Start with Indiana Rules of Evidence. In Indiana, Indiana evidence practice is organized under the Indiana Rules of Evidence. Relevance starts at Ind. R. Evid. 401, 403; hearsay starts at Ind. R. Evid. 801, 802. That is the question this guide answers for evidence law. Authenticity is a separate fight under Ind. R. Evid. 901, 902. Depositions at trial: Ind. Trial R. 32 governs civil deposition use at trial. Ind. Crim. R. 17 addresses criminal discovery; deposition testimony at trial generally requires Ind. R. Evid. 804(b)(1) with proper unavailability findings.
General standards of admissibility
Indiana starts every evidence dispute with relevance and unfair prejudice. Under Ind. R. Evid. 401, 403, evidence is relevant when it has any tendency to make a fact of consequence more or less probable, and relevant evidence is still excluded when its probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. Preliminary questions of admissibility are for the court; conditional relevance and limited-purpose instructions keep otherwise-usable proof from becoming a Trojan horse for propensity or truth-of-the-matter use.
Indiana courts apply Ind. Evidence Rule 617 for religious beliefs. Check Indiana Supreme Court orders for periodic rule amendments.
Practice tip: articulate the theory of relevance in one sentence before citing the exception. Lawyers who lead with "it's a business record" without explaining what fact the record proves often lose the 403 balance even when the hearsay foundation is clean.
Character evidence
Character evidence in Indiana is governed by Ind. R. Evid. 404, 405. The default rule is familiar: evidence of a person's character or character trait is not admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character or trait. The same body of law then carves out the classic exceptions — essential-element character, accused-opens-the-door reputation or opinion, and other-acts evidence offered for a non-propensity purpose such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake.
Other-acts notice, 403 balancing, and limiting instructions do most of the real work. In criminal cases, prosecutors who dump prior misconduct without a specific non-propensity theory invite reversal; defense counsel who open the door to good-character testimony without anticipating rebuttal create the very propensity inference the rules were designed to police.
Indiana character-evidence opinions
Shahid IQBAL, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
…imine instruction to the jury advising them to consider the character evidence only as it related to Iqbal's intent, motive, relationship with Tammy, and absence of mistake or acei-dent. At the end of the jury trial, the jury returned a guilty verdict on all charges. On July 3, 2003, the trial court conducted a sentencing hearing. During this hearing, the trial court sentenced…
Practitioners open Shahid IQBAL, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff when Indiana character evidence turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Iqbal's intent, motive, relationship with Tammy, and absence of mistake or acei-dent. At the end of the jury trial, the jury returned a guilty verdict on all charges. On July 3, 2003, the trial court conducted a sentencing hearing." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Adrian BRAND, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
…rejudice outweighed the probative value of the evidence. 1. Character Evidence to Prove Conduct Generally, evidence of a person's character is inadmissible to prove action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion. Brooks v. State, 683 N.E.2d 574 (Ind.1997); Evid. Rule 404(a). However, Indiana Evidence Rule 404 provides in pertinent part that: (a) Evidence of a person's…
On character evidence, Adrian BRAND, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff speaks to the Indiana dispute in this passage: "Character Evidence to Prove Conduct Generally, evidence of a person's character is inadmissible to prove action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion. Brooks v. State, 683 N.E.2d 574 (Ind.1997); Evid. Rule 404(a)." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Carl R. DOCKERY, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee
Carl R. DOCKERY, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee, 1994 Ind. LEXIS 210 (1994)
…d 675; Smith v. State (1983), 454 N.E.2d 412, 414. That is, character evidence, including evidence of prior or bad acts, was generally inadmissible unless (1) that evidence was independently relevant to some issue other than the defendant's bad character and the inference that the defendant acted in conformity with that bad character, or (2) there existed a specific exception t…
On character evidence, Carl R. DOCKERY, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee speaks to the Indiana dispute in this passage: "Smith v. State (1983), 454 N.E.2d 412, 414." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Joseph E. SUNDLING, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff — Chezem, J., dissenting
…ed sexual instinct exception which allowed the admission of character evidence in the prosecution of certain sex offenses. Rather than admitting evidence of prior bad acts to establish that a sex crime defendant acted in conformity with a previously exhibited depraved sexual instinct, such evidence can now be admitted only when it is offered for a purpose other than to prove th…
Indiana opinions such as Joseph E. SUNDLING, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff — Chezem, J., dissenting are cited where character evidence is disputed. The court stated: "ed sexual instinct exception which allowed the admission of character evidence in the prosecution of certain sex offenses. Rather than admitting evidence of prior bad acts to establish that a sex crime defendant acted in conformity with a previously exhibited depraved sexual inst" That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Bryson MATTHEWS, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
…003). The rationale for the prohibition against bad act and character evidence is “predicated upon our fundamental precept that every defendant should only be required to defend against the specific charges filed.” Oldham v. State, 779 N.E.2d 1162, 1173 (Ind.Ct.App.2002), trans. denied. To decide whether character evidence is admissible under Evid. R. 404(b), the trial court mu…
Bryson MATTHEWS, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff is worth reading on Indiana character evidence because the court put the point in its own words: "The rationale for the prohibition against bad act and character evidence is “predicated upon our fundamental precept that every defendant should only be required to defend against the specific charges filed.” Oldham v. State, 779 N.E.2d 1162, 1173 (Ind.Ct.App.2002), trans. denied." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Dale R. RHODES, Appellant, Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
…victions. Because we find that the introduction of improper character evidence was so prejudicial that it rendered a fair trial impossible, we reverse Rhodes's conviction and remand for a new trial. Facts and Procedural History In the early morning hours of November 7, 2000, Syracuse Police Officer Joe Salazar was at a Redi-Mart gas station getting gas for his patrol car. While…
On character evidence, Dale R. RHODES, Appellant, Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff speaks to the Indiana dispute in this passage: "Because we find that the introduction of improper character evidence was so prejudicial that it rendered a fair trial impossible, we reverse Rhodes's conviction and remand for a new trial." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Joseph LARRY, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
…Collateral Misconduct Indiana Evidence Rule 404 reads: (a) Character Evidence Generally. Evidence of a person’s character or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, ... (b) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a pers…
Indiana opinions such as Joseph LARRY, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff are cited where character evidence is disputed. The court stated: "Collateral Misconduct Indiana Evidence Rule 404 reads: (a) Character Evidence Generally. Evidence of a person’s character or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, ..." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
How the Indiana rule applies
Apply the Indiana authorities in order. The facts are simplified so the statute and the standard are visible.
