Missouri's rule on evidence law turns on a feature the national template does not capture: Missouri evidence practice is organized under the Missouri Rules of Evidence. Relevance starts at Mo. R. Evid. 401, 403; hearsay starts at Mo. R. Evid. 801, 802. The controlling authority is Missouri Rules of Evidence. Authenticity is a separate fight under Mo. R. Evid. 901, 902. Depositions at trial: Mo. R. Civ. P. 57 and 57.03 govern civil depositions and trial use. Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 25.03 addresses criminal discovery; deposition testimony at trial requires Mo. R. Evid. 804(b)(1) when unavailability is established.
Contents
- General standards of admissibility
- Character evidence
- Hearsay: start with the definition
- Party admissions
- Business records
- Important hearsay exceptions that do not require unavailability
- Declarant unavailable
- Dying declarations
- Medical diagnosis or treatment statements
- Use of depositions at trial
- Authenticity: why it matters and how to prove it
- Practice checklist
- Frequently asked questions
Worked example under Missouri law
The illustration below uses only rules already stated for Missouri. It is a research hypothetical, not a prediction of what a court will do.
A lawyer in Missouri wants to offer a medical record, a party email, and a statement the declarant made while believing death was imminent.
- Clear relevance and unfair prejudice under Mo. R. Evid. 401, 403.
- If the email is the opposing party's, test Mo. R. Evid. 801(d)(2) before the hearsay definition in Mo. R. Evid. 801, 802.
- For the medical record, lay the business-records foundation in Mo. R. Evid. 803(6) and the treatment purpose in Mo. R. Evid. 803(4).
- For the deathbed statement, meet Mo. R. Evid. 804(b)(2), then authenticate every exhibit under Mo. R. Evid. 901, 902.
Missouri keeps hearsay, character, and authenticity on different rules inside the Missouri Rules of Evidence. Winning one does not win the others.
General standards of admissibility
Missouri starts every evidence dispute with relevance and unfair prejudice. Under Mo. R. Evid. 401, 403, evidence is relevant when it has any tendency to make a fact of consequence more or less probable, and relevant evidence is still excluded when its probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. Preliminary questions of admissibility are for the court; conditional relevance and limited-purpose instructions keep otherwise-usable proof from becoming a Trojan horse for propensity or truth-of-the-matter use.
Missouri courts apply Mo. R. Evid. 5-404(b) for other crimes and acts. Verify Missouri Supreme Court rule orders for amendments.
Practice tip: articulate the theory of relevance in one sentence before citing the exception. Lawyers who lead with "it's a business record" without explaining what fact the record proves often lose the 403 balance even when the hearsay foundation is clean.
Character evidence
Character evidence in Missouri is governed by Mo. R. Evid. 404, 405. The default rule is familiar: evidence of a person's character or character trait is not admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character or trait. The same body of law then carves out the classic exceptions — essential-element character, accused-opens-the-door reputation or opinion, and other-acts evidence offered for a non-propensity purpose such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake.
Other-acts notice, 403 balancing, and limiting instructions do most of the real work. In criminal cases, prosecutors who dump prior misconduct without a specific non-propensity theory invite reversal; defense counsel who open the door to good-character testimony without anticipating rebuttal create the very propensity inference the rules were designed to police.
Missouri character-evidence opinions
STATE of Missouri v. Travis W. WILLIAMS
STATE of Missouri v. Travis W. WILLIAMS, 548 S.W.3d 275 (2018)
…r of the lustful disposition rule alongside the more modern character evidence rules."). Even states that do not expressly admit propensity evidence as such will admit it by claiming it is not truly propensity evidence.10 See, e.g. , Wigmore, supra , § 62.2, at 1335 (asserting many of the "rationales are often fiction rather than fact"); Dix, et al., supra , § 190 ("[C]ourts in…
Practitioners open STATE of Missouri v. Travis W. WILLIAMS when Missouri character evidence turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Even states that do not expressly admit propensity evidence as such will admit it by claiming it is not truly propensity evidence.10 See, e.g. , Wigmore, supra , § 62.2, at 1335 (asserting many of the 'rationales are often fiction rather than fact'); Dix, et al." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
STATE of Missouri, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. David REILLY, Defendant-Appellant — Blackmar, J., dissenting
…The state, of course, was entitled to rebut the defendant’s character evidence by adducing testimony of persons familiar with defendant's reputation in the community in which he was known. It produced no such witnesses. Instead, it propounded the testimony of the Sheriff of Marion County, Missouri, who neither personally knew the defendant, nor had heard of him until he was acc…
STATE of Missouri, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. David REILLY, Defendant-Appellant — Blackmar, J., dissenting is worth reading on Missouri character evidence because the court put the point in its own words: "The state, of course, was entitled to rebut the defendant’s character evidence by adducing testimony of persons familiar with defendant's reputation in the community in which he was known. It produced no such witnesses." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Marvin C. JONES, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent
Marvin C. JONES, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent, 1989 Mo. LEXIS 20 (1989)
…al counsel was ineffective in failing to present mitigating character evidence at the penalty phase of trial. Specifically, he contends counsel (1) should have called his relatives to testify in the penalty phase, and (2) should have introduced his army records into evidence at the penalty phase. The motion court concluded that mov-ant’s counsel was not ineffective in his prese…
Marvin C. JONES, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent is worth reading on Missouri character evidence because the court put the point in its own words: "Specifically, he contends counsel (1) should have called his relatives to testify in the penalty phase, and (2) should have introduced his army records into evidence at the penalty phase." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
STATE of Missouri v. Nathan Wayne JENSEN
STATE of Missouri v. Nathan Wayne JENSEN, 2017 Mo. LEXIS 334 (2017)
…he proposed questioning on grounds it would be inadmissible character evidence. The trial court expressed concern that “comments from both sides have been loud enough that the jury on occasion could hear, and it worried me.” Defense eounsél agreed the jury should not be asked whether they heard the prosecutor’s statements, as that would serve' to emphasize the statements. Defen…
STATE of Missouri v. Nathan Wayne JENSEN is worth reading on Missouri character evidence because the court put the point in its own words: "The trial court expressed concern that “comments from both sides have been loud enough that the jury on occasion could hear, and it worried me." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Jeffrey THURMAN, Appellant
STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Jeffrey THURMAN, Appellant, 2008 Mo. App. LEXIS 1770 (2008)
…stimony regarding the charge was inadmissible as history or character evidence. In Fassero, the state presented only an Illinois indictment, which the Missouri Supreme Court found was relevant only to prove that the appellant had been charged with a crime, not that he had actually engaged in any criminal conduct. Id. Thus, the Court held the indictment was not “history and char…
On character evidence, STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Jeffrey THURMAN, Appellant speaks to the Missouri dispute in this passage: "In Fassero, the state presented only an Illinois indictment, which the Missouri Supreme Court found was relevant only to prove that the appellant had been charged with a crime, not that he had actually engaged in any criminal conduct. Id." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
State of Missouri v. Jafari R. Boss
State of Missouri v. Jafari R. Boss, 577 S.W.3d 509 (2019)
…f the University of Missouri-Columbia's homecoming weekend. Character evidence and propensity evidence "are distinct from each other." State v. Shockley, 410 S.W.3d 179, 193 (Mo. banc 2013). Character evidence does not involve "proof of specific prior instances of conduct, but constitutes evidence that concerns a person's reputation, such as whether someone in the defendant's c…
