Start with Minnesota Rules of Evidence. In Minnesota, Minnesota evidence practice is organized under the Minnesota Rules of Evidence. Relevance starts at Minn. R. Evid. 401, 403; hearsay starts at Minn. R. Evid. 801, 802. That is the question this guide answers for evidence law. Authenticity is a separate fight under Minn. R. Evid. 901, 902. Depositions at trial: Minn. R. Civ. P. 30 and 32 govern civil depositions and trial use. Minn. R. Crim. P. 9 addresses criminal discovery; prior testimony may be offered under Minn. R. Evid. 804(b)(1) when unavailability criteria are met.
General standards of admissibility
Minnesota starts every evidence dispute with relevance and unfair prejudice. Under Minn. R. Evid. 401, 403, evidence is relevant when it has any tendency to make a fact of consequence more or less probable, and relevant evidence is still excluded when its probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. Preliminary questions of admissibility are for the court; conditional relevance and limited-purpose instructions keep otherwise-usable proof from becoming a Trojan horse for propensity or truth-of-the-matter use.
Minnesota publishes official commentaries to its rules. Appellate courts apply abuse-of-discretion review with strong deference on 403 balancing.
Practice tip: articulate the theory of relevance in one sentence before citing the exception. Lawyers who lead with "it's a business record" without explaining what fact the record proves often lose the 403 balance even when the hearsay foundation is clean.
Character evidence
Character evidence in Minnesota is governed by Minn. R. Evid. 404, 405. The default rule is familiar: evidence of a person's character or character trait is not admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character or trait. The same body of law then carves out the classic exceptions — essential-element character, accused-opens-the-door reputation or opinion, and other-acts evidence offered for a non-propensity purpose such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake.
Other-acts notice, 403 balancing, and limiting instructions do most of the real work. In criminal cases, prosecutors who dump prior misconduct without a specific non-propensity theory invite reversal; defense counsel who open the door to good-character testimony without anticipating rebuttal create the very propensity inference the rules were designed to police.
Minnesota character-evidence opinions
STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Robert Wayne LOEBACH, Appellant
STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Robert Wayne LOEBACH, Appellant, 1981 Minn. LEXIS 1416 (1981)
…ntroduction of the Carpenter and Nelson testimony and other character evidence was to demonstrate that appellant fit within the “battering parent” profile. The general rule as to the admission of such character, evidence is contained in Minn.R.Evid. 404(a) which provides in relevant part as follows: (a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person’s character or a trait o…
Practitioners open STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Robert Wayne LOEBACH, Appellant when Minnesota character evidence turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Carpenter and Nelson testimony and other character evidence was to demonstrate that appellant fit within the “battering parent” profile. The general rule as to the admission of such character, evidence is contained in Minn.R.Evid." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Jamie Glenn RICHARDSON, Appellant
STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Jamie Glenn RICHARDSON, Appellant, 2003 Minn. LEXIS 650 (2003)
…sted that defense counsel not be permitted to refer to this character evidence because Richardson had not yet demonstrated its admissibility. Defense counsel responded, asking the court to rule on the admissibility of the character evidence in the context of Richardson’s claim that he was relying upon a defense of others defense. Defense counsel made an offer of proof, indicati…
Practitioners open STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Jamie Glenn RICHARDSON, Appellant when Minnesota character evidence turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Richardson had not yet demonstrated its admissibility. Defense counsel responded, asking the court to rule on the admissibility of the character evidence in the context of Richardson’s claim that he was relying upon a defense of others defense." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
STATE of MINNESOTA, Respondent, v. Amani Jamalludin FARDAN, Appellant — Meyer, J., dissenting
…2). The Supreme Court has explained the basis for excluding character evidence: *330“The state may not show defendant’s prior trouble with the law, specific criminal acts, or ill name among his neighbors, even though such facts might logically be persuasive that he is by propensity a probable perpetrator of the crime. The inquiry is not rejected because character is irrelevant;…
Minnesota opinions such as STATE of MINNESOTA, Respondent, v. Amani Jamalludin FARDAN, Appellant — Meyer, J., dissenting are cited where character evidence is disputed. The court stated: "The state may not show defendant’s prior trouble with the law, specific criminal acts, or ill name among his neighbors, even though such facts might logically be persuasive that he is by propensity a probable perpetrator of the crime." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Tyree Leland JACKSON, Appellant — Hanson, J., concurring
…dence; and third, the effect of his testimony was to supply character evidence that is prohibited by Minn. R. Evid. 404(a) or other *699crimes evidence that does not meet the requirements of Minn. R. Evid. 404(b). The more difficult question is whether we should exercise our discretion to apply a plain error test. My review of the record suggests that Jackson’s counsel was purs…
STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Tyree Leland JACKSON, Appellant — Hanson, J., concurring is worth reading on Minnesota character evidence because the court put the point in its own words: "Minn. R. Evid. 404(a) or other *699crimes evidence that does not meet the requirements of Minn. R. Evid. 404(b). The more difficult question is whether we should exercise our discretion to apply a plain error test." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Diamond Lee Jamal GRIFFIN, Appellant — Stras, J., concurring
…e is generally consistent with the common law doctrine that character evidence is not admissible to prove that an individual acted in conformity with his character on a specific occasion. Certain exceptions to this general doctrine are contained in the rule.”). Nor is there any reason for two discrete exceptions—identity and plan—to overlap with one another. The approaches of m…
Minnesota opinions such as STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Diamond Lee Jamal GRIFFIN, Appellant — Stras, J., concurring are cited where character evidence is disputed. The court stated: "Certain exceptions to this general doctrine are contained in the rule.”). Nor is there any reason for two discrete exceptions—identity and plan—to overlap with one another." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Mark Orlando HARRIS, Appellant
STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Mark Orlando HARRIS, Appellant, 1994 Minn. LEXIS 649 (1994)
…onduct for the prosecutor to attempt to elicit inadmissible character evidence; and (4) the trial court violated Harris’ fifth, sixth, and fourteenth amendment rights by giving the deadlocked jury instruction prior to jury deliberations. 2 We find the prosecutor’s exploitation of evidence related to the placement of witnesses in the protection program, including threats against…
STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Mark Orlando HARRIS, Appellant is worth reading on Minnesota character evidence because the court put the point in its own words: "Harris’ fifth, sixth, and fourteenth amendment rights by giving the deadlocked jury instruction prior to jury deliberations." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
STATE of Minnesota, Petitioner, Appellant, v. Virginia FRISINGER, Respondent
…92 (“[T]he rule — like R. 404(a), which generally excludes character evidence — does not even apply when the other-crime evidence is used for some purpose other than to show that the person acted in conformity with his character.”). After this step, the trial court engages in the basic Rule 403 analysis, balancing the relevance of the evidence against the potential of the evid…
On character evidence, STATE of Minnesota, Petitioner, Appellant, v. Virginia FRISINGER, Respondent speaks to the Minnesota dispute in this passage: "T]he rule — like R. 404(a), which generally excludes character evidence — does not even apply when the other-crime evidence is used for some purpose other than to show that the person acted in conformity with his character.”)." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
M.L., Respondent (C0-94-1465, C6-94-1647), James Arndt, Respondent (C6-94-1664, C5-94-1722), v. Albert C. MAGNUSON
…nt and absence of mistake or accident, citing the rule that character evidence is admissible to prove “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” Minn.R.Evid. 404(b). But there was no need to prove Magnuson’s intent or the absence of mistake or accident because Magnuson admitted abusing M.L. The use of character evid…
Minnesota opinions such as M.L., Respondent (C0-94-1465, C6-94-1647), James Arndt, Respondent (C6-94-1664, C5-94-1722), v. Albert C. MAGNUSON are cited where character evidence is disputed. The court stated: "Minn.R.Evid. 404(b). But there was no need to prove Magnuson’s intent or the absence of mistake or accident because Magnuson admitted abusing M.L." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
How the Minnesota rule applies
Apply the Minnesota authorities in order. The facts are simplified so the statute and the standard are visible.