A lawyer in Indiana wants to offer a medical record, a party email, and a statement the declarant made while believing death was imminent.
- Clear relevance and unfair prejudice under Ind. R. Evid. 401, 403.
- If the email is the opposing party's, test Ind. R. Evid. 801(d)(2) before the hearsay definition in Ind. R. Evid. 801, 802.
- For the medical record, lay the business-records foundation in Ind. R. Evid. 803(6) and the treatment purpose in Ind. R. Evid. 803(4).
- For the deathbed statement, meet Ind. R. Evid. 804(b)(2), then authenticate every exhibit under Ind. R. Evid. 901, 902.
Indiana keeps hearsay, character, and authenticity on different rules inside the Indiana Rules of Evidence. Winning one does not win the others.
Hearsay: start with the definition
Most hearsay objections in Indiana are won or lost on the definition, not on an exception. Under Ind. R. Evid. 801, 802, hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Non-hearsay purposes — verbal acts, effect on the listener, notice, circumstantial evidence of state of mind, and impeachment — remain available when the proponent can articulate them without asking the jury to believe the declarant.
Layered hearsay (hearsay within hearsay) requires an exception or exclusion for each layer. Machine-generated data and non-assertive conduct sit outside the hearsay definition in FRE-aligned jurisdictions, but they still need authenticity and, often, expert or business-records foundations.
Indiana hearsay opinions
John Edward COX, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below)
…the Madison County Work Release Center was revoked based on hearsay evidence from the work release center director concerning marijuana use. The Court of Appeals found the hearsay evidence inadmissible. Because strict evidentiary standards do not apply in community corrections placement revocation hearings, this evidence was admissible. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court. B…
Indiana opinions such as John Edward COX, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below) are cited where hearsay is disputed. The court stated: "Madison County Work Release Center was revoked based on hearsay evidence from the work release center director concerning marijuana use. The Court of Appeals found the hearsay evidence inadmissible." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
James COX, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
…follows: *1026 1. Whether the trial court properly admitted hearsay testimony under the excited utterance hearsay exception; and 2. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support his conviction. Facts and Procedural History . Deputy Sheriff Daniel Herrick responded to a radio dispatch of a reported battery on October 12, 2001. When he arrived at the scene, he observ…
Practitioners open James COX, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff when Indiana hearsay turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Whether the trial court properly admitted hearsay testimony under the excited utterance hearsay exception; and 2. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support his conviction. Facts and Procedural History ." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Ezra MILLER, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee
Ezra MILLER, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee, 1991 Ind. LEXIS 135 (1991)
…al court erred in allowing Dr. Donald Dian to testify, over hearsay objection, about the contents of a telephone conversation he had with a Dr. Varju concerning appellant's former girlfriend, Martha Garber Zang. Appellant raises several other allegations of trial court error, but because our resolution of the hearsay question requires the reversal of his conviction, we find it…
Practitioners open Ezra MILLER, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee when Indiana hearsay turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Dr. Donald Dian to testify, over hearsay objection, about the contents of a telephone conversation he had with a Dr. Varju concerning appellant's former girlfriend, Martha Garber Zang." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Phillip EALY, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below)
…admitting an autopsy report into evidence over defendant’s hearsay objections, (2) whether the trial court erred by allowing a police detective to testify, over hearsay objections, about his conversations with individuals during the course of his investigation, (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction, and (4) whether the sentence is manifestly unreaso…
Indiana opinions such as Phillip EALY, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below) are cited where hearsay is disputed. The court stated: "admitting an autopsy report into evidence over defendant’s hearsay objections, (2) whether the trial court erred by allowing a police detective to testify, over hearsay objections, about his conversations with individuals during the course of his investigation, (3) whether the ev" That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
James BAKER, Appellant (Respondent Below), v. Imogene WAGERS, Appellee (Petitioner Below)
…present at trial, the test report constituted inadmissible hearsay. Additionally Baker contends that the business record exception to the hearsay rule does not apply because the tests were not properly identified by the custodian of the records and because the report was prepared specifically for litigation. We emphasize that Baker does not contest the accuracy of the red bloo…
Practitioners open James BAKER, Appellant (Respondent Below), v. Imogene WAGERS, Appellee (Petitioner Below) when Indiana hearsay turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Additionally Baker contends that the business record exception to the hearsay rule does not apply because the tests were not properly identified by the custodian of the records and because the report was prepared specifically for litigation." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Linda JONES, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
…police officer under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule and to his mother under the present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule; and II. Whether Ind.Code § 385-37-4-6 (1998) is applicable. We affirm. The relevant facts follow. On December 1, 2001, Jones babysat all four of Jennifer Johnson's children at Jones's home on Avenue E in Greencastle, Indian…
Indiana opinions such as Linda JONES, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff are cited where hearsay is disputed. The court stated: "II. Whether Ind.Code § 385-37-4-6 (1998) is applicable. We affirm. The relevant facts follow." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Luis David PALACIOS, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
…counsel because: (A) his trial counsel failed to object to hearsay evidence presented by the State; and (B) his trial counsel failed to request that the jury be instructed on the definitions of "knowingly" and "intentionally." We will address each argument separately. A. Trial Counsel's Decision Not to Object on Hearsay Grounds Palacios argues that his trial counsel was ineffe…
Luis David PALACIOS, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff is worth reading on Indiana hearsay because the court put the point in its own words: "A) his trial counsel failed to object to hearsay evidence presented by the State; and (B) his trial counsel failed to request that the jury be instructed on the definitions of 'knowingly' and 'intentionally.' We will address each argument separately. A." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Party admissions
Statements of an opposing party are among the most important routes around the hearsay bar. Indiana treats them under Ind. R. Evid. 801(d)(2). Nothing about the statement need be against interest, contemporaneous, or based on personal knowledge — the theory is adversarial, not reliability-based. A party cannot complain that his own words are unreliable when offered against him.
Scope questions dominate practice: the party's own statement; adopted statements (including silence in circumstances where a reasonable person would deny); statements by authorized speakers; agent or employee statements on matters within the scope of the relationship; and, in criminal conspiracy cases, coconspirator statements during and in furtherance of the conspiracy. A defendant generally cannot introduce his own exculpatory out-of-court statement as a "party admission" against himself — the rule runs one way.
Indiana party-admission opinions
Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc. v. Fields Et Al.
Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc. v. Fields Et Al., 254 Ind. 219 (1970)
…more obvious ground which requires a reversal, namely, the admission of prejudicial hearsay evidence. The motion for a new trial lists over one-hundred items of alleged hearsay as highly prejudicial before a jury. To go into each one of these items would unduly extend this opinion. We will consider only a few: The first instance that comes to our attention is an affidavit take…
Indiana opinions such as Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc. v. Fields Et Al. are cited where party admissions is disputed. The court stated: "The motion for a new trial lists over one-hundred items of alleged hearsay as highly prejudicial before a jury. To go into each one of these items would unduly extend this opinion." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Aaron G. FOWLER, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
…is rule into three distinct elements that the party seeking admission must prove: "(1) a startling event occurs; (2) a statement was made by a declarant while under the stress of excitement caused by the event; and (8) the statement relates to the event." Williams, 782 N.E.2d at 1046. Here, Officer Decker testified that he arrived at A.R.'s residence approximately five minutes…
Aaron G. FOWLER, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff is worth reading on Indiana party admissions because the court put the point in its own words: "Williams, 782 N.E.2d at 1046. Here, Officer Decker testified that he arrived at A.R." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Robert Jeffrey PELLEY, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below)
…II. Insufficient evidence to support the convictions; III. Admission of certain hearsay statements and exclusion of evidence regarding a third-party motive and the prosecutor's delay in bringing charges; and IV. Denial of Pelley's petition for a special prosecutor. The Court of Appeals reversed Pelley's convictions on the first issue and therefore did not address the remaining…
Practitioners open Robert Jeffrey PELLEY, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below) when Indiana party admissions turns on the distinction in this sentence: "II. Insufficient evidence to support the convictions; III. Admission of certain hearsay statements and exclusion of evidence regarding a third-party motive and the prosecutor's delay in bringing charges; and IV. Denial of Pelley's petition for a special prosecutor." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Roger ISAACS, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below)
…ertainly did not violate Isaaes' Sixth Amendment rights. V. Admission of Coroner's Videotape Before the presentation of evidence, the parties discussed admissibility of a videotape of the coroner's examination of the victim's body at the crime seene. Isaacs did not object to the video being shown, but he urged that it be stopped at the point where the coroner turned the body ov…
Practitioners open Roger ISAACS, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below) when Indiana party admissions turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Isaaes' Sixth Amendment rights. V. Admission of Coroner's Videotape Before the presentation of evidence, the parties discussed admissibility of a videotape of the coroner's examination of the victim's body at the crime seene." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
The Union Central Life Insurance Company v. Thomas
The Union Central Life Insurance Company v. Thomas, 46 Ind. 44 (1873)
…the acts of the agent are admissible, his declarations and admissions respecting the subject-matter will also bind the principal, if they are made at the time, *48an,d constitute part of the transaction. The party’s own admissions, whenever made, may be given in evidence against him; but the admissions or declarations of his agent bind him only when made in regard to a transac…
Indiana opinions such as The Union Central Life Insurance Company v. Thomas are cited where party admissions is disputed. The court stated: "the acts of the agent are admissible, his declarations and admissions respecting the subject-matter will also bind the principal, if they are made at the time, *48an,d constitute part of the transaction. The party’s own admissions, whenever made, may be given in evidence against" That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Garr, Scott & Co. v. Shaffer
Garr, Scott & Co. v. Shaffer, 139 Ind. 191 (1894)
…er. Sarah A. Shaffer was afterwards called and denied these admissions, and denied, also, that the conversations in which it was claimed such admissions were made ever took place. On the theory that the witness, Sarah A. Shaffer, was thus impeached by evidence as to statements made by her out of court, contradictory to those made by her as a witness on the trial, other witnesse…
Practitioners open Garr, Scott & Co. v. Shaffer when Indiana party admissions turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Sarah A. Shaffer was afterwards called and denied these admissions, and denied, also, that the conversations in which it was claimed such admissions were made ever took place. On the theory that the witness, Sarah A." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Jack T. HINKLE, Appellant (Plaintiff Below), v. the GARRETT-KEYSER-BUTLER SCHOOL DISTRICT, the Garrett-Keyser-Butler
…students who had accused him of misconduct. 2. Whether the admission of hearsay evidence during the School Board hearing on Hinkle's contract cancellation violated Hinkle's right to a full and fair hearing. 8. Whether documents prepared by the county welfare department were properly admitted at the hearing under an exception to the hearsay rule. 4. Whether the decision to canc…
Indiana opinions such as Jack T. HINKLE, Appellant (Plaintiff Below), v. the GARRETT-KEYSER-BUTLER SCHOOL DISTRICT, the Garrett-Keyser-Butler are cited where party admissions is disputed. The court stated: "Whether the admission of hearsay evidence during the School Board hearing on Hinkle's contract cancellation violated Hinkle's right to a full and fair hearing. 8." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Business records
The business-records exception under Ind. R. Evid. 803(6) is the everyday path for medical charts, employment files, bank statements, and maintenance logs. The foundation requires a record made at or near the time by — or from information transmitted by — someone with knowledge; kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity; and made as a regular practice. A custodian or other qualified witness (or a qualifying certification where the jurisdiction allows it) lays the foundation. The opponent may still attack lack of trustworthiness when the source or method of preparation indicates unreliability — litigation-driven reports are the classic failure mode.
Do not confuse authenticity with the business-records exception. You still need to show the exhibit is what you claim it is; the hearsay exception then answers why the out-of-court assertions inside it may be considered for their truth.
Indiana business-records opinions
William J. SPEYBROECK, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
…ments into evidence under Indiana Evidence Rule 803(6), the business records exception to the hearsay rule. 3.Whether a retrial is appropriate.- We reverse and remand for' a new trial. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY On February 20, 2002, William purchased a Kawasaki motorcycle from Maple City Cycle (“Maple City”) in Goshen. To finance the purchase, William used a Kawasaki “Good T…
Practitioners open William J. SPEYBROECK, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff when Indiana business records turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Indiana Evidence Rule 803(6), the business records exception to the hearsay rule. 3.Whether a retrial is appropriate.- We reverse and remand for' a new trial." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
In Re the Matter of the TERMINATION OF THE PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP of E.T. and B.T.
…ng home visits and supervised visitations do not qualify as business records and thus are not admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule. Facts The Allen County Office of Family and Children ("OFC") removed E.T. and B.T. from their parents' care in August 1999 after the children were found wandering from their home for the second time in a month. After unsuccessfully workin…
Practitioners open In Re the Matter of the TERMINATION OF THE PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP of E.T. and B.T. when Indiana business records turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Facts The Allen County Office of Family and Children ('OFC') removed E.T. and B.T. from their parents' care in August 1999 after the children were found wandering from their home for the second time in a month." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
In Re Paternity of HRM
In Re Paternity of HRM, 864 N.E.2d 442 (2007)
…ng with these documents, Manlief submitted an "Affidavit of Business Records Custodian" signed by Martin. On September 7, 2006, the trial court issued an Order denying Gaddie's application, and granting Manlief's motion. The trial court ordered that Gaddie's visitation with H.R.M. should now be supervised, and that Gaddie should pay the costs associated with such supervision. G…
On business records, In Re Paternity of HRM speaks to the Indiana dispute in this passage: "Manlief submitted an 'Affidavit of Business Records Custodian' signed by Martin. On September 7, 2006, the trial court issued an Order denying Gaddie's application, and granting Manlief's motion. The trial court ordered that Gaddie's visitation with H.R.M." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
James BAKER, Appellant (Respondent Below), v. Imogene WAGERS, Appellee (Petitioner Below)
…inadmissible hearsay. Additionally Baker contends that the business record exception to the hearsay rule does not apply because the tests were not properly identified by the custodian of the records and because the report was prepared specifically for litigation. We emphasize that Baker does not contest the accuracy of the red blood cell antigen tests, the test's reputation fo…
Practitioners open James BAKER, Appellant (Respondent Below), v. Imogene WAGERS, Appellee (Petitioner Below) when Indiana business records turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Additionally Baker contends that the business record exception to the hearsay rule does not apply because the tests were not properly identified by the custodian of the records and because the report was prepared specifically for litigation." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Paula GROUND, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
…the court erred when it admitted certain evidence under the business records exception to the hearsay rule. FACTS In August of 1995, Ground began working part-time for Employability Services. Ground’s responsibilities included opening the mail, bookkeeping and receptionist duties. As part of her job, Ground frequently wrote checks and presented them to the owner of the company,…
Paula GROUND, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff is worth reading on Indiana business records because the court put the point in its own words: "FACTS In August of 1995, Ground began working part-time for Employability Services. Ground’s responsibilities included opening the mail, bookkeeping and receptionist duties." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Jeffrey EMBREY, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
…used its discretion in admitting certain evidence under the business records exception to the hearsay rule. Embrey also contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for Class C felony neglect of a dependent. Concluding that the trial court acted within its discretion in admitting the challenged evidence and that the evidence is sufficient to sustain Embr…
Practitioners open Jeffrey EMBREY, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff when Indiana business records turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Embrey also contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for Class C felony neglect of a dependent." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Frank Augustus COBB, Jr., Appellant-Defendant v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
…failed to lay a proper foundation for the records under the business record exception. II. Issue The issue on appeal is whether the trial court properly allowed admission of the copies of checks and deposit slips into evidence via the business record exception to the hearsay rule through King, a Bank officer and auditor, who at trial stated he was familiar with the Bank’s recor…
Indiana opinions such as Frank Augustus COBB, Jr., Appellant-Defendant v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff are cited where business records is disputed. The court stated: "failed to lay a proper foundation for the records under the business record exception. II. Issue The issue on appeal is whether the trial court properly allowed admission of the copies of checks and deposit slips into evidence via the business record exception to the hearsay rule" That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Alexander HOLMES, Appellant-Defendant, v. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE STUDENT LOAN TRUST, Appellee-Plaintiff
…s practice to incorporate prior loan records ... into TSI's business records," and therefore she was competent and authorized to testify regarding Holmes's specific loan and "the business records attached" to the affidavit. Id. The purpose of the Jefferis affidavit was to authenticate and lay the foundation for the admissibility of several attached documents, the most relevant…
On business records, Alexander HOLMES, Appellant-Defendant, v. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE STUDENT LOAN TRUST, Appellee-Plaintiff speaks to the Indiana dispute in this passage: "TSI's business records,' and therefore she was competent and authorized to testify regarding Holmes's specific loan and 'the business records attached' to the affidavit. Id." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Important hearsay exceptions that do not require unavailability
Three present-sense and mental-state exceptions carry most of the remaining traffic in Indiana trial practice.
Excited utterance — Ind. R. Evid. 803(2). A statement relating to a startling event or condition, made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused. Timing is elastic; composure defeats the exception even minutes after the event, while visible distress can preserve it for hours.
Present sense impression — Ind. R. Evid. 803(1). A statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while or immediately after the declarant perceived it. Contemporaneity is strict — seconds and minutes, not hours — and excitement is not required.
Then-existing mental, emotional, or physical condition — Ind. R. Evid. 803(3). Statements of then-existing state of mind (including intent and plan) come in; statements of memory or belief offered to prove the fact remembered generally do not. Intent-to-meet-another-person cases remain the hardest applications.
Declarant unavailable
When the declarant is unavailable under Ind. R. Evid. 804(a), Indiana opens a second suite of exceptions. Unavailability typically includes privilege, refusal to testify despite court order, lack of memory, death or then-existing infirmity, and absence despite reasonable efforts to procure attendance. The proponent bears the burden of proving unavailability with specific facts — a bare assertion that the witness "could not be found" is not enough.
Former testimony under Ind. R. Evid. 804(b)(1) is the workhorse once unavailability is shown: testimony given as a witness at a trial, hearing, or lawful deposition, offered against a party who had an opportunity and similar motive to develop it by direct, cross, or redirect. Criminal confrontation analysis runs in parallel and is not satisfied merely because a hearsay exception applies.
Dying declarations
Dying declarations under Ind. R. Evid. 804(b)(2) remain a narrow but decisive exception in homicide and, in many jurisdictions, civil cases involving the cause or circumstances of what the declarant believed to be impending death. The foundational showing is the declarant's belief that death was imminent — not that death in fact followed within any particular time — plus a statement concerning the cause or circumstances of what the declarant believed to be the impending death. Courts police coaching and narrative expansions aggressively.
Indiana dying-declaration opinions
Montgomery v. State
Montgomery v. State, 80 Ind. 338 (1881)
…objection, the State was permitted to give in evidence the dying declarations of the woman. This ruling presents the controlling question in the case. It is contended on the part of the prosecution that the death of the woman is the gravamen of the offence, and that, where death results from an unlawful act in producing abortion, the crime is homicide. In support of the princi…
Montgomery v. State is worth reading on Indiana dying declaration because the court put the point in its own words: "State was permitted to give in evidence the dying declarations of the woman. This ruling presents the controlling question in the case." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Boyle v. State — Zollars, J., dissenting
Boyle v. State — Zollars, J., dissenting, 97 Ind. 322 (1884)
…of as holds competent to go to the jury that portion of the dying declarations of Casey in which he stated that appellant had no reason for the shooting that he, Casey, knew of. In cases of this sort the following propositions are settled beyond controversy : First. The declarations of the deceased are admissible only as to matters to which he would have been competent to testi…
Practitioners open Boyle v. State — Zollars, J., dissenting when Indiana dying declaration turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Casey in which he stated that appellant had no reason for the shooting that he, Casey, knew of. In cases of this sort the following propositions are settled beyond controversy : First." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Willie T. WALLACE, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
…the shooter, satisfy neither the excited utterance nor the dying declaration exception to the admissibility of hearsay. 3 *991 6[1,2] Hearsay is recognized as "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." Ind. Eivi-dence Rule 801(c). Hearsay is admissible under the ex…
Practitioners open Willie T. WALLACE, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff when Indiana dying declaration turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Hearsay is recognized as 'a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.' Ind. Eivi-dence Rule 801(c)." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Lane v. State
Lane v. State, 151 Ind. 511 (1898)
…is insisted that the court erred in admitting in evidence a dying declaration of Thomas Good, which was reduced to writing, and signed by him. Counsel for appellant, in their brief, do not insist that the court erred in admitting the dying declaration as an entirety, but that the part which reads as follows, “I made no attempt to injure him,” should have been excluded by the co…
Lane v. State is worth reading on Indiana dying declaration because the court put the point in its own words: "Thomas Good, which was reduced to writing, and signed by him." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Jeremiah BEVERLY, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
…the crime that Beverly shot him was properly admitted as a dying declaration where the victim suffered a single gunshot wound to the back of his head while driving his car and was slumped over and in a decreased state of consciousness. Furthermore, the deputies had reasonable suspicion to stop Beverly because several people called 911 with generally the same information about…
Indiana opinions such as Jeremiah BEVERLY, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff are cited where dying declaration is disputed. The court stated: "Beverly shot him was properly admitted as a dying declaration where the victim suffered a single gunshot wound to the back of his head while driving his car and was slumped over and in a decreased state of consciousness." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Medical diagnosis or treatment statements
Statements made for medical diagnosis or treatment under Ind. R. Evid. 803(4) cover medical history, past or present symptoms, and their general cause when reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. The exception is not limited to treating physicians; statements to nurses, EMTs, and consulting clinicians can qualify when the diagnostic purpose is genuine. Fault and identity remain the usual battleground: "I was hit by a car" is often pertinent; "the light was green" usually is not; abuser identity in child-abuse and domestic-violence cases is heavily litigated.
Indiana medical-statement opinions
William O. McCLAIN, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
…a Evidence Rule 803(4) for statements made “for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment.” A jury convicted the defendant, William O. McClain, of child molesting, a class B felony. 1 The Court of Appeals affirmed in a memorandum decision. McClain v. State, No. 32A05-9408-CR-307, 654 N.E.2d 918 (Ind.Ct.App.1995). McClain seeks transfer arguing that the trial court erred in rel…
William O. McCLAIN, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff is worth reading on Indiana medical diagnosis hearsay because the court put the point in its own words: "Evidence Rule 803(4) for statements made “for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment.” A jury convicted the defendant, William O. McClain, of child molesting, a class B felony. 1 The Court of Appeals affirmed in a memorandum decision. McClain v. State, No." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
In Re Paternity of HRM
In Re Paternity of HRM, 864 N.E.2d 442 (2007)
…Evid. Rule 103(a). II. Statements Made for the Purposes of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment Under Indiana Evidence Rule 803(4), otherwise inadmissible hearsay may be admitted if it consists of statements made for the purposes of medical treatment.[2] The basis for this rule is the assumption that people seeking medical treatment have a strong incentive to tell the truth, and tha…
Indiana opinions such as In Re Paternity of HRM are cited where medical diagnosis hearsay is disputed. The court stated: "Evid. Rule 103(a). II. Statements Made for the Purposes of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment Under Indiana Evidence Rule 803(4), otherwise inadmissible hearsay may be admitted if it consists of statements made for the purposes of medical treatment." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Eric P. SIBBING, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. Amanda N. CAVE, Individually, and as the Mother and Guardian of
…at "Dr. Saquib, Cave's internist, was not the one receiving medical diagnosis or treatment" and that the plaintiff's "testimony as to what Dr. Saquib allegedly told her about the results of diagnostic tests and the cause of her pain does not qualify as an exception to the hearsay rule under Evid. R. 803(4) since the statements at issue were made by Dr. Saquib to Cave and not by…
Practitioners open Eric P. SIBBING, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. Amanda N. CAVE, Individually, and as the Mother and Guardian of when Indiana medical diagnosis hearsay turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Dr. Saquib, Cave's internist, was not the one receiving medical diagnosis or treatment' and that the plaintiff's 'testimony as to what Dr." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Jeremiah BEVERLY, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
…ce pursuant to Rule 8083(2), or a statement for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment pursuant to Rule 803(4). The trial court ultimately denied the motion in limine because it found that Robinson's statement qualified as one for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. However, the trial court did not state whether the two other exceptions applied as well. On appeal, B…
Practitioners open Jeremiah BEVERLY, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff when Indiana medical diagnosis hearsay turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Rule 8083(2), or a statement for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment pursuant to Rule 803(4). The trial court ultimately denied the motion in limine because it found that Robinson's statement qualified as one for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Dennis COOPER, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
…e? 2. Did the trial court err in admitting, pursuant to the medical diagnosis or treatment exception to the hearsay rule, a nurse’s testimony that the five- or six-year-old victim, S.A., told the nurse that Cooper had kissed her vaginal area? We affirm. The facts most favorable to the judgment are as follows. During 1997, Cooper and his wife Diane provided child care to five ch…
Practitioners open Dennis COOPER, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff when Indiana medical diagnosis hearsay turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Did the trial court err in admitting, pursuant to the medical diagnosis or treatment exception to the hearsay rule, a nurse’s testimony that the five- or six-year-old victim, S.A., told the nurse that Cooper had kissed her vaginal area?" Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Jarrad L. MASTIN, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
…fer of-proof and argument regarding a hearsay exception for medical diagnosis or treatment, the trial court reversed its ruling. Winans was ultimately permitted to testify that K.M. had begun to talk about “why the lady stuck a Q-tip down there and rub[bed] it,” wondered aloud if Winans was “mad at her” and stated, “well my daddy plays secret games with me.” (Tr. 84.) Because M…
Practitioners open Jarrad L. MASTIN, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff when Indiana medical diagnosis hearsay turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Winans was ultimately permitted to testify that K.M. had begun to talk about “why the lady stuck a Q-tip down there and rub[bed] it,” wondered aloud if Winans was “mad at her” and stated, “well my daddy plays secret games with me.” (Tr. 84." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Richard STEELE, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
…02. [10] One exception is a statement made “for Purposes of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment.” Ind. Evidence Rule 803(4). For hearsay to fall into this exception, it must: (1) be made by a person “seeking medical diagnosis or treatment”; (2) be “reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment”; and (3) describe medical history, symptoms, pain or sensations and their inception or g…
Practitioners open Richard STEELE, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff when Indiana medical diagnosis hearsay turns on the distinction in this sentence: "One exception is a statement made “for Purposes of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment.” Ind. Evidence Rule 803(4)." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Use of depositions at trial
Ind. Trial R. 32 governs civil deposition use at trial. Ind. Crim. R. 17 addresses criminal discovery; deposition testimony at trial generally requires Ind. R. Evid. 804(b)(1) with proper unavailability findings.
Deposition use is always a two-layer problem: procedural permission to read or play the deposition, plus a hearsay path (often former testimony, party admission, or impeachment). Counsel who satisfy the civil or criminal procedure rule but skip the evidence-rule foundation invite a sustained objection; counsel who have a hearsay exception but failed to preserve the deposition under the procedural rule face the same result. Video designations, counter-designations, and completeness objections should be teed up before the jury is seated.
Indiana deposition / former-testimony opinions
David James Roberts v. State of Indiana — DeBruler, J., concurring
David James Roberts v. State of Indiana — DeBruler, J., concurring, 268 Ind. 348 (1978)
…ce with regard to the admissibility at trial of the Patrick deposition. The right to confrontation is a trial right which includes the right to cross-examine the State’s witnesses and to have the jury judge their demeanor. Barber v. Page, (1968) 390 U.S. 719, 88 *357S.Ct. 1318, 20 L.Ed.2d 255. A waiver thereof should be an express, intentional act of the accused after having be…
On deposition / former testimony, David James Roberts v. State of Indiana — DeBruler, J., concurring speaks to the Indiana dispute in this passage: "Patrick deposition. The right to confrontation is a trial right which includes the right to cross-examine the State’s witnesses and to have the jury judge their demeanor. Barber v. Page, (1968) 390 U.S. 719, 88 *357S.Ct. 1318, 20 L.Ed.2d 255." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Joseph B. GARNER, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below)
…the woman with whom he lived. We affirm, finding two video depositions admitted at trial did not fall within a hearsay exception but that their admission constituted harmless error. Background, In July 1998, Defendant moved in with his girlfriend, Anna Camp, and her three daughters: S.C., age thirteen; T.C., age twelve; and L.C., age five. Between July and November 1999, while…