Missouri opinions such as State of Missouri v. Jafari R. Boss are cited where character evidence is disputed. The court stated: "University of Missouri-Columbia's homecoming weekend. Character evidence and propensity evidence 'are distinct from each other.' State v. Shockley, 410 S.W.3d 179, 193 (Mo. banc 2013)." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Brian STEWART, Appellant
STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Brian STEWART, Appellant, 2000 Mo. App. LEXIS 440 (2000)
…ecially in light of Defendant’s motion in limine to exclude character evidence and uncharged bad acts. He contends that the introduction of such evidence violated his right to a fair trial and due process of law. Defendant’s motion in limine to exclude character evidence and uncharged bad acts was granted prior to trial and the State executed an agreement to exclude Defendant’s…
Missouri opinions such as STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Brian STEWART, Appellant are cited where character evidence is disputed. The court stated: "Defendant’s motion in limine to exclude character evidence and uncharged bad acts. He contends that the introduction of such evidence violated his right to a fair trial and due process of law." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Frank HAYNAM and Sondra Haynam, Plaintiffs-Appellants-Respondents, v. LACLEDE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC
…or the purpose of impeachment or rehabilitation, reputation character evidence will be admitted under specific rules to prove the defendant is not the kind of person who would commit the crime charged or, in response to such evidence, to prove the defendant is the kind of person who would commit the crime. This is sometimes called “substantive character.” Substantive character…
On character evidence, Frank HAYNAM and Sondra Haynam, Plaintiffs-Appellants-Respondents, v. LACLEDE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC speaks to the Missouri dispute in this passage: "This is sometimes called “substantive character." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Hearsay: start with the definition
Most hearsay objections in Missouri are won or lost on the definition, not on an exception. Under Mo. R. Evid. 801, 802, hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Non-hearsay purposes — verbal acts, effect on the listener, notice, circumstantial evidence of state of mind, and impeachment — remain available when the proponent can articulate them without asking the jury to believe the declarant.
Layered hearsay (hearsay within hearsay) requires an exception or exclusion for each layer. Machine-generated data and non-assertive conduct sit outside the hearsay definition in FRE-aligned jurisdictions, but they still need authenticity and, often, expert or business-records foundations.
Missouri hearsay opinions
STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Winston BELL, Appellant
STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Winston BELL, Appellant, 1997 Mo. LEXIS 69 (1997)
…f numerous previous incidents of abuse by her husband. This hearsay evidence was erroneously admitted and prejudiced Mr. Bell's defense. We reverse and remand for a new trial. On June 3, 1994, Ms. Allen called 911, asking for help and saying that her husband had set her on fire. When police and paramedics arrived, Ms. Allen was alert and told them that Mr. Bell had thrown gasol…
Missouri opinions such as STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Winston BELL, Appellant are cited where hearsay is disputed. The court stated: "This hearsay evidence was erroneously admitted and prejudiced Mr. Bell's defense. We reverse and remand for a new trial. On June 3, 1994, Ms. Allen called 911, asking for help and saying that her husband had set her on fire. When police and paramedics arrived, Ms." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Jack DOUGLAS, Appellant
STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Jack DOUGLAS, Appellant, 2004 Mo. App. LEXIS 305 (2004)
…UV at the intersection of 59th and Prospect” because it was hearsay and no hearsay exception applied for its admission. We reverse and remand for a new trial. Facts On April 8, 2001, at approximately 9:20 p.m., Officers Kimberly Tott and Marc Lombardo, of the Kansas City, Missouri, Police Department, while on patrol, responded to a call for service at 59th and Prospect in Kansa…
Missouri opinions such as STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Jack DOUGLAS, Appellant are cited where hearsay is disputed. The court stated: "UV at the intersection of 59th and Prospect” because it was hearsay and no hearsay exception applied for its admission. We reverse and remand for a new trial. Facts On April 8, 2001, at approximately 9:20 p.m." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Madonna J. WILLIAMS, Respondent, v. Arthur S. DAUS, M.D., Appellant — Shrum, J., concurring
…ts and establish a previously unrecognized exception to the hearsay rule in juror misconduct cases.1 This is shown by the dissent’s assertion that the “relevance of Juror No. 2’s statement lies in the mere fact that she brought into the jury room outside information not offered in trial[ ]” and by its conclusion that it “cannot find that the four jurors gave hearsay testimony.”…
Missouri opinions such as Madonna J. WILLIAMS, Respondent, v. Arthur S. DAUS, M.D., Appellant — Shrum, J., concurring are cited where hearsay is disputed. The court stated: "This is shown by the dissent’s assertion that the “relevance of Juror No. 2’s statement lies in the mere fact that she brought into the jury room outside information not offered in trial[ ]” and by its conclusion that it “cannot find that the four jurors gave hearsay testimony." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
STATE of Missouri Ex Rel. STATE HIGHWAY COMMISSION of Missouri, Respondent, v. Mary BARRON Et Al., on Exceptions of
…g his opinion state to the jury any facts that are based on hearsay.” It is appellant’s position that Mr. McReynolds’ testimony with reference to the other sales was not based upon firsthand knowledge of those sales but upon hearsay. It is also urged that Mr. McReynolds erroneously was permitted to state that said sales were comparable to the subject property. Tom McReynolds, a…
STATE of Missouri Ex Rel. STATE HIGHWAY COMMISSION of Missouri, Respondent, v. Mary BARRON Et Al., on Exceptions of is worth reading on Missouri hearsay because the court put the point in its own words: "It is appellant’s position that Mr. McReynolds’ testimony with reference to the other sales was not based upon firsthand knowledge of those sales but upon hearsay. It is also urged that Mr." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Dennis J. MEAD, Appellant
STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Dennis J. MEAD, Appellant, 2003 Mo. App. LEXIS 772 (2003)
…ing that the trial court committed plain error in admitting hearsay testimony in violation of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. The State contends, among other things, that plain error review has been waived for failure to object to the admission of the hearsay testimony. I. Facts On July 25, 1999, David Tresler was sitting in his friend’s car in a parking lot ou…
STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Dennis J. MEAD, Appellant is worth reading on Missouri hearsay because the court put the point in its own words: "Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. The State contends, among other things, that plain error review has been waived for failure to object to the admission of the hearsay testimony. I." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Jerry Lee COLE, Appellant
STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Jerry Lee COLE, Appellant, 2016 Mo. App. LEXIS 214 (2016)
…by allowing a police officer to testify about incriminating hearsay statements made by an informant to police. We affirm. Factual Background In August 2013, law enforcement received a tip from an informant that Appellant was selling drugs from his home. Sergeant Michael Cheek, with the East Central Drug Task Force, applied for a warrant to search Mr. Cole’s home. The warrant wa…
Practitioners open STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Jerry Lee COLE, Appellant when Missouri hearsay turns on the distinction in this sentence: "We affirm. Factual Background In August 2013, law enforcement received a tip from an informant that Appellant was selling drugs from his home. Sergeant Michael Cheek, with the East Central Drug Task Force, applied for a warrant to search Mr. Cole’s home." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Party admissions
Statements of an opposing party are among the most important routes around the hearsay bar. Missouri treats them under Mo. R. Evid. 801(d)(2). Nothing about the statement need be against interest, contemporaneous, or based on personal knowledge — the theory is adversarial, not reliability-based. A party cannot complain that his own words are unreliable when offered against him.