A lawyer in Minnesota wants to offer a medical record, a party email, and a statement the declarant made while believing death was imminent.
- Clear relevance and unfair prejudice under Minn. R. Evid. 401, 403.
- If the email is the opposing party's, test Minn. R. Evid. 801(d)(2) before the hearsay definition in Minn. R. Evid. 801, 802.
- For the medical record, lay the business-records foundation in Minn. R. Evid. 803(6) and the treatment purpose in Minn. R. Evid. 803(4).
- For the deathbed statement, meet Minn. R. Evid. 804(b)(2), then authenticate every exhibit under Minn. R. Evid. 901, 902.
Minnesota keeps hearsay, character, and authenticity on different rules inside the Minnesota Rules of Evidence. Winning one does not win the others.
Hearsay: start with the definition
Most hearsay objections in Minnesota are won or lost on the definition, not on an exception. Under Minn. R. Evid. 801, 802, hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Non-hearsay purposes — verbal acts, effect on the listener, notice, circumstantial evidence of state of mind, and impeachment — remain available when the proponent can articulate them without asking the jury to believe the declarant.
Layered hearsay (hearsay within hearsay) requires an exception or exclusion for each layer. Machine-generated data and non-assertive conduct sit outside the hearsay definition in FRE-aligned jurisdictions, but they still need authenticity and, often, expert or business-records foundations.
Minnesota hearsay opinions
STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Ardelle Hope MANTHEY, Appellant — Hanson, J., concurring
…he conclusion of the majority that the admission of the six hearsay statements was not prejudicial, I disagree with the majority’s suggestion that the statements were not clearly or obviously inadmissible hearsay. The six statements were all out-of-court statements supposedly made by the victim. They were apparently offered to prove that Manthey had a motive to kill the victim…
On hearsay, STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Ardelle Hope MANTHEY, Appellant — Hanson, J., concurring speaks to the Minnesota dispute in this passage: "I disagree with the majority’s suggestion that the statements were not clearly or obviously inadmissible hearsay. The six statements were all out-of-court statements supposedly made by the victim." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
De-Aunteze Lavion BOBO v. STATE of Minnesota — Stras, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part
…ef. First, Bobo’s newly discovered evidence is inadmissible hearsay. Second, the posteonviction court did not clearly err when it found that Bobo’s newly discovered evidence was “profoundly doubtful” — a finding that is supported by the record and that the court fails to address meaningfully. For these reasons, I would affirm the posteonviction court’s decision to summarily den…
De-Aunteze Lavion BOBO v. STATE of Minnesota — Stras, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part is worth reading on Minnesota hearsay because the court put the point in its own words: "First, Bobo’s newly discovered evidence is inadmissible hearsay." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. William John HOGETVEDT, Appellant
…her assailant, under the excited utterance and the residual-hearsay rule exceptions? II. Was appellant denied his due-process right to a fair trial because two of the state’s witnesses volunteered testimony that the district court had previously ruled inadmissible? III. Did the district court err by imposing a consecutive sentence without calculating the duration using a zero c…
Minnesota opinions such as STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. William John HOGETVEDT, Appellant are cited where hearsay is disputed. The court stated: "II. Was appellant denied his due-process right to a fair trial because two of the state’s witnesses volunteered testimony that the district court had previously ruled inadmissible?" That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
In the Matter of the CHILD OF Michael SIMON, Parent
In the Matter of the CHILD OF Michael SIMON, Parent, 2003 Minn. App. LEXIS 673 (2003)
…ild's therapist under the business-records exception to the hearsay rule and (b) terminating his parental rights because of his imprisonment. We affirm. FACTS In 1997, Michael Simon was adjudicated the father of T.H., born on May 31, 1994. Simon was incarcerated for approximately four years for second-degree burglary beginning in May 1998. In November 2000, respondent Hennepin…
Practitioners open In the Matter of the CHILD OF Michael SIMON, Parent when Minnesota hearsay turns on the distinction in this sentence: "We affirm. FACTS In 1997, Michael Simon was adjudicated the father of T.H., born on May 31, 1994. Simon was incarcerated for approximately four years for second-degree burglary beginning in May 1998." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Jamie Lee AUBID, Petitioner, Appellant
…sible at Aubid’s trial under the catch-all exception to the hearsay rule, and (2) admission of this testimony would not violate Aubid’s Confrontation Clause rights. Aubid now seeks review before this court, contending the state did not meet its burden of proving the district court clearly and unequivocally erred when it excluded the codefendants’ testimony. We conclude that the…
On hearsay, STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Jamie Lee AUBID, Petitioner, Appellant speaks to the Minnesota dispute in this passage: "Aubid’s trial under the catch-all exception to the hearsay rule, and (2) admission of this testimony would not violate Aubid’s Confrontation Clause rights." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Jermaine FERGUSON v. STATE of Minnesota
Jermaine FERGUSON v. STATE of Minnesota, 2013 Minn. LEXIS 114 (2013)
…that an affidavit from a recanting witness is inadmissible hearsay. Ferguson also claims that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel during the postcon-viction proceedings. Because we conclude that the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the affidavit and that Ferguson does not have a constitutional right to effective assistance of post-co…
On hearsay, Jermaine FERGUSON v. STATE of Minnesota speaks to the Minnesota dispute in this passage: "Ferguson also claims that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel during the postcon-viction proceedings." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Party admissions
Statements of an opposing party are among the most important routes around the hearsay bar. Minnesota treats them under Minn. R. Evid. 801(d)(2). Nothing about the statement need be against interest, contemporaneous, or based on personal knowledge — the theory is adversarial, not reliability-based. A party cannot complain that his own words are unreliable when offered against him.
Scope questions dominate practice: the party's own statement; adopted statements (including silence in circumstances where a reasonable person would deny); statements by authorized speakers; agent or employee statements on matters within the scope of the relationship; and, in criminal conspiracy cases, coconspirator statements during and in furtherance of the conspiracy. A defendant generally cannot introduce his own exculpatory out-of-court statement as a "party admission" against himself — the rule runs one way.
Minnesota party-admission opinions
STATE of MINNESOTA, Respondent, v. Amani Jamalludin FARDAN, Appellant — Meyer, J., dissenting
…sionary rules, police statements may be admissible as party admissions.5 But the exculpatory portions of police statements are typically excluded, on the State’s motion in limine, as inadmissible hearsay unless and until the defendant testifies. “‘Hearsay’ is a statement ... offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Minn. R. Evid. 801(c). But “[a] statemen…
Minnesota opinions such as STATE of MINNESOTA, Respondent, v. Amani Jamalludin FARDAN, Appellant — Meyer, J., dissenting are cited where party admissions is disputed. The court stated: "But the exculpatory portions of police statements are typically excluded, on the State’s motion in limine, as inadmissible hearsay unless and until the defendant testifies. “‘Hearsay’ is a statement ... offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Minn. R. Evid." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Meng VANG, Appellant
STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Meng VANG, Appellant, 2009 Minn. LEXIS 768 (2009)
…decision.” DeShay, 669 N.W.2d at 888. But if the erroneous admission of evidence violated the defendant’s constitutional rights, we will reverse unless the jury verdict was “surely unattributable” to the error. See Valtierra, 718 N.W.2d at 435 n. 4. Appellant’s defense was that he was not associated with the MOD and that he did not commit a crime for the benefit of a criminal…
Practitioners open STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Meng VANG, Appellant when Minnesota party admissions turns on the distinction in this sentence: "DeShay, 669 N.W.2d at 888. But if the erroneous admission of evidence violated the defendant’s constitutional rights, we will reverse unless the jury verdict was “surely unattributable” to the error. See Valtierra, 718 N.W.2d at 435 n. 4." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Vera L. WAGNER, Et Al., Respondents, v. THOMAS J. OBERT ENTERPRISES, Petitioner, Appellant
…where she was treated by Dr. Carl Caspers. In the hospital admission record, Dr. Caspers made the notation, “The patient stated that she was at a roller rink with her grandchildren. She had her skates on and was standing at the rink. She became concerned about a child that was on the track and she lost her balance and fell At the beginning of the trial, plaintiffs, who did…
Practitioners open Vera L. WAGNER, Et Al., Respondents, v. THOMAS J. OBERT ENTERPRISES, Petitioner, Appellant when Minnesota party admissions turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Dr. Carl Caspers. In the hospital admission record, Dr. Caspers made the notation, “The patient stated that she was at a roller rink with her grandchildren. She had her skates on and was standing at the rink." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Alex Chico TOVAR, Appellant
STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Alex Chico TOVAR, Appellant, 2000 Minn. LEXIS 66 (2000)
…interest” exception contained in Rule 804(b)(3) allows the admission of certain out-of-court statements against interest, if the declarant is unavailable to testify at trial. See generally Minn. R. Evid. 802 and 804. A statement that would tend to expose a declarant to criminal liability and that is offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating “circu…
On party admissions, STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Alex Chico TOVAR, Appellant speaks to the Minnesota dispute in this passage: "Rule 804(b)(3) allows the admission of certain out-of-court statements against interest, if the declarant is unavailable to testify at trial. See generally Minn. R. Evid. 802 and 804." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Hussein Osman AHMED, Appellant
STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Hussein Osman AHMED, Appellant, 2010 Minn. App. LEXIS 70 (2010)
…ined in Minn. R. Evid. 807. 1 The residual exception allows admission of statements that do not fall under the usual hearsay exceptions found in Minn. R. Evid. 803 and 804 but have “equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness” upon a determination by the court that (a) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (b) the statement is more probative on th…
Practitioners open STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Hussein Osman AHMED, Appellant when Minnesota party admissions turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Minn. R. Evid. 807. 1 The residual exception allows admission of statements that do not fall under the usual hearsay exceptions found in Minn. R. Evid." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
KENNETH S. JOHNSON v. FREDERICK C. SLEIZER, INDIVIDUALLY AND D.B.A. THE AQUARIUM BAR AND LOUNGE
…as declarations against interest and thus to justify their admission into evidence. We said in Dempsey v. Meighen, 251 Minn. 562, 570, 90 N. W. (2d) 178, 183, quoting from 5 Wigmore, Evidence (3 ed.) § 1455: “The Exception requires, like most of the others, first, a Necessity for resorting to hearsay , i. e., the death of the declarant, or some 425 other condition render…
Minnesota opinions such as KENNETH S. JOHNSON v. FREDERICK C. SLEIZER, INDIVIDUALLY AND D.B.A. THE AQUARIUM BAR AND LOUNGE are cited where party admissions is disputed. The court stated: "We said in Dempsey v. Meighen, 251 Minn. 562, 570, 90 N. W. (2d) 178, 183, quoting from 5 Wigmore, Evidence (3 ed.) § 1455: “The Exception requires, like most of the others, first, a Necessity for resorting to hearsay *, i. e." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. John Edward PALMER, Jr., Appellant
…degree. At trial before the court, appellant’s objection to admission of the three recorded conversations was overruled, and Finley and the narcotics officer testified that the language used in the conversations referred to drugs. In addition, a chemist with the Minneapolis Department of Health testified that she analyzed the sheets of blue, plastic-like material recovered from…
Minnesota opinions such as STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. John Edward PALMER, Jr., Appellant are cited where party admissions is disputed. The court stated: "At trial before the court, appellant’s objection to admission of the three recorded conversations was overruled, and Finley and the narcotics officer testified that the language used in the conversations referred to drugs." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Business records
The business-records exception under Minn. R. Evid. 803(6) is the everyday path for medical charts, employment files, bank statements, and maintenance logs. The foundation requires a record made at or near the time by — or from information transmitted by — someone with knowledge; kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity; and made as a regular practice. A custodian or other qualified witness (or a qualifying certification where the jurisdiction allows it) lays the foundation. The opponent may still attack lack of trustworthiness when the source or method of preparation indicates unreliability — litigation-driven reports are the classic failure mode.
Do not confuse authenticity with the business-records exception. You still need to show the exhibit is what you claim it is; the hearsay exception then answers why the out-of-court assertions inside it may be considered for their truth.
Minnesota business-records opinions
John J. Wild, M. D. v. Frank M. Rarig and Others
John J. Wild, M. D. v. Frank M. Rarig and Others, 302 Minn. 419 (1975)
…he project. Defendants claim the letter was admissible as a business record under Minn. St. 600.02, while Dr. Wild argues that the exclusion of the letter “was a fair and reasonable exercise of discretion by the trial judge”; that the exhibit was cumulative; and that its exclusion from evidence was not prejudicial. *456The Minnesota Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act, in…
On business records, John J. Wild, M. D. v. Frank M. Rarig and Others speaks to the Minnesota dispute in this passage: "Defendants claim the letter was admissible as a business record under Minn. St. 600.02, while Dr." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Richard L. Lindstrom and Another v. Yellow Taxi Company of Minneapolis
Richard L. Lindstrom and Another v. Yellow Taxi Company of Minneapolis, 298 Minn. 224 (1974)
…of proof was that the hospital records were not part of the business records of the hospital. Plaintiffs’ objections were sustained by the court on the “thrust of the Brown case” (presumably the trial court meant Brown v. St. Paul City Ry. Co. 241 Minn. 15, 62 N. W. 2d 688, 44 A. L. R. 2d 535 [1954]), and on hearsay. The issue is whether the entries recorded in plaintiffs’ hosp…
Richard L. Lindstrom and Another v. Yellow Taxi Company of Minneapolis is worth reading on Minnesota business records because the court put the point in its own words: "Plaintiffs’ objections were sustained by the court on the “thrust of the Brown case” (presumably the trial court meant Brown v. St. Paul City Ry. Co. 241 Minn. 15, 62 N. W. 2d 688, 44 A. L. R. 2d 535 [1954]), and on hearsay." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
In the Matter of the CHILD OF Michael SIMON, Parent
In the Matter of the CHILD OF Michael SIMON, Parent, 2003 Minn. App. LEXIS 673 (2003)
…Evid. 803(6) (business-records exception to hearsay rule). Business records are presumed to be reliable because (1) the regularity of the records produces habits of precision in the record keeper, (2) the records are regularly checked, (3) employees are motivated to make accurate records because the businesses that employ them function in reliance on these records, and (4) emp…
In the Matter of the CHILD OF Michael SIMON, Parent is worth reading on Minnesota business records because the court put the point in its own words: "Evid. 803(6) (business-records exception to hearsay rule)." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
NATIONAL TEA COMPANY, INC., Appellant, v. TYLER REFRIGERATION COMPANY, INC., Respondent
…admission into evidence of the report contained in Tyler’s business records which indicates Underwriters’ Laboratories had approved the design. Underwriters’ Laboratories is an independent, not for profit, organization, which many years ago was formed by the insurance industry in an effort to establish a certification program whereby the quality of products could be determined…
Practitioners open NATIONAL TEA COMPANY, INC., Appellant, v. TYLER REFRIGERATION COMPANY, INC., Respondent when Minnesota business records turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Tyler’s business records which indicates Underwriters’ Laboratories had approved the design." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
In the Matter of the WELFARE OF W.R. and A.R., Children
In the Matter of the WELFARE OF W.R. and A.R., Children, 1985 Minn. App. LEXIS 4811 (1985)
…hone conversation properly admitted into evidence under the business records exception to the hearsay rule? ANALYSIS I. Termination of parental rights is controlled by statute. See Minn.Stat. § 260.-221 (1984) (grounds for termination of parental rights). The decision is a drastic step that can only be taken for grave and weighty reasons. In re Welfare of H.G.B., 306 N.W.2d 821…
On business records, In the Matter of the WELFARE OF W.R. and A.R., Children speaks to the Minnesota dispute in this passage: "ANALYSIS I. Termination of parental rights is controlled by statute. See Minn.Stat. § 260.-221 (1984) (grounds for termination of parental rights). The decision is a drastic step that can only be taken for grave and weighty reasons. In re Welfare of H.G.B., 306 N.W." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
STATE of Minnesota, Appellant, v. Jason Michael VONDERHARR, Respondent
…ents that by their nature were not testimonial-for example, business records or statements in furtherance of a conspiracy. We do not infer from these that the Framers thought exceptions would apply even to prior testimony. Id. (footnote omitted); see also id. at 76, 124 S.Ct. at 1378 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in judgment) (“To its credit, the Court’s analysis of ‘testimony’…
Practitioners open STATE of Minnesota, Appellant, v. Jason Michael VONDERHARR, Respondent when Minnesota business records turns on the distinction in this sentence: "We do not infer from these that the Framers thought exceptions would apply even to prior testimony. Id. (footnote omitted); see also id. at 76, 124 S.Ct. at 1378 (Rehnquist, C.J." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Important hearsay exceptions that do not require unavailability
Three present-sense and mental-state exceptions carry most of the remaining traffic in Minnesota trial practice.
Excited utterance — Minn. R. Evid. 803(2). A statement relating to a startling event or condition, made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused. Timing is elastic; composure defeats the exception even minutes after the event, while visible distress can preserve it for hours.
Present sense impression — Minn. R. Evid. 803(1). A statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while or immediately after the declarant perceived it. Contemporaneity is strict — seconds and minutes, not hours — and excitement is not required.
Then-existing mental, emotional, or physical condition — Minn. R. Evid. 803(3). Statements of then-existing state of mind (including intent and plan) come in; statements of memory or belief offered to prove the fact remembered generally do not. Intent-to-meet-another-person cases remain the hardest applications.
Declarant unavailable
When the declarant is unavailable under Minn. R. Evid. 804(a), Minnesota opens a second suite of exceptions. Unavailability typically includes privilege, refusal to testify despite court order, lack of memory, death or then-existing infirmity, and absence despite reasonable efforts to procure attendance. The proponent bears the burden of proving unavailability with specific facts — a bare assertion that the witness "could not be found" is not enough.
Former testimony under Minn. R. Evid. 804(b)(1) is the workhorse once unavailability is shown: testimony given as a witness at a trial, hearing, or lawful deposition, offered against a party who had an opportunity and similar motive to develop it by direct, cross, or redirect. Criminal confrontation analysis runs in parallel and is not satisfied merely because a hearsay exception applies.
Dying declarations
Dying declarations under Minn. R. Evid. 804(b)(2) remain a narrow but decisive exception in homicide and, in many jurisdictions, civil cases involving the cause or circumstances of what the declarant believed to be impending death. The foundational showing is the declarant's belief that death was imminent — not that death in fact followed within any particular time — plus a statement concerning the cause or circumstances of what the declarant believed to be the impending death. Courts police coaching and narrative expansions aggressively.
Minnesota dying-declaration opinions
STATE v. GEORGE B. FINDLING
STATE v. GEORGE B. FINDLING, 123 Minn. 413 (1913)
…t what the boy said at this time was properly admitted as a dying declaration, he having been informed at the time that he was about to die, we do not find it necessary to consider the correctness of that contention. It may be conceded, in harmony with defendant’s claim, that the evidence was inadmissible as a dying declaration, since no sufficient foundation therefor had been…
Minnesota opinions such as STATE v. GEORGE B. FINDLING are cited where dying declaration is disputed. The court stated: "t what the boy said at this time was properly admitted as a dying declaration, he having been informed at the time that he was about to die, we do not find it necessary to consider the correctness of that contention. It may be conceded, in harmony with defendant’s claim, that the" That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Alonzo FERGUSON, Appellant
STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Alonzo FERGUSON, Appellant, 1998 Minn. LEXIS 408 (1998)
…n Wheatley Jr. made before his death that was admitted as a dying declaration; (2) photographs of alleged gang graffiti, along with testimony explaining the graffiti; and (3) vouching testimony. Ferguson argues that the erroneous admission of this evidence was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and he contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict. We af…
STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Alonzo FERGUSON, Appellant is worth reading on Minnesota dying declaration because the court put the point in its own words: "Wheatley Jr. made before his death that was admitted as a dying declaration; (2) photographs of alleged gang graffiti, along with testimony explaining the graffiti; and (3) vouching testimony." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Jeffery Lamar YOUNG, Appellant
STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Jeffery Lamar YOUNG, Appellant, 2006 Minn. LEXIS 99 (2006)
…r. Young argues that this statement was not admissible as a dying declaration or an excited utterance, and that its admission violated Young’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). Young concedes that he did not object at trial to the admission of this hearsay statement. In the appeal of Young’s…
On dying declaration, STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Jeffery Lamar YOUNG, Appellant speaks to the Minnesota dispute in this passage: "Young argues that this statement was not admissible as a dying declaration or an excited utterance, and that its admission violated Young’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004)." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
State of Minnesota v. Thomas J. Pearce
State of Minnesota v. Thomas J. Pearce, 56 Minn. 226 (1894)
…ssion of the offense. The wife, Helen Clayton, says, in her dying declarations, that it was her fault and the doctor’s, meaning, as we understand it, the defendant. She was pregnant with child, and, desiring to have an operation performed upon her, she and her husband went to the defendant, who was a physician, and requested him to produce an abortion or miscarriage upon the wi…
On dying declaration, State of Minnesota v. Thomas J. Pearce speaks to the Minnesota dispute in this passage: "The wife, Helen Clayton, says, in her dying declarations, that it was her fault and the doctor’s, meaning, as we understand it, the defendant." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Lennell Maurice MARTIN, Appellant
STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Lennell Maurice MARTIN, Appellant, 2005 Minn. LEXIS 267 (2005)
…admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule, either as a dying declaration or an excited utterance. Generally, a defendant failing to object to proffered testimony at trial is deemed to have forfeited his right to have the error reviewed on appeal. State v. Williams, 525 N.W.2d 538, 544 (Minn. *583 1994). However, the issue may be reviewed on appeal if it constitutes plain e…
Practitioners open STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Lennell Maurice MARTIN, Appellant when Minnesota dying declaration turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Generally, a defendant failing to object to proffered testimony at trial is deemed to have forfeited his right to have the error reviewed on appeal. State v. Williams, 525 N.W.2d 538, 544 (Minn. *583 1994)." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Louis Cardona BUGGS, Appellant
STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Louis Cardona BUGGS, Appellant, 1998 Minn. LEXIS 555 (1998)
…t McCarthy identifying appellant as her assailant under the dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule; (2) the trial court committed reversible error by refusing to limit the scope of the state’s evidence relating to appellant’s prior assault of Talley; (3) the trial court committed reversible error by not providing any guidance to the jury on how they should resolve thei…
STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Louis Cardona BUGGS, Appellant is worth reading on Minnesota dying declaration because the court put the point in its own words: "t McCarthy identifying appellant as her assailant under the dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule; (2) the trial court committed reversible error by refusing to limit the scope of the state’s evidence relating to appellant’s prior assault of Talley; (3) the trial court" Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Medical diagnosis or treatment statements
Statements made for medical diagnosis or treatment under Minn. R. Evid. 803(4) cover medical history, past or present symptoms, and their general cause when reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. The exception is not limited to treating physicians; statements to nurses, EMTs, and consulting clinicians can qualify when the diagnostic purpose is genuine. Fault and identity remain the usual battleground: "I was hit by a car" is often pertinent; "the light was green" usually is not; abuser identity in child-abuse and domestic-violence cases is heavily litigated.