Indiana opinions such as Joseph B. GARNER, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below) are cited where deposition / former testimony is disputed. The court stated: "We affirm, finding two video depositions admitted at trial did not fall within a hearsay exception but that their admission constituted harmless error. Background, In July 1998, Defendant moved in with his girlfriend, Anna Camp, and her three daughters: S.C., age thirteen; T.C." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Ronald C. HOWARD, Jr., Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below)
…was found guilty of child molesting based largely upon the deposition testimony of a child witness who refused to testify at trial. Because there was no showing that the witness was unavailable for trial within the meaning of the protected person statute, the trial court erred in allowing the deposition into evidence. We therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court and re…
Ronald C. HOWARD, Jr., Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below) is worth reading on Indiana deposition / former testimony because the court put the point in its own words: "Because there was no showing that the witness was unavailable for trial within the meaning of the protected person statute, the trial court erred in allowing the deposition into evidence." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Nathan S. BERKMAN, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
…the trial court abused its discretion in admitting certain deposition testimony; and IV. Whether Berkman’s sixty-year executed sentence is inappropriately harsh. We affirm. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY In August of 2008, Berkman owed approximately $2000 to Olen Hawkins, from whom he had frequently purchased cocaine. On August 30, 2008, Berkman telephoned Hawkins, told him that…
Nathan S. BERKMAN, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff is worth reading on Indiana deposition / former testimony because the court put the point in its own words: "IV. Whether Berkman’s sixty-year executed sentence is inappropriately harsh. We affirm. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY In August of 2008, Berkman owed approximately $2000 to Olen Hawkins, from whom he had frequently purchased cocaine." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Michael GALLAGHER, Defendant-Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Plaintiff-Appellee
…83. Less than a week before trial, defense counsel took the deposition of McBride in the presence of the state but Gallagher, the defendant, was absent. McBride was questioned only by defense counsel during the deposition. On the first day of the trial, McBride did not appear despite the issuance of a subpoena. On the second day, a police officer testified as to his inability t…
Michael GALLAGHER, Defendant-Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Plaintiff-Appellee is worth reading on Indiana deposition / former testimony because the court put the point in its own words: "Less than a week before trial, defense counsel took the deposition of McBride in the presence of the state but Gallagher, the defendant, was absent. McBride was questioned only by defense counsel during the deposition." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Gustavo GUY, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
…ther the trial court properly admitted into evidence T.M.'s deposition testimony; 2. Whether there was sufficient evidence to support his conviction for child molesting, a Class A felony; and 3. Whether the State's closing remarks constituted reversible error. Facts and Procedural History The facts reveal that sometime between May 23, 1998, and May 22, 1999, Guy inserted his pe…
Indiana opinions such as Gustavo GUY, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff are cited where deposition / former testimony is disputed. The court stated: "T.M.'s deposition testimony; 2. Whether there was sufficient evidence to support his conviction for child molesting, a Class A felony; and 3. Whether the State's closing remarks constituted reversible error." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Ronald C. HOWARD, Jr., Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
…violated Howard's right of confrontation by presenting the deposition testimony of the victim to the jury after the trial court declared the victim to be unavailable to continue her testimony; (3) Whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting hearsay evidence; (4) Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying Howard's request to introduce evidence which…
Ronald C. HOWARD, Jr., Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff is worth reading on Indiana deposition / former testimony because the court put the point in its own words: "violated Howard's right of confrontation by presenting the deposition testimony of the victim to the jury after the trial court declared the victim to be unavailable to continue her testimony; (3) Whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting hearsay evidence; (4) Wh" Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Authenticity: why it matters and how to prove it
Authenticity is not a hearsay doctrine and it is not optional. Under Ind. R. Evid. 901, 902, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is. Self-authenticating categories — certified public records, newspapers, acknowledged documents, trade inscriptions, and (where adopted) certified domestic records of a regularly conducted activity — shorten the path, but most trial exhibits still need a sponsoring witness, distinctive characteristics, chain of custody, or process-or-system evidence.
Indiana manufacturing, insurance, and OWI prosecutions frequently litigate authentication of breath-test documents, factory records, and surveillance video under Ind. R. Evid. 901–902.
Why authenticity gets its own section in every Indiana trial notebook:
- It is a condition precedent. An unauthenticated exhibit never reaches the relevance, hearsay, or privilege analysis in a useful way — the jury never properly considers it.
- Digital evidence multiplies the failure modes. Screenshots, social-media posts, text threads, and cloud downloads require hash values, account attribution, metadata, or a percipient witness who saw the content created or received.
- Chain of custody is authenticity by another name. Drugs, firearms, biological samples, and seized devices are excluded when the links from seizure to lab to courtroom are broken, even if a hearsay exception would otherwise apply to a lab report.
- Business-records shortcuts do not replace authentication. A custodian can explain record-keeping practices and still fail if nobody can say the particular PDF or printout is the record of this patient, this account, or this machine.
- Self-authentication is narrow. Counsel who wave a notarization or a letterhead and skip the rest of Rule 901-style analysis often lose when the document's contents are disputed.
Practical authentication checklist for Indiana trials: identify the exhibit; choose a 901 method or a 902 category; line up the sponsoring witness or certificate; preserve chain-of-custody testimony for physical and digital items; and separate the authenticity objection from any hearsay objection so the court rules on each.
Indiana authenticity opinions
Matthew PAVLOVICH, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
…sages and emails into evidence and properly permitted their authentication as having been written by Pavlovich; and III.Whether the trial court properly denied Pavlovich’s motion for a directed verdict with respect to the child solicitation charge. We affirm. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY On November 9, 2011, Pavlovich contacted twenty-one-year-old S.Y. after seeing an Internet…
Practitioners open Matthew PAVLOVICH, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff when Indiana authentication turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Pavlovich; and III.Whether the trial court properly denied Pavlovich’s motion for a directed verdict with respect to the child solicitation charge. We affirm. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY On November 9, 2011, Pavlovich contacted twenty-one-year-old S.Y." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
William J. SPEYBROECK, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
…which we restate as follows: 1. Whether the State properly authenticated business documents pursuant to Indiana Evidence Rule 902(9). 2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting documents into evidence under Indiana Evidence Rule 803(6), the business records exception to the hearsay rule. 3.Whether a retrial is appropriate.- We reverse and remand for' a new t…