Scope questions dominate practice: the party's own statement; adopted statements (including silence in circumstances where a reasonable person would deny); statements by authorized speakers; agent or employee statements on matters within the scope of the relationship; and, in criminal conspiracy cases, coconspirator statements during and in furtherance of the conspiracy. A defendant generally cannot introduce his own exculpatory out-of-court statement as a "party admission" against himself — the rule runs one way.
Missouri party-admission opinions
Cynthia BYNOTE, Respondent, v. NATIONAL SUPER MARKETS, INC., Appellant
Cynthia BYNOTE, Respondent, v. NATIONAL SUPER MARKETS, INC., Appellant, 1995 Mo. LEXIS 9 (1995)
…s state of mind testimony or under the excited utterance or admission of party-opponent exceptions to the hearsay rule. From a review of the record, it appears that the trial court admitted the statements under the excited-utterance exception to the hearsay rule. B. When a witness offers the out-of-court statements of another to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the sta…
On party admissions, Cynthia BYNOTE, Respondent, v. NATIONAL SUPER MARKETS, INC., Appellant speaks to the Missouri dispute in this passage: "From a review of the record, it appears that the trial court admitted the statements under the excited-utterance exception to the hearsay rule. B." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
David MORTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. the HEARST CORPORATION, Et Al., Defendants-Respondents
…nce admissible against the Business Journal as that party’s admissions amounted to inadmissible hearsay against the Hearst Corporation. 2 . An action for libel per se arises when the published words are defamatory on their face. To support a cause of action for libel per se the plaintiff need only plead that the defendant published the defamatory words about the plaintiff. Diet…
David MORTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. the HEARST CORPORATION, Et Al., Defendants-Respondents is worth reading on Missouri party admissions because the court put the point in its own words: "Business Journal as that party’s admissions amounted to inadmissible hearsay against the Hearst Corporation. 2 . An action for libel per se arises when the published words are defamatory on their face." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Richard E. BROWN, Appellant
STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Richard E. BROWN, Appellant, 1992 Mo. App. LEXIS 908 (1992)
…pellant contends that none of the statements constitute an “admission against interest” by Mr. Brown, and they are therefore inadmissible. It is often said that an out-of-court statement made by a party is admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule if it constitutes an “admission against interest.” State v. Marvel, 756 S.W.2d 207, 211 (Mo.App.1988); Joong Sui No…
Missouri opinions such as STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Richard E. BROWN, Appellant are cited where party admissions is disputed. The court stated: "Mr. Brown, and they are therefore inadmissible. It is often said that an out-of-court statement made by a party is admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule if it constitutes an “admission against interest.” State v. Marvel, 756 S.W.2d 207, 211 (Mo.App." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
James STEENROD, Appellant, v. KLIPSCH HAULING COMPANY, INC., Et Al., Respondents
…require Klipsch to respond to Steenrod’s second request for admissions concerning the absence of a safety catch and warning, in not requiring Klipsch to respond to Steenrod’s request for production, and in quashing a deposition subpoena duces tecum for pictures of the tank trailer immediately after the accident; (5) in not permitting Gary Haley to testify concerning statements…
On party admissions, James STEENROD, Appellant, v. KLIPSCH HAULING COMPANY, INC., Et Al., Respondents speaks to the Missouri dispute in this passage: "require Klipsch to respond to Steenrod’s second request for admissions concerning the absence of a safety catch and warning, in not requiring Klipsch to respond to Steenrod’s request for production, and in quashing a deposition subpoena duces tecum for pictures of the tank traile" The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Lewis CARPENTER, Appellant, v. Wilbur A. DAVIS, Mary Frances Davis, Leo F. Hackman, Tulah B. Hackman, and Thomas
…e statement, we must first recognize the difference between admissions against interest and declarations against interest. “There is a vital distinction between admissions against interest and declarations against interest. Admissions against interest are those made by a party to the litigation or by one in privity with or identified in legal interest with such party, and admis…
Practitioners open Lewis CARPENTER, Appellant, v. Wilbur A. DAVIS, Mary Frances Davis, Leo F. Hackman, Tulah B. Hackman, and Thomas when Missouri party admissions turns on the distinction in this sentence: "There is a vital distinction between admissions against interest and declarations against interest." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Bill SCHERFFIUS, Plaintiff, and Connie Lee Scherffius, by Next Friend, Bill Scherffius, Plaintiff-Respondent, v
…defendant owned the black calf and that defendant’s alleged admissions against interest do not merit credence because defendant, not being a witness to the accident, could not have known it was his calf which plaintiff says was on the highway. “A party’s admission against interest of a material fact relevant to an issue in the case [including admissions as *125 to the. ownershi…
Practitioners open Bill SCHERFFIUS, Plaintiff, and Connie Lee Scherffius, by Next Friend, Bill Scherffius, Plaintiff-Respondent, v when Missouri party admissions turns on the distinction in this sentence: "A party’s admission against interest of a material fact relevant to an issue in the case [including admissions as *125 to the." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
T. S. Neely, Respondent, v. Kansas City Public Service Company, a Corporation, Appellant
…, and that even if otherwise proper, they became subject to admission or exclusion in the sole discretion of the trial judge. Plaintiff argues also that if defendant was negligent and such negligence contributed to cause the collision, then Messick’s negligence would be no defense. Plaintiff does not challenge the unavailability of the witness Messick, as to which there was the…
T. S. Neely, Respondent, v. Kansas City Public Service Company, a Corporation, Appellant is worth reading on Missouri party admissions because the court put the point in its own words: "Plaintiff argues also that if defendant was negligent and such negligence contributed to cause the collision, then Messick’s negligence would be no defense." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Business records
The business-records exception under Mo. R. Evid. 803(6) is the everyday path for medical charts, employment files, bank statements, and maintenance logs. The foundation requires a record made at or near the time by — or from information transmitted by — someone with knowledge; kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity; and made as a regular practice. A custodian or other qualified witness (or a qualifying certification where the jurisdiction allows it) lays the foundation. The opponent may still attack lack of trustworthiness when the source or method of preparation indicates unreliability — litigation-driven reports are the classic failure mode.
Do not confuse authenticity with the business-records exception. You still need to show the exhibit is what you claim it is; the hearsay exception then answers why the out-of-court assertions inside it may be considered for their truth.
Missouri business-records opinions
STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Roy SUTHERLAND, Appellant; Roy SUTHERLAND, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri Respondent
…rleans Barge Lines, Inc., 431 S.W.2d 205, 210-11 (Mo.1968) (business record exception). In Missouri, one of the hearsay exceptions, the business records exception, is codified in the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Law (“the Act”): A record of an act, condition, or event, shall, insofar as relevant, be competent evidence if the custodian or other qualified witness testifie…
Practitioners open STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Roy SUTHERLAND, Appellant; Roy SUTHERLAND, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri Respondent when Missouri business records turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Barge Lines, Inc., 431 S.W.2d 205, 210-11 (Mo.1968) (business record exception)." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
C & W ASSET ACQUISITION, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Janos SOMOGYI, Defendant-Respondent
…ant was Exhibit l, 2 which it sought to introduce under the business records exception to the hearsay rule. See § 490.692. Respondent objected to Exhibit 1 on several grounds. He argued that the affidavit of Spoonamore, a Cadle employee, did not comply with Section 490.692, in that Cadle was not involved in the litigation and there was no evidence as to the business relationshi…
On business records, C & W ASSET ACQUISITION, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Janos SOMOGYI, Defendant-Respondent speaks to the Missouri dispute in this passage: "Exhibit l, 2 which it sought to introduce under the business records exception to the hearsay rule. See § 490.692. Respondent objected to Exhibit 1 on several grounds. He argued that the affidavit of Spoonamore, a Cadle employee, did not comply with Section 490." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Sally Ann CANNON, Petitioner/Appellant, v. DIRECTOR OF REVENUE, STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent/Respondent
…the record. To that end, Director offered into evidence as business records the chemical test result printout, the maintenance report of the breathalyzer machine, and the reports of the arresting officer and the chemical test operator. These documents were accompanied by the notarized affidavits of the custodian of records of the Glendale Police Department and the custodian of…
Practitioners open Sally Ann CANNON, Petitioner/Appellant, v. DIRECTOR OF REVENUE, STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent/Respondent when Missouri business records turns on the distinction in this sentence: "To that end, Director offered into evidence as business records the chemical test result printout, the maintenance report of the breathalyzer machine, and the reports of the arresting officer and the chemical test operator." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
In Re Estate of Newman
In Re Estate of Newman, 58 S.W.3d 640 (2001)
…ion required for the admission of hearsay records under the business records exception to the hearsay rule found in § 490.680. In Point II, it claims that the probate court erred in finding for the respondent and against it on its claim because the court's judgment was against the weight of the evidence in that, but for the court's erroneous exclusion of Exhibits 2, 3, 4 and 5,…
Missouri opinions such as In Re Estate of Newman are cited where business records is disputed. The court stated: "ion required for the admission of hearsay records under the business records exception to the hearsay rule found in § 490.680. In Point II, it claims that the probate court erred in finding for the respondent and against it on its claim because the court's judgment was against th" That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Billy J. HELTON, Respondent, v. DIRECTOR OF REVENUE, STATE OF MISSOURI, Appellant
…, the Director offered a copy of Hel-ton’s arrest file as a business record in accordance with § 490.680, RSMo 1994, and § 490.692, RSMo 1994. The Director presented no live testimony. The trial court ruled that the Director had failed to make a prima facie case, and set aside the suspension of Helton’s driving privileges. Because we hold that the Director did make a prima faci…
Practitioners open Billy J. HELTON, Respondent, v. DIRECTOR OF REVENUE, STATE OF MISSOURI, Appellant when Missouri business records turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Director offered a copy of Hel-ton’s arrest file as a business record in accordance with § 490.680, RSMo 1994, and § 490.692, RSMo 1994. The Director presented no live testimony." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Daniel R. OVERMANN, Appellant, v. DIRECTOR OF REVENUE, STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent
…bove quoted Department of Health regulation. Relying on the business records exception, the Director introduced into evidence, over objection, an exhibit which contained the certificate of analysis at issue. The exhibit also had an affidavit from a Town & Country police officer attesting that he was the custodian of records of the Town and Country police department and that the…
Practitioners open Daniel R. OVERMANN, Appellant, v. DIRECTOR OF REVENUE, STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent when Missouri business records turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Department of Health regulation. Relying on the business records exception, the Director introduced into evidence, over objection, an exhibit which contained the certificate of analysis at issue." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES, LLC, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Juanita SCHULTZ, Defendant/Respondent
…tence and assignment of the debt from GE to Appellant via a Business Records Affidavit (Exhibit 4) prepared by GE and 30 attached documents, as well as the testimony of Appellant’s own custodian of records. Each separate attachment to the affidavit was labeled and presented to the trial court for admission into evidence as a separate exhibit, to-wit: a two-page Bill of Sale (Ex…
PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES, LLC, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Juanita SCHULTZ, Defendant/Respondent is worth reading on Missouri business records because the court put the point in its own words: "GE to Appellant via a Business Records Affidavit (Exhibit 4) prepared by GE and 30 attached documents, as well as the testimony of Appellant’s own custodian of records." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Important hearsay exceptions that do not require unavailability
Three present-sense and mental-state exceptions carry most of the remaining traffic in Missouri trial practice.
Excited utterance — Mo. R. Evid. 803(2). A statement relating to a startling event or condition, made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused. Timing is elastic; composure defeats the exception even minutes after the event, while visible distress can preserve it for hours.
Present sense impression — Mo. R. Evid. 803(1). A statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while or immediately after the declarant perceived it. Contemporaneity is strict — seconds and minutes, not hours — and excitement is not required.
Then-existing mental, emotional, or physical condition — Mo. R. Evid. 803(3). Statements of then-existing state of mind (including intent and plan) come in; statements of memory or belief offered to prove the fact remembered generally do not. Intent-to-meet-another-person cases remain the hardest applications.
Declarant unavailable
When the declarant is unavailable under Mo. R. Evid. 804(a), Missouri opens a second suite of exceptions. Unavailability typically includes privilege, refusal to testify despite court order, lack of memory, death or then-existing infirmity, and absence despite reasonable efforts to procure attendance. The proponent bears the burden of proving unavailability with specific facts — a bare assertion that the witness "could not be found" is not enough.
Former testimony under Mo. R. Evid. 804(b)(1) is the workhorse once unavailability is shown: testimony given as a witness at a trial, hearing, or lawful deposition, offered against a party who had an opportunity and similar motive to develop it by direct, cross, or redirect. Criminal confrontation analysis runs in parallel and is not satisfied merely because a hearsay exception applies.
Dying declarations
Dying declarations under Mo. R. Evid. 804(b)(2) remain a narrow but decisive exception in homicide and, in many jurisdictions, civil cases involving the cause or circumstances of what the declarant believed to be impending death. The foundational showing is the declarant's belief that death was imminent — not that death in fact followed within any particular time — plus a statement concerning the cause or circumstances of what the declarant believed to be the impending death. Courts police coaching and narrative expansions aggressively.
Missouri dying-declaration opinions
State v. SIMON AND JACOB HENDRICKS
State v. SIMON AND JACOB HENDRICKS, 172 Mo. 654 (1903)
…was made, they will take and consider such statement as the dying declarations of said Wil*663liam O. Hipes and give them snch weight as they may believe them justly entitled to in the light of all the other facts and circumstances disclosed in the evidence in the case. You should consider, however, that such statement or statements were not made in the presence of the defendan…
State v. SIMON AND JACOB HENDRICKS is worth reading on Missouri dying declaration because the court put the point in its own words: "Wil*663liam O. Hipes and give them snch weight as they may believe them justly entitled to in the light of all the other facts and circumstances disclosed in the evidence in the case." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
The STATE v. ETTA GORE, Appellant
The STATE v. ETTA GORE, Appellant, 292 Mo. 173 (1922)
…resulting in the shooting grew out of that incident. - The dying declaration of deceased tends to show that there was no trouble between himself and the defendant at the time of and immediately prior to the shooting. His statement is that he and his wife.had been sitting’; in the room talking, and he started to go to his home on 27th Street, and went into the restaurant to get…
Missouri opinions such as The STATE v. ETTA GORE, Appellant are cited where dying declaration is disputed. The court stated: "The dying declaration of deceased tends to show that there was no trouble between himself and the defendant at the time of and immediately prior to the shooting. His statement is that he and his wife." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
State of Missouri, in Error v. Patrick McCanon, in Error
State of Missouri, in Error v. Patrick McCanon, in Error, 51 Mo. 160 (1872)
…t was present and took part in the crime, was admitted as a dying declaration. The defendant objected to the admission of this testimony, because no proper foundation had been laid to authorize it. It was not shown that the deceased had any immediate apprehension of dying, but, on the contrary, he expressed strong hopes of recovering. The question of the admissibility of dying…
State of Missouri, in Error v. Patrick McCanon, in Error is worth reading on Missouri dying declaration because the court put the point in its own words: "The defendant objected to the admission of this testimony, because no proper foundation had been laid to authorize it. It was not shown that the deceased had any immediate apprehension of dying, but, on the contrary, he expressed strong hopes of recovering." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
State v. Draper
State v. Draper, 65 Mo. 335 (1877)
…the trial witness Carter was permitted to testify as to the dying declaration of Gilbert, against defendant’s objections. His evidence was as follows : “ Gilbert told him he could not live till morning, that he could not live through the night. Gilbert’s voice was very weak. He told me his trouble with Draper originated about a trunk; that Draper and his wife had boarded with h…
Practitioners open State v. Draper when Missouri dying declaration turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Carter was permitted to testify as to the dying declaration of Gilbert, against defendant’s objections. His evidence was as follows : “ Gilbert told him he could not live till morning, that he could not live through the night. Gilbert’s voice was very weak." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
State v. ALBERT M. CRONE
State v. ALBERT M. CRONE, 209 Mo. 316 (1908)
…ried when evidence was offered by the State tending to show dying declarations by the deceased, and heard the evidence with respect thereto, and then had the jury recalled and allowed the evidence to be submitted to them, was equivalent to an affirmative ruling by the court that such declarations were primarily admissible. Moreover, in the absence of the jury, the court remarke…
On dying declaration, State v. ALBERT M. CRONE speaks to the Missouri dispute in this passage: "ried when evidence was offered by the State tending to show dying declarations by the deceased, and heard the evidence with respect thereto, and then had the jury recalled and allowed the evidence to be submitted to them, was equivalent to an affirmative ruling by the court that" The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Vincent Keith MINNER, Appellant
STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Vincent Keith MINNER, Appellant, 2010 Mo. App. LEXIS 295 (2010)
…e crime by the murder victim, which implicated Minner, as a dying declaration. Minner also claims the jury could not have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder victim died as a result of the gunshot wounds inflicted by Minner or that Minner acted with deliberation. Finally, Minner alleges the trial court committed plain error in failing to intercede when the State in…
STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Vincent Keith MINNER, Appellant is worth reading on Missouri dying declaration because the court put the point in its own words: "Minner, as a dying declaration. Minner also claims the jury could not have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder victim died as a result of the gunshot wounds inflicted by Minner or that Minner acted with deliberation." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
The State v. N. A. Strawther, Appellant
The State v. N. A. Strawther, Appellant, 342 Mo. 618 (1938)
…point is made that the court erred in admitting the alleged dying declaration of Shrum because no proper or sufficient foundation was laid for its introduction, in that it was not shown that, at the time of the making thereof, the declarant had abandoned all hope of recovery, and believed that his death was imminent. It is hardly necessary to cite authorities in support of the…
The State v. N. A. Strawther, Appellant is worth reading on Missouri dying declaration because the court put the point in its own words: "Shrum because no proper or sufficient foundation was laid for its introduction, in that it was not shown that, at the time of the making thereof, the declarant had abandoned all hope of recovery, and believed that his death was imminent." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
State v. LOUIS ZORN
State v. LOUIS ZORN, 202 Mo. 12 (1907)
…. B. R. Bridge-ford and J. "W. Alexander, together with the dying declaration introduced in .evidence and marked ‘‘Exhibit’B” in the record. This testimony tended to show that on the 23d day of June the defendant, with one of Ms hired men by the name of Joe Orton, attempted to go upon the Sechrest premises, which was objected to by Mr. Sechrest. According to the dying declarati…
On dying declaration, State v. LOUIS ZORN speaks to the Missouri dispute in this passage: "B. R. Bridge-ford and J. 'W. Alexander, together with the dying declaration introduced in .evidence and marked ‘‘Exhibit’B” in the record." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Medical diagnosis or treatment statements
Statements made for medical diagnosis or treatment under Mo. R. Evid. 803(4) cover medical history, past or present symptoms, and their general cause when reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. The exception is not limited to treating physicians; statements to nurses, EMTs, and consulting clinicians can qualify when the diagnostic purpose is genuine. Fault and identity remain the usual battleground: "I was hit by a car" is often pertinent; "the light was green" usually is not; abuser identity in child-abuse and domestic-violence cases is heavily litigated.
Missouri medical-statement opinions
Jana KIVLAND and Kristin K. Bold, Appellants, v. COLUMBIA ORTHOPAEDIC GROUP, LLP, and Robert Gaines, M.D., Respondents
…data needed to be otherwise reasonably reliable: Without a medical diagnosis for Kivland, the statements in Dr. Jarvis’s affidavit and deposition testimony become only personal opinions, not scientific conclusions. The admission of such an opinion would be highly prejudicial to the defendants and improper under Missouri law. Admission of the doctor’s opinion would be an abuse…
On medical diagnosis hearsay, Jana KIVLAND and Kristin K. Bold, Appellants, v. COLUMBIA ORTHOPAEDIC GROUP, LLP, and Robert Gaines, M.D., Respondents speaks to the Missouri dispute in this passage: "Without a medical diagnosis for Kivland, the statements in Dr. Jarvis’s affidavit and deposition testimony become only personal opinions, not scientific conclusions. The admission of such an opinion would be highly prejudicial to the defendants and improper under Missouri law." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Roy SUTHERLAND, Appellant; Roy SUTHERLAND, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri Respondent
…363 (Mo.App.1960) (exception for statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment); Stewart v. Sioux City & New Orleans Barge Lines, Inc., 431 S.W.2d 205, 210-11 (Mo.1968) (business record exception). In Missouri, one of the hearsay exceptions, the business records exception, is codified in the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Law (“the Act”): A record of an act, c…
STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Roy SUTHERLAND, Appellant; Roy SUTHERLAND, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri Respondent is worth reading on Missouri medical diagnosis hearsay because the court put the point in its own words: "Mo.App.1960) (exception for statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment); Stewart v. Sioux City & New Orleans Barge Lines, Inc., 431 S.W.2d 205, 210-11 (Mo.1968) (business record exception)." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Robert v. FOWLER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Bobby Dean DANIEL, Defendant-Respondent
…edical or scientific terms and plaintiff also complains the medical diagnosis read from the hospital records by defense counsel was hearsay. Therefore, plaintiff reasons, there is no competent evidence supporting the noted assumptions in the hypothetical and, plaintiff concludes, this hypothetical was improper. We need not determine the merit of these arguments, because plainti…
Missouri opinions such as Robert v. FOWLER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Bobby Dean DANIEL, Defendant-Respondent are cited where medical diagnosis hearsay is disputed. The court stated: "Therefore, plaintiff reasons, there is no competent evidence supporting the noted assumptions in the hypothetical and, plaintiff concludes, this hypothetical was improper." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. James Michael STEELE, Appellant
STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. James Michael STEELE, Appellant, 2010 Mo. App. LEXIS 961 (2010)
…hearsay. The prosecutor argued the evidence was offered for medical diagnosis, but in overruling the objection, the court restricted the testimony to only statements about the cause of her injuries and did not allow any reference to the identity of the perpetrator. The prosecutor then called Dr. Willingham and asked what Victim had told him about what had happened to cause her…
Practitioners open STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. James Michael STEELE, Appellant when Missouri medical diagnosis hearsay turns on the distinction in this sentence: "The prosecutor argued the evidence was offered for medical diagnosis, but in overruling the objection, the court restricted the testimony to only statements about the cause of her injuries and did not allow any reference to the identity of the perpetrator." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Randall Dean RUSSELL, Appellant
STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Randall Dean RUSSELL, Appellant, 1994 Mo. App. LEXIS 492 (1994)
…first exception involves statements made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment. The second involves statements admissible pursuant to § 491.075. 3 The third involves excited utterances. The trial court admitted the testimony without specifying on which ground it based its decision. In matters like this, involving the admission of evidence, this Court reviews for pre…
Practitioners open STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Randall Dean RUSSELL, Appellant when Missouri medical diagnosis hearsay turns on the distinction in this sentence: "The second involves statements admissible pursuant to § 491.075. 3 The third involves excited utterances. The trial court admitted the testimony without specifying on which ground it based its decision." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Roger Lenn MEYERS, Appellant
STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Roger Lenn MEYERS, Appellant, 2010 Mo. App. LEXIS 1539 (2010)
…g your verdict, if you want to *46 look at that as making a medical diagnosis, I suggest to you that you render the verdict that gets this disease out of our community, at least for some period of time.” Meyers argues that this comment was prejudicial in that it was designed to arouse the passions and hostilities of the jury in order to cause them to render a guilty verdict. He…
STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Roger Lenn MEYERS, Appellant is worth reading on Missouri medical diagnosis hearsay because the court put the point in its own words: "I suggest to you that you render the verdict that gets this disease out of our community, at least for some period of time." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Mabel HOMM, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Fred OAKES, Defendant-Respondent
Mabel HOMM, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Fred OAKES, Defendant-Respondent, 1970 Mo. App. LEXIS 633 (1970)
…aralysis or parathesias are well within normal limits”. The medical diagnosis was as follows : “Cervical syndrome and lumbosacral strain secondary to trauma”. There were other medical findings which tended to show that plaintiff was suffering from tender *681 ness in the lumbar region with low grade muscle spasms and motion limited to about 25 percent. The medical evidence of i…
On medical diagnosis hearsay, Mabel HOMM, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Fred OAKES, Defendant-Respondent speaks to the Missouri dispute in this passage: "The medical diagnosis was as follows : “Cervical syndrome and lumbosacral strain secondary to trauma”." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
STATE of Missouri, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Justin ROBINSON, Defendant-Appellant
…363 (Mo.App.1960) (exception for statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment); Stewart v. Sioux City & New Orleans Barge Lines, Inc., 431 S.W.2d 205, 210-11 (Mo.1968) (business record exception). State v. Sutherland, 939 S.W.2d 373, 376 (Mo. banc), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 871, 118 S.Ct. 186, 139 L.Ed.2d 125 (1997). The state’s argument in opposition to Point II is…
Practitioners open STATE of Missouri, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Justin ROBINSON, Defendant-Appellant when Missouri medical diagnosis hearsay turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Mo.App.1960) (exception for statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment); Stewart v. Sioux City & New Orleans Barge Lines, Inc., 431 S.W.2d 205, 210-11 (Mo.1968) (business record exception). State v. Sutherland, 939 S.W.2d 373, 376 (Mo. banc), cert. denied, 522 U.S." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Use of depositions at trial
Mo. R. Civ. P. 57 and 57.03 govern civil depositions and trial use. Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 25.03 addresses criminal discovery; deposition testimony at trial requires Mo. R. Evid. 804(b)(1) when unavailability is established.
Deposition use is always a two-layer problem: procedural permission to read or play the deposition, plus a hearsay path (often former testimony, party admission, or impeachment). Counsel who satisfy the civil or criminal procedure rule but skip the evidence-rule foundation invite a sustained objection; counsel who have a hearsay exception but failed to preserve the deposition under the procedural rule face the same result. Video designations, counter-designations, and completeness objections should be teed up before the jury is seated.