Minnesota medical-statement opinions
STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Andre ROBINSON, Appellant
STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Andre ROBINSON, Appellant, 2006 Minn. LEXIS 439 (2006)
…tive admission of F.T.'s statements to the nurses under the medical diagnosis *402 and treatment hearsay exception, Minn. R. Evid. 803(4). The court of appeals agreed, but concluded that the statements were admissible under the residual hearsay exception, Minn. R. Evid. 803(24), and as nonhearsay statements of identification under Minn. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(C). State v. Robinson,…
On medical diagnosis hearsay, STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Andre ROBINSON, Appellant speaks to the Minnesota dispute in this passage: "F.T.'s statements to the nurses under the medical diagnosis *402 and treatment hearsay exception, Minn. R. Evid. 803(4). The court of appeals agreed, but concluded that the statements were admissible under the residual hearsay exception, Minn. R. Evid." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Bruce Philip LARSON, Petitioner, Appellant
…ception) and Minn.R.Evid. 803(4) (statements for purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment) and that the statements were sufficiently reliable to satisfy the confrontation clause. But, since our decision preceded the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Wright, we did not have the benefit of the Wright analysis, an analysis on which we relied in upholding the admission of…
Minnesota opinions such as STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Bruce Philip LARSON, Petitioner, Appellant are cited where medical diagnosis hearsay is disputed. The court stated: "Minn.R.Evid. 803(4) (statements for purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment) and that the statements were sufficiently reliable to satisfy the confrontation clause." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
D.A.H. v. G.A.H.
D.A.H. v. G.A.H., 371 N.W.2d 1 (1985)
…m the definition of hearsay statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. We do not address this argument because we find the disputed testimo*3ny admissible under Rule 803(24), which excepts from the hearsay rule: A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the…
On medical diagnosis hearsay, D.A.H. v. G.A.H. speaks to the Minnesota dispute in this passage: "m the definition of hearsay statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. We do not address this argument because we find the disputed testimo*3ny admissible under Rule 803(24), which excepts from the hearsay rule: A statement not specifically covered by any of" The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Bruce Philip LARSON, Appellant
STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Bruce Philip LARSON, Appellant, 1990 Minn. LEXIS 85 (1990)
…ng with the admission of statements made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment, does not afford a basis for admitting a victim’s statement as to the identity of her abuser. We disagree with all of these conclusions and the reasoning underlying them. First, the Constitution does not preclude the use of the victim’s out-of-court statements unless the state has called…
STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Bruce Philip LARSON, Appellant is worth reading on Minnesota medical diagnosis hearsay because the court put the point in its own words: "We disagree with all of these conclusions and the reasoning underlying them." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Use of depositions at trial
Minn. R. Civ. P. 30 and 32 govern civil depositions and trial use. Minn. R. Crim. P. 9 addresses criminal discovery; prior testimony may be offered under Minn. R. Evid. 804(b)(1) when unavailability criteria are met.
Deposition use is always a two-layer problem: procedural permission to read or play the deposition, plus a hearsay path (often former testimony, party admission, or impeachment). Counsel who satisfy the civil or criminal procedure rule but skip the evidence-rule foundation invite a sustained objection; counsel who have a hearsay exception but failed to preserve the deposition under the procedural rule face the same result. Video designations, counter-designations, and completeness objections should be teed up before the jury is seated.
Minnesota deposition / former-testimony opinions
STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Robyn Keith AMOS, Sr., Petitioner, Appellant
…f perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition . Minn. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(A). 2 . Rule 804(b)(1) provides, in pertinent part: The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness: (1) Former testimony. In a criminal proceeding involving a retrial of the same defendant for the same or an included offen…
On deposition / former testimony, STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Robyn Keith AMOS, Sr., Petitioner, Appellant speaks to the Minnesota dispute in this passage: "Minn. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(A). 2 . Rule 804(b)(1) provides, in pertinent part: The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness: (1) Former testimony." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
TC/AMERICAN MONORAIL, INC. v. CUSTOM CONVEYOR CORPORATION
TC/AMERICAN MONORAIL, INC. v. CUSTOM CONVEYOR CORPORATION, 2013 Minn. LEXIS 748 (2013)
…stice: The issue in this case is whether a party may take a deposition to preserve trial testimony of an unavailable, out-of-state witness, even though the deposition would occur after a discovery deadline in a scheduling order. Respondent TC/American Monorail, Inc., brought this civil action to recover payment for industrial equipment that it fabricated for appellant Custom *4…
On deposition / former testimony, TC/AMERICAN MONORAIL, INC. v. CUSTOM CONVEYOR CORPORATION speaks to the Minnesota dispute in this passage: "The issue in this case is whether a party may take a deposition to preserve trial testimony of an unavailable, out-of-state witness, even though the deposition would occur after a discovery deadline in a scheduling order. Respondent TC/American Monorail, Inc." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
CITY OF BEMIDJI, Appellant, v. Robert Blaine HARR, Respondent
CITY OF BEMIDJI, Appellant, v. Robert Blaine HARR, Respondent, 1985 Minn. App. LEXIS 4221 (1985)
…e. Harr moved under Minn.R.Crim.P. 21.01 to take Rongstad’s deposition prior to trial. Harr’s counsel claimed he did not think Rongstad would give information unless subpoenaed. The trial court granted Harr’s motion and ordered the issuance of a subpoena requiring Rongstad to appear for a deposition at defense counsel’s office during normal business hours prior to trial. The co…
CITY OF BEMIDJI, Appellant, v. Robert Blaine HARR, Respondent is worth reading on Minnesota deposition / former testimony because the court put the point in its own words: "Harr moved under Minn.R.Crim.P. 21.01 to take Rongstad’s deposition prior to trial. Harr’s counsel claimed he did not think Rongstad would give information unless subpoenaed." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
John D. LARSON, Et Al., Appellants, v. ANDERSON, TAUNTON & WALSH, INC., D.B.A. Tom & Bill’s Skylark Red Owl, Respondents
…mini tornado.” Over appellants’ objection, Adrid Hag-berg’s deposition was read into the record. Hagberg, 81 years old, was a passenger in John Skalberg’s car, which was behind appellants’ car at the time of the accident. Appellants’ attorney informed respondents’ attorney, several days before trial, that Hagberg was moving to Arizona and that his deposition would be read in pl…
Minnesota opinions such as John D. LARSON, Et Al., Appellants, v. ANDERSON, TAUNTON & WALSH, INC., D.B.A. Tom & Bill’s Skylark Red Owl, Respondents are cited where deposition / former testimony is disputed. The court stated: "Over appellants’ objection, Adrid Hag-berg’s deposition was read into the record. Hagberg, 81 years old, was a passenger in John Skalberg’s car, which was behind appellants’ car at the time of the accident." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
TC/AMERICAN MONORAIL, INC. v. CUSTOM CONVEYOR CORPORATION
TC/AMERICAN MONORAIL, INC. v. CUSTOM CONVEYOR CORPORATION, 2012 Minn. App. LEXIS 115 (2012)
…equest for commissions or letters rogatory to conduct trial depositions, and (3) excluding certain evidence during trial. We affirm. FACTS In 2009, appellant Custom Conveyor Corporation contracted to provide equipment for a wastewater treatment plant in the City of North Las Vegas, Nevada (the city or CNLV). Custom Conveyor manufactured some of the equipment for the project its…
TC/AMERICAN MONORAIL, INC. v. CUSTOM CONVEYOR CORPORATION is worth reading on Minnesota deposition / former testimony because the court put the point in its own words: "We affirm. FACTS In 2009, appellant Custom Conveyor Corporation contracted to provide equipment for a wastewater treatment plant in the City of North Las Vegas, Nevada (the city or CNLV)." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
STATE of Minnesota v. Jamaine Jamie WILLIAMS
STATE of Minnesota v. Jamaine Jamie WILLIAMS, 908 N.W.2d 362 (2018)
…ss before trial; (2) admitting a redacted transcript of the deposition at trial; and (3) admitting evidence that, 1 week before the murders, in that same apartment, Williams had pointed a gun at two of the victims and threatened to "kill everybody" in the apartment. According to Williams, the alleged errors were harmful because the formal nature of the deposition unfairly bolst…
On deposition / former testimony, STATE of Minnesota v. Jamaine Jamie WILLIAMS speaks to the Minnesota dispute in this passage: "Williams had pointed a gun at two of the victims and threatened to 'kill everybody' in the apartment." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Karrie Anne SMITH, Appellant
STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Karrie Anne SMITH, Appellant, 1997 Minn. App. LEXIS 592 (1997)
…d in a civil action brought by L.D. against appellant. This deposition, however, was not admitted into evidence here and is not part of this record. Indeed, appellant filed a motion in limine to exclude the deposition; the trial court apparently found it unnecessary to rule on this motion because it was allowing the bartender's statement that "[L.D.] didn’t do anything." While…
On deposition / former testimony, STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Karrie Anne SMITH, Appellant speaks to the Minnesota dispute in this passage: "L.D. against appellant. This deposition, however, was not admitted into evidence here and is not part of this record." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Authenticity: why it matters and how to prove it
Authenticity is not a hearsay doctrine and it is not optional. Under Minn. R. Evid. 901, 902, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is. Self-authenticating categories — certified public records, newspapers, acknowledged documents, trade inscriptions, and (where adopted) certified domestic records of a regularly conducted activity — shorten the path, but most trial exhibits still need a sponsoring witness, distinctive characteristics, chain of custody, or process-or-system evidence.
Minnesota healthcare, retail, and DWI cases require authenticated lab certificates, POS records, and body-camera video under Minn. R. Evid. 901–902 before business-record exceptions apply.
Why authenticity gets its own section in every Minnesota trial notebook:
- It is a condition precedent. An unauthenticated exhibit never reaches the relevance, hearsay, or privilege analysis in a useful way — the jury never properly considers it.
- Digital evidence multiplies the failure modes. Screenshots, social-media posts, text threads, and cloud downloads require hash values, account attribution, metadata, or a percipient witness who saw the content created or received.
- Chain of custody is authenticity by another name. Drugs, firearms, biological samples, and seized devices are excluded when the links from seizure to lab to courtroom are broken, even if a hearsay exception would otherwise apply to a lab report.
- Business-records shortcuts do not replace authentication. A custodian can explain record-keeping practices and still fail if nobody can say the particular PDF or printout is the record of this patient, this account, or this machine.
- Self-authentication is narrow. Counsel who wave a notarization or a letterhead and skip the rest of Rule 901-style analysis often lose when the document's contents are disputed.
Practical authentication checklist for Minnesota trials: identify the exhibit; choose a 901 method or a 902 category; line up the sponsoring witness or certificate; preserve chain-of-custody testimony for physical and digital items; and separate the authenticity objection from any hearsay objection so the court rules on each.
Minnesota authenticity opinions
STATE ex rel. CHARLES R. DENTON v. CHARLES H. CURTIS
STATE ex rel. CHARLES R. DENTON v. CHARLES H. CURTIS, 111 Minn. 240 (1910)
…c in these words: “It appears from the annexed papers, duly authenticated in accordance with the laws of this state.” The statute (section 5278, supra) does not prescribe any particular form for the certificate of authentication. The purpose of requiring the certificate is to prevent the Governor of the • state upon whom the demand is made being imposed upon by spurious charges…
STATE ex rel. CHARLES R. DENTON v. CHARLES H. CURTIS is worth reading on Minnesota authentication because the court put the point in its own words: "It appears from the annexed papers, duly authenticated in accordance with the laws of this state.” The statute (section 5278, supra) does not prescribe any particular form for the certificate of authentication." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Charles L. Colman v. Charles C. Goodnow and others
Charles L. Colman v. Charles C. Goodnow and others, 36 Minn. 9 (1886)
…r, C. W. Fenlason, but the signature of the officer was not authenticated by his official seal. It was received in evidence by the trial court, which finds that at the time of the trial, October, 1882, “there was an impression of the seal of the register of deeds immediately at the left of the name of G. W. Fenlason, signed to the jurat of the affidavit, but *11such impression…
Practitioners open Charles L. Colman v. Charles C. Goodnow and others when Minnesota authentication turns on the distinction in this sentence: "C. W. Fenlason, but the signature of the officer was not authenticated by his official seal." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Edward P. Wells v. Abigail A. Atkinson and another
Edward P. Wells v. Abigail A. Atkinson and another, 24 Minn. 161 (1877)
…f the peace, in the state of Oregon, in May, 1876, that the authentication of the certificate of acknowledgment by the clerk of the court was insufficient to authorize such record, in this: that the clerk does not certify that he knows the signature of the justice, nor does he certify to the genuineness of it to such acknowledgment, or his belief therein, but merely that “the s…
Edward P. Wells v. Abigail A. Atkinson and another is worth reading on Minnesota authentication because the court put the point in its own words: "f the peace, in the state of Oregon, in May, 1876, that the authentication of the certificate of acknowledgment by the clerk of the court was insufficient to authorize such record, in this: that the clerk does not certify that he knows the signature of the justice, nor does he ce" Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. David Paul HAGER, Appellant
STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. David Paul HAGER, Appellant, 1982 Minn. LEXIS 1808 (1982)
…by Minn.R.Evid. 901(a), which provides, “The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” An excellent discussion of the application of this rule in the context of authentication of so-called “real evidence” is containe…
STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. David Paul HAGER, Appellant is worth reading on Minnesota authentication because the court put the point in its own words: "Minn.R.Evid. 901(a), which provides, “The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Alexander Gunn v. John D. Peakes
Alexander Gunn v. John D. Peakes, 36 Minn. 177 (1886)
…179A foreign judgment may be proved by a copy thereof, duly authenticated by the duly-authenticated certificate of an officer properly authorized by law to give a copy. 1 Greenl. Ev. § 488; Mahurin v. Bickford, 6 N. H. 567; Church v. Hubbart, 2 Cranch, 187, 237; Dozier v. Joyce, supra. The clerk or prothonotary of a court is presumed to possess authority to make and certify cop…
Minnesota opinions such as Alexander Gunn v. John D. Peakes are cited where authentication is disputed. The court stated: "A foreign judgment may be proved by a copy thereof, duly authenticated by the duly-authenticated certificate of an officer properly authorized by law to give a copy. 1 Greenl. Ev. § 488; Mahurin v. Bickford, 6 N. H. 567; Church v. Hubbart, 2 Cranch, 187, 237; Dozier v." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Ruth E. Morrison v. Henry H. Porter and another
Ruth E. Morrison v. Henry H. Porter and another, 35 Minn. 425 (1886)
…by having seen him write, or from acquaintance with papers authenticated as genuine. In such cases the conception of the handwriting retained in the mind of the witness becomes a standard for comparison, by reference to which his opinion is formed, and given in evidence, It would seem that a standard generally not less satisfactory, and very often much more satisfactory, is af…
On authentication, Ruth E. Morrison v. Henry H. Porter and another speaks to the Minnesota dispute in this passage: "by having seen him write, or from acquaintance with papers authenticated as genuine. In such cases the conception of the handwriting retained in the mind of the witness becomes a standard for comparison, by reference to which his opinion is formed, and given in evidence, It would" The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
In the Matter of the WELFARE OF S.A.M.
In the Matter of the WELFARE OF S.A.M., 1997 Minn. App. LEXIS 1187 (1997)
…The state also produced testimony fiom three witnesses to authenticate the videotape. Jeffrey Williams, the video technician who services the video camera and video cassette recorders on MCTO buses, testified about the location of cameras on the buses and how they operate. He testified that when he last serviced the cameras on the bus where the 164 assault occurred, they wer…
In the Matter of the WELFARE OF S.A.M. is worth reading on Minnesota authentication because the court put the point in its own words: "The state also produced testimony fi*om three witnesses to authenticate the videotape. Jeffrey Williams, the video technician who services the video camera and video cassette recorders on MCTO buses, testified about the location of cameras on the buses and how they operate." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
H. G. DeGraw, Assignee v. James King, Sheriff
H. G. DeGraw, Assignee v. James King, Sheriff, 28 Minn. 118 (1881)
…himself with the proper official seal, with which he shall authenticate his official acts.” The statute being imperative, the seal is essential to the authenticity and legal effect of the acts of the notary. Each act by him must be so authenticated. We have endeavored to find some rule, either upon principle or authority, by which one seal may be held to apply to and authentic…
Practitioners open H. G. DeGraw, Assignee v. James King, Sheriff when Minnesota authentication turns on the distinction in this sentence: "The statute being imperative, the seal is essential to the authenticity and legal effect of the acts of the notary. Each act by him must be so authenticated." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Practice checklist
- State the relevance theory in one sentence before naming an exception.
- Run the 403 / unfair-prejudice balance explicitly for other-acts and graphic exhibits.
- For character or other-acts evidence, identify the non-propensity purpose and request a limiting instruction on the record.
- Decide whether an out-of-court statement is hearsay for the purpose offered before hunting exceptions.
- Lay business-records foundations with time, knowledge, regular practice, and custodial qualifications — or a qualifying certification.
- Prove unavailability with specific facts before offering former testimony or dying declarations.
- Treat deposition use as procedure-plus-hearsay; designate and counter-designate early.
- Authenticate every exhibit under Minn. R. Evid. 901, 902 (or the self-authentication path) before arguing hearsay.
- Preserve chain of custody for physical and digital evidence with named custodians.
- Search LawDiver for recent Minnesota appellate evidence opinions before mediation or motions in limine.
Contents
- General standards of admissibility
- Character evidence
- Hearsay: start with the definition
- Party admissions
- Business records
- Important hearsay exceptions that do not require unavailability
- Declarant unavailable
- Dying declarations
- Medical diagnosis or treatment statements
- Use of depositions at trial
- Authenticity: why it matters and how to prove it
- Practice checklist
- Frequently asked questions
Frequently asked questions
What is the primary evidence source in Minnesota?
Minnesota applies the Minnesota Rules of Evidence. Minnesota's rules track the FRE; Minn. R. Evid. 401–902 apply in district court with Minnesota-specific commentary in selected rules.
How do Minnesota courts decide relevance and unfair prejudice?
Under Minn. R. Evid. 401, 403, evidence must make a fact of consequence more or less probable, and the court may exclude relevant evidence when unfair prejudice, confusion, or waste of time substantially outweighs its probative value.
Are party admissions hearsay in Minnesota?
Party-opponent statements under Minn. R. Evid. 801(d)(2) are generally excluded from the hearsay ban (or treated as an exception, depending on local drafting). They may be offered against the party who made or adopted them without showing unavailability.
What foundation is required for business records?
Under Minn. R. Evid. 803(6), show a record made at or near the time from someone with knowledge, kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity, as a regular practice, through a custodian, qualified witness, or allowed certification — subject to trustworthiness attack.
When can I use a deposition at trial in Minnesota?
Minn. R. Civ. P. 30 and 32 govern civil depositions and trial use. Minn. R. Crim. P. 9 addresses criminal discovery; prior testimony may be offered under Minn. R. Evid. 804(b)(1) when unavailability criteria are met.
Why is authenticity separate from hearsay?
Authenticity asks whether the item is what you claim it is; hearsay asks whether out-of-court assertions inside it may be used for their truth. You can lose on either ground independently. Minnesota authenticity practice starts with Minn. R. Evid. 901, 902.
Where do dying declarations and medical statements fit?
Dying declarations under Minn. R. Evid. 804(b)(2) require belief in impending death and concern the cause or circumstances of that believed death. Medical statements under Minn. R. Evid. 803(4) require a genuine diagnostic or treatment purpose and reasonable pertinence to care.