If you only remember one point about evidence law in Maryland, remember this: Maryland evidence practice is organized under the Maryland Rules of Evidence. Relevance starts at Md. R. Evid. 401, 403; hearsay starts at Md. R. Evid. 801, 802. Procedure, examples, and the opinions below hang off Maryland Rules of Evidence. Authenticity is a separate fight under Md. R. Evid. 901, 902. Depositions at trial: Md. R. Civ. P. 2-411 and 2-501 govern civil depositions and trial use. Md. R. Crim. P. 4-262 addresses criminal discovery; deposition testimony at trial requires Md. R. Evid. 804(b)(1) or another exception.
Hearsay: start with the definition
Most hearsay objections in Maryland are won or lost on the definition, not on an exception. Under Md. R. Evid. 801, 802, hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Non-hearsay purposes — verbal acts, effect on the listener, notice, circumstantial evidence of state of mind, and impeachment — remain available when the proponent can articulate them without asking the jury to believe the declarant.
Layered hearsay (hearsay within hearsay) requires an exception or exclusion for each layer. Machine-generated data and non-assertive conduct sit outside the hearsay definition in FRE-aligned jurisdictions, but they still need authenticity and, often, expert or business-records foundations.
Maryland hearsay opinions
Michael Joseph BERNADYN v. STATE of Maryland
Michael Joseph BERNADYN v. STATE of Maryland, 390 Md. 1 (2005)
…at Bernadyn lived at that address, constitutes inadmissible hearsay. We shall answer that question in the affirmative and shall hold that the bill was inadmissible hearsay. I. Michael Bernadyn, petitioner, was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for Harford County of the offenses of possession of marijuana, possession with intent to distribute, and maintaining a common nui…
Maryland opinions such as Michael Joseph BERNADYN v. STATE of Maryland are cited where hearsay is disputed. The court stated: "Bernadyn lived at that address, constitutes inadmissible hearsay. We shall answer that question in the affirmative and shall hold that the bill was inadmissible hearsay. I." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Kelvin PARKER A/K/A Calvin Parker v. STATE of Maryland
Kelvin PARKER A/K/A Calvin Parker v. STATE of Maryland, 408 Md. 428 (2009)
…gh the testimony of a police officer, purportedly for a non-hearsay purpose. The trial court allowed a police detective to testify at a *431 jury trial that he received a tip from a confidential informant that a black male wearing a blue baseball cap and a black hooded sweatshirt was selling heroin at a particular intersection. Appellant Kelvin Parker was convicted by a jury of…
Practitioners open Kelvin PARKER A/K/A Calvin Parker v. STATE of Maryland when Maryland hearsay turns on the distinction in this sentence: "The trial court allowed a police detective to testify at a *431 jury trial that he received a tip from a confidential informant that a black male wearing a blue baseball cap and a black hooded sweatshirt was selling heroin at a particular intersection." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Erik STODDARD v. STATE of Maryland — Wilner, J., concurring
Erik STODDARD v. STATE of Maryland — Wilner, J., concurring, 389 Md. 681 (2005)
…me if Erik was going to get her.” Stoddard objected on both hearsay and reliability grounds and moved for a mistrial. The State gave a dual response: (1) that the remark was not hearsay because it was in the form of a question and that a question could not constitute a statement for purposes of the hearsay rule, and (2) that the remark was not being offered for its truth, to sh…
On hearsay, Erik STODDARD v. STATE of Maryland — Wilner, J., concurring speaks to the Maryland dispute in this passage: "Erik was going to get her.” Stoddard objected on both hearsay and reliability grounds and moved for a mistrial." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Jones v. State
Jones v. State, 205 Md. 528 (2001)
…renewed his motion “on the further ground these records are hearsay.” The motion was overruled. Dr. Hanson was then asked: “referring to the hospital records which you. have, tell the jury, just what they reveal in regard to the patient Anna Mae Moore Camper?” Defense counsel stated that he would like the record to show “that the defense objects to the use of the ho…
On hearsay, Jones v. State speaks to the Maryland dispute in this passage: "The motion was overruled. Dr. Hanson was then asked: “referring to the hospital records which you. have, tell the jury, just what they reveal in regard to the patient Anna Mae Moore Camper?" The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Clarence Mouzone v. State of Maryland
Clarence Mouzone v. State of Maryland, 294 Md. 692 (1982)
…lice officer falls within any exception to the rule against hearsay. We set forth the facts crucial to our discussion of the issue. At approximately two o’clock in the afternoon of August 31,1979, Anna Byrd happened to be in the vicinity of North Avenue and Charles Street in Baltimore City. While there she heard a loud noise, similar to a car back-firing. She turned around to s…
Practitioners open Clarence Mouzone v. State of Maryland when Maryland hearsay turns on the distinction in this sentence: "We set forth the facts crucial to our discussion of the issue. At approximately two o’clock in the afternoon of August 31,1979, Anna Byrd happened to be in the vicinity of North Avenue and Charles Street in Baltimore City." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Kenneth THOMAS v. STATE of Maryland
Kenneth THOMAS v. STATE of Maryland, 429 Md. 85 (2012)
…hold that the prior consistent statements were inadmissible hearsay and were neither relevant nor admissible under Rule 5-616(c) to “detract from the impeachment,” or “rebut logically” the impeachment undertaken. I. In the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, a jury convicted Petitioner, Kenneth Thomas, of distribution of a controlled dangerous substance. The trial judge senten…
Practitioners open Kenneth THOMAS v. STATE of Maryland when Maryland hearsay turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Rule 5-616(c) to “detract from the impeachment,” or “rebut logically” the impeachment undertaken. I. In the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, a jury convicted Petitioner, Kenneth Thomas, of distribution of a controlled dangerous substance." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Walking through Maryland facts
Use this walkthrough to see which Maryland authority does the work at each step.
A lawyer in Maryland wants to offer a medical record, a party email, and a statement the declarant made while believing death was imminent.
- Clear relevance and unfair prejudice under Md. R. Evid. 401, 403.
- If the email is the opposing party's, test Md. R. Evid. 801(d)(2) before the hearsay definition in Md. R. Evid. 801, 802.
- For the medical record, lay the business-records foundation in Md. R. Evid. 803(6) and the treatment purpose in Md. R. Evid. 803(4).
- For the deathbed statement, meet Md. R. Evid. 804(b)(2), then authenticate every exhibit under Md. R. Evid. 901, 902.
Maryland keeps hearsay, character, and authenticity on different rules inside the Maryland Rules of Evidence. Winning one does not win the others.
Party admissions
Statements of an opposing party are among the most important routes around the hearsay bar. Maryland treats them under Md. R. Evid. 801(d)(2). Nothing about the statement need be against interest, contemporaneous, or based on personal knowledge — the theory is adversarial, not reliability-based. A party cannot complain that his own words are unreliable when offered against him.
Scope questions dominate practice: the party's own statement; adopted statements (including silence in circumstances where a reasonable person would deny); statements by authorized speakers; agent or employee statements on matters within the scope of the relationship; and, in criminal conspiracy cases, coconspirator statements during and in furtherance of the conspiracy. A defendant generally cannot introduce his own exculpatory out-of-court statement as a "party admission" against himself — the rule runs one way.
Maryland party-admission opinions
Elizabeth Horton ELLSWORTH v. SHERNE LINGERIE, INC., Et Al.
Elizabeth Horton ELLSWORTH v. SHERNE LINGERIE, INC., Et Al., 303 Md. 581 (1985)
…ation problems. Id. But the burden is on the party opposing admission to demonstrate that the report is not reliable. See Kehm, at 618; Baker v. Elcona Homes Corp., 588 F.2d 551, 558 (6th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 933, 99 S.Ct. 2054, 60 L.Ed.2d 661 (1979). Placing the burden on the opposing party makes considerable practical sense. Most government sponsored investigatio…
On party admissions, Elizabeth Horton ELLSWORTH v. SHERNE LINGERIE, INC., Et Al. speaks to the Maryland dispute in this passage: "Id. But the burden is on the party opposing admission to demonstrate that the report is not reliable. See Kehm, at 618; Baker v. Elcona Homes Corp., 588 F.2d 551, 558 (6th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 933, 99 S.Ct. 2054, 60 L.Ed.2d 661 (1979)." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Joseph Nathan BELLAMY v. STATE of Maryland
Joseph Nathan BELLAMY v. STATE of Maryland, 403 Md. 308 (2008)
…that the statement should have been admitted as an adoptive admission of a party opponent (the State) under Maryland Rule 5-803(a)(2). Second, Bellamy asserts that Saunders’s statement constitutes a declaration against penal interest and, therefore, should have been admitted under Maryland Rule 5-804(b)(3). Finally, if his first two contentions gain no traction with us, Bellamy…
Maryland opinions such as Joseph Nathan BELLAMY v. STATE of Maryland are cited where party admissions is disputed. The court stated: "State) under Maryland Rule 5-803(a)(2). Second, Bellamy asserts that Saunders’s statement constitutes a declaration against penal interest and, therefore, should have been admitted under Maryland Rule 5-804(b)(3)." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
AETNA CASUALTY & SURETY COMPANY v. BARRY A. KUHL Et Al.
AETNA CASUALTY & SURETY COMPANY v. BARRY A. KUHL Et Al., 296 Md. 446 (1983)
…ase here. Kuhl and Beutelspacher vigorously objected to the admission of the convictions but the trial court allowed them into evidence anyway. *452 We conclude, therefore, that in this jurisdiction a judgment of conviction in a criminal case is not admissible in a civil case as evidence of the facts upon which it is based. The parties to the criminal prosecution are different.…
AETNA CASUALTY & SURETY COMPANY v. BARRY A. KUHL Et Al. is worth reading on Maryland party admissions because the court put the point in its own words: "Kuhl and Beutelspacher vigorously objected to the admission of the convictions but the trial court allowed them into evidence anyway." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Ebert Henry HARMONY, Sr. v. STATE of Maryland
Ebert Henry HARMONY, Sr. v. STATE of Maryland, 88 Md. App. 306 (1991)
…Md. 462, 466, 180 A.2d 682 (1962). The precondition to the admission of these type statements is that the victim be a witness and the “ ‘only time requirement is that the complaint have been made without a delay which is unexplained or is inconsistent with the occurrence of the offense, in general a less demanding time aspect than with the typical excited utterance exception.’…
On party admissions, Ebert Henry HARMONY, Sr. v. STATE of Maryland speaks to the Maryland dispute in this passage: "Md. 462, 466, 180 A.2d 682 (1962). The precondition to the admission of these type statements is that the victim be a witness and the “ ‘only time requirement is that the complaint have been made without a delay which is unexplained or is inconsistent with the occurrence of the o" The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Anna E. DIFFENDAL, Et Vir v. KASH AND KARRY SERVICE CORPORATION
Anna E. DIFFENDAL, Et Vir v. KASH AND KARRY SERVICE CORPORATION, 74 Md. App. 170 (1988)
…to support Kash and Karry’s motion for summary judgment an admission under Rule 2-501(e)? This appeal arises out of a personal injury sustained by Anna Diffendal while she was shopping in the Kash and Karry supermarket on June 23, 1983 in Glen Burnie, Maryland. Upon arriving at the store, Mrs. Diffendal took a shopping cart and proceeded to the frozen food aisle, where she int…
Maryland opinions such as Anna E. DIFFENDAL, Et Vir v. KASH AND KARRY SERVICE CORPORATION are cited where party admissions is disputed. The court stated: "Kash and Karry’s motion for summary judgment an admission under Rule 2-501(e)?" That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Ola Lucille Wilkins and James Cole v. State of Maryland
Ola Lucille Wilkins and James Cole v. State of Maryland, 11 Md. App. 113 (1971)
…at. I have got to go through the motion of objecting to the admission of the evidence in any event when it is proffered. THE COURT: I am not sure that the question of a person’s criminal record can be put into evidence in this manner. MR. SHEPHERD: That is about the only thing. If we can somehow judicially strike that out, I have no objection. But we are entitled to that stipul…
On party admissions, Ola Lucille Wilkins and James Cole v. State of Maryland speaks to the Maryland dispute in this passage: "I have got to go through the motion of objecting to the admission of the evidence in any event when it is proffered. THE COURT: I am not sure that the question of a person’s criminal record can be put into evidence in this manner. MR. SHEPHERD: That is about the only thing." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Henry Oelrichs and Gustav W. Lurman v. Benjamin Ford — Bowie, J., dissenting
Henry Oelrichs and Gustav W. Lurman v. Benjamin Ford — Bowie, J., dissenting, 21 Md. 489 (1864)
…ommercial community. The first exception in each, is to the admission of certain letters and telegrams to and from a supposed agent, Mr. Bell, to the plaintiffs, and entries of a deceased clerk of Bell, to show that the contract sued upon, which was made in the name of Bell with the defendants, was made by- him *511as agent of tlie plaintiffs, before the agency was proved “aliu…
Henry Oelrichs and Gustav W. Lurman v. Benjamin Ford — Bowie, J., dissenting is worth reading on Maryland party admissions because the court put the point in its own words: "The first exception in each, is to the admission of certain letters and telegrams to and from a supposed agent, Mr." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Business records
The business-records exception under Md. R. Evid. 803(6) is the everyday path for medical charts, employment files, bank statements, and maintenance logs. The foundation requires a record made at or near the time by — or from information transmitted by — someone with knowledge; kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity; and made as a regular practice. A custodian or other qualified witness (or a qualifying certification where the jurisdiction allows it) lays the foundation. The opponent may still attack lack of trustworthiness when the source or method of preparation indicates unreliability — litigation-driven reports are the classic failure mode.
Do not confuse authenticity with the business-records exception. You still need to show the exhibit is what you claim it is; the hearsay exception then answers why the out-of-court assertions inside it may be considered for their truth.
Maryland business-records opinions
Wesley Allen ROLLINS v. STATE of Maryland
Wesley Allen ROLLINS v. STATE of Maryland, 392 Md. 455 (2006)
…ents that by their nature were not testimonial—for example, business records or statements in furtherance of a conspiracy. We do not infer from these that the Framers thought exceptions would apply even to prior testimony. Cf. Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 134, 119 S.Ct. 1887, 144 L.Ed.2d 117 (1999) (plurality opinion) (“[Accomplices’ confessions that inculpate a criminal de…
On business records, Wesley Allen ROLLINS v. STATE of Maryland speaks to the Maryland dispute in this passage: "We do not infer from these that the Framers thought exceptions would apply even to prior testimony. Cf. Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 134, 119 S.Ct. 1887, 144 L.Ed." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Craig Wesley MOON v. STATE of Maryland — Rodowsky, J., dissenting
Craig Wesley MOON v. STATE of Maryland — Rodowsky, J., dissenting, 300 Md. 354 (1984)
…witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. Amendment VI. Here the business records statute was the exclusive basis for evidentiary competency. But the Confrontation Clause does not prohibit a court in a criminal case from receiving into evidence a hospital record reporting the objective results of a scientific test which was ordered for purposes of treatment and which was conducted b…
Practitioners open Craig Wesley MOON v. STATE of Maryland — Rodowsky, J., dissenting when Maryland business records turns on the distinction in this sentence: "U.S. Const. Amendment VI. Here the business records statute was the exclusive basis for evidentiary competency." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
John v. CHAPMAN v. STATE of Maryland
John v. CHAPMAN v. STATE of Maryland, 331 Md. 448 (1993)
…ction 142(c)’s most apparent analog is Maryland’s statutory business records hearsay ex *459 ception, which provides for the admission into evidence of a “writing or record made in the regular course of business as a memorandum or record of an act, transaction, occurrence, or event ... to prove the act, transaction, occurrence, or event.” Md.Code (1974,1989 Repl.Vol.), Courts &…
Practitioners open John v. CHAPMAN v. STATE of Maryland when Maryland business records turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Maryland’s statutory business records hearsay ex *459 ception, which provides for the admission into evidence of a “writing or record made in the regular course of business as a memorandum or record of an act, transaction, occurrence, or event ..." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Wesley Allen ROLLINS v. STATE of Maryland
Wesley Allen ROLLINS v. STATE of Maryland, 161 Md. App. 34 (2005)
…e. After establishing that the *54 records in the file were business records prepared in the ordinary course of business, she stated that she personally viewed all the tissues and sections of the heart on the microscopic slides that Dr. Pestaner prepared. Dr. Ripple stated that she viewed the police reports, witness statements, rough body drawings and notations, prior medical r…
Wesley Allen ROLLINS v. STATE of Maryland is worth reading on Maryland business records because the court put the point in its own words: "After establishing that the *54 records in the file were business records prepared in the ordinary course of business, she stated that she personally viewed all the tissues and sections of the heart on the microscopic slides that Dr. Pestaner prepared. Dr." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
STATE of Maryland v. William Dunlock BRYANT
STATE of Maryland v. William Dunlock BRYANT, 361 Md. 420 (2000)
…y report had been improperly admitted in evidence under the business records exception to the hearsay rule, Maryland Rule 5-803(b)(6). The Court of Special Appeals held that the toxicology report was inadmissible on two grounds: first, that it did not meet the requirements of Maryland Code (1973, 1998 Repl.Vol., 2000 Supp.) § 10-306 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Articl…
Practitioners open STATE of Maryland v. William Dunlock BRYANT when Maryland business records turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Maryland Rule 5-803(b)(6). The Court of Special Appeals held that the toxicology report was inadmissible on two grounds: first, that it did not meet the requirements of Maryland Code (1973, 1998 Repl.Vol., 2000 Supp." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Allan JACKSON v. STATE of Maryland
Allan JACKSON v. STATE of Maryland, 460 Md. 107 (2018)
…PNC bank statements satisfied the four requirements of the business record hearsay exception, under Md. Rule 5-803(b)(6), and, thus, were properly authenticated. Mr. Jackson filed a petition for writ of certiorari in this Court, which we granted to answer the following questions: 1. Whether the Court of Special Appeals erred in holding that evidence had been properly authentic…
On business records, Allan JACKSON v. STATE of Maryland speaks to the Maryland dispute in this passage: "PNC bank statements satisfied the four requirements of the business record hearsay exception, under Md. Rule 5-803(b)(6), and, thus, were properly authenticated. Mr." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Important hearsay exceptions that do not require unavailability
Three present-sense and mental-state exceptions carry most of the remaining traffic in Maryland trial practice.
Excited utterance — Md. R. Evid. 803(2). A statement relating to a startling event or condition, made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused. Timing is elastic; composure defeats the exception even minutes after the event, while visible distress can preserve it for hours.
Present sense impression — Md. R. Evid. 803(1). A statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while or immediately after the declarant perceived it. Contemporaneity is strict — seconds and minutes, not hours — and excitement is not required.
Then-existing mental, emotional, or physical condition — Md. R. Evid. 803(3). Statements of then-existing state of mind (including intent and plan) come in; statements of memory or belief offered to prove the fact remembered generally do not. Intent-to-meet-another-person cases remain the hardest applications.
Declarant unavailable
When the declarant is unavailable under Md. R. Evid. 804(a), Maryland opens a second suite of exceptions. Unavailability typically includes privilege, refusal to testify despite court order, lack of memory, death or then-existing infirmity, and absence despite reasonable efforts to procure attendance. The proponent bears the burden of proving unavailability with specific facts — a bare assertion that the witness "could not be found" is not enough.
Former testimony under Md. R. Evid. 804(b)(1) is the workhorse once unavailability is shown: testimony given as a witness at a trial, hearing, or lawful deposition, offered against a party who had an opportunity and similar motive to develop it by direct, cross, or redirect. Criminal confrontation analysis runs in parallel and is not satisfied merely because a hearsay exception applies.
Dying declarations
Dying declarations under Md. R. Evid. 804(b)(2) remain a narrow but decisive exception in homicide and, in many jurisdictions, civil cases involving the cause or circumstances of what the declarant believed to be impending death. The foundational showing is the declarant's belief that death was imminent — not that death in fact followed within any particular time — plus a statement concerning the cause or circumstances of what the declarant believed to be the impending death. Courts police coaching and narrative expansions aggressively.
Maryland dying-declaration opinions
Connor v. State
Connor v. State, 225 Md. 543 (1961)
…ive jurors; (ii) that it was prejudicial error to admit the dying declaration of the *549 deceased as evidence; (iii) that it was error to admit the statements of the defendant to the police into the evidence (a) because the police had obtained his signature to the first statement at a time when, though it was known to the police, it was not known to the defendant that his form…
Practitioners open Connor v. State when Maryland dying declaration turns on the distinction in this sentence: "ive jurors; (ii) that it was prejudicial error to admit the dying declaration of the *549 deceased as evidence; (iii) that it was error to admit the statements of the defendant to the police into the evidence (a) because the police had obtained his signature to the first statemen" Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Smith v. State of Maryland — Smith, J., dissenting
Smith v. State of Maryland — Smith, J., dissenting, 273 Md. 152 (1974)
…s no attempt to show that the statement of the victim was a dying declaration. There is not even a suggestion that it was a dying declaration. The trial judge in his ruling on the proffer (in the portion omitted by the majority opinion) said: “Although the condition of the deceased was then *164critical, although he did die presumably several days later, the testimony of Office…
On dying declaration, Smith v. State of Maryland — Smith, J., dissenting speaks to the Maryland dispute in this passage: "There is not even a suggestion that it was a dying declaration." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Jermaine HAILES v. STATE of Maryland
Jermaine HAILES v. STATE of Maryland, 442 Md. 488 (2015)
…al violation; if so, (II) whether, here, a declarant made a dying declaration two years before dying; and, if so, (III) whether the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution is applicable to dying declarations. We hold that: (I) the State may appeal from a trial court’s exclusion of intangible evidence based on a determination that *493 the e…
On dying declaration, Jermaine HAILES v. STATE of Maryland speaks to the Maryland dispute in this passage: "II) whether, here, a declarant made a dying declaration two years before dying; and, if so, (III) whether the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution is applicable to dying declarations." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
STATE of Maryland v. Gary Ray GARLICK
STATE of Maryland v. Gary Ray GARLICK, 313 Md. 209 (1988)
…ny time been Without recognized exceptions, as for instance dying declarations or documentary evidence____ The exceptions are not even static, but may be enlarged from time to time if there is no material departure from the reason of the general rule. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107, 54 S.Ct. 330, 333, 78 L.Ed. 674, 679 (1934) [citations omitted]. In Moon v. State, Ju…
Maryland opinions such as STATE of Maryland v. Gary Ray GARLICK are cited where dying declaration is disputed. The court stated: "Without recognized exceptions, as for instance dying declarations or documentary evidence____ The exceptions are not even static, but may be enlarged from time to time if there is no material departure from the reason of the general rule. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
James Edward Chandler v. State of Maryland
James Edward Chandler v. State of Maryland, 7 Md. App. 646 (1969)
…the purpose to kill Graves. See Brooks v. State, supra. II DYING DECLARATION Officer Ronald Brown arrived at the scene within ten minutes of the shooting. He found Graves lying in blood soaked clothing in a pool of blood on the sidewalk with pellet holes from his chest to his knees. (The autopsy report, admitted in evidence, showed that pellets had penetrated both lungs, heart…
James Edward Chandler v. State of Maryland is worth reading on Maryland dying declaration because the court put the point in its own words: "Graves. See Brooks v. State, supra. II DYING DECLARATION Officer Ronald Brown arrived at the scene within ten minutes of the shooting. He found Graves lying in blood soaked clothing in a pool of blood on the sidewalk with pellet holes from his chest to his knees." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
OKINO ALAN JACKSON (a/K/A Okino Jackson Alan) v. STATE OF MARYLAND
OKINO ALAN JACKSON (a/K/A Okino Jackson Alan) v. STATE OF MARYLAND, 31 Md. App. 332 (1976)
…States, 146 U. S. 140, 13 S. Ct. 50, 36 L. Ed. 917 (1892), dying declaration; Mattox v. United States, 156 U. S. 237, 15 S. Ct. 337, 39 L. Ed. 409 (1895), prior sworn statement; Kirby v. United States, 174 U. S. 47, 19 S. Ct. 574, 43 L. Ed. 890 (1899), dying declaration, use of record of prior trial; Motes v. United States, 178 U. S. 458, 20 S. Ct. 993, 44 L. Ed. 1150 (1900),…
On dying declaration, OKINO ALAN JACKSON (a/K/A Okino Jackson Alan) v. STATE OF MARYLAND speaks to the Maryland dispute in this passage: "States, 146 U. S. 140, 13 S. Ct. 50, 36 L. Ed. 917 (1892), dying declaration; Mattox v. United States, 156 U. S. 237, 15 S. Ct. 337, 39 L. Ed. 409 (1895), prior sworn statement; Kirby v. United States, 174 U. S. 47, 19 S. Ct. 574, 43 L. Ed." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Medical diagnosis or treatment statements
Statements made for medical diagnosis or treatment under Md. R. Evid. 803(4) cover medical history, past or present symptoms, and their general cause when reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. The exception is not limited to treating physicians; statements to nurses, EMTs, and consulting clinicians can qualify when the diagnostic purpose is genuine. Fault and identity remain the usual battleground: "I was hit by a car" is often pertinent; "the light was green" usually is not; abuser identity in child-abuse and domestic-violence cases is heavily litigated.
Maryland medical-statement opinions
Marvin Clark WEBSTER v. STATE of Maryland
Marvin Clark WEBSTER v. STATE of Maryland, 151 Md. App. 527 (2003)
…hearsay exception covering statements made “for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment.” We shall hold that it was, even though there were dual medical and forensic purposes for the challenged statement. *531 FACTS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS On the evening of August 6, 1999, Evelyn Francis hosted a “safe sex” meeting sponsored by the health department. Children of the guests and…
Practitioners open Marvin Clark WEBSTER v. STATE of Maryland when Maryland medical diagnosis hearsay turns on the distinction in this sentence: "We shall hold that it was, even though there were dual medical and forensic purposes for the challenged statement. *531 FACTS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS On the evening of August 6, 1999, Evelyn Francis hosted a “safe sex” meeting sponsored by the health department." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Frederick Roscoe COATES v. STATE of Maryland
Frederick Roscoe COATES v. STATE of Maryland, 175 Md. App. 588 (2007)
…the hearsay exception for statements made “for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment.” We must determine, inter alia, whether the circuit court erred or abused its discretion in admitting statements made in November 2003 by Jazmyne T., a child sexual abuse victim, to a nurse practitioner. The child’s out-of-court statements, made when she was *591 almost eight years old,…
Practitioners open Frederick Roscoe COATES v. STATE of Maryland when Maryland medical diagnosis hearsay turns on the distinction in this sentence: "We must determine, inter alia, whether the circuit court erred or abused its discretion in admitting statements made in November 2003 by Jazmyne T., a child sexual abuse victim, to a nurse practitioner." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND MEDICAL SYSTEM CORPORATION v. Janet MALORY, Personal Representative of the Estate of Jamal
…), or the exception regarding statements for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment, as stated in Rule 5-803(b)(4). Appellees disagreed, positing that this testimony constituted hearsay not within any exception to the rule against hearsay. The trial court agreed with appellees, finding all three exceptions to be inapplicable and, as a result, sustained appellees’ objecti…
UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND MEDICAL SYSTEM CORPORATION v. Janet MALORY, Personal Representative of the Estate of Jamal is worth reading on Maryland medical diagnosis hearsay because the court put the point in its own words: "Rule 5-803(b)(4). Appellees disagreed, positing that this testimony constituted hearsay not within any exception to the rule against hearsay." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Daeho Michael CHOI and Young Charles Choi v. STATE of Maryland
Daeho Michael CHOI and Young Charles Choi v. STATE of Maryland, 134 Md. App. 311 (2000)
…[statements [are] made for purposes of medical treatment or medical diagnosis in contemplation of treatment and [describe] medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensation, or the inception or general character of the cause or external sources thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to treatment or diagnosis in contemplation of treatment. Appellants contend that…
Daeho Michael CHOI and Young Charles Choi v. STATE of Maryland is worth reading on Maryland medical diagnosis hearsay because the court put the point in its own words: "[statements [are] made for purposes of medical treatment or medical diagnosis in contemplation of treatment and [describe] medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensation, or the inception or general character of the cause or external sources thereof insofar as r" Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Drexel Devoe NELSON v. STATE of Maryland
Drexel Devoe NELSON v. STATE of Maryland, 137 Md. App. 402 (2001)
…t is available as a witness: (4) Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. Statements made for purposes of medical treatment or medical diagnosis in contemplation of treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensation, or the inception or general character of the cause or external sources thereof insofar as reasonably perti…
Drexel Devoe NELSON v. STATE of Maryland is worth reading on Maryland medical diagnosis hearsay because the court put the point in its own words: "Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
STATE of Maryland v. Frederick Roscoe COATES
STATE of Maryland v. Frederick Roscoe COATES, 405 Md. 131 (2008)
…myne T.’s statements to Bresee were made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment and therefore, should be permitted pursuant to Md. Rule 5—803(b)(4), even though the statements are hearsay. 4 At a hearing on April 7, 2005, to exclude Bresee’s testimony, the State noted that Bresee would not testify with regard to Coates’ access to Jazmyne T., which was one of the reas…
Practitioners open STATE of Maryland v. Frederick Roscoe COATES when Maryland medical diagnosis hearsay turns on the distinction in this sentence: "T.’s statements to Bresee were made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment and therefore, should be permitted pursuant to Md. Rule 5—803(b)(4), even though the statements are hearsay." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Boyd Caleb LOW v. STATE of Maryland
Boyd Caleb LOW v. STATE of Maryland, 119 Md. App. 413 (1998)
…f availability of the declarant: Statements for Purposes of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment.— Statements made for purposes of medical treatment or medical diagnosis in contemplation of treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensation, or the inception or general character of the cause or external sources thereof insofar as reasonably pert…
On medical diagnosis hearsay, Boyd Caleb LOW v. STATE of Maryland speaks to the Maryland dispute in this passage: "Statements for Purposes of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Robert D. Sarrio v. Reliable Contracting Company, Inc.
Robert D. Sarrio v. Reliable Contracting Company, Inc., 14 Md. App. 99 (1972)
…pellant’s condition of sobriety constituted the making of a medical diagnosis. While the record before us does not indicate the official status of the intern in the hospital, the provisions of Md. Code, Art. 43, § 122 b 1 do provide that an intern may practice medicine under conditions set down by the State Board of Medical Examiners. But whatever his official status with the h…
Robert D. Sarrio v. Reliable Contracting Company, Inc. is worth reading on Maryland medical diagnosis hearsay because the court put the point in its own words: "While the record before us does not indicate the official status of the intern in the hospital, the provisions of Md. Code, Art. 43, § 122 b 1 do provide that an intern may practice medicine under conditions set down by the State Board of Medical Examiners." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Use of depositions at trial
Md. R. Civ. P. 2-411 and 2-501 govern civil depositions and trial use. Md. R. Crim. P. 4-262 addresses criminal discovery; deposition testimony at trial requires Md. R. Evid. 804(b)(1) or another exception.
Deposition use is always a two-layer problem: procedural permission to read or play the deposition, plus a hearsay path (often former testimony, party admission, or impeachment). Counsel who satisfy the civil or criminal procedure rule but skip the evidence-rule foundation invite a sustained objection; counsel who have a hearsay exception but failed to preserve the deposition under the procedural rule face the same result. Video designations, counter-designations, and completeness objections should be teed up before the jury is seated.
Maryland deposition / former-testimony opinions
OWENS-ILLINOIS, INC. Et Al. v. William ZENOBIA, Sr. Et Al.
OWENS-ILLINOIS, INC. Et Al. v. William ZENOBIA, Sr. Et Al., 325 Md. 420 (1992)
…argued that it was entitled to a new trial because certain depositions were improperly admitted into evidence, and because the trial court gave an erroneous jury instruction that Owens-Illinois had a duty to warn of the hazards of asbestos after it had stopped manufacturing products containing asbestos. Owens-Illinois also challenged the award of punitive damages. MCIC, Inc.,…
On deposition / former testimony, OWENS-ILLINOIS, INC. Et Al. v. William ZENOBIA, Sr. Et Al. speaks to the Maryland dispute in this passage: "Owens-Illinois had a duty to warn of the hazards of asbestos after it had stopped manufacturing products containing asbestos. Owens-Illinois also challenged the award of punitive damages. MCIC, Inc." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
RIPPON v. MERCANTILE-SAFE DEPOSIT AND TRUST COMPANY, Trustee Et Al.
RIPPON v. MERCANTILE-SAFE DEPOSIT AND TRUST COMPANY, Trustee Et Al., 213 Md. 215 (1957)
…owever, that she contends that the trial Judge read certain depositions taken on her behalf by her counsel before the trial, which depositions were not offered in evidence at the trial. This contention must be held to be without merit for at least two reasons. The record only discloses that the trial Judge read one of the depositions; and it further discloses that appellant’s c…
RIPPON v. MERCANTILE-SAFE DEPOSIT AND TRUST COMPANY, Trustee Et Al. is worth reading on Maryland deposition / former testimony because the court put the point in its own words: "Judge read certain depositions taken on her behalf by her counsel before the trial, which depositions were not offered in evidence at the trial. This contention must be held to be without merit for at least two reasons." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Tom J. BILLMAN, Et Al. v. STATE OF MARYLAND DEPOSIT INSURANCE FUND CORPORATION, Et Al.
…19 (1985). *7 I. On September 29, 1989, appellees noted the depositions of Billman, Crysopt, and the First through Sixth Batts Neck Companies. The depositions were set for November 7, 1989, and included requests for production of documents, including BNC’s state income tax returns for 1985 and 1986 which had not been requested previously. 2 On November 6, 1989, one day before t…
Maryland opinions such as Tom J. BILLMAN, Et Al. v. STATE OF MARYLAND DEPOSIT INSURANCE FUND CORPORATION, Et Al. are cited where deposition / former testimony is disputed. The court stated: "I. On September 29, 1989, appellees noted the depositions of Billman, Crysopt, and the First through Sixth Batts Neck Companies." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
AUDREY COSDEN v. MERCANTILE-SAFE DEPOSIT AND TRUST COMPANY, TRUSTEE
AUDREY COSDEN v. MERCANTILE-SAFE DEPOSIT AND TRUST COMPANY, TRUSTEE, 41 Md. App. 519 (1979)
…Jockey *538Club at the time in question, testified through deposition that the negotiations over the sale of Pimlico were hard fought on both sides. Mr. Lawrence Perm, who in 1947 was also a director of the Jockey Club and its chief attorney, testified at the trial that the position of Mercantile’s president and chief Pimlico negotiator, Mr. Thomas B. Butler, was “adamant” and…
AUDREY COSDEN v. MERCANTILE-SAFE DEPOSIT AND TRUST COMPANY, TRUSTEE is worth reading on Maryland deposition / former testimony because the court put the point in its own words: "Jockey *538Club at the time in question, testified through deposition that the negotiations over the sale of Pimlico were hard fought on both sides. Mr." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
McFADDEN v. MERCANTILE-SAFE DEPOSIT & TRUST COMPANY
McFADDEN v. MERCANTILE-SAFE DEPOSIT & TRUST COMPANY, 260 Md. 601 (1971)
…ee after a recision of the contract. McFadden stated in his deposition that he asked Mr. Marshall to sell his [McFadden’s] trucks. Marshall, at the most, was offering his services to try to sell the trucks for McFadden. This does not establish a mutual agreement to rescind or abandon the contract between Softee and McFadden; rather it appears to assume that the contract continu…
McFADDEN v. MERCANTILE-SAFE DEPOSIT & TRUST COMPANY is worth reading on Maryland deposition / former testimony because the court put the point in its own words: "McFadden stated in his deposition that he asked Mr. Marshall to sell his [McFadden’s] trucks. Marshall, at the most, was offering his services to try to sell the trucks for McFadden." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
In the Matter of the Application of CHARLES M. for Admission to the Bar of Maryland
…edings C.M. admitted that he had given false testimony in a deposition in 1984. A transcript of the trial proceedings revealed that C.M. made no attempt to explain why the 1984 deposition testimony was false. *174 The false testimony related to whether C.M. had sustained original injuries in the accident of September, 1977, or whether those injuries were aggravations of pre-exi…
Maryland opinions such as In the Matter of the Application of CHARLES M. for Admission to the Bar of Maryland are cited where deposition / former testimony is disputed. The court stated: "C.M. admitted that he had given false testimony in a deposition in 1984. A transcript of the trial proceedings revealed that C.M. made no attempt to explain why the 1984 deposition testimony was false. *174 The false testimony related to whether C.M." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Westley SHIVES, Et Al. v. William K. FURST
Westley SHIVES, Et Al. v. William K. FURST, 70 Md. App. 328 (1987)
…ry trial, the court *331 refused to admit into evidence the deposition testimony of one of appellants’ expert medical witnesses, Dr. Adolph L. Sahs. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Dr. Furst. The sole issue that appellants raise is whether the trial court erred when it excluded the deposition testimony of appellants’ expert, Dr. Sahs. FACTS In early November, following…
Practitioners open Westley SHIVES, Et Al. v. William K. FURST when Maryland deposition / former testimony turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Dr. Adolph L. Sahs. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Dr. Furst. The sole issue that appellants raise is whether the trial court erred when it excluded the deposition testimony of appellants’ expert, Dr. Sahs." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Barbara A. McKINNEY v. STATE OF MARYLAND DEPOSIT INSURANCE FUND CORPORATION
Barbara A. McKINNEY v. STATE OF MARYLAND DEPOSIT INSURANCE FUND CORPORATION, 99 Md. App. 124 (1994)
…onnection with this Settlement Agreement.” MDIF had taken a deposition of appellant in aid of executing on its judgment on December 8, 1988—prior to entering into the settlement agreement; it never sought another sworn statement as provided for in ¶ 14. In that deposition, appellant stated that there was no one in the world keeping any asset for her, that apart from a claim aga…
Maryland opinions such as Barbara A. McKINNEY v. STATE OF MARYLAND DEPOSIT INSURANCE FUND CORPORATION are cited where deposition / former testimony is disputed. The court stated: "Settlement Agreement.” MDIF had taken a deposition of appellant in aid of executing on its judgment on December 8, 1988—prior to entering into the settlement agreement; it never sought another sworn statement as provided for in ¶ 14." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Authenticity: why it matters and how to prove it
Authenticity is not a hearsay doctrine and it is not optional. Under Md. R. Evid. 901, 902, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is. Self-authenticating categories — certified public records, newspapers, acknowledged documents, trade inscriptions, and (where adopted) certified domestic records of a regularly conducted activity — shorten the path, but most trial exhibits still need a sponsoring witness, distinctive characteristics, chain of custody, or process-or-system evidence.
Maryland criminal and civil trials turn on authenticated police body-worn camera footage, hospital records, and government databases under Md. R. Evid. 901–902, especially in Baltimore City and suburban circuit courts.
Why authenticity gets its own section in every Maryland trial notebook:
- It is a condition precedent. An unauthenticated exhibit never reaches the relevance, hearsay, or privilege analysis in a useful way — the jury never properly considers it.
- Digital evidence multiplies the failure modes. Screenshots, social-media posts, text threads, and cloud downloads require hash values, account attribution, metadata, or a percipient witness who saw the content created or received.
- Chain of custody is authenticity by another name. Drugs, firearms, biological samples, and seized devices are excluded when the links from seizure to lab to courtroom are broken, even if a hearsay exception would otherwise apply to a lab report.
- Business-records shortcuts do not replace authentication. A custodian can explain record-keeping practices and still fail if nobody can say the particular PDF or printout is the record of this patient, this account, or this machine.
- Self-authentication is narrow. Counsel who wave a notarization or a letterhead and skip the rest of Rule 901-style analysis often lose when the document's contents are disputed.
Practical authentication checklist for Maryland trials: identify the exhibit; choose a 901 method or a 902 category; line up the sponsoring witness or certificate; preserve chain-of-custody testimony for physical and digital items; and separate the authenticity objection from any hearsay objection so the court rules on each.
Maryland authenticity opinions
Albert SUBLET IV v. STATE of Maryland; Tavares D. Harris v. State of Maryland; Carlos Alberto Monge-Martinez v
…of social media, 2 once again gives us cause to explore the authentication of documents related to this genre, under Maryland Rule 5-901, which provides that the “requirement of *637 authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims”, in thr…
Albert SUBLET IV v. STATE of Maryland; Tavares D. Harris v. State of Maryland; Carlos Alberto Monge-Martinez v is worth reading on Maryland authentication because the court put the point in its own words: "of social media, 2 once again gives us cause to explore the authentication of documents related to this genre, under Maryland Rule 5-901, which provides that the “requirement of *637 authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by eviden" Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Michael E. DONATI v. STATE of Maryland
Michael E. DONATI v. STATE of Maryland, 215 Md. App. 686 (2014)
…on in admitting into evidence emails that were not properly authenticated? 2. Was the evidence sufficient to support appellant’s convictions for e-mail harassment? 3. Do the convictions for e-mail harassment merge? 4. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in restricting defense counsel’s closing argument? 5. Did the trial court err in admitting a letter seized during the exe…
Maryland opinions such as Michael E. DONATI v. STATE of Maryland are cited where authentication is disputed. The court stated: "Was the evidence sufficient to support appellant’s convictions for e-mail harassment?" That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
John Otha DICKENS, Sr. v. STATE of Maryland
John Otha DICKENS, Sr. v. STATE of Maryland, 175 Md. App. 231 (2007)
…e inadmissible because, purportedly, they were not properly authenticated by the State. The victim’s mother, Alma Jean Young, testified that a few months before her daughter was killed she gave the victim a cell phone so that she could call 911 in the event she had a problem with appellant. That phone was introduced into evidence as State’s Exhibit 25. A few days after her daug…
Practitioners open John Otha DICKENS, Sr. v. STATE of Maryland when Maryland authentication turns on the distinction in this sentence: "State. The victim’s mother, Alma Jean Young, testified that a few months before her daughter was killed she gave the victim a cell phone so that she could call 911 in the event she had a problem with appellant. That phone was introduced into evidence as State’s Exhibit 25." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Washington v. State
Washington v. State, 961 A.2d 1110 (2008)
…not filled." The State argued that even if the tape was not authenticated under the business records exception, it was authenticated under the "silent witness" rule, based upon Kim's testimony. The court overruled the objection and admitted the tape into evidence. The State played the tape before the jury, pausing it and asking Detective Vila questions about what he could see o…
On authentication, Washington v. State speaks to the Maryland dispute in this passage: "The State argued that even if the tape was not authenticated under the business records exception, it was authenticated under the 'silent witness' rule, based upon Kim's testimony. The court overruled the objection and admitted the tape into evidence." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Allan JACKSON v. STATE of Maryland
Allan JACKSON v. STATE of Maryland, 460 Md. 107 (2018)
…ootage. Because we determine that the evidence was properly authenticated under the Maryland Rules of Evidence, we shall affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Mr. Jackson was tried by a jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City on nine separate criminal counts. 1 The charges against Mr. Jackson stemmed from an alleged home inv…
Allan JACKSON v. STATE of Maryland is worth reading on Maryland authentication because the court put the point in its own words: "Because we determine that the evidence was properly authenticated under the Maryland Rules of Evidence, we shall affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Mr." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Schroder v. State
Schroder v. State, 206 Md. 261 (1955)
…a public official record and therefore could not have been authenticated as such. A child was born to the appellant and the prosecutrix on September 30, 1948. The appellant’s testimony, if true, would bastardize this child. The appellant admitted that on May 30, 1952, using the fictitious name of Johannas A. Schroter, he married Betty Jane Wilson in Cumberland. They have no ch…
On authentication, Schroder v. State speaks to the Maryland dispute in this passage: "A child was born to the appellant and the prosecutrix on September 30, 1948. The appellant’s testimony, if true, would bastardize this child. The appellant admitted that on May 30, 1952, using the fictitious name of Johannas A. Schroter, he married Betty Jane Wilson in Cumberland." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
State v. Sample
State v. Sample, 468 Md. 560 (2020)
…4, September Term, 2019 MARYLAND RULE 5-901(a) AND (b)(4) – AUTHENTICATING SOCIAL MEDIA EVIDENCE THROUGH CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE – “REASONABLE JUROR” TEST – Court of Appeals held that trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Facebook-related evidence, as there was sufficient circumstantial evidence under Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(4) for reasonable juror to find that F…
Practitioners open State v. Sample when Maryland authentication turns on the distinction in this sentence: "4, September Term, 2019 MARYLAND RULE 5-901(a) AND (b)(4) – AUTHENTICATING SOCIAL MEDIA EVIDENCE THROUGH CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE – “REASONABLE JUROR” TEST – Court of Appeals held that trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Facebook-related evidence, as there was su" Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
George Coburn, Administrator of Thomas Coburn v. John Harris
George Coburn, Administrator of Thomas Coburn v. John Harris, 53 Md. 367 (1880)
…asserts the proj>osition that “unless the claim after being authenticated by the oath of the plaintiff, or after being passed by the Orphans’ Court, was presented to the administrators for payment by the plaintiff, or by some one by him authorized so to present it, and was disputed or rejected by said administrators, and the plaintiff failed to bring suit to recover on said cla…
On authentication, George Coburn, Administrator of Thomas Coburn v. John Harris speaks to the Maryland dispute in this passage: "asserts the proj>osition that “unless the claim after being authenticated by the oath of the plaintiff, or after being passed by the Orphans’ Court, was presented to the administrators for payment by the plaintiff, or by some one by him authorized so to present it, and was disput" The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Practice checklist
- State the relevance theory in one sentence before naming an exception.
- Run the 403 / unfair-prejudice balance explicitly for other-acts and graphic exhibits.
- For character or other-acts evidence, identify the non-propensity purpose and request a limiting instruction on the record.
- Decide whether an out-of-court statement is hearsay for the purpose offered before hunting exceptions.
- Lay business-records foundations with time, knowledge, regular practice, and custodial qualifications — or a qualifying certification.
- Prove unavailability with specific facts before offering former testimony or dying declarations.
- Treat deposition use as procedure-plus-hearsay; designate and counter-designate early.
- Authenticate every exhibit under Md. R. Evid. 901, 902 (or the self-authentication path) before arguing hearsay.
- Preserve chain of custody for physical and digital evidence with named custodians.
- Search LawDiver for recent Maryland appellate evidence opinions before mediation or motions in limine.
Contents
- General standards of admissibility
- Character evidence
- Hearsay: start with the definition
- Party admissions
- Business records
- Important hearsay exceptions that do not require unavailability
- Declarant unavailable
- Dying declarations
- Medical diagnosis or treatment statements
- Use of depositions at trial
- Authenticity: why it matters and how to prove it
- Practice checklist
- Frequently asked questions
General standards of admissibility
Maryland starts every evidence dispute with relevance and unfair prejudice. Under Md. R. Evid. 401, 403, evidence is relevant when it has any tendency to make a fact of consequence more or less probable, and relevant evidence is still excluded when its probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. Preliminary questions of admissibility are for the court; conditional relevance and limited-purpose instructions keep otherwise-usable proof from becoming a Trojan horse for propensity or truth-of-the-matter use.
Maryland has unique rules on medical bills and expert testimony in some statutory contexts. Md. R. Evid. 5-404(b) governs other crimes, wrongs, or acts.
Practice tip: articulate the theory of relevance in one sentence before citing the exception. Lawyers who lead with "it's a business record" without explaining what fact the record proves often lose the 403 balance even when the hearsay foundation is clean.
Character evidence
Character evidence in Maryland is governed by Md. R. Evid. 404, 405. The default rule is familiar: evidence of a person's character or character trait is not admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character or trait. The same body of law then carves out the classic exceptions — essential-element character, accused-opens-the-door reputation or opinion, and other-acts evidence offered for a non-propensity purpose such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake.
Other-acts notice, 403 balancing, and limiting instructions do most of the real work. In criminal cases, prosecutors who dump prior misconduct without a specific non-propensity theory invite reversal; defense counsel who open the door to good-character testimony without anticipating rebuttal create the very propensity inference the rules were designed to police.
Maryland character-evidence opinions
Dwayne HARRIS A/K/A Eric Harris v. STATE of Maryland
Dwayne HARRIS A/K/A Eric Harris v. STATE of Maryland, 324 Md. 490 (1991)
…evidence of prior bad acts suggesting a vicious or criminal propensity has been held relevant in certain types of civil cases. For example, failure to make reasonable inquiry concerning the history of a prospective employee with respect to prior bad acts may, under some circumstances, constitute negligence on the part of an employer. Henley v. Prince George’s County, 305 Md. 32…
Maryland opinions such as Dwayne HARRIS A/K/A Eric Harris v. STATE of Maryland are cited where character evidence is disputed. The court stated: "For example, failure to make reasonable inquiry concerning the history of a prospective employee with respect to prior bad acts may, under some circumstances, constitute negligence on the part of an employer. Henley v. Prince George’s County, 305 Md." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Montague v. State
Montague v. State, 471 Md. 657 (2020)
…ally outweighed by their unfairly prejudicial effect as bad-character evidence and the lyrics were accordingly inadmissible. Id. at 357. While Hannah’s analytical framework is instructive, as explained above, that decision is not dispositive in determining whether a defendant’s rap lyrics may be relevant 16 and admissible as substantive evidence of their guilt. Although we excl…
Maryland opinions such as Montague v. State are cited where character evidence is disputed. The court stated: "Id. at 357. While Hannah’s analytical framework is instructive, as explained above, that decision is not dispositive in determining whether a defendant’s rap lyrics may be relevant 16 and admissible as substantive evidence of their guilt." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
James SESSOMS v. STATE of Maryland
James SESSOMS v. STATE of Maryland, 357 Md. 274 (2000)
…e of Evidence (FRE) 404(b). Maryland Rule 5-404 states: (a) Character evidence generally. (1) In general. Evidence of a person’s character or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except: *286(A) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of an accused offered by the accus…
James SESSOMS v. STATE of Maryland is worth reading on Maryland character evidence because the court put the point in its own words: "Evidence (FRE) 404(b). Maryland Rule 5-404 states: (a) Character evidence generally. (1) In general." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Justin Ray HANNAH v. STATE of Maryland
Justin Ray HANNAH v. STATE of Maryland, 420 Md. 339 (2011)
…stated: *349Appellant contends that the rap video is simply character evidence introduced to prove a “criminal disposition.” Billings [v. Commonwealth of Kentucky], 843 S.W.2d [890] at 892 [ (Ky.1992) ]. Appellant, however, misapplies the character evidence standard. Evidence of prior arrests, convictions, or bad acts is excluded not because they are not relevant, but rather, b…
Maryland opinions such as Justin Ray HANNAH v. STATE of Maryland are cited where character evidence is disputed. The court stated: "Appellant contends that the rap video is simply character evidence introduced to prove a “criminal disposition.” Billings [v. Commonwealth of Kentucky], 843 S.W.2d [890] at 892 [ (Ky.1992) ]. Appellant, however, misapplies the character evidence standard." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Shelton BURRIS a/k/a Tyrone Burris v. STATE of Maryland
Shelton BURRIS a/k/a Tyrone Burris v. STATE of Maryland, 435 Md. 370 (2013)
…ule 5-404, governing admission of prior bad acts, provides: Character evidence not admissible to prove conduct; exceptions; other crimes. (a) Character evidence. (1) Prohibited uses. Subject to subsections (a)(2) and (3) of this Rule, evidence of a person’s character or character trait is not admissible to prove that the person acted in accordance with the character or trait on…
Practitioners open Shelton BURRIS a/k/a Tyrone Burris v. STATE of Maryland when Maryland character evidence turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Character evidence not admissible to prove conduct; exceptions; other crimes. (a) Character evidence. (1) Prohibited uses." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Karl Lymont THOMPSON v. STATE of Maryland
Karl Lymont THOMPSON v. STATE of Maryland, 412 Md. 497 (2010)
…axation of the general prohibition is "probably because the character evidence is believed to have greater probative value in those circumstances." In sex crimes cases the special relevance of the other crimes evidence that may be admissible is a criminal propensity particularized to similar sex crimes perpetrated on the same victim. Thus, in a sex offense prosecution, when the…
On character evidence, Karl Lymont THOMPSON v. STATE of Maryland speaks to the Maryland dispute in this passage: "In sex crimes cases the special relevance of the other crimes evidence that may be admissible is a criminal propensity particularized to similar sex crimes perpetrated on the same victim." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Frequently asked questions
What is the primary evidence source in Maryland?
Maryland applies the Maryland Rules of Evidence. Maryland adopted FRE-style rules in 1994; Md. R. Evid. 401–902 apply in circuit and district courts with Maryland-specific amendments in selected rules.
How do Maryland courts decide relevance and unfair prejudice?
Under Md. R. Evid. 401, 403, evidence must make a fact of consequence more or less probable, and the court may exclude relevant evidence when unfair prejudice, confusion, or waste of time substantially outweighs its probative value.
Are party admissions hearsay in Maryland?
Party-opponent statements under Md. R. Evid. 801(d)(2) are generally excluded from the hearsay ban (or treated as an exception, depending on local drafting). They may be offered against the party who made or adopted them without showing unavailability.
What foundation is required for business records?
Under Md. R. Evid. 803(6), show a record made at or near the time from someone with knowledge, kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity, as a regular practice, through a custodian, qualified witness, or allowed certification — subject to trustworthiness attack.
When can I use a deposition at trial in Maryland?
Md. R. Civ. P. 2-411 and 2-501 govern civil depositions and trial use. Md. R. Crim. P. 4-262 addresses criminal discovery; deposition testimony at trial requires Md. R. Evid. 804(b)(1) or another exception.
Why is authenticity separate from hearsay?
Authenticity asks whether the item is what you claim it is; hearsay asks whether out-of-court assertions inside it may be used for their truth. You can lose on either ground independently. Maryland authenticity practice starts with Md. R. Evid. 901, 902.
Where do dying declarations and medical statements fit?
Dying declarations under Md. R. Evid. 804(b)(2) require belief in impending death and concern the cause or circumstances of that believed death. Medical statements under Md. R. Evid. 803(4) require a genuine diagnostic or treatment purpose and reasonable pertinence to care.