If you only remember one point about evidence law in Idaho, remember this: Idaho evidence practice is organized under the Idaho Rules of Evidence. Relevance starts at Idaho R. Evid. 401, 403; hearsay starts at Idaho R. Evid. 801, 802. Procedure, examples, and the opinions below hang off Idaho Rules of Evidence. Authenticity is a separate fight under Idaho R. Evid. 901, 902. Depositions at trial: Idaho R. Civ. P. 32 governs civil deposition use at trial. Idaho Crim. R. 16 limits criminal discovery; prior sworn testimony may be offered under Idaho R. Evid. 804(b)(1) when unavailability is established.
Hearsay: start with the definition
Most hearsay objections in Idaho are won or lost on the definition, not on an exception. Under Idaho R. Evid. 801, 802, hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Non-hearsay purposes — verbal acts, effect on the listener, notice, circumstantial evidence of state of mind, and impeachment — remain available when the proponent can articulate them without asking the jury to believe the declarant.
Layered hearsay (hearsay within hearsay) requires an exception or exclusion for each layer. Machine-generated data and non-assertive conduct sit outside the hearsay definition in FRE-aligned jurisdictions, but they still need authenticity and, often, expert or business-records foundations.
Idaho hearsay opinions
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. William O. FIELD, Defendant-Appellant
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. William O. FIELD, Defendant-Appellant, 144 Idaho 559 (2007)
…tements were properly admitted either because they were not hearsay, they fell under the I.R.E. 803(24) catch-all exception, or because they fell under the I.R.E. 803(2) excited utterance exception. We hold the statements were inadmissible. Originally, the State argued the statements were not hearsay because they were not introduced to prove the truth of the matter asserted, on…
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. William O. FIELD, Defendant-Appellant is worth reading on Idaho hearsay because the court put the point in its own words: "I.R.E. 803(24) catch-all exception, or because they fell under the I.R.E. 803(2) excited utterance exception. We hold the statements were inadmissible." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. John Asa ZIMMERMAN, Defendant-Appellant
…s not require that declarant be at trial or unavailable for hearsay statements to be admissible). We can separate the out-of-court statements into three distinct categories. The first category consists of the victim’s statements that her daddy “picked” at her and “scratched” her with his fingernail. The second category consists of the statement “I’m not going to tell my dad’s s…
Idaho opinions such as STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. John Asa ZIMMERMAN, Defendant-Appellant are cited where hearsay is disputed. The court stated: "We can separate the out-of-court statements into three distinct categories. The first category consists of the victim’s statements that her daddy “picked” at her and “scratched” her with his fingernail." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent v. George Roy HESTER
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent v. George Roy HESTER, 114 Idaho 688 (1988)
…mother were admissible under I.C. § 19-3024, the child *692hearsay exception,3 and I.R.E. 803(24).4 The court specifically found that each element of these two hearsay exceptions was met. Brian’s mother was then permitted to testify regarding Brian’s actions and the statements he made to her, as set out at page 689, 760 P.2d at page 28 above. In addition to the testimony quote…
Idaho opinions such as STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent v. George Roy HESTER are cited where hearsay is disputed. The court stated: "I.C. § 19-3024, the child *692hearsay exception,3 and I.R.E. 803(24).4 The court specifically found that each element of these two hearsay exceptions was met." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Vance A. WATKINS, Defendant-Appellant
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Vance A. WATKINS, Defendant-Appellant, 148 Idaho 418 (2009)
…oth that the expert’s testimony was based upon inadmissible hearsay and that it violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation, we decide this case solely upon the evidentiary issue. We *420 vacate the conviction and remand the case for a new trial. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On December 9, 2004, a grand jury indicted Watkins on a single count of lewd conduct wit…
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Vance A. WATKINS, Defendant-Appellant is worth reading on Idaho hearsay because the court put the point in its own words: "Sixth Amendment right to confrontation, we decide this case solely upon the evidentiary issue. We *420 vacate the conviction and remand the case for a new trial. I." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
STATE of Idaho Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Laura Lee WRIGHT, Defendant-Appellant — Bakes, J., dissenting
…t. As I deduce from the opinion’s analysis, from now on all hearsay statements by very young children are inadmissible unless they are either (1) uttered spontaneously and excitedly, or (2) made in response to “open-ended” questions from a specially trained professional during a videotaped interview and the evidence establishes that the child’s memory was not “confabulated” by…
STATE of Idaho Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Laura Lee WRIGHT, Defendant-Appellant — Bakes, J., dissenting is worth reading on Idaho hearsay because the court put the point in its own words: "t. As I deduce from the opinion’s analysis, from now on all hearsay statements by very young children are inadmissible unless they are either (1) uttered spontaneously and excitedly, or (2) made in response to “open-ended” questions from a specially trained professional during a" Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Heriberto SANDOVAL-TENA, Defendant-Appellant
…into evidence under the "business records exception" to the hearsay rule, and (2) when it informed the prosecutor that he had failed to elicit testimonial evidence from the lab investigator as to the weight of the substances tested and then permitted the prosecutor to recall that witness. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Acting on a tip from a confidential informant, Detect…
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Heriberto SANDOVAL-TENA, Defendant-Appellant is worth reading on Idaho hearsay because the court put the point in its own words: "into evidence under the 'business records exception' to the hearsay rule, and (2) when it informed the prosecutor that he had failed to elicit testimonial evidence from the lab investigator as to the weight of the substances tested and then permitted the prosecutor to recall that" Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Walking through Idaho facts
Use this walkthrough to see which Idaho authority does the work at each step.
A lawyer in Idaho wants to offer a medical record, a party email, and a statement the declarant made while believing death was imminent.
- Clear relevance and unfair prejudice under Idaho R. Evid. 401, 403.
- If the email is the opposing party's, test Idaho R. Evid. 801(d)(2) before the hearsay definition in Idaho R. Evