Iowa evidence practice is organized under the Iowa Rules of Evidence. Relevance starts at Iowa R. Evid. 401, 403; hearsay starts at Iowa R. Evid. 801, 802. That is what separates Iowa evidence law from a generic national summary. Read Iowa Rules of Evidence before the background sections below. Authenticity is a separate fight under Iowa R. Evid. 901, 902. Depositions at trial: Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.704 and 1.731 govern civil depositions and trial use. Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.15 controls criminal discovery; prior testimony may be admitted under Iowa R. Evid. 804(b)(1) when the declarant is unavailable.
Character evidence
Character evidence in Iowa is governed by Iowa R. Evid. 404, 405. The default rule is familiar: evidence of a person's character or character trait is not admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character or trait. The same body of law then carves out the classic exceptions — essential-element character, accused-opens-the-door reputation or opinion, and other-acts evidence offered for a non-propensity purpose such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake.
Other-acts notice, 403 balancing, and limiting instructions do most of the real work. In criminal cases, prosecutors who dump prior misconduct without a specific non-propensity theory invite reversal; defense counsel who open the door to good-character testimony without anticipating rebuttal create the very propensity inference the rules were designed to police.
Iowa character-evidence opinions
STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Andrew Marcus SULLIVAN, Appellant
STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Andrew Marcus SULLIVAN, Appellant, 2004 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 110 (2004)
…Prove Mens Rea: The Doctrines Which Threaten to Engulf the Character Evidence Prohibition, 51 Ohio St. L.J. 575, 581-82 (1990) (“[T]he available psychological studies indicate that once they have characterized the accused’s general character, the jurors are likely to attach great weight to that characterization in determining whether the accused acted ‘in character’ on the occ…
STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Andrew Marcus SULLIVAN, Appellant is worth reading on Iowa character evidence because the court put the point in its own words: "Prove Mens Rea: The Doctrines Which Threaten to Engulf the Character Evidence Prohibition, 51 Ohio St. L.J." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Argilee HENDERSON, Appellant — Lavorato, J., concurring
…Prove Mens Rea: The Doctrines Which Threaten to Engulf the Character Evidence Prohibition, 51 Ohio St. L.J. 575, 596-98 (1990) [hereinafter Imwinkelried]. To avoid the danger that similar bad-acts evidence presents, the mens rea issue must be in “bona fide dispute,” and the prosecutor must have a “bona fide need to resort to the potentially prejudicial uncharged misconduct evi…
Practitioners open STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Argilee HENDERSON, Appellant — Lavorato, J., concurring when Iowa character evidence turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Prove Mens Rea: The Doctrines Which Threaten to Engulf the Character Evidence Prohibition, 51 Ohio St. L.J. 575, 596-98 (1990) [hereinafter Imwinkelried]." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
In the Interest of J.A.L., Minor Child, J.A.L., Minor Child
In the Interest of J.A.L., Minor Child, J.A.L., Minor Child, 2005 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 48 (2005)
…ng, the juvenile court admitted J.A.L.’s journal entries as character evidence. J.A.L. appeals the juvenile court’s decision arguing his journal entries were not admissible, and the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that J.A.L. violated section 712.7. Although we agree with J.A.L. that the journal entries were inadmissible as character or other-acts evidence, we n…
In the Interest of J.A.L., Minor Child, J.A.L., Minor Child is worth reading on Iowa character evidence because the court put the point in its own words: "J.A.L.’s journal entries as character evidence. J.A.L. appeals the juvenile court’s decision arguing his journal entries were not admissible, and the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that J.A.L. violated section 712.7. Although we agree with J.A.L." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Bryan Kirby BARRETT, Appellant
STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Bryan Kirby BARRETT, Appellant, 1987 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 1076 (1987)
…er in this opinion. Iowa Rule of Evidence 404 provides: (a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person’s character or a trait of his character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except: (1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of his character of *187 fered by an accused, or by the…
STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Bryan Kirby BARRETT, Appellant is worth reading on Iowa character evidence because the court put the point in its own words: "Iowa Rule of Evidence 404 provides: (a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person’s character or a trait of his character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except: (1) Character of accused." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
STATE of Iowa, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Rick Dewayne NEBINGER, Defendant-Appellant
…vidence. Iowa Rule of Evidence 404 provides as follows: (a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person’s character or a trait of his character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except: (1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of his character offered by an accused, or by the prosec…
Practitioners open STATE of Iowa, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Rick Dewayne NEBINGER, Defendant-Appellant when Iowa character evidence turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Iowa Rule of Evidence 404 provides as follows: (a) Character evidence generally." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Isidro MARTINEZ, Appellant
STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Isidro MARTINEZ, Appellant, 2004 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 159 (2004)
…the defendant’s requested instruction on the jury’s use of character evidence. Because the record is inadequate to allow us to determine Martinez’s ineffective-assistance claims on appeal, we preserve these matters for a possible postconviction relief action. In light of our conclusions, we affirm the defendant’s convictions and sentences. I. Background Facts and Proceedings.…
Iowa opinions such as STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Isidro MARTINEZ, Appellant are cited where character evidence is disputed. The court stated: "Because the record is inadequate to allow us to determine Martinez’s ineffective-assistance claims on appeal, we preserve these matters for a possible postconviction relief action. In light of our conclusions, we affirm the defendant’s convictions and sentences. I." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Hearsay: start with the definition
Most hearsay objections in Iowa are won or lost on the definition, not on an exception. Under Iowa R. Evid. 801, 802, hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Non-hearsay purposes — verbal acts, effect on the listener, notice, circumstantial evidence of state of mind, and impeachment — remain available when the proponent can articulate them without asking the jury to believe the declarant.
Layered hearsay (hearsay within hearsay) requires an exception or exclusion for each layer. Machine-generated data and non-assertive conduct sit outside the hearsay definition in FRE-aligned jurisdictions, but they still need authenticity and, often, expert or business-records foundations.
Iowa hearsay opinions
STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Jerry Lee Michael NEWELL, Appellant
STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Jerry Lee Michael NEWELL, Appellant, 2006 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 17 (2006)
…to life imprisonment. This appeal followed. II. Evidence of Hearsay and Prior Acts. A. Challenged testimony. Newell challenges the trial court’s admission of testimony concerning the relationship between the defendant and Gillen, claiming the evidence constituted inadmissible hearsay and inadmissible prior-bad-acts evidence. The defendant objected to the following testimony: 1.…
On hearsay, STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Jerry Lee Michael NEWELL, Appellant speaks to the Iowa dispute in this passage: "This appeal followed. II. Evidence of Hearsay and Prior Acts. A. Challenged testimony." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Vernon Lee HUSER, Appellant
STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Vernon Lee HUSER, Appellant, 2017 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 47 (2017)
…trict court improperly allowed the admission of prejudicial hearsay evidence. The State retried Huser, and he was again convicted. Huser appeals his second conviction. Huser claims that his second conviction must be reversed because (1) the State failed to produce sufficient evidence to convict Huser of aiding and abetting the murder of Morningstar; (2) the district court erred…
Iowa opinions such as STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Vernon Lee HUSER, Appellant are cited where hearsay is disputed. The court stated: "The State retried Huser, and he was again convicted. Huser appeals his second conviction." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Frederick L. SOWDER, Appellant
STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Frederick L. SOWDER, Appellant, 1986 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 1314 (1986)
…at was that conversation? Defense counsel then interposed a hearsay objection. The court, after an offer of proof by the State in chambers, overruled defendant's objection and the following occurred in the presence of the jury: THE COURT: You may answer. MS. BUCHHOLZ: First I said to AlanI said, "Did you know that Fred got that money from holding up that convenience store?" An…
Practitioners open STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Frederick L. SOWDER, Appellant when Iowa hearsay turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Defense counsel then interposed a hearsay objection. The court, after an offer of proof by the State in chambers, overruled defendant's objection and the following occurred in the presence of the jury: THE COURT: You may answer. MS." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Elsie BRUNNER, Paul Warnke, Lucille Warnke, Arthur Eugene Warnke and Ellen L. Kirkestue, Appellants, v. James BROWN
…their expert witness, during direct examination, to relate hearsay evidence that he had considered in forming his opinion on the decedent’s mental state. We conclude that, while such evidence is admissible under Iowa Rules of Evidence 703 and 705, the district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting it under the facts of this case. The contestants’ psychiatrist, Dr. Ve…
Practitioners open Elsie BRUNNER, Paul Warnke, Lucille Warnke, Arthur Eugene Warnke and Ellen L. Kirkestue, Appellants, v. James BROWN when Iowa hearsay turns on the distinction in this sentence: "We conclude that, while such evidence is admissible under Iowa Rules of Evidence 703 and 705, the district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting it under the facts of this case. The contestants’ psychiatrist, Dr." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Michael Eugene WIXOM, Appellant
STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Michael Eugene WIXOM, Appellant, 1999 Iowa App. LEXIS 20 (1999)
…its own witnesses in order to offer otherwise inadmissible hearsay into evidence, we reverse. I. Background Facts & Proceedings. On October 8, 1996, Wixom’s residence was searched pursuant to a warrant. The police found drugs and drug paraphernalia. Wixom was charged with possession with intent to deliver cocaine, possession with intent to deliver marijuana, and possession wit…
Iowa opinions such as STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Michael Eugene WIXOM, Appellant are cited where hearsay is disputed. The court stated: "I. Background Facts & Proceedings. On October 8, 1996, Wixom’s residence was searched pursuant to a warrant. The police found drugs and drug paraphernalia." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Party admissions
Statements of an opposing party are among the most important routes around the hearsay bar. Iowa treats them under Iowa R. Evid. 801(d)(2). Nothing about the statement need be against interest, contemporaneous, or based on personal knowledge — the theory is adversarial, not reliability-based. A party cannot complain that his own words are unreliable when offered against him.
Scope questions dominate practice: the party's own statement; adopted statements (including silence in circumstances where a reasonable person would deny); statements by authorized speakers; agent or employee statements on matters within the scope of the relationship; and, in criminal conspiracy cases, coconspirator statements during and in furtherance of the conspiracy. A defendant generally cannot introduce his own exculpatory out-of-court statement as a "party admission" against himself — the rule runs one way.
Iowa party-admission opinions
STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Raymond James HEPHNER, Appellant
STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Raymond James HEPHNER, Appellant, 1968 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 948 (1968)
…nerally, before the trial court can be put in error for the admission or rejection of testimony, it must be clearly shown that the attorney who considered himself aggrieved insisted on a ruling and that the court failed or refused to make one, or * made a ruling which was erroneous.’); Id., § 321f.” See also 4 C.J.S. Appeal & Error § 321e, page 1026: “Although an appellate…
Practitioners open STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Raymond James HEPHNER, Appellant when Iowa party admissions turns on the distinction in this sentence: "nerally, before the trial court can be put in error for the admission or rejection of testimony, it must be clearly shown that the attorney who considered himself aggrieved insisted on a ruling and that the court failed or refused to make one, or * made a ruling which was err" Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Emma Hardwick v. Thomas Hardwick
Emma Hardwick v. Thomas Hardwick, 130 Iowa 230 (1906)
…e defendant, and you must not consider such evidence as any admission by the defendant, or as at all binding upon him.” Possibly this instruction was without prejudice, for, after stating the reasons for receiving the evidence, the jury was told it could not be considered for the purpose of proving the facts against defendant. What then could have been the object in introducing…
Practitioners open Emma Hardwick v. Thomas Hardwick when Iowa party admissions turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Possibly this instruction was without prejudice, for, after stating the reasons for receiving the evidence, the jury was told it could not be considered for the purpose of proving the facts against defendant." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Francis P. BAILEY, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Maude Elizabeth Bailey, D — Uhlenhopp, J
…ts about her marital trouble are said to be inadmissible as admissions because not inconsistent with the fiduciary’s present position. But the fiduciary is claiming damages for loss of the services Mrs. Bailey would have rendered as spouse, whereas Mrs. Bailey admitted in substance that she rendered practically no such services by reason of Mr. Bailey’s absence. Thus the positi…
On party admissions, Francis P. BAILEY, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Maude Elizabeth Bailey, D — Uhlenhopp, J speaks to the Iowa dispute in this passage: "But the fiduciary is claiming damages for loss of the services Mrs. Bailey would have rendered as spouse, whereas Mrs. Bailey admitted in substance that she rendered practically no such services by reason of Mr. Bailey’s absence." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
STATE of Iowa, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jon Michael MANICCIA, Defendant-Appellant
…in surrebuttal the court sustained the State’s objection to admission of a drawn-to-scale diagram of the house. I. We first address Maniccia’s argument that he was denied due process by the State’s “intentional destruction” of the tape recording of the alleged cocaine transaction. It is Maniccia’s position that the district court erred in failing to impose a sanction for the St…
Practitioners open STATE of Iowa, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jon Michael MANICCIA, Defendant-Appellant when Iowa party admissions turns on the distinction in this sentence: "State’s objection to admission of a drawn-to-scale diagram of the house. I. We first address Maniccia’s argument that he was denied due process by the State’s “intentional destruction” of the tape recording of the alleged cocaine transaction." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Winch v. Norman
Winch v. Norman, 65 Iowa 186 (1884)
…who.saw the person write it; and, Secondly, by the party’s admission, when not offered by himself. We do not mean to say that these are the only methods, but only that the proof must be positive.” The court also said: “ The very idea of proving handwriting by comparison implies, of necessity, the establishment of the genuineness of the standard. The court is not prepared to ad…
Iowa opinions such as Winch v. Norman are cited where party admissions is disputed. The court stated: "Secondly, by the party’s admission, when not offered by himself. We do not mean to say that these are the only methods, but only that the proof must be positive." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
STATE of Iowa, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Duane Eddie WRIGHT, Defendant-Appellant
…guilt without finding a unanimous version of the facts. I. Admission of Deposition Defendant raises several issues regarding the use of Donnell Wright’s deposition at trial. First, defendant contends admission of the deposition violated his sixth amendment right of confrontation. For reasons stated below, we uphold the trial court’s ruling. The confrontation clause requirement…
Practitioners open STATE of Iowa, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Duane Eddie WRIGHT, Defendant-Appellant when Iowa party admissions turns on the distinction in this sentence: "I. Admission of Deposition Defendant raises several issues regarding the use of Donnell Wright’s deposition at trial. First, defendant contends admission of the deposition violated his sixth amendment right of confrontation." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Harrison County v. The State Savings Bank
Harrison County v. The State Savings Bank, 127 Iowa 242 (1905)
…ne troublesome question arises upon exceptions taken to tbe admission of testimony on tbe trial below. Tbe plaintiff was permitted, over appellant’s objection, to in evidence what is described as “ a transcript of certain testimony eiven by W. J". Burke in tbe case of tbe State of Iowa v. Charles H. Hilliard in the District Court of Harrison County, Iowa, commencing February 24…
Harrison County v. The State Savings Bank is worth reading on Iowa party admissions because the court put the point in its own words: "Tbe plaintiff was permitted, over appellant’s objection, to in evidence what is described as “ a transcript of certain testimony eiven by W. J'. Burke in tbe case of tbe State of Iowa v. Charles H." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
A concrete Iowa scenario
Here is one way the Iowa pieces fit together. Change any fact and the statute may point somewhere else.
A lawyer in Iowa wants to offer a medical record, a party email, and a statement the declarant made while believing death was imminent.
- Clear relevance and unfair prejudice under Iowa R. Evid. 401, 403.
- If the email is the opposing party's, test Iowa R. Evid. 801(d)(2) before the hearsay definition in Iowa R. Evid. 801, 802.
- For the medical record, lay the business-records foundation in Iowa R. Evid. 803(6) and the treatment purpose in Iowa R. Evid. 803(4).
- For the deathbed statement, meet Iowa R. Evid. 804(b)(2), then authenticate every exhibit under Iowa R. Evid. 901, 902.
Iowa keeps hearsay, character, and authenticity on different rules inside the Iowa Rules of Evidence. Winning one does not win the others.
Business records
The business-records exception under Iowa R. Evid. 803(6) is the everyday path for medical charts, employment files, bank statements, and maintenance logs. The foundation requires a record made at or near the time by — or from information transmitted by — someone with knowledge; kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity; and made as a regular practice. A custodian or other qualified witness (or a qualifying certification where the jurisdiction allows it) lays the foundation. The opponent may still attack lack of trustworthiness when the source or method of preparation indicates unreliability — litigation-driven reports are the classic failure mode.
Do not confuse authenticity with the business-records exception. You still need to show the exhibit is what you claim it is; the hearsay exception then answers why the out-of-court assertions inside it may be considered for their truth.
Iowa business-records opinions
STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Brian Edward REYNOLDS, Appellant
STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Brian Edward REYNOLDS, Appellant, 2008 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 53 (2008)
…court properly admitted certain hearsay evidence under the business records hearsay exception, Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.803(6). The decision of the court of appeals also rejected Reynolds’s claim that defense counsel was ineffective in failing to raise Confrontation Clause objections to some of the hearsay evidence. We vacate the decision of the court of appeals, reverse Reynol…
Iowa opinions such as STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Brian Edward REYNOLDS, Appellant are cited where business records is disputed. The court stated: "Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.803(6). The decision of the court of appeals also rejected Reynolds’s claim that defense counsel was ineffective in failing to raise Confrontation Clause objections to some of the hearsay evidence." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Bradley Dale SHIPLEY, Appellant
STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Bradley Dale SHIPLEY, Appellant, 2008 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 95 (2008)
…urt specifically distinguished testimonial statements from “business records or statements in furtherance of a conspiracy.” Id. Although the majority opinion did not specifically address the issue, Chief Justice Rehnquist in a concurring opinion suggested that official records as well as business records fell outside the scope of the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 76, 124 S.Ct. a…
STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Bradley Dale SHIPLEY, Appellant is worth reading on Iowa business records because the court put the point in its own words: "Id. Although the majority opinion did not specifically address the issue, Chief Justice Rehnquist in a concurring opinion suggested that official records as well as business records fell outside the scope of the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 76, 124 S.Ct." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
GE MONEY BANK, Appellee, v. Maria MORALES, Appellant
GE MONEY BANK, Appellee, v. Maria MORALES, Appellant, 2009 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 114 (2009)
…found the billing statements admissible on the basis of the business record exception to the hearsay rule, concluding the verified account established the necessary foundation to admit the statements as business records. Morales contends the bank failed to establish the proper foundation and the billing statements were hearsay. The bank answers this contention by first arguing…
On business records, GE MONEY BANK, Appellee, v. Maria MORALES, Appellant speaks to the Iowa dispute in this passage: "Morales contends the bank failed to establish the proper foundation and the billing statements were hearsay." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Lewis Lopez FISHER, Jr., Appellant
STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Lewis Lopez FISHER, Jr., Appellant, 1970 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 861 (1970)
…accordingly. Our present section 622.28 is a relatively new business records statute which became effective in 1961. It replaced our prior shop-book record rule. Its purpose was to liberalize the circumstances under which written memoranda, reports, and other data may be admitted into evidence without the necessity of producing each person who contributed information to those r…
STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Lewis Lopez FISHER, Jr., Appellant is worth reading on Iowa business records because the court put the point in its own words: "Our present section 622.28 is a relatively new business records statute which became effective in 1961. It replaced our prior shop-book record rule." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
STATE of Iowa, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Brock McRey BURGDORF, Defendant-Appellant
…otion, reasoning the documents would likely fall within the business records exception to the rule prohibiting admission of hearsay evidence. See Iowa Rs. Evid. 5.801, .802. At trial, the State began by eliciting general testimony about NPLEx records from a special agent with the Iowa Department of Public Safety. In the midst of his testimony, the State moved to amend the minut…
Practitioners open STATE of Iowa, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Brock McRey BURGDORF, Defendant-Appellant when Iowa business records turns on the distinction in this sentence: "See Iowa Rs. Evid. 5.801, .802. At trial, the State began by eliciting general testimony about NPLEx records from a special agent with the Iowa Department of Public Safety." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
State of Iowa v. Kris Warick
State of Iowa v. Kris Warick (2014)
…established through the testimony of three witnesses and a business records affidavit. A pharmacist testified regarding the process and procedure by which a covered retailer obtained and recorded identification information and a signature at the point of sale and the process and procedure by which that information was placed into the electronic repository. A special agent from…
Practitioners open State of Iowa v. Kris Warick when Iowa business records turns on the distinction in this sentence: "A pharmacist testified regarding the process and procedure by which a covered retailer obtained and recorded identification information and a signature at the point of sale and the process and procedure by which that information was placed into the electronic repository." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Jason McKenney v. Iowa Physicians Clinic Medical Foundation, d/b/a Unity Point Clinic and Unity Point Clinic Family
…id adequate foundation for admission of Exhibit B under the business record exception through the testimony of Arein Mutchler. Consequently, the Court admitted Exhibit B as a business record over [McKenney’s] objection. After reviewing the transcript of the trial testimony of Ms. Mutchler, the Court once again concludes that [the Medical Providers] met their burden of proving t…
Iowa opinions such as Jason McKenney v. Iowa Physicians Clinic Medical Foundation, d/b/a Unity Point Clinic and Unity Point Clinic Family are cited where business records is disputed. The court stated: "Exhibit B under the business record exception through the testimony of Arein Mutchler. Consequently, the Court admitted Exhibit B as a business record over [McKenney’s] objection. After reviewing the transcript of the trial testimony of Ms." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
State of Iowa v. Heidi Fiems
State of Iowa v. Heidi Fiems (2020)
…business-records exception to the hearsay rule. To admit a business record and avoid exclusion as hearsay, a party must establish a foundation for the record, including: (1) That it is a business record; (2) That it was made at or near the time of an act; (3) That it was made by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge; (4) That it was kept in the course of…
On business records, State of Iowa v. Heidi Fiems speaks to the Iowa dispute in this passage: "business-records exception to the hearsay rule. To admit a business record and avoid exclusion as hearsay, a party must establish a foundation for the record, including: (1) That it is a business record; (2) That it was made at or near the time of an act; (3) That it was made by," The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Important hearsay exceptions that do not require unavailability
Three present-sense and mental-state exceptions carry most of the remaining traffic in Iowa trial practice.
Excited utterance — Iowa R. Evid. 803(2). A statement relating to a startling event or condition, made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused. Timing is elastic; composure defeats the exception even minutes after the event, while visible distress can preserve it for hours.
Present sense impression — Iowa R. Evid. 803(1). A statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while or immediately after the declarant perceived it. Contemporaneity is strict — seconds and minutes, not hours — and excitement is not required.
Then-existing mental, emotional, or physical condition — Iowa R. Evid. 803(3). Statements of then-existing state of mind (including intent and plan) come in; statements of memory or belief offered to prove the fact remembered generally do not. Intent-to-meet-another-person cases remain the hardest applications.
Declarant unavailable
When the declarant is unavailable under Iowa R. Evid. 804(a), Iowa opens a second suite of exceptions. Unavailability typically includes privilege, refusal to testify despite court order, lack of memory, death or then-existing infirmity, and absence despite reasonable efforts to procure attendance. The proponent bears the burden of proving unavailability with specific facts — a bare assertion that the witness "could not be found" is not enough.
Former testimony under Iowa R. Evid. 804(b)(1) is the workhorse once unavailability is shown: testimony given as a witness at a trial, hearing, or lawful deposition, offered against a party who had an opportunity and similar motive to develop it by direct, cross, or redirect. Criminal confrontation analysis runs in parallel and is not satisfied merely because a hearsay exception applies.
Dying declarations
Dying declarations under Iowa R. Evid. 804(b)(2) remain a narrow but decisive exception in homicide and, in many jurisdictions, civil cases involving the cause or circumstances of what the declarant believed to be impending death. The foundational showing is the declarant's belief that death was imminent — not that death in fact followed within any particular time — plus a statement concerning the cause or circumstances of what the declarant believed to be the impending death. Courts police coaching and narrative expansions aggressively.
Iowa dying-declaration opinions
STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Sessions Lament HARPER, Appellant
STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Sessions Lament HARPER, Appellant, 2009 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 12 (2009)
…r two exceptions to the hearsay rule, excited utterance and dying declaration. Iowa Rs. Evid. 5.803(2), 5.804(b)(2). An excited utterance is a “statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.” Iowa R. Evid. 5.803(2). “The rationale behind the exception is that statements made unde…
Iowa opinions such as STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Sessions Lament HARPER, Appellant are cited where dying declaration is disputed. The court stated: "Iowa Rs. Evid. 5.803(2), 5.804(b)(2). An excited utterance is a “statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.” Iowa R. Evid. 5.803(2)." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
State v. Elliott
State v. Elliott, 45 Iowa 486 (1877)
…he principal evidence against the defendant consists in the dying declarations of deceased. The State introduced T. J. Caldwell, a surgeon who was called to attend Bold. Tie testified as to liis condition and his belief that his dissolution was approaching. He was then asked to state what Bold said in regard to who shot him, or who inflicted the wound on him. The defendant obje…
On dying declaration, State v. Elliott speaks to the Iowa dispute in this passage: "The State introduced T. J. Caldwell, a surgeon who was called to attend Bold. Tie testified as to liis condition and his belief that his dissolution was approaching. He was then asked to state what Bold said in regard to who shot him, or who inflicted the wound on him." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
State v. Clemons
State v. Clemons, 51 Iowa 274 (1879)
…e was convicted. State v. Tweedy, 11 Iowa, 350. i evidence: dying declarations. II. On the evening of the 19th of August, 1876, the deceased, with several other persons, was in a billiard hall in the village of Westchester, Washington county. There was a window m the north end of the hall. The lower sash of the window was up and a curtain extended down near to the bottom of the…
State v. Clemons is worth reading on Iowa dying declaration because the court put the point in its own words: "State v. Tweedy, 11 Iowa, 350. i evidence: dying declarations. II. On the evening of the 19th of August, 1876, the deceased, with several other persons, was in a billiard hall in the village of Westchester, Washington county. There was a window m the north end of the hall." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
State v. Baldwin
State v. Baldwin, 79 Iowa 714 (1890)
…o statements made by *719Mattie Rodabaugh, deceased, as her dying declarations. The grounds of defendant’s objections were that it was not shown that deceased was conscious of her danger, and had given up all hopes of recovery at the time of making the statements; that she was not conscious and sane at the time; and that the statements are not declarations of admissible facts.…
Iowa opinions such as State v. Baldwin are cited where dying declaration is disputed. The court stated: "Mattie Rodabaugh, deceased, as her dying declarations." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
State of Iowa v. J. W. Sale
State of Iowa v. J. W. Sale, 119 Iowa 1 (1902)
…was made in behalf of defendant to show that deceased made dying declarations to the effect that he was to blame in the difficulty between them, and that defendant had to do what he did. But this offer was refused on the ground that what was offered to be shown was a mere conclusion ox the deceased, and therefore inadmissible,under the ruling of this court in State v. Wright,1…
State of Iowa v. J. W. Sale is worth reading on Iowa dying declaration because the court put the point in its own words: "But this offer was refused on the ground that what was offered to be shown was a mere conclusion ox the deceased, and therefore inadmissible,under the ruling of this court in State v." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
State of Iowa, Appellee, v. George H. Gibson, Appellant
State of Iowa, Appellee, v. George H. Gibson, Appellant, 204 Iowa 1306 (1927)
…st the officer. The testimony of the witness Bourke and the dying declaration of’ the officer are to the effect that they saw Gibson come from the south and disappear behind the barn shortly before the sheriff walked toward the barn door. An indictment was returned by the grand jury on the 10th day of April, 1926, charging the appellant with murder in the first degree. On April…
On dying declaration, State of Iowa, Appellee, v. George H. Gibson, Appellant speaks to the Iowa dispute in this passage: "The testimony of the witness Bourke and the dying declaration of’ the officer are to the effect that they saw Gibson come from the south and disappear behind the barn shortly before the sheriff walked toward the barn door." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
State of Iowa v. Conrad Klute
State of Iowa v. Conrad Klute, 160 Iowa 170 (1913)
…ions given by the court. 2. Criminal law: murder: evidence: dying declarations. II. A written dying declaration of deceased was admitted in evidence. Defendant objected to the statement as a whole, and to certain parts of it, on the ground that it contained matters not properly admissible as- a dying statement, for the reason that as to some of such matters deceased could not h…
Practitioners open State of Iowa v. Conrad Klute when Iowa dying declaration turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Criminal law: murder: evidence: dying declarations. II. A written dying declaration of deceased was admitted in evidence." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
State of Iowa v. Lem Johns
State of Iowa v. Lem Johns, 152 Iowa 383 (1911)
…either side. Against this the state introduced a purported dying declaration made by Tharp, from which we quote the following: Mr. Tharp said that'he and his wife had been down to their little house where they had been living, packing 'up their goods preparatory to moving them over to his father’s house, where he and his father had been living before; that they worked awhile,…
On dying declaration, State of Iowa v. Lem Johns speaks to the Iowa dispute in this passage: "Against this the state introduced a purported dying declaration made by Tharp, from which we quote the following: Mr." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Medical diagnosis or treatment statements
Statements made for medical diagnosis or treatment under Iowa R. Evid. 803(4) cover medical history, past or present symptoms, and their general cause when reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. The exception is not limited to treating physicians; statements to nurses, EMTs, and consulting clinicians can qualify when the diagnostic purpose is genuine. Fault and identity remain the usual battleground: "I was hit by a car" is often pertinent; "the light was green" usually is not; abuser identity in child-abuse and domestic-violence cases is heavily litigated.
Iowa medical-statement opinions
STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Steven Dale HILDRETH, Appellant
STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Steven Dale HILDRETH, Appellant, 1998 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 197 (1998)
…as a witness: [[Image here]] (4) Statements for Purposes of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment. Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. The po…
STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Steven Dale HILDRETH, Appellant is worth reading on Iowa medical diagnosis hearsay because the court put the point in its own words: "Image here]] (4) Statements for Purposes of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Trent D. SMITH, Appellant
STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Trent D. SMITH, Appellant, 2016 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 26 (2016)
…ule of Evidence 5.803(4) as statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. The court of appeals found the hearsay statements were properly admitted at the trial. On our review, we conclude there was insufficient foundation to admit, the statements under rule 5.803(4). We affirm the decision of the court of appeals in part and vacate in part, reverse the decisio…
Practitioners open STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Trent D. SMITH, Appellant when Iowa medical diagnosis hearsay turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Evidence 5.803(4) as statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. The court of appeals found the hearsay statements were properly admitted at the trial. On our review, we conclude there was insufficient foundation to admit, the statements under rule 5.803(4)." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Michael Wesley TORNQUIST, Appellant
STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Michael Wesley TORNQUIST, Appellant, 1999 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 215 (1999)
…3(4) (hearsay exception for statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment) of statements made by an alleged victim to a mental health counselor; (2) use of a prior conviction under Iowa Code chapter 709 for enhancement of a sexually predatory offense under Iowa Code chapter 901A (1997); and (3) proper procedure to be followed under Iowa rule of criminal proced…
STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Michael Wesley TORNQUIST, Appellant is worth reading on Iowa medical diagnosis hearsay because the court put the point in its own words: "3(4) (hearsay exception for statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment) of statements made by an alleged victim to a mental health counselor; (2) use of a prior conviction under Iowa Code chapter 709 for enhancement of a sexually predatory offense under Iowa" Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
State of Iowa v. Stephen Carl Brodersen, Jr.
State of Iowa v. Stephen Carl Brodersen, Jr. (2017)
…ts to the examining nurse were not made for the purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment but rather given in response to the nurse’s questions as part of the nurse’s forensic examination. Our review is for correction of errors at law. See State v. Smith, 876 N.W.2d 180, 184 (Iowa 2016). Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter…
State of Iowa v. Stephen Carl Brodersen, Jr. is worth reading on Iowa medical diagnosis hearsay because the court put the point in its own words: "Our review is for correction of errors at law. See State v. Smith, 876 N.W.2d 180, 184 (Iowa 2016)." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
State of Iowa v. Jessy Ryan Demoss
State of Iowa v. Jessy Ryan Demoss, 31 N.W.3d 190 (2026)
…tted the identification as a statement made for purposes of medical diagnosis under Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.803(4). The jury ultimately convicted DeMoss as charged. DeMoss now appeals. STANDARD OF REVIEW Our review of evidentiary rulings on hearsay is for the correction of legal error. State v. Walker, 935 N.W.2d 874, 878 (Iowa 2019). “Although we normally review evidence-admis…
Iowa opinions such as State of Iowa v. Jessy Ryan Demoss are cited where medical diagnosis hearsay is disputed. The court stated: "Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.803(4). The jury ultimately convicted DeMoss as charged. DeMoss now appeals. STANDARD OF REVIEW Our review of evidentiary rulings on hearsay is for the correction of legal error. State v. Walker, 935 N.W.2d 874, 878 (Iowa 2019)." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
State of Iowa v. Jeremy Allan Anderson
State of Iowa v. Jeremy Allan Anderson (2018)
…parts were involved, that would be pertinent to any sort of medical diagnosis and treatment? A. Exactly. You couldn't do your full assessment, treatment without knowing that part of it. Finding adequate foundation had been provided, the district court overruled Anderson’s hearsay objection. Hoodjer then testified: A.F. said the neighbor’s boyfriend put his hands down her pants.…
Iowa opinions such as State of Iowa v. Jeremy Allan Anderson are cited where medical diagnosis hearsay is disputed. The court stated: "A. Exactly. You couldn't do your full assessment, treatment without knowing that part of it. Finding adequate foundation had been provided, the district court overruled Anderson’s hearsay objection. Hoodjer then testified: A.F." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Use of depositions at trial
Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.704 and 1.731 govern civil depositions and trial use. Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.15 controls criminal discovery; prior testimony may be admitted under Iowa R. Evid. 804(b)(1) when the declarant is unavailable.
Deposition use is always a two-layer problem: procedural permission to read or play the deposition, plus a hearsay path (often former testimony, party admission, or impeachment). Counsel who satisfy the civil or criminal procedure rule but skip the evidence-rule foundation invite a sustained objection; counsel who have a hearsay exception but failed to preserve the deposition under the procedural rule face the same result. Video designations, counter-designations, and completeness objections should be teed up before the jury is seated.
Iowa deposition / former-testimony opinions
STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Richard Lamont HOLLAND, Appellant
STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Richard Lamont HOLLAND, Appellant, 1986 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 1195 (1986)
…fore, decided not to subpoena him, but to take a videotaped deposition instead during the week prior to the time trial actually occurred. Both parties were aware of the purpose for taking the deposition. Defendant and his counsel attended the deposition but objected on the ground that the witness was not unavailable for trial. Cross-examination was permitted, and a thorough cro…
Practitioners open STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Richard Lamont HOLLAND, Appellant when Iowa deposition / former testimony turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Both parties were aware of the purpose for taking the deposition. Defendant and his counsel attended the deposition but objected on the ground that the witness was not unavailable for trial." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
STATE of Iowa, Appellant, v. Daniel Dean RAINSONG, Appellee
STATE of Iowa, Appellant, v. Daniel Dean RAINSONG, Appellee, 2011 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 104 (2011)
WIGGINS, Justice. The State noticed the deposition of a victim. The defendant refused to attend the deposition. The State proceeded to take the deposition of the victim without participation by the defendant and later attempted to introduce the deposition at trial. The district court did not allow the State to use the deposition. The State requested interloc…
On deposition / former testimony, STATE of Iowa, Appellant, v. Daniel Dean RAINSONG, Appellee speaks to the Iowa dispute in this passage: "WIGGINS, Justice. The State noticed the deposition of a victim. The defendant refused to attend the deposition. The State proceeded to take the deposition of the victim without participation by the defendant and later attempted to introduce the deposition at trial." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. William Walter DEAN, Appellant
STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. William Walter DEAN, Appellant, 1983 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 1521 (1983)
…ue in this appeal is whether the State’s use of a discovery deposition violated defendant’s sixth amendment right of confrontation. A jury found defendant guilty of second-degree robbery, a violation of Iowa Code sections 711.1 and 711.3. He appeals and we reverse and remand for new trial. Prom the evidence the jury readily could have found defendant and an accomplice, Teresa J…
Practitioners open STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. William Walter DEAN, Appellant when Iowa deposition / former testimony turns on the distinction in this sentence: "State’s use of a discovery deposition violated defendant’s sixth amendment right of confrontation. A jury found defendant guilty of second-degree robbery, a violation of Iowa Code sections 711.1 and 711.3. He appeals and we reverse and remand for new trial." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
STATE of Iowa, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Sharon Kay CUEVAS, Defendant-Appellant
…that trial court's acceptance of the complaining witness's deposition at trial was in violation of her constitutional right to confront witnesses against her and entitles her to a new trial. We reverse and remand for a new trial. On September 2, 1980, defendant was charged by county attorney's information with theft in the second degree in violation of sections 714.1(1) and 71…
STATE of Iowa, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Sharon Kay CUEVAS, Defendant-Appellant is worth reading on Iowa deposition / former testimony because the court put the point in its own words: "We reverse and remand for a new trial. On September 2, 1980, defendant was charged by county attorney's information with theft in the second degree in violation of sections 714." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
STATE of Iowa, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Duane Eddie WRIGHT, Defendant-Appellant
…court erred by admitting into evidence the transcript of a deposition given by his brother, Donnell Wright. Donnell testified that *730 shortly after the crime the defendant and his companion had arrived at the brother’s house with incriminating physical evidence and had made incriminating statements. The defendant contends he was prejudiced by repetitious hearsay statements c…
On deposition / former testimony, STATE of Iowa, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Duane Eddie WRIGHT, Defendant-Appellant speaks to the Iowa dispute in this passage: "Donnell Wright. Donnell testified that *730 shortly after the crime the defendant and his companion had arrived at the brother’s house with incriminating physical evidence and had made incriminating statements." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Michael Lee KELLOGG, Appellant
STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Michael Lee KELLOGG, Appellant, 385 N.W.2d 558 (1986)
…h murder. In preparing for trial, Kellogg’s lawyer took the deposition of Walker who, Kellogg claims, actually killed the victim. At the time Walker gave her deposition, she had not been charged with a crime, and she did not have an attorney present with her. In her deposition, Walker testified that, on the day immediately preceding the killing, she discovered that the victim w…
Iowa opinions such as STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Michael Lee KELLOGG, Appellant are cited where deposition / former testimony is disputed. The court stated: "In preparing for trial, Kellogg’s lawyer took the deposition of Walker who, Kellogg claims, actually killed the victim. At the time Walker gave her deposition, she had not been charged with a crime, and she did not have an attorney present with her." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
STATE of Iowa, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Barry Lynn REDDICK, Defendant-Appellant
…appeals, saying the court erred in its conclusion that the deposition should be allowed because the witness was unavailable and other requirements were met of the exception to the hearsay rule found at Iowa Rule of Evidence 804(b)(5). We reverse and remand. The case against defendant on second-degree burglary charges was circumstantial. His vehicle was seen by the police chief…
Iowa opinions such as STATE of Iowa, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Barry Lynn REDDICK, Defendant-Appellant are cited where deposition / former testimony is disputed. The court stated: "Iowa Rule of Evidence 804(b)(5). We reverse and remand. The case against defendant on second-degree burglary charges was circumstantial." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Authenticity: why it matters and how to prove it
Authenticity is not a hearsay doctrine and it is not optional. Under Iowa R. Evid. 901, 902, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is. Self-authenticating categories — certified public records, newspapers, acknowledged documents, trade inscriptions, and (where adopted) certified domestic records of a regularly conducted activity — shorten the path, but most trial exhibits still need a sponsoring witness, distinctive characteristics, chain of custody, or process-or-system evidence.
Iowa farm-equipment accidents and medical-malpractice trials require authenticated maintenance records, expert imaging, and EHR exports under Iowa R. Evid. 901 before jurors may consider them.
Why authenticity gets its own section in every Iowa trial notebook:
- It is a condition precedent. An unauthenticated exhibit never reaches the relevance, hearsay, or privilege analysis in a useful way — the jury never properly considers it.
- Digital evidence multiplies the failure modes. Screenshots, social-media posts, text threads, and cloud downloads require hash values, account attribution, metadata, or a percipient witness who saw the content created or received.
- Chain of custody is authenticity by another name. Drugs, firearms, biological samples, and seized devices are excluded when the links from seizure to lab to courtroom are broken, even if a hearsay exception would otherwise apply to a lab report.
- Business-records shortcuts do not replace authentication. A custodian can explain record-keeping practices and still fail if nobody can say the particular PDF or printout is the record of this patient, this account, or this machine.
- Self-authentication is narrow. Counsel who wave a notarization or a letterhead and skip the rest of Rule 901-style analysis often lose when the document's contents are disputed.
Practical authentication checklist for Iowa trials: identify the exhibit; choose a 901 method or a 902 category; line up the sponsoring witness or certificate; preserve chain-of-custody testimony for physical and digital items; and separate the authenticity objection from any hearsay objection so the court rules on each.
Iowa authenticity opinions
STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Brian M. KENNEDY, Appellant
STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Brian M. KENNEDY, Appellant, 2014 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 51 (2014)
…tness, and the second issue was whether the record could be authenticated without the custodian’s testimony. Id. We first recognized the underlying public record was not testimonial when we considered the purpose of the right of cross-examination. Id. at 237. The IDOT created the driving record prior to the criminal prosecution and it would have existed even if there was not a…
Iowa opinions such as STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Brian M. KENNEDY, Appellant are cited where authentication is disputed. The court stated: "Id. We first recognized the underlying public record was not testimonial when we considered the purpose of the right of cross-examination. Id. at 237." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Lester Donald HOLDERNESS, Appellant
STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Lester Donald HOLDERNESS, Appellant, 1980 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 874 (1980)
…01(a) and (b)(4): (a) General provision. The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims. (b) Illustrations. By way of illustration only, and not by way of limitation, the following are examples of authentica *231 tion o…
Iowa opinions such as STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Lester Donald HOLDERNESS, Appellant are cited where authentication is disputed. The court stated: "General provision. The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims. (b) Illustrations." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Lewis Lopez FISHER, Jr., Appellant
STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Lewis Lopez FISHER, Jr., Appellant, 1970 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 861 (1970)
…ntly raised the issue of the preliminary proof necessary to authenticate a hospital record before its admission under section 622.28, Code. The only issue raised concerns the mechanics by which the laboratory report became and remained part of the hospital rcords justifying its later use to establish “the facts stated therein.” We limit our discussion accordingly. Our present s…
Iowa opinions such as STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Lewis Lopez FISHER, Jr., Appellant are cited where authentication is disputed. The court stated: "Code. The only issue raised concerns the mechanics by which the laboratory report became and remained part of the hospital rcords justifying its later use to establish “the facts stated therein.” We limit our discussion accordingly." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Brandon SAYLES, Appellant
STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Brandon SAYLES, Appellant, 2003 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 94 (2003)
…ected on two grounds: (1) lack of foundation, specifically, authentication; and (2) the unfair prejudice of the evidence outweighed its probative value. The court made a preliminary ruling it would allow the State to show eight of the nineteen slides. The defendant renewed his objections to the evidence at trial, focusing specifically on the slide depicting how a shaken baby in…
Practitioners open STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Brandon SAYLES, Appellant when Iowa authentication turns on the distinction in this sentence: "The court made a preliminary ruling it would allow the State to show eight of the nineteen slides." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Chester WALTON, Jr., Appellant
STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Chester WALTON, Jr., Appellant, 1981 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 1069 (1981)
…of section 747.5 [definition of habitual criminal], a duly authenticated copy of the former judgment and commitment, from any court in which such judgment and commitment was had, for either of the said crimes formerly committed by the party indicted under section 747.5, shall be competent and prima-facie evidence of such former judgment and commitment, and may be used in evide…
Iowa opinions such as STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Chester WALTON, Jr., Appellant are cited where authentication is disputed. The court stated: "of section 747.5 [definition of habitual criminal], a duly authenticated copy of the former judgment and commitment, from any court in which such judgment and commitment was had, for either of the said crimes formerly committed by the party indicted under section 747.5, shall be" That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
STATE of Iowa, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Brock McRey BURGDORF, Defendant-Appellant
…al, one of which we find dispositive: the absence of proper authentication or founda *276 tion for admission of the NPLEx records. Certain other issues will be addressed to the extent they bear on this issue. II. Authentication, Foundation of NPLEx Records Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.901 requires authentication or identification of documents as a condition precedent to admissibilit…
Iowa opinions such as STATE of Iowa, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Brock McRey BURGDORF, Defendant-Appellant are cited where authentication is disputed. The court stated: "NPLEx records. Certain other issues will be addressed to the extent they bear on this issue. II. Authentication, Foundation of NPLEx Records Iowa Rule of Evidence 5." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Isaac Baldwin v. D. L. Ryder
Isaac Baldwin v. D. L. Ryder, 85 Iowa 251 (1892)
…of the Code, and that the trial judge has not certified or authenticated any such transei’ipt. The cause was submitted on the eighth day of April, 1890, and a decree entered on the twenty-second day of April, 1890. The appellant’s additional abstract shows that the official reporter’s' shorthand notes of the testimony, duly certified by him, were filed with the clerk oh the te…
On authentication, Isaac Baldwin v. D. L. Ryder speaks to the Iowa dispute in this passage: "Code, and that the trial judge has not certified or authenticated any such transei’ipt. The cause was submitted on the eighth day of April, 1890, and a decree entered on the twenty-second day of April, 1890." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Langerman v. Mohr
…the admission of the anonymous letters, asserting a lack of authentication and foundation; even if foundation could be shown, the letters contained “multiple levels of hearsay, of which no exception can apply.” The court allowed the exhibits subject to the objections and stated it would rule on the objections if it relied on the letters. In its written ruling, the district cour…
Iowa opinions such as Langerman v. Mohr are cited where authentication is disputed. The court stated: "The court allowed the exhibits subject to the objections and stated it would rule on the objections if it relied on the letters." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Practice checklist
- State the relevance theory in one sentence before naming an exception.
- Run the 403 / unfair-prejudice balance explicitly for other-acts and graphic exhibits.
- For character or other-acts evidence, identify the non-propensity purpose and request a limiting instruction on the record.
- Decide whether an out-of-court statement is hearsay for the purpose offered before hunting exceptions.
- Lay business-records foundations with time, knowledge, regular practice, and custodial qualifications — or a qualifying certification.
- Prove unavailability with specific facts before offering former testimony or dying declarations.
- Treat deposition use as procedure-plus-hearsay; designate and counter-designate early.
- Authenticate every exhibit under Iowa R. Evid. 901, 902 (or the self-authentication path) before arguing hearsay.
- Preserve chain of custody for physical and digital evidence with named custodians.
- Search LawDiver for recent Iowa appellate evidence opinions before mediation or motions in limine.
Contents
- General standards of admissibility
- Character evidence
- Hearsay: start with the definition
- Party admissions
- Business records
- Important hearsay exceptions that do not require unavailability
- Declarant unavailable
- Dying declarations
- Medical diagnosis or treatment statements
- Use of depositions at trial
- Authenticity: why it matters and how to prove it
- Practice checklist
- Frequently asked questions
General standards of admissibility
Iowa starts every evidence dispute with relevance and unfair prejudice. Under Iowa R. Evid. 401, 403, evidence is relevant when it has any tendency to make a fact of consequence more or less probable, and relevant evidence is still excluded when its probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. Preliminary questions of admissibility are for the court; conditional relevance and limited-purpose instructions keep otherwise-usable proof from becoming a Trojan horse for propensity or truth-of-the-matter use.
Iowa has state-specific impeachment and rape-shield provisions within the rules. Federal bankruptcy and diversity cases in Iowa apply the FRE, not Iowa R. Evid.
Practice tip: articulate the theory of relevance in one sentence before citing the exception. Lawyers who lead with "it's a business record" without explaining what fact the record proves often lose the 403 balance even when the hearsay foundation is clean.
Frequently asked questions
What is the primary evidence source in Iowa?
Iowa applies the Iowa Rules of Evidence. Iowa's rules closely track the FRE; Iowa R. Evid. 401–902 are used in district court civil and criminal trials with persuasive federal authority.
How do Iowa courts decide relevance and unfair prejudice?
Under Iowa R. Evid. 401, 403, evidence must make a fact of consequence more or less probable, and the court may exclude relevant evidence when unfair prejudice, confusion, or waste of time substantially outweighs its probative value.
Are party admissions hearsay in Iowa?
Party-opponent statements under Iowa R. Evid. 801(d)(2) are generally excluded from the hearsay ban (or treated as an exception, depending on local drafting). They may be offered against the party who made or adopted them without showing unavailability.
What foundation is required for business records?
Under Iowa R. Evid. 803(6), show a record made at or near the time from someone with knowledge, kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity, as a regular practice, through a custodian, qualified witness, or allowed certification — subject to trustworthiness attack.
When can I use a deposition at trial in Iowa?
Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.704 and 1.731 govern civil depositions and trial use. Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.15 controls criminal discovery; prior testimony may be admitted under Iowa R. Evid. 804(b)(1) when the declarant is unavailable.
Why is authenticity separate from hearsay?
Authenticity asks whether the item is what you claim it is; hearsay asks whether out-of-court assertions inside it may be used for their truth. You can lose on either ground independently. Iowa authenticity practice starts with Iowa R. Evid. 901, 902.
Where do dying declarations and medical statements fit?
Dying declarations under Iowa R. Evid. 804(b)(2) require belief in impending death and concern the cause or circumstances of that believed death. Medical statements under Iowa R. Evid. 803(4) require a genuine diagnostic or treatment purpose and reasonable pertinence to care.