hunting exceptions.
- Lay business-records foundations with time, knowledge, regular practice, and custodial qualifications — or a qualifying certification.
- Prove unavailability with specific facts before offering former testimony or dying declarations.
- Treat deposition use as procedure-plus-hearsay; designate and counter-designate early.
- Authenticate every exhibit under Ohio Evid. R. 901, 902 (or the self-authentication path) before arguing hearsay.
- Preserve chain of custody for physical and digital evidence with named custodians.
- Search LawDiver for recent Ohio appellate evidence opinions before mediation or motions in limine.
Contents
- General standards of admissibility
- Character evidence
- Hearsay: start with the definition
- Party admissions
- Business records
- Important hearsay exceptions that do not require unavailability
- Declarant unavailable
- Dying declarations
- Medical diagnosis or treatment statements
- Use of depositions at trial
- Authenticity: why it matters and how to prove it
- Practice checklist
- Frequently asked questions
Frequently asked questions
What is the primary evidence source in Ohio?
Ohio applies the Ohio Rules of Evidence. Ohio's rules follow the FRE; Ohio Evid. R. 401–902 govern trials in courts of common pleas and appellate review with Ohio-specific amendments in selected rules.
How do Ohio courts decide relevance and unfair prejudice?
Under Ohio Evid. R. 401, 403, evidence must make a fact of consequence more or less probable, and the court may exclude relevant evidence when unfair prejudice, confusion, or waste of time substantially outweighs its probative value.
Are party admissions hearsay in Ohio?
Party-opponent statements under Ohio Evid. R. 801(d)(2) are generally excluded from the hearsay ban (or treated as an exception, depending on local drafting). They may be offered against the party who made or adopted them without showing unavailability.
What foundation is required for business records?
Under Ohio Evid. R. 803(6), show a record made at or near the time from someone with knowledge, kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity, as a regular practice, through a custodian, qualified witness, or allowed certification — subject to trustworthiness attack.
When can I use a deposition at trial in Ohio?
Ohio Civ. R. 30 and 32 govern civil depositions and trial use. Ohio Crim. R. 16 addresses criminal discovery; deposition testimony at trial requires Ohio Evid. R. 804(B)(1) when unavailability is shown.
Why is authenticity separate from hearsay?
Authenticity asks whether the item is what you claim it is; hearsay asks whether out-of-court assertions inside it may be used for their truth. You can lose on either ground independently. Ohio authenticity practice starts with Ohio Evid. R. 901, 902.
Where do dying declarations and medical statements fit?
Dying declarations under Ohio Evid. R. 804(b)(2) require belief in impending death and concern the cause or circumstances of that believed death. Medical statements under Ohio Evid. R. 803(4) require a genuine diagnostic or treatment purpose and reasonable pertinence to care.