Missouri deposition / former-testimony opinions
STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Clarence THOMPSON, Jr., Appellant
STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Clarence THOMPSON, Jr., Appellant, 2011 Mo. App. LEXIS 677 (2011)
…d by: (1) allowing the State to introduce a child witness’s deposition testimony because it lacked sufficient indicia of reliability as required by Section 491.075; (2) allowing the State to introduce a child witness’s deposition testimony pursuant to Section 491.075, despite the statute’s conflict with Rule 25.16 governing the use of depositions in criminal trials; (3) admitti…
STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Clarence THOMPSON, Jr., Appellant is worth reading on Missouri deposition / former testimony because the court put the point in its own words: "State to introduce a child witness’s deposition testimony because it lacked sufficient indicia of reliability as required by Section 491.075; (2) allowing the State to introduce a child witness’s deposition testimony pursuant to Section 491." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Linda NACHTWEIH, Appellant, v. L.M. MARAVILLA, M.D., Respondent
Linda NACHTWEIH, Appellant, v. L.M. MARAVILLA, M.D., Respondent, 1993 Mo. App. LEXIS 1319 (1993)
…s on appeal are whether the trial court erred in allowing a deposition to be read to the jury pursuant to Rule 57.07(a)(2) and, if so, whether the error was sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a new trial. We hold that admission of the deposition was error but was not sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a new trial. Plaintiff initially filed suit for medical negligence in 1984.…
On deposition / former testimony, Linda NACHTWEIH, Appellant, v. L.M. MARAVILLA, M.D., Respondent speaks to the Missouri dispute in this passage: "Rule 57.07(a)(2) and, if so, whether the error was sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a new trial. We hold that admission of the deposition was error but was not sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a new trial. Plaintiff initially filed suit for medical negligence in 1984." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Cleta NULL and Charles Null, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Michael GRAY and Frederick G. St. Clair, Defendants-Appellants
…nses, lost wages, and loss of consortium. Respondent took a deposition from Dr. Schaerer, which indicated that he did much surgery and would .not be able to testify during the week the case was scheduled for trial. The case, however, was not reached for trial until over a year later. At trial, when respondent offered Dr. Schaerer’s deposition into evidence, appellant objected o…
Missouri opinions such as Cleta NULL and Charles Null, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Michael GRAY and Frederick G. St. Clair, Defendants-Appellants are cited where deposition / former testimony is disputed. The court stated: "Respondent took a deposition from Dr. Schaerer, which indicated that he did much surgery and would .not be able to testify during the week the case was scheduled for trial. The case, however, was not reached for trial until over a year later. At trial, when respondent offered Dr." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Lawrence SANCHEZ, Appellant
STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Lawrence SANCHEZ, Appellant, 1988 Mo. LEXIS 51 (1988)
…asserts among other things that the admission of videotaped depositions of the alleged victims pursuant to § 491.680, RSMo 1986, denied him his right to confront the witnesses against him guaranteed by the United States and Missouri Constitutions. Finding that issue dispositive, we reverse and remand for a new trial. The pertinent facts developed by the state’s evidence, includ…
On deposition / former testimony, STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Lawrence SANCHEZ, Appellant speaks to the Missouri dispute in this passage: "RSMo 1986, denied him his right to confront the witnesses against him guaranteed by the United States and Missouri Constitutions. Finding that issue dispositive, we reverse and remand for a new trial." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
STATE of Missouri ex rel. Marvin L. CHANEY, Relator v. The Honorable James A. FRANKLIN, Jr., Judge of the Circuit
…ndment.1 Defendant’s public defender later sought McQueen’s deposition. McQueen appeared at the deposition with another public defender (Batek), invoked Ms Fifth Amendment privilege, and refused to testify. The State then issued subpoenas for the purpose of deposing Defendant’s counsel (Berrigan), Ba-tek, and Barbara Hoppe (Hoppe), an attorney with the public defender’s office…
Missouri opinions such as STATE of Missouri ex rel. Marvin L. CHANEY, Relator v. The Honorable James A. FRANKLIN, Jr., Judge of the Circuit are cited where deposition / former testimony is disputed. The court stated: "Defendant’s public defender later sought McQueen’s deposition. McQueen appeared at the deposition with another public defender (Batek), invoked Ms Fifth Amendment privilege, and refused to testify." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Lenn Homer ORR, Individually and as next friend of Sharon Orr v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, a
…times a week.” In the trial of the case respondent read the deposition of Charles’ father, Thomas. That testimony need not be stated in detail but it tended to support respondent’s contention that Charles used the Dodge automobile regularly. Thereafter, respondent called as a witness Mrs. Fowks, the court reporter, and offered to prove a number of the statements made by Charles…
Practitioners open Lenn Homer ORR, Individually and as next friend of Sharon Orr v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, a when Missouri deposition / former testimony turns on the distinction in this sentence: "In the trial of the case respondent read the deposition of Charles’ father, Thomas. That testimony need not be stated in detail but it tended to support respondent’s contention that Charles used the Dodge automobile regularly. Thereafter, respondent called as a witness Mrs." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Diane DAVIDSON, Appellant
STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Diane DAVIDSON, Appellant, 1989 Mo. App. LEXIS 169 (1989)
…ouri Constitution when the court allowed the child victim’s deposition to be taken without Diane present. 1 Reversed and Remanded. In April of 1986 the Division of Family Services received a hotline call from Diane indicating that her stepchildren, Christina and Michael, were being physically neglected. Diane was married to Michael Davidson, the father of the children, at that…
Practitioners open STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Diane DAVIDSON, Appellant when Missouri deposition / former testimony turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Constitution when the court allowed the child victim’s deposition to be taken without Diane present. 1 Reversed and Remanded." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Authenticity: why it matters and how to prove it
Authenticity is not a hearsay doctrine and it is not optional. Under Mo. R. Evid. 901, 902, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is. Self-authenticating categories — certified public records, newspapers, acknowledged documents, trade inscriptions, and (where adopted) certified domestic records of a regularly conducted activity — shorten the path, but most trial exhibits still need a sponsoring witness, distinctive characteristics, chain of custody, or process-or-system evidence.
Missouri product-liability, workers' compensation, and criminal cases hinge on authenticated corporate records, toxicology reports, and surveillance footage under Mo. R. Evid. 901–902.
Why authenticity gets its own section in every Missouri trial notebook:
- It is a condition precedent. An unauthenticated exhibit never reaches the relevance, hearsay, or privilege analysis in a useful way — the jury never properly considers it.
- Digital evidence multiplies the failure modes. Screenshots, social-media posts, text threads, and cloud downloads require hash values, account attribution, metadata, or a percipient witness who saw the content created or received.
- Chain of custody is authenticity by another name. Drugs, firearms, biological samples, and seized devices are excluded when the links from seizure to lab to courtroom are broken, even if a hearsay exception would otherwise apply to a lab report.
- Business-records shortcuts do not replace authentication. A custodian can explain record-keeping practices and still fail if nobody can say the particular PDF or printout is the record of this patient, this account, or this machine.
- Self-authentication is narrow. Counsel who wave a notarization or a letterhead and skip the rest of Rule 901-style analysis often lose when the document's contents are disputed.
Practical authentication checklist for Missouri trials: identify the exhibit; choose a 901 method or a 902 category; line up the sponsoring witness or certificate; preserve chain-of-custody testimony for physical and digital items; and separate the authenticity objection from any hearsay objection so the court rules on each.
