Maine evidence practice is organized under the Maine Rules of Evidence. Relevance starts at Me. R. Evid. 401, 403; hearsay starts at Me. R. Evid. 801, 802. That is what separates Maine evidence law from a generic national summary. Read Maine Rules of Evidence before the background sections below. Authenticity is a separate fight under Me. R. Evid. 901, 902. Depositions at trial: Me. R. Civ. P. 30 and 32 govern civil depositions and trial use. Me. Crim. P. 16 controls criminal discovery; prior testimony may be admitted under Me. R. Evid. 804(b)(1) when unavailability is shown.
Character evidence
Character evidence in Maine is governed by Me. R. Evid. 404, 405. The default rule is familiar: evidence of a person's character or character trait is not admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character or trait. The same body of law then carves out the classic exceptions — essential-element character, accused-opens-the-door reputation or opinion, and other-acts evidence offered for a non-propensity purpose such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake.
Other-acts notice, 403 balancing, and limiting instructions do most of the real work. In criminal cases, prosecutors who dump prior misconduct without a specific non-propensity theory invite reversal; defense counsel who open the door to good-character testimony without anticipating rebuttal create the very propensity inference the rules were designed to police.
Maine character-evidence opinions
STATE of Maine v. Melvin B. LAGASSE, Jr.
STATE of Maine v. Melvin B. LAGASSE, Jr., 1980 Me. LEXIS 490 (1980)
…his evidence was admissible either under M.R. Evid. 404, as character evidence, or under M.R.Evid. 406, as evidence of habit. The purpose of offering this evidence was to bolster the defendant’s claim of self-defense on the theory that this evidence would tend to show the decedent was the aggressor in the fatal fight. Habit or routine practice is admissible under M.R.Evid. 406(…
Practitioners open STATE of Maine v. Melvin B. LAGASSE, Jr. when Maine character evidence turns on the distinction in this sentence: "M.R. Evid. 404, as character evidence, or under M.R.Evid. 406, as evidence of habit. The purpose of offering this evidence was to bolster the defendant’s claim of self-defense on the theory that this evidence would tend to show the decedent was the aggressor in the fatal fight." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
STATE of Maine v. Christopher CONLOGUE — Scolnik, J., dissenting
STATE of Maine v. Christopher CONLOGUE — Scolnik, J., dissenting, 1984 Me. LEXIS 658 (1984)
…0); see also State v. LeClair, 425 A.2d 182, 187 (Me.1981). Character evidence, however, merely creates a conjectural inference or suspicion as to another’s guilt and therefore is inadmissible. United *174States v. Puckett, 692 F.2d 663, 670-671 (10th Cir)., cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1091, 103 S.Ct. 579, 74 L.Ed.2d 939 (1982); United States v. Bocra, 623 F.2d 281, 286-287 (3rd Cir…
STATE of Maine v. Christopher CONLOGUE — Scolnik, J., dissenting is worth reading on Maine character evidence because the court put the point in its own words: "State v. LeClair, 425 A.2d 182, 187 (Me.1981). Character evidence, however, merely creates a conjectural inference or suspicion as to another’s guilt and therefore is inadmissible. United *174States v. Puckett, 692 F.2d 663, 670-671 (10th Cir)., cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1091, 103 S." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
STATE of Maine, v. Calvin L. WELLS A/K/A Calvin L. Wills
STATE of Maine, v. Calvin L. WELLS A/K/A Calvin L. Wills, 1980 Me. LEXIS 701 (1980)
…sole issue before this Court is whether Mr. Cuda’s alleged character evidence was properly excluded. The defendant seeks to justify his claim of error on the ground that, being the accused on trial, he had “an unqualified right to submit character evidence concerning his disposition to intentionally or knowingly injure or attack another person.” We agree that, under the consti…
Practitioners open STATE of Maine, v. Calvin L. WELLS A/K/A Calvin L. Wills when Maine character evidence turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Court is whether Mr. Cuda’s alleged character evidence was properly excluded." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Melanie (Currie) STEADMAN v. Steven PAGELS
Melanie (Currie) STEADMAN v. Steven PAGELS, 2015 Me. LEXIS 132 (2015)
…at the evidence of prior bad acts is tantamount to improper character evidence barred by Rule 404(b), and that the court’s judgment demonstrates that the court used the evidence improperly. [¶ 17] At the time of trial, Maine Rule of Evidence 404(b) provided, “Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that the…
Melanie (Currie) STEADMAN v. Steven PAGELS is worth reading on Maine character evidence because the court put the point in its own words: "Rule 404(b), and that the court’s judgment demonstrates that the court used the evidence improperly." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
STATE of Maine v. Andrew B. MADERIOS
STATE of Maine v. Andrew B. MADERIOS, 2016 Me. LEXIS 174 (2016)
…at it would survive the State’s challenge to it as improper character evidence. 7 We need not reach those questions, however, because we conclude that the court did not err by excluding the evidence pursuant to Rule 403. [¶10] The trial cóurt is “afforded wide discretion to make Rule 403 determinations.” State v. Filler, 2010 ME 90, ¶ 17, 3 A.3d 365 (quotation marks omitted). E…
Practitioners open STATE of Maine v. Andrew B. MADERIOS when Maine character evidence turns on the distinction in this sentence: "State’s challenge to it as improper character evidence. 7 We need not reach those questions, however, because we conclude that the court did not err by excluding the evidence pursuant to Rule 403. [¶10] The trial cóurt is “afforded wide discretion to make Rule 403 determinations." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
In Re KAYLA S.
In Re KAYLA S., 2001 Me. LEXIS 72 (2001)
…tion. State v. Kelly, 2000 ME 107, ¶ 22, 752 A.2d 188, 193. Character evidence is not admissible for the purpose of proving that the accused acted in conformity with the trait on the particular occasion in volved at trial, but such character evidence may be used in some circumstances. See M.R. Evid. 404(a), 405(b); State v. Bourgeois, 639 A.2d 634, 637 (Me.1994); State v. Wells…
On character evidence, In Re KAYLA S. speaks to the Maine dispute in this passage: "State v. Kelly, 2000 ME 107, ¶ 22, 752 A.2d 188, 193. Character evidence is not admissible for the purpose of proving that the accused acted in conformity with the trait on the particular occasion in volved at trial, but such character evidence may be used in some circumstances." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
STATE of Maine v. Laura KIRK
STATE of Maine v. Laura KIRK, 2005 Me. LEXIS 64 (2005)
…testimony. Although we agree with Kirk that non-reputation character evidence was improperly admitted at trial, its admission was harmless error. Kirk’s other contentions are without merit, and we affirm the judgment. [¶ 2] In January of 2002, Kirk was indicted for the intentional and knowing murder of Tara Bell pursuant to 17-A M.R.S.A. § 201(1)(A). 1 Following a jury trial i…
On character evidence, STATE of Maine v. Laura KIRK speaks to the Maine dispute in this passage: "Although we agree with Kirk that non-reputation character evidence was improperly admitted at trial, its admission was harmless error. Kirk’s other contentions are without merit, and we affirm the judgment." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Hearsay: start with the definition
Most hearsay objections in Maine are won or lost on the definition, not on an exception. Under Me. R. Evid. 801, 802, hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Non-hearsay purposes — verbal acts, effect on the listener, notice, circumstantial evidence of state of mind, and impeachment — remain available when the proponent can articulate them without asking the jury to believe the declarant.
Layered hearsay (hearsay within hearsay) requires an exception or exclusion for each layer. Machine-generated data and non-assertive conduct sit outside the hearsay definition in FRE-aligned jurisdictions, but they still need authenticity and, often, expert or business-records foundations.
Maine hearsay opinions
STATE of Maine v. Robert C. TRUE III
STATE of Maine v. Robert C. TRUE III, 1981 Me. LEXIS 1041 (1981)
….R.S.A. § 252(f). 1 On his appeal, defendant raises several hearsay objections and challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm his convictions on Counts II and III and vacate his conviction on Count I. The three prosecutrices are sisters of defendant. His sister Ruth testified as follows: On June 4, 1978, she accompanied defendant and his wife to the couple’s home in…
Practitioners open STATE of Maine v. Robert C. TRUE III when Maine hearsay turns on the distinction in this sentence: "R.S.A. § 252(f). 1 On his appeal, defendant raises several hearsay objections and challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm his convictions on Counts II and III and vacate his conviction on Count I. The three prosecutrices are sisters of defendant." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
STATE of Maine v. Frank A. CUGLIATA and John Moraites
STATE of Maine v. Frank A. CUGLIATA and John Moraites, 1977 Me. LEXIS 469 (1977)
…that time both defendants objected that it was inadmissible hearsay under the Maine law of evidence as well as by virtue of the rights of confrontation guaranteed defendants by the 6th-14th Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. Defendant Cug-liata made the further claim that should the proffered testimony be held admissible, the Court delete the mention of the na…
Practitioners open STATE of Maine v. Frank A. CUGLIATA and John Moraites when Maine hearsay turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Maine law of evidence as well as by virtue of the rights of confrontation guaranteed defendants by the 6th-14th Amendments to the Constitution of the United States." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
STATE of Maine v. John A. FAHNLEY
STATE of Maine v. John A. FAHNLEY, 2015 Me. LEXIS 90 (2015)
…ess each issue separately. *733 A. First Complaint Rule and Hearsay [¶ 15] Because Fahnley did not object to the testimony about the victim’s report to his mother, we review his argument on appeal for obvious error. See State v. Lovejoy, 2014 ME 48, ¶ 19, 89 A.3d 1066; see also M.R. Crim. P. 52(b). For us to vacate a conviction based on the obvious error standard of review, “th…
Maine opinions such as STATE of Maine v. John A. FAHNLEY are cited where hearsay is disputed. The court stated: "A. First Complaint Rule and Hearsay [¶ 15] Because Fahnley did not object to the testimony about the victim’s report to his mother, we review his argument on appeal for obvious error. See State v. Lovejoy, 2014 ME 48, ¶ 19, 89 A.3d 1066; see also M.R. Crim. P. 52(b)." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
STATE of Maine v. Gatherius WHITE A.K.A. Jatherius White
STATE of Maine v. Gatherius WHITE A.K.A. Jatherius White, 2002 Me. 122 (2002)
…ds that an incomplete jury instruction, as well as admitted hearsay, are obvious and not harmless errors respectively. We disagree and affirm. I. BACKGROUND [¶ 2] The following facts are undisputed. White was drinking beer and whiskey with Wendell Golden at Tamara Sehriver’s house in Whitefield. White and Schriver were romantically involved, while Golden was a mutual friend. Wh…
Maine opinions such as STATE of Maine v. Gatherius WHITE A.K.A. Jatherius White are cited where hearsay is disputed. The court stated: "We disagree and affirm. I. BACKGROUND [¶ 2] The following facts are undisputed. White was drinking beer and whiskey with Wendell Golden at Tamara Sehriver’s house in Whitefield. White and Schriver were romantically involved, while Golden was a mutual friend." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
STATE of Maine v. Jesse GUYETTE
STATE of Maine v. Jesse GUYETTE, 2012 Me. LEXIS 9 (2012)
…trial pursuant to the M.R. Evid. 804(b)(3) exception to the hearsay rule for statements against penal interest.2 We agree and vacate the judgment. I. BACKGROUND [¶ 2] We view the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the State and determine that the jury could have found the following facts beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Preston, 2011 ME 98, ¶ 2, 26…
On hearsay, STATE of Maine v. Jesse GUYETTE speaks to the Maine dispute in this passage: "M.R. Evid. 804(b)(3) exception to the hearsay rule for statements against penal interest.2 We agree and vacate the judgment. I." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
STATE of Maine v. David VAUGHAN
STATE of Maine v. David VAUGHAN, 2009 Me. LEXIS 65 (2009)
…eived by dispatch and given to the officer was inadmissible hearsay. Vaughan argues that the evidence was, in fact, hearsay and that, without any admissible evidence as to the officer’s reasonable articulable suspicion, all evidence obtained as a result of the stop was properly suppressed by the Superior Court. We vacate the suppression order. I. BACKGROUND [¶ 2] On December 6,…
On hearsay, STATE of Maine v. David VAUGHAN speaks to the Maine dispute in this passage: "Vaughan argues that the evidence was, in fact, hearsay and that, without any admissible evidence as to the officer’s reasonable articulable suspicion, all evidence obtained as a result of the stop was properly suppressed by the Superior Court. We vacate the suppression order. I." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
STATE of Maine v. David W. TROY
STATE of Maine v. David W. TROY, 2014 Me. LEXIS 8 (2014)
…ible under the business or public records exceptions to the hearsay rule, was never admitted into evidence, and (2) the clerk’s testimony, to which Troy did not object, concerning the entries on that docket record was inadmissible hearsay. 5 [¶ 12] A person is guilty of escape pursuant to 17-A M.R.S. § 755(1)(B) if, in relevant part, the person intentionally leaves official cus…
On hearsay, STATE of Maine v. David W. TROY speaks to the Maine dispute in this passage: "Troy did not object, concerning the entries on that docket record was inadmissible hearsay. 5 [¶ 12] A person is guilty of escape pursuant to 17-A M.R.S." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
STATE of Maine v. Richard J. WATSON
STATE of Maine v. Richard J. WATSON, 2016 Me. LEXIS 197 (2016)
…ted, asserting that the victim’s statement was inadmissible hearsay. At sidebar, the prosecutor asserted that the statement was “being offered as a present sense ■ impression.” The court did not explicitly overrule or sustain the objection, but allowed the prosecutor to continue the line of questioning. [¶ 5] The victim’s grandmother testified that the victim was living with he…
Practitioners open STATE of Maine v. Richard J. WATSON when Maine hearsay turns on the distinction in this sentence: "At sidebar, the prosecutor asserted that the statement was “being offered as a present sense ■ impression.” The court did not explicitly overrule or sustain the objection, but allowed the prosecutor to continue the line of questioning." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Party admissions
Statements of an opposing party are among the most important routes around the hearsay bar. Maine treats them under Me. R. Evid. 801(d)(2). Nothing about the statement need be against interest, contemporaneous, or based on personal knowledge — the theory is adversarial, not reliability-based. A party cannot complain that his own words are unreliable when offered against him.
Scope questions dominate practice: the party's own statement; adopted statements (including silence in circumstances where a reasonable person would deny); statements by authorized speakers; agent or employee statements on matters within the scope of the relationship; and, in criminal conspiracy cases, coconspirator statements during and in furtherance of the conspiracy. A defendant generally cannot introduce his own exculpatory out-of-court statement as a "party admission" against himself — the rule runs one way.
Maine party-admission opinions
STATE of Maine v. Dennis THERRIAULT
STATE of Maine v. Dennis THERRIAULT, 1984 Me. LEXIS 877 (1984)
…ing justice’s chambers, that she would not stipulate to the admission of the laboratory report, that she was not planning to offer it as evidence at trial and would object to its admission on grounds of hearsay if offered by defendant. During this discussion, the justice ruled that because the report was admitted at the first trial without objection the State was deemed to have…
Practitioners open STATE of Maine v. Dennis THERRIAULT when Maine party admissions turns on the distinction in this sentence: "ing justice’s chambers, that she would not stipulate to the admission of the laboratory report, that she was not planning to offer it as evidence at trial and would object to its admission on grounds of hearsay if offered by defendant. During this discussion, the justice ruled th" Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
James Edward SMITH v. Catherine HAWTHORNE, M.D.
James Edward SMITH v. Catherine HAWTHORNE, M.D., 2006 Me. LEXIS 21 (2006)
…laimed that their right to a jury trial was violated by the admission of the panel findings without their having the opportunity to impeach those findings by examining panel members or otherwise attacking the panel findings. Id. ¶7, 691 A.2d at 669. We rejected that contention. Id. ¶ 12, 691 A.2d at 671. We said that “[t]he constitutional deficiency lies in the lack of relevant…
Practitioners open James Edward SMITH v. Catherine HAWTHORNE, M.D. when Maine party admissions turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Id. ¶7, 691 A.2d at 669. We rejected that contention. Id. ¶ 12, 691 A.2d at 671." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
STATE of Maine v. Sherwood K. WILLIAMS
STATE of Maine v. Sherwood K. WILLIAMS, 1983 Me. LEXIS 745 (1983)
…616 (Me.1981). When an objection is made, the party seeking admission of some particular evidence must make such an adequate offer of proof that the trial court may be fully advised as to the relevancy and admissibility of the proposed testimony. State v. Gervais, 317 A.2d 796, 803 (Me.1974). In the instant case, trial counsel’s statements were woefully inadequate to constitute…
On party admissions, STATE of Maine v. Sherwood K. WILLIAMS speaks to the Maine dispute in this passage: "Me.1981). When an objection is made, the party seeking admission of some particular evidence must make such an adequate offer of proof that the trial court may be fully advised as to the relevancy and admissibility of the proposed testimony. State v. Gervais, 317 A.2d 796, 803 (Me." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
In Re SORIAH B. Et Al.
In Re SORIAH B. Et Al., 2010 Me. LEXIS 137 (2010)
…. § 4055(1)(B)(2) (2009). The mother challenges the court’s admission of two psychological reports written by testifying experts. We conclude that the court properly admitted only those portions of the reports in which the experts expressed their opinions. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment. 1 I. BACKGROUND [¶ 2] On August 20, 2008, pursuant to an order of preliminary protecti…
In Re SORIAH B. Et Al. is worth reading on Maine party admissions because the court put the point in its own words: "B)(2) (2009). The mother challenges the court’s admission of two psychological reports written by testifying experts. We conclude that the court properly admitted only those portions of the reports in which the experts expressed their opinions. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
State of Maine vs. Earle W. Albee
State of Maine vs. Earle W. Albee, 152 Me. 425 (1957)
…expenses. The first four exceptions relate to testimony of admissions by the respondent, admitted over objection by the *428 respondent, that he had, on several occasions, through his political influence, been able to have such cases disposed of —among others, he cited his own case. This evidence was objected to as immaterial and prejudicial. The evidence was not offered nor a…
Maine opinions such as State of Maine vs. Earle W. Albee are cited where party admissions is disputed. The court stated: "The first four exceptions relate to testimony of admissions by the respondent, admitted over objection by the *428 respondent, that he had, on several occasions, through his political influence, been able to have such cases disposed of —among others, he cited his own case." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
MAINE SHIPYARD & MARINE RAILWAY v. Daniel G. LILLEY and Annette P. Lilley, Trustees of the Lilley Trust, and Daniel
…en the parties to the agreement”). Rule 408 did not bar the admission of the settlement evidence because in this case only one party to the litigation was a party to the settlement agreement. See LeClair, 679 A.2d at 92; Gannett, 655 A.2d at 472-73. Thus, the court properly admitted the evidence regarding Lilley’s settlement negotiations with the representatives of the Julie N.…
On party admissions, MAINE SHIPYARD & MARINE RAILWAY v. Daniel G. LILLEY and Annette P. Lilley, Trustees of the Lilley Trust, and Daniel speaks to the Maine dispute in this passage: "Rule 408 did not bar the admission of the settlement evidence because in this case only one party to the litigation was a party to the settlement agreement. See LeClair, 679 A.2d at 92; Gannett, 655 A.2d at 472-73." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
STATE of Maine v. Patricia DOUGHTY
STATE of Maine v. Patricia DOUGHTY, 1989 Me. LEXIS 46 (1989)
…the prosecutor’s reference in closing argument to Doughty’s admission to her doctor that she had consumed four mimosas. Even if the prosecutor’s reference to the hospital record did go beyond the limited purpose of impeachment, there was no impropriety because the use of the evidence was not restricted to that purpose. No limiting instruction was ever requested under M.R. Evid.…
Practitioners open STATE of Maine v. Patricia DOUGHTY when Maine party admissions turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Doughty’s admission to her doctor that she had consumed four mimosas. Even if the prosecutor’s reference to the hospital record did go beyond the limited purpose of impeachment, there was no impropriety because the use of the evidence was not restricted to that purpose." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
A concrete Maine scenario
Here is one way the Maine pieces fit together. Change any fact and the statute may point somewhere else.