Indiana opinions such as William J. SPEYBROECK, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff are cited where authentication is disputed. The court stated: "Whether the State properly authenticated business documents pursuant to Indiana Evidence Rule 902(9). 2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting documents into evidence under Indiana Evidence Rule 803(6), the business records exception to the hearsay rule. 3." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Datwone B. FRY, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
…produced shortly before trial and because they had not been authenticated; (2) Whether the State presented evidence sufficient to support his conviction for attempted murder beyond a reasonable doubt; and (3) Whether the sentence is appropriate in light of the nature of the offense and Fry’s character. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY On May 11, 2007, Michael Edwards (Edwards) cont…
On authentication, Datwone B. FRY, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff speaks to the Indiana dispute in this passage: "Whether the State presented evidence sufficient to support his conviction for attempted murder beyond a reasonable doubt; and (3) Whether the sentence is appropriate in light of the nature of the offense and Fry’s character." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
John MANN, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
…rt his conviction. He also asserts that the State failed to authenticate documents concerning an alleged prior conviction from Ohio and that these documents were inadmissible hearsay. Finally, Mann asserts that his conviction should not have been enhanced to a Class D felony because the State failed to prove that he had previously been convicted of OWI under a similar statutory…
Practitioners open John MANN, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff when Indiana authentication turns on the distinction in this sentence: "He also asserts that the State failed to authenticate documents concerning an alleged prior conviction from Ohio and that these documents were inadmissible hearsay." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Donald E. WEAVER, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee
Donald E. WEAVER, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee, 76 Ind. Dec. 250 (1980)
…ion of this exhibit on two grounds: (1) it was not properly authenticated, and (2) it was inadmissible hearsay. On appeal, Weaver argues this exhibit was not properly authenticated; adding to this allegation the contention that there was no evidence indicating he was the individual named in State’s exhibit number one (1). Weaver has failed to preserve for our review his second…
On authentication, Donald E. WEAVER, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee speaks to the Indiana dispute in this passage: "On appeal, Weaver argues this exhibit was not properly authenticated; adding to this allegation the contention that there was no evidence indicating he was the individual named in State’s exhibit number one (1)." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
William C. WILLIAMS, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
…in admitting Exhibit 65 because the State did not properly authenticate it. [2] We agree that the State did not properly authenticate Exhibit 65 either by a certification that complied with Indiana Evidence Rule 902(11) or by a records custodian who testified that the records were made at or near the time by — or from information transmitted by — someone with knowledge and tha…
Indiana opinions such as William C. WILLIAMS, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff are cited where authentication is disputed. The court stated: "Exhibit 65 because the State did not properly authenticate it." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Michael GETHA, Defendant-Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Plaintiff-Appellee
…ibits erroneously admitted into evidence because improperly authenticated under the business records exception to the hearsay rule? Second, was the authentication of two exhibits purporting to show that appellant executed the checks drawn on the Bank of Indiana account inadequate? Third, was the evidence sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict? Appellant first argues that cert…
Practitioners open Michael GETHA, Defendant-Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Plaintiff-Appellee when Indiana authentication turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Second, was the authentication of two exhibits purporting to show that appellant executed the checks drawn on the Bank of Indiana account inadequate?" Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Jaqueline B. WALTERS, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
…rounds." (Tr. Vol. 3 at 137). She argued they were not self-authenticating and did not "comply with Indiana Rule 803(d)." ( Id. ) She asserted the certification was not specific and "could apply to anything [as it did not] state what phone number it applies to ... what search warrant it is responding to. It's just what dates the records that it is attached cover." 7 ( Id. ) [20…
On authentication, Jaqueline B. WALTERS, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff speaks to the Indiana dispute in this passage: "Tr. Vol. 3 at 137). She argued they were not self-authenticating and did not 'comply with Indiana Rule 803(d).' ( Id. ) She asserted the certification was not specific and 'could apply to anything [as it did not] state what phone number it applies to ..." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Practice checklist
- State the relevance theory in one sentence before naming an exception.
- Run the 403 / unfair-prejudice balance explicitly for other-acts and graphic exhibits.
- For character or other-acts evidence, identify the non-propensity purpose and request a limiting instruction on the record.
- Decide whether an out-of-court statement is hearsay for the purpose offered before hunting exceptions.
- Lay business-records foundations with time, knowledge, regular practice, and custodial qualifications — or a qualifying certification.
- Prove unavailability with specific facts before offering former testimony or dying declarations.
- Treat deposition use as procedure-plus-hearsay; designate and counter-designate early.
- Authenticate every exhibit under Ind. R. Evid. 901, 902 (or the self-authentication path) before arguing hearsay.
- Preserve chain of custody for physical and digital evidence with named custodians.
- Search LawDiver for recent Indiana appellate evidence opinions before mediation or motions in limine.
Contents
- General standards of admissibility
- Character evidence
- Hearsay: start with the definition
- Party admissions
- Business records
- Important hearsay exceptions that do not require unavailability
- Declarant unavailable
- Dying declarations
- Medical diagnosis or treatment statements
- Use of depositions at trial
- Authenticity: why it matters and how to prove it
- Practice checklist
- Frequently asked questions
Frequently asked questions
What is the primary evidence source in Indiana?
Indiana applies the Indiana Rules of Evidence. Indiana's evidence rules follow the FRE structure; Ind. R. Evid. 401–902 govern trials in circuit and superior courts statewide.
How do Indiana courts decide relevance and unfair prejudice?
Under Ind. R. Evid. 401, 403, evidence must make a fact of consequence more or less probable, and the court may exclude relevant evidence when unfair prejudice, confusion, or waste of time substantially outweighs its probative value.
Are party admissions hearsay in Indiana?
Party-opponent statements under Ind. R. Evid. 801(d)(2) are generally excluded from the hearsay ban (or treated as an exception, depending on local drafting). They may be offered against the party who made or adopted them without showing unavailability.
What foundation is required for business records?
Under Ind. R. Evid. 803(6), show a record made at or near the time from someone with knowledge, kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity, as a regular practice, through a custodian, qualified witness, or allowed certification — subject to trustworthiness attack.
When can I use a deposition at trial in Indiana?
Ind. Trial R. 32 governs civil deposition use at trial. Ind. Crim. R. 17 addresses criminal discovery; deposition testimony at trial generally requires Ind. R. Evid. 804(b)(1) with proper unavailability findings.
Why is authenticity separate from hearsay?
Authenticity asks whether the item is what you claim it is; hearsay asks whether out-of-court assertions inside it may be used for their truth. You can lose on either ground independently. Indiana authenticity practice starts with Ind. R. Evid. 901, 902.
Where do dying declarations and medical statements fit?
Dying declarations under Ind. R. Evid. 804(b)(2) require belief in impending death and concern the cause or circumstances of that believed death. Medical statements under Ind. R. Evid. 803(4) require a genuine diagnostic or treatment purpose and reasonable pertinence to care.