Missouri authenticity opinions
Erick C. MILLS, Plaintiff/Respondent, v. DIRECTOR OF REVENUE STATE OF MISSOURI Defendant/Appellant
…trial court sustained objections of lack of foundation and authentication under Section 302.312 RSMo (1996). Due to the exclusion of Exhibit B, there was “no evidence that the officer had probable cause to believe [Respondent] was operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, no arrest and no test result.” The trial court entered judgment against Director and reinstated Respond…
Erick C. MILLS, Plaintiff/Respondent, v. DIRECTOR OF REVENUE STATE OF MISSOURI Defendant/Appellant is worth reading on Missouri authentication because the court put the point in its own words: "Section 302.312 RSMo (1996). Due to the exclusion of Exhibit B, there was “no evidence that the officer had probable cause to believe [Respondent] was operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, no arrest and no test result." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Verne Nelson YOUNG, Appellant
STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Verne Nelson YOUNG, Appellant, 1963 Mo. LEXIS 803 (1963)
…8 U.S.C.A., provides that certain documents which have been authenticated as therein set out shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States as they have by law or usage in the courts of the State from which they are taken. Without detailing their deficiencies, it is sufficient to say that none of the three exhibits in this case met the authent…
Missouri opinions such as STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Verne Nelson YOUNG, Appellant are cited where authentication is disputed. The court stated: "U.S.C.A., provides that certain documents which have been authenticated as therein set out shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States as they have by law or usage in the courts of the State from which they are taken." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. James MADDEN, Appellant
STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. James MADDEN, Appellant, 1965 Mo. LEXIS 703 (1965)
…bits ‘A’ and ‘B’ in that said exhibits were not verified or authenticated as true copies.” These exhibits were offered by the state in support of the charge under the Habitual Criminal Act. Section 556.280. Exhibit “A” purports to be a copy of a record of the Kansas State Industrial Reformatory showing, among other things, that a James Madden was imprisoned therein pursuant to…
Practitioners open STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. James MADDEN, Appellant when Missouri authentication turns on the distinction in this sentence: "A’ and ‘B’ in that said exhibits were not verified or authenticated as true copies.” These exhibits were offered by the state in support of the charge under the Habitual Criminal Act. Section 556.280." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
McPHERSON REDEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Eugene WATKINS, Et Al., Defendants-Respondents
…tapes should have been admitted because they were properly authenticated and were relevant to issues in the case. Before addressing the admissibility of each video tape specifically, we consider some principles relative to the admission of video tapes in general. The same principles which govern the foundation for the admission of still photographs apply to the admission of mo…
Practitioners open McPHERSON REDEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Eugene WATKINS, Et Al., Defendants-Respondents when Missouri authentication turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Before addressing the admissibility of each video tape specifically, we consider some principles relative to the admission of video tapes in general." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Debra SWIGERT, Appellant
STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Debra SWIGERT, Appellant, 1993 Mo. App. LEXIS 497 (1993)
…foundation for their admission by not offering evidence to authenticate the letters, and the letters were inadmissible hearsay used to prove the element of sexual gratification on the charge of abuse of a child. The trial judge is given wide latitude in ruling on whether to admit or exclude evidence, and absent a clear abuse of discretion, the appellate court will not interfer…
Practitioners open STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Debra SWIGERT, Appellant when Missouri authentication turns on the distinction in this sentence: "foundation for their admission by not offering evidence to authenticate the letters, and the letters were inadmissible hearsay used to prove the element of sexual gratification on the charge of abuse of a child. The trial judge is given wide latitude in ruling on whether to admit" Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Michael P. CONNELLY, Jr., Appellant, v. DIRECTOR OF REVENUE, State of Missouri, Respondent
…zed. Thus, Driver maintains Exhibit A lacked foundation and authentication. As for Exhibit B, the maintenance report, Driver contends it was not properly certified because it was not notarized. Driver argues further that it lacked foundation and authentication because it was a Department of Health record that the Director attempted to authenticate and claim as its own record. I…
Michael P. CONNELLY, Jr., Appellant, v. DIRECTOR OF REVENUE, State of Missouri, Respondent is worth reading on Missouri authentication because the court put the point in its own words: "Thus, Driver maintains Exhibit A lacked foundation and authentication. As for Exhibit B, the maintenance report, Driver contends it was not properly certified because it was not notarized." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
STATE of Missouri v. Gary Lee PYLYPCZUK
STATE of Missouri v. Gary Lee PYLYPCZUK, 2017 Mo. App. LEXIS 789 (2017)
…ated traffic offender because the evidence was not properly authenticated. We agree. Accordingly, we reverse the sentence imposed by the court and remand for jury sentencing for the class B misdemeanor of driving while intoxicated. Background Pylypczuk was charged in the Circuit Court of Clay County, as a persistent offender, with driving while intoxicated in violation of § 577…
Practitioners open STATE of Missouri v. Gary Lee PYLYPCZUK when Missouri authentication turns on the distinction in this sentence: "We agree. Accordingly, we reverse the sentence imposed by the court and remand for jury sentencing for the class B misdemeanor of driving while intoxicated." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
CENTRAL BANK OF KANSAS CITY v. John F. MIKA, Brigid Mika and Venus Automotive, Inc.
…, which were attached to the affidavit of Morgan, “were not authenticated in any manner and would not be admissible in evidence without proper authentication.” We fail to understand this contention, in light of the fact that Morgan’s affidavit referred to the documents and identified them as the attached exhibits. The Mikas raised no issue concerning the identity and authentici…
On authentication, CENTRAL BANK OF KANSAS CITY v. John F. MIKA, Brigid Mika and Venus Automotive, Inc. speaks to the Missouri dispute in this passage: "Morgan, “were not authenticated in any manner and would not be admissible in evidence without proper authentication.” We fail to understand this contention, in light of the fact that Morgan’s affidavit referred to the documents and identified them as the attached exhibits." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Practice checklist
- State the relevance theory in one sentence before naming an exception.
- Run the 403 / unfair-prejudice balance explicitly for other-acts and graphic exhibits.
- For character or other-acts evidence, identify the non-propensity purpose and request a limiting instruction on the record.
- Decide whether an out-of-court statement is hearsay for the purpose offered before hunting exceptions.
- Lay business-records foundations with time, knowledge, regular practice, and custodial qualifications — or a qualifying certification.
- Prove unavailability with specific facts before offering former testimony or dying declarations.
- Treat deposition use as procedure-plus-hearsay; designate and counter-designate early.
- Authenticate every exhibit under Mo. R. Evid. 901, 902 (or the self-authentication path) before arguing hearsay.
- Preserve chain of custody for physical and digital evidence with named custodians.
- Search LawDiver for recent Missouri appellate evidence opinions before mediation or motions in limine.
Frequently asked questions
What is the primary evidence source in Missouri?
Missouri applies the Missouri Rules of Evidence. Missouri's rules follow the FRE; Mo. R. Evid. 401–902 apply in circuit court trials statewide.
How do Missouri courts decide relevance and unfair prejudice?
Under Mo. R. Evid. 401, 403, evidence must make a fact of consequence more or less probable, and the court may exclude relevant evidence when unfair prejudice, confusion, or waste of time substantially outweighs its probative value.
Are party admissions hearsay in Missouri?
Party-opponent statements under Mo. R. Evid. 801(d)(2) are generally excluded from the hearsay ban (or treated as an exception, depending on local drafting). They may be offered against the party who made or adopted them without showing unavailability.
What foundation is required for business records?
Under Mo. R. Evid. 803(6), show a record made at or near the time from someone with knowledge, kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity, as a regular practice, through a custodian, qualified witness, or allowed certification — subject to trustworthiness attack.
When can I use a deposition at trial in Missouri?
Mo. R. Civ. P. 57 and 57.03 govern civil depositions and trial use. Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 25.03 addresses criminal discovery; deposition testimony at trial requires Mo. R. Evid. 804(b)(1) when unavailability is established.
Why is authenticity separate from hearsay?
Authenticity asks whether the item is what you claim it is; hearsay asks whether out-of-court assertions inside it may be used for their truth. You can lose on either ground independently. Missouri authenticity practice starts with Mo. R. Evid. 901, 902.
Where do dying declarations and medical statements fit?
Dying declarations under Mo. R. Evid. 804(b)(2) require belief in impending death and concern the cause or circumstances of that believed death. Medical statements under Mo. R. Evid. 803(4) require a genuine diagnostic or treatment purpose and reasonable pertinence to care.