A lawyer in Maine wants to offer a medical record, a party email, and a statement the declarant made while believing death was imminent.
- Clear relevance and unfair prejudice under Me. R. Evid. 401, 403.
- If the email is the opposing party's, test Me. R. Evid. 801(d)(2) before the hearsay definition in Me. R. Evid. 801, 802.
- For the medical record, lay the business-records foundation in Me. R. Evid. 803(6) and the treatment purpose in Me. R. Evid. 803(4).
- For the deathbed statement, meet Me. R. Evid. 804(b)(2), then authenticate every exhibit under Me. R. Evid. 901, 902.
Maine keeps hearsay, character, and authenticity on different rules inside the Maine Rules of Evidence. Winning one does not win the others.
Business records
The business-records exception under Me. R. Evid. 803(6) is the everyday path for medical charts, employment files, bank statements, and maintenance logs. The foundation requires a record made at or near the time by — or from information transmitted by — someone with knowledge; kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity; and made as a regular practice. A custodian or other qualified witness (or a qualifying certification where the jurisdiction allows it) lays the foundation. The opponent may still attack lack of trustworthiness when the source or method of preparation indicates unreliability — litigation-driven reports are the classic failure mode.
Do not confuse authenticity with the business-records exception. You still need to show the exhibit is what you claim it is; the hearsay exception then answers why the out-of-court assertions inside it may be considered for their truth.
Maine business-records opinions
HSBC MORTGAGE SERVICES, INC. v. Dana S. MURPHY Et Al.
HSBC MORTGAGE SERVICES, INC. v. Dana S. MURPHY Et Al., 2011 Me. LEXIS 59 (2011)
…h the foundation for admission of the attached documents as business records pursuant to M.R. Evid. 803(6), we vacate the judgment without reaching the substantive issues raised. I. BACKGROUND [¶ 2] On March 15, 2005, the Murphys executed and delivered a promissory note in the principal sum of $149,000 to Calusa Investments, a Virginia corporation. 1 As security for the note, t…
On business records, HSBC MORTGAGE SERVICES, INC. v. Dana S. MURPHY Et Al. speaks to the Maine dispute in this passage: "M.R. Evid. 803(6), we vacate the judgment without reaching the substantive issues raised. I. BACKGROUND [¶ 2] On March 15, 2005, the Murphys executed and delivered a promissory note in the principal sum of $149,000 to Calusa Investments, a Virginia corporation." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
BENEFICIAL MAINE INC. v. Timothy G. CARTER Et Al.
BENEFICIAL MAINE INC. v. Timothy G. CARTER Et Al., 2011 Me. LEXIS 77 (2011)
…t the admissibility of its mortgage records pursuant to the business records exception to the hearsay rule. See M.R. Evid. 803(6). Beneficial relied on the affidavit of an employee of a separate business to support its motion for summary judgment. Because that affidavit was inadequate to establish the admissibility of the purported business records, we vacate the summary judgme…
BENEFICIAL MAINE INC. v. Timothy G. CARTER Et Al. is worth reading on Maine business records because the court put the point in its own words: "See M.R. Evid. 803(6). Beneficial relied on the affidavit of an employee of a separate business to support its motion for summary judgment." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
NORTHEAST BANK & TRUST CO. v. Joseph L. SOLEY and Laite-Soley Enterprises
NORTHEAST BANK & TRUST CO. v. Joseph L. SOLEY and Laite-Soley Enterprises, 1984 Me. LEXIS 779 (1984)
…red Justice. This appeal draws in question the scope of the business records exception to the hearsay rule. M.R.Evid. 803(6). The plaintiff, Northeast Bank & Trust Co., brought an action in Superior Court (Penobscot County) on a promissory note executed in its favor by the defendants, Gilbert C. Laite, Joseph L. Soley, and Laite-Soley Enterprises. 1 After a jury-waived trial he…
On business records, NORTHEAST BANK & TRUST CO. v. Joseph L. SOLEY and Laite-Soley Enterprises speaks to the Maine dispute in this passage: "Justice. This appeal draws in question the scope of the business records exception to the hearsay rule. M.R.Evid. 803(6). The plaintiff, Northeast Bank & Trust Co." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
STATE of Maine v. Dennis THERRIAULT — Wathen, J., dissenting
STATE of Maine v. Dennis THERRIAULT — Wathen, J., dissenting, 1984 Me. LEXIS 877 (1984)
…investigative laboratory report was inadmissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule. At trial defendant advanced four theories in support of the admissibility of the report. He argued alternatively that it was either a record of a regularly conducted business, former testimony, a statement against interest, or the admission of a party opponent. In his bri…
STATE of Maine v. Dennis THERRIAULT — Wathen, J., dissenting is worth reading on Maine business records because the court put the point in its own words: "At trial defendant advanced four theories in support of the admissibility of the report. He argued alternatively that it was either a record of a regularly conducted business, former testimony, a statement against interest, or the admission of a party opponent." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
The BANK OF MAINE v. Lewis E. HATCH III Et Al.
The BANK OF MAINE v. Lewis E. HATCH III Et Al., 38 A.3d 1260 (2012)
…t the admissibility of its mortgage records pursuant to the business records exception to the hearsay rule. See M.R. Evid. 803(6). The Bank relied on an affidavit of its own employee to support its motion for summary judgment. Because that affidavit was adequate to establish the admissibility of the business records, we affirm the summary judgment. I. BACKGROUND [¶2] In 2005, L…
Maine opinions such as The BANK OF MAINE v. Lewis E. HATCH III Et Al. are cited where business records is disputed. The court stated: "See M.R. Evid. 803(6). The Bank relied on an affidavit of its own employee to support its motion for summary judgment. Because that affidavit was adequate to establish the admissibility of the business records, we affirm the summary judgment. I." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
MIDLAND FUNDING LLC v. Mark WALTON
MIDLAND FUNDING LLC v. Mark WALTON, 155 A.3d 864 (2017)
…Midland Funding from Barclays Bank Delaware pursuant to the business records exception to the hearsay rule. We affirm the judgment. I. BACKGROUND [¶2] On February 26, 2015, Midland Funding filed a complaint against Walton alleging that he had entered into a credit card agreement with Barclays Bank Delaware in April 2008, used the card to obtain extensions of credit, and failed…
Maine opinions such as MIDLAND FUNDING LLC v. Mark WALTON are cited where business records is disputed. The court stated: "Midland Funding from Barclays Bank Delaware pursuant to the business records exception to the hearsay rule. We affirm the judgment. I." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Important hearsay exceptions that do not require unavailability
Three present-sense and mental-state exceptions carry most of the remaining traffic in Maine trial practice.
Excited utterance — Me. R. Evid. 803(2). A statement relating to a startling event or condition, made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused. Timing is elastic; composure defeats the exception even minutes after the event, while visible distress can preserve it for hours.
Present sense impression — Me. R. Evid. 803(1). A statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while or immediately after the declarant perceived it. Contemporaneity is strict — seconds and minutes, not hours — and excitement is not required.
Then-existing mental, emotional, or physical condition — Me. R. Evid. 803(3). Statements of then-existing state of mind (including intent and plan) come in; statements of memory or belief offered to prove the fact remembered generally do not. Intent-to-meet-another-person cases remain the hardest applications.
Declarant unavailable
When the declarant is unavailable under Me. R. Evid. 804(a), Maine opens a second suite of exceptions. Unavailability typically includes privilege, refusal to testify despite court order, lack of memory, death or then-existing infirmity, and absence despite reasonable efforts to procure attendance. The proponent bears the burden of proving unavailability with specific facts — a bare assertion that the witness "could not be found" is not enough.
Former testimony under Me. R. Evid. 804(b)(1) is the workhorse once unavailability is shown: testimony given as a witness at a trial, hearing, or lawful deposition, offered against a party who had an opportunity and similar motive to develop it by direct, cross, or redirect. Criminal confrontation analysis runs in parallel and is not satisfied merely because a hearsay exception applies.
Dying declarations
Dying declarations under Me. R. Evid. 804(b)(2) remain a narrow but decisive exception in homicide and, in many jurisdictions, civil cases involving the cause or circumstances of what the declarant believed to be impending death. The foundational showing is the declarant's belief that death was imminent — not that death in fact followed within any particular time — plus a statement concerning the cause or circumstances of what the declarant believed to be the impending death. Courts police coaching and narrative expansions aggressively.
Maine dying-declaration opinions
STATE of Maine v. David Conrad COLLINS
STATE of Maine v. David Conrad COLLINS, 1972 Me. LEXIS 358 (1972)
…owed in relation to deetrminations of the admissibility of “dying declarations” as an exception to the general rule by which hearsay evidence is excluded. As the Court stressed in Chaplin, neither the constitutional facets nor the general public policy considerations so important in the determinations of the evidential- y admissibility of confessions are significantly involved…
Maine opinions such as STATE of Maine v. David Conrad COLLINS are cited where dying declaration is disputed. The court stated: "owed in relation to deetrminations of the admissibility of “dying declarations” as an exception to the general rule by which hearsay evidence is excluded. As the Court stressed in Chaplin, neither the constitutional facets nor the general public policy considerations so important" That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
STATE of Maine v. Paul A. LAFFERTY
STATE of Maine v. Paul A. LAFFERTY, 1973 Me. LEXIS 344 (1973)
…olved. (2) She had made a statement (admissible either as a dying declaration or under the res gestae rule; see infra) which indicated that her husband was the assailant. (3) The vehicle beside which the appellant was arrested matched the vehicle described as the appellant’s. (4) From the testimony of Wendell Beaulieu, the actual occupant of the apartment at 17 Elliot Street, t…
On dying declaration, STATE of Maine v. Paul A. LAFFERTY speaks to the Maine dispute in this passage: "She had made a statement (admissible either as a dying declaration or under the res gestae rule; see infra) which indicated that her husband was the assailant. (3) The vehicle beside which the appellant was arrested matched the vehicle described as the appellant’s." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
STATE of Maine v. Timothy L. ANDERSON and Edward G. Sabatino
STATE of Maine v. Timothy L. ANDERSON and Edward G. Sabatino, 1979 Me. LEXIS 811 (1979)
…ity remains for ultimate jury assessment. As in the case of dying declarations, it would have been the task of the jury to determine the weight and credibility to be given to Anderson’s declarations, if admitted as excited utterances, assigning to them such weight, or none at all, as in their judgment the underlying facts proved or disproved that the statements were factually m…
Practitioners open STATE of Maine v. Timothy L. ANDERSON and Edward G. Sabatino when Maine dying declaration turns on the distinction in this sentence: "ity remains for ultimate jury assessment. As in the case of dying declarations, it would have been the task of the jury to determine the weight and credibility to be given to Anderson’s declarations, if admitted as excited utterances, assigning to them such weight, or none at all" Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
STATE of Maine v. Fred O’CLAIR
STATE of Maine v. Fred O’CLAIR, 1972 Me. LEXIS 305 (1972)
…however, to the hearsay rule have been recognized, such as dying declarations of a deceased person tending to show the cause and manner of death even though not made in the presence of the accused murderer (State v. Bordeleau, 1920, 118 Me. 424, 108 A. 464; State v. Chaplin, 1972, Me., 286 A.2d 325); declarations constituting a verbal part of the act itself (Inhabitants of Dee…
On dying declaration, STATE of Maine v. Fred O’CLAIR speaks to the Maine dispute in this passage: "State v. Bordeleau, 1920, 118 Me. 424, 108 A. 464; State v. Chaplin, 1972, Me., 286 A." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
STATE of Maine v. Frank A. CUGLIATA and John Moraites
STATE of Maine v. Frank A. CUGLIATA and John Moraites, 1977 Me. LEXIS 469 (1977)
…only two exceptions to the rule excluding hearsay, viz., a dying declaration and statements within the res gestae, State v. Chaplin, Me., 286 A.2d 325 (1972); State v. Lafferty, Me., 309 A.2d 647 (1973). Arguing that the note and statement to Wilson fit neither of those exceptions, defendants maintain that both should have been excluded as hearsay. Conceding that the evidence…
On dying declaration, STATE of Maine v. Frank A. CUGLIATA and John Moraites speaks to the Maine dispute in this passage: "State v. Chaplin, Me., 286 A.2d 325 (1972); State v. Lafferty, Me., 309 A.2d 647 (1973). Arguing that the note and statement to Wilson fit neither of those exceptions, defendants maintain that both should have been excluded as hearsay." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
State of Maine v. Alva Ranger
State of Maine v. Alva Ranger, 149 Me. 52 (1958)
…le, yet, in one case, a learned judge promptly rejected the dying declarations of a child of tender years, observing, that it was quite impossible that she, however precocious her mind, could have had that idea of a future state, which is necessary to make such declarations admissible. On the other hand, it is not unusual to receive the testimony of children under nine, and som…
State of Maine v. Alva Ranger is worth reading on Maine dying declaration because the court put the point in its own words: "le, yet, in one case, a learned judge promptly rejected the dying declarations of a child of tender years, observing, that it was quite impossible that she, however precocious her mind, could have had that idea of a future state, which is necessary to make such declarations admis" Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
State v. Ranger
State v. Ranger, 98 A.2d 652 (1953)
…le, yet, in one case, a learned Judge promptly rejected the dying declarations of a child of tender years, observing, that it was quite impossible that she, however precocious her mind, could have had that idea of a future state, which is necessary to make such declarations admissible. On the other hand, it is not unusual to receive the testimony of children under nine, and som…
State v. Ranger is worth reading on Maine dying declaration because the court put the point in its own words: "Judge promptly rejected the dying declarations of a child of tender years, observing, that it was quite impossible that she, however precocious her mind, could have had that idea of a future state, which is necessary to make such declarations admissible." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Medical diagnosis or treatment statements
Statements made for medical diagnosis or treatment under Me. R. Evid. 803(4) cover medical history, past or present symptoms, and their general cause when reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. The exception is not limited to treating physicians; statements to nurses, EMTs, and consulting clinicians can qualify when the diagnostic purpose is genuine. Fault and identity remain the usual battleground: "I was hit by a car" is often pertinent; "the light was green" usually is not; abuser identity in child-abuse and domestic-violence cases is heavily litigated.
Maine medical-statement opinions
STATE of Maine v. Robert C. TRUE III
STATE of Maine v. Robert C. TRUE III, 1981 Me. LEXIS 1041 (1981)
…admissible under M.R.Evid. 803(4) 7 as a statement made for medical diagnosis or treatment. That it was intercourse that caused Lona to see the doctor and that it occurred the previous evening are facts reasonably pertinent to the diagnosis and treatment and bring the testimony within the 803(4) exception to the hearsay rule. But the identity of the perpetrator and the scene of…
Practitioners open STATE of Maine v. Robert C. TRUE III when Maine medical diagnosis hearsay turns on the distinction in this sentence: "M.R.Evid. 803(4) 7 as a statement made for medical diagnosis or treatment." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
STATE of Maine v. Jeffrey A. COOKSON
STATE of Maine v. Jeffrey A. COOKSON, 2003 Me. LEXIS 152 (2003)
…ied and approved by the State Board of Nursing, to “perform medical diagnosis ... when these services are delegated by a licensed physician.” He points out that there was no evidence that she was certified and approved by the Board and, because she testified that she acts independently and without the supervision of a physician, she does not strictly adhere to the statutory req…
On medical diagnosis hearsay, STATE of Maine v. Jeffrey A. COOKSON speaks to the Maine dispute in this passage: "State Board of Nursing, to “perform medical diagnosis ... when these services are delegated by a licensed physician." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
STATE of Maine v. Edmond H. HEBERT
STATE of Maine v. Edmond H. HEBERT, 1984 Me. LEXIS 728 (1984)
…803(4) (1984), which states: (4) Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment [are no…
On medical diagnosis hearsay, STATE of Maine v. Edmond H. HEBERT speaks to the Maine dispute in this passage: "Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Lori HANDRAHAN v. Igor MALENKO
Lori HANDRAHAN v. Igor MALENKO, 2011 Me. LEXIS 15 (2011)
…Rule 803(4) allows hearsay statements “made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing ... the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.” Here, Wientzen conducted a forensic interview of the child in her capacity as co-director of the Spurwink Child Abuse Program, and on t…
Practitioners open Lori HANDRAHAN v. Igor MALENKO when Maine medical diagnosis hearsay turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Rule 803(4) allows hearsay statements “made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing ... the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
STATE of Maine v. Nicolo LEONE
STATE of Maine v. Nicolo LEONE, 1990 Me. LEXIS 248 (1990)
…(M.R.Evid. 803(2)), and the “statements for the purpose of medical diagnosis and treatment” exception (M.R.Evid.803(4)).2 M.R.Evid. 803(2) defines an excited utterance as “[a] statement relating to a startling event or conditions made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.” As we have previously stated, such an utterance is a p…
On medical diagnosis hearsay, STATE of Maine v. Nicolo LEONE speaks to the Maine dispute in this passage: "M.R.Evid. 803(2)), and the “statements for the purpose of medical diagnosis and treatment” exception (M.R.Evid.803(4)).2 M.R.Evid." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Mary WALTON v. David C. IRELAND Jr. — Mead, J., dissenting
Mary WALTON v. David C. IRELAND Jr. — Mead, J., dissenting, 2014 Me. LEXIS 140 (2014)
…as a witness: [[Image here]] (4) Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. The ru…
Mary WALTON v. David C. IRELAND Jr. — Mead, J., dissenting is worth reading on Maine medical diagnosis hearsay because the court put the point in its own words: "Image here]] (4) Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Use of depositions at trial
Me. R. Civ. P. 30 and 32 govern civil depositions and trial use. Me. Crim. P. 16 controls criminal discovery; prior testimony may be admitted under Me. R. Evid. 804(b)(1) when unavailability is shown.
Deposition use is always a two-layer problem: procedural permission to read or play the deposition, plus a hearsay path (often former testimony, party admission, or impeachment). Counsel who satisfy the civil or criminal procedure rule but skip the evidence-rule foundation invite a sustained objection; counsel who have a hearsay exception but failed to preserve the deposition under the procedural rule face the same result. Video designations, counter-designations, and completeness objections should be teed up before the jury is seated.
Maine deposition / former-testimony opinions
Cathy DOYLE v. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES
Cathy DOYLE v. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, 2003 Me. LEXIS 69 (2003)
…5; page 10, lines 1-13; and page 45, lines 17-25 of Doyle’s deposition; and Exhibit 3. However, the page 19 citation refers to Doyle’s explanation of how to work the unavailable mode; the page 10 citation refers to Doyle’s accommodation and Doyle's previous supervisors; the page 45 citation refers to Doyle’s description of keeping a record of logging on and off; and Exhibit 3 i…
On deposition / former testimony, Cathy DOYLE v. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES speaks to the Maine dispute in this passage: "5; page 10, lines 1-13; and page 45, lines 17-25 of Doyle’s deposition; and Exhibit 3. However, the page 19 citation refers to Doyle’s explanation of how to work the unavailable mode; the page 10 citation refers to Doyle’s accommodation and Doyle's previous supervisors; the page" The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
STATE of Maine v. Mark BARNES
STATE of Maine v. Mark BARNES, 2004 Me. LEXIS 124 (2004)
…sh admiralty courts routinely took colonists’ testimony “by deposition or private judicial examination.” Id. at ——, 124 S.Ct. at 1362. Because the depositions were obtained without the truth-seeking effects of the crucible of cross-examination, they were substantially subject to manipulation and inaccuracy. Id. at ——, 124 *211 S.Ct. at 1362-63. 3 When such depositions in respon…
Practitioners open STATE of Maine v. Mark BARNES when Maine deposition / former testimony turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Id. at ——, 124 S.Ct. at 1362. Because the depositions were obtained without the truth-seeking effects of the crucible of cross-examination, they were substantially subject to manipulation and inaccuracy. Id. at ——, 124 *211 S.Ct. at 1362-63." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
STATE of Maine v. Nicholas HASSAPELIS
STATE of Maine v. Nicholas HASSAPELIS, 1993 Me. LEXIS 12 (1993)
…allowing the State to read to the jury a transcript of the deposition testimony of medical examiner Dr. Ronald Roy without first determining his unavailability as a witness at the time of trial. Because we conclude that the trial court’s error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we affirm the conviction. On January 5, 1990, Hassapelis was indicted by the Cumberland County…
On deposition / former testimony, STATE of Maine v. Nicholas HASSAPELIS speaks to the Maine dispute in this passage: "State to read to the jury a transcript of the deposition testimony of medical examiner Dr. Ronald Roy without first determining his unavailability as a witness at the time of trial." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
STATE of Maine v. Nancy A. FREDETTE
STATE of Maine v. Nancy A. FREDETTE, 1983 Me. LEXIS 717 (1983)
…e when the testimony was originally given. IV. Exclusion of Deposition of Unavailable Witness for Impeachment Purposes During this same chambers conference, defense counsel sought a ruling on whether she would be allowed to impeach Laverri-ere’s trial testimony by using a deposition which had been taken before the first trial. After defense counsel made an offer of proof, the p…
Maine opinions such as STATE of Maine v. Nancy A. FREDETTE are cited where deposition / former testimony is disputed. The court stated: "Exclusion of Deposition of Unavailable Witness for Impeachment Purposes During this same chambers conference, defense counsel sought a ruling on whether she would be allowed to impeach Laverri-ere’s trial testimony by using a deposition which had been taken before the first trial." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
STATE of Maine v. Elwood TWIST
STATE of Maine v. Elwood TWIST, 1987 Me. LEXIS 762 (1987)
…granted. The Superior Court received in evidence videotaped depositions of two children alleged to have been victims of sex abuse perpetrated by the defendant. The court and the parties viewed the videotaped testimony at trial. On June 27, 1985, the court entered the judgments of conviction from which the defendant appeals. I. The defendant argued before the Superi- or Court an…
Practitioners open STATE of Maine v. Elwood TWIST when Maine deposition / former testimony turns on the distinction in this sentence: "The Superior Court received in evidence videotaped depositions of two children alleged to have been victims of sex abuse perpetrated by the defendant. The court and the parties viewed the videotaped testimony at trial." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
STATE of Maine v. Stephen J. TUCKER Sr.
STATE of Maine v. Stephen J. TUCKER Sr., 2015 Me. LEXIS 74 (2015)
…a jury trial. In October 2013, the State filed a motion for deposition pursuant to M.R. Crim. P. 15 in order to obtain the testimony of Jacques Violette, who had been hired by the Board to provide vocational and rehabilitation services to Tucker, and who would be unavailable for trial. The court granted the motion for cause shown and without objection, and Viol-ette’s video dep…
Practitioners open STATE of Maine v. Stephen J. TUCKER Sr. when Maine deposition / former testimony turns on the distinction in this sentence: "In October 2013, the State filed a motion for deposition pursuant to M.R. Crim. P. 15 in order to obtain the testimony of Jacques Violette, who had been hired by the Board to provide vocational and rehabilitation services to Tucker, and who would be unavailable for trial." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
STATE of Maine v. Stephen J. SCHOLZ
STATE of Maine v. Stephen J. SCHOLZ, 1981 Me. LEXIS 881 (1981)
…ther hearing of the same or a different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with law in the course of the same or another proceeding, if the party against whom the testimony is now offered, or in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination. 3 .Due…
Maine opinions such as STATE of Maine v. Stephen J. SCHOLZ are cited where deposition / former testimony is disputed. The court stated: "ther hearing of the same or a different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with law in the course of the same or another proceeding, if the party against whom the testimony is now offered, or in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an oppor" That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Authenticity: why it matters and how to prove it
Authenticity is not a hearsay doctrine and it is not optional. Under Me. R. Evid. 901, 902, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is. Self-authenticating categories — certified public records, newspapers, acknowledged documents, trade inscriptions, and (where adopted) certified domestic records of a regularly conducted activity — shorten the path, but most trial exhibits still need a sponsoring witness, distinctive characteristics, chain of custody, or process-or-system evidence.
Maine maritime, forestry, and tourism cases require authenticated Coast Guard reports, lodging records, and electronic communications under Me. R. Evid. 901–902.
Why authenticity gets its own section in every Maine trial notebook:
- It is a condition precedent. An unauthenticated exhibit never reaches the relevance, hearsay, or privilege analysis in a useful way — the jury never properly considers it.
- Digital evidence multiplies the failure modes. Screenshots, social-media posts, text threads, and cloud downloads require hash values, account attribution, metadata, or a percipient witness who saw the content created or received.
- Chain of custody is authenticity by another name. Drugs, firearms, biological samples, and seized devices are excluded when the links from seizure to lab to courtroom are broken, even if a hearsay exception would otherwise apply to a lab report.
- Business-records shortcuts do not replace authentication. A custodian can explain record-keeping practices and still fail if nobody can say the particular PDF or printout is the record of this patient, this account, or this machine.
- Self-authentication is narrow. Counsel who wave a notarization or a letterhead and skip the rest of Rule 901-style analysis often lose when the document's contents are disputed.
Practical authentication checklist for Maine trials: identify the exhibit; choose a 901 method or a 902 category; line up the sponsoring witness or certificate; preserve chain-of-custody testimony for physical and digital items; and separate the authenticity objection from any hearsay objection so the court rules on each.
Maine authenticity opinions
STATE of Maine v. Melvin B. LAGASSE, Jr.
STATE of Maine v. Melvin B. LAGASSE, Jr., 1980 Me. LEXIS 490 (1980)
…ce abused his discretion because the knife was not properly authenticated and because its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value. These two distinct contentions must be examined separately. M.R.Evid. 901(a), which governs authentication, provides: “The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence s…
STATE of Maine v. Melvin B. LAGASSE, Jr. is worth reading on Maine authentication because the court put the point in its own words: "These two distinct contentions must be examined separately. M.R.Evid." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
STATE of Maine v. William FORBES
STATE of Maine v. William FORBES, 1982 Me. LEXIS 671 (1982)
…tate’s Exhibit 2 over the defendant’s objection for lack of authentication and unfair prejudice, as consisting of the gun that was seized in the box in which it was found. Demakis gave the gun to Officer Wallace of the Portland Police Department who took it to the police station. Wallace identified Exhibit 2 as the shotgun he obtained from Demakis. Wallace gave the gun to Offic…
Practitioners open STATE of Maine v. William FORBES when Maine authentication turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Exhibit 2 over the defendant’s objection for lack of authentication and unfair prejudice, as consisting of the gun that was seized in the box in which it was found. Demakis gave the gun to Officer Wallace of the Portland Police Department who took it to the police station." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
STATE of Maine v. Miles Benjamin THOMPSON
STATE of Maine v. Miles Benjamin THOMPSON, 1986 Me. LEXIS 647 (1986)
…ld. 1 I. At trial defendant objected to the adequacy of the authentication of the blood specimens tested at the Roche laboratory. He complained that since none of the Roche technicians from North Carolina was present, he could not test the authenticity of the specimens by cross-examination. The presiding justice overruled the objection and held that the documents shipped with a…
On authentication, STATE of Maine v. Miles Benjamin THOMPSON speaks to the Maine dispute in this passage: "I. At trial defendant objected to the adequacy of the authentication of the blood specimens tested at the Roche laboratory." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Maine League Federal Credit Union v. Atlantic Motors
Maine League Federal Credit Union v. Atlantic Motors, 1969 Me. LEXIS 243 (1969)
…ted or adopted by [the plaintiff] with present intention to authenticate [the financing statement].” Section 1-201(39). From the agreed statement it is apparent that the words above noted were not intended by the assistant treasurer to be the signature of the plaintiff Credit Union. There was no present intention by the assistant treasurer thereby to authenticate the “writing.”…
Practitioners open Maine League Federal Credit Union v. Atlantic Motors when Maine authentication turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Section 1-201(39). From the agreed statement it is apparent that the words above noted were not intended by the assistant treasurer to be the signature of the plaintiff Credit Union. There was no present intention by the assistant treasurer thereby to authenticate the “writing." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
STATE of Maine v. James BERKE
STATE of Maine v. James BERKE, 2010 Me. LEXIS 35 (2010)
…urt’s admission of certain videotapes into evidence without authenticating testimony. We affirm the conviction. I. BACKGROUND [¶ 2] Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the State as the prevailing party, the court could have rationally found the following facts beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Bruzzese, 2009 ME 61, ¶ 2, 974 A.2d 311, 311-12. In late March 200…
Practitioners open STATE of Maine v. James BERKE when Maine authentication turns on the distinction in this sentence: "We affirm the conviction. I. BACKGROUND [¶ 2] Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the State as the prevailing party, the court could have rationally found the following facts beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Bruzzese, 2009 ME 61, ¶ 2, 974 A.2d 311, 311-12." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
State of Maine v. Luc W. Tieman
State of Maine v. Luc W. Tieman, 2019 ME 60 (2019)
…cretion in finding that the Facebook Messenger records were authenticated pursuant to M.R. Evid. 901. Second, he asserts that the court abused its discretion by admitting the Facebook Messenger records pursuant to the hearsay exception that allows for the admission of a declarant’s statement of his or her then-existing state of mind. See M.R. Evid. 803(3). [¶12] We review a tri…
On authentication, State of Maine v. Luc W. Tieman speaks to the Maine dispute in this passage: "Facebook Messenger records were authenticated pursuant to M.R. Evid. 901." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
STATE of Maine v. Abdiaziz HUSSEIN
STATE of Maine v. Abdiaziz HUSSEIN, 208 A.3d 752 (2019)
…rrest on her cellphone. Hussein's counsel then attempted to authenticate the video through the officer. Although the officer acknowledged that the recording fairly and accurately represented a portion of his interaction with Hussein, the court excluded the video, reasoning, "With respect to the attempt to authenticate this particular piece of evidence through [the officer], giv…
Practitioners open STATE of Maine v. Abdiaziz HUSSEIN when Maine authentication turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Hussein's counsel then attempted to authenticate the video through the officer." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Practice checklist
- State the relevance theory in one sentence before naming an exception.
- Run the 403 / unfair-prejudice balance explicitly for other-acts and graphic exhibits.
- For character or other-acts evidence, identify the non-propensity purpose and request a limiting instruction on the record.
- Decide whether an out-of-court statement is hearsay for the purpose offered before hunting exceptions.
- Lay business-records foundations with time, knowledge, regular practice, and custodial qualifications — or a qualifying certification.
- Prove unavailability with specific facts before offering former testimony or dying declarations.
- Treat deposition use as procedure-plus-hearsay; designate and counter-designate early.
- Authenticate every exhibit under Me. R. Evid. 901, 902 (or the self-authentication path) before arguing hearsay.
- Preserve chain of custody for physical and digital evidence with named custodians.
- Search LawDiver for recent Maine appellate evidence opinions before mediation or motions in limine.
Contents
- General standards of admissibility
- Character evidence
- Hearsay: start with the definition
- Party admissions
- Business records
- Important hearsay exceptions that do not require unavailability
- Declarant unavailable
- Dying declarations
- Medical diagnosis or treatment statements
- Use of depositions at trial
- Authenticity: why it matters and how to prove it
- Practice checklist
- Frequently asked questions
General standards of admissibility
Maine starts every evidence dispute with relevance and unfair prejudice. Under Me. R. Evid. 401, 403, evidence is relevant when it has any tendency to make a fact of consequence more or less probable, and relevant evidence is still excluded when its probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. Preliminary questions of admissibility are for the court; conditional relevance and limited-purpose instructions keep otherwise-usable proof from becoming a Trojan horse for propensity or truth-of-the-matter use.
Maine courts cite federal advisory-committee notes frequently. Check Me. R. Evid. 412 and 615 for localized witness-exclusion rules.
Practice tip: articulate the theory of relevance in one sentence before citing the exception. Lawyers who lead with "it's a business record" without explaining what fact the record proves often lose the 403 balance even when the hearsay foundation is clean.
Frequently asked questions
What is the primary evidence source in Maine?
Maine applies the Maine Rules of Evidence. Maine's rules follow the FRE; Me. R. Evid. 401–902 govern trials in the District and Superior Courts.
How do Maine courts decide relevance and unfair prejudice?
Under Me. R. Evid. 401, 403, evidence must make a fact of consequence more or less probable, and the court may exclude relevant evidence when unfair prejudice, confusion, or waste of time substantially outweighs its probative value.
Are party admissions hearsay in Maine?
Party-opponent statements under Me. R. Evid. 801(d)(2) are generally excluded from the hearsay ban (or treated as an exception, depending on local drafting). They may be offered against the party who made or adopted them without showing unavailability.
What foundation is required for business records?
Under Me. R. Evid. 803(6), show a record made at or near the time from someone with knowledge, kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity, as a regular practice, through a custodian, qualified witness, or allowed certification — subject to trustworthiness attack.
When can I use a deposition at trial in Maine?
Me. R. Civ. P. 30 and 32 govern civil depositions and trial use. Me. Crim. P. 16 controls criminal discovery; prior testimony may be admitted under Me. R. Evid. 804(b)(1) when unavailability is shown.
Why is authenticity separate from hearsay?
Authenticity asks whether the item is what you claim it is; hearsay asks whether out-of-court assertions inside it may be used for their truth. You can lose on either ground independently. Maine authenticity practice starts with Me. R. Evid. 901, 902.
Where do dying declarations and medical statements fit?
Dying declarations under Me. R. Evid. 804(b)(2) require belief in impending death and concern the cause or circumstances of that believed death. Medical statements under Me. R. Evid. 803(4) require a genuine diagnostic or treatment purpose and reasonable pertinence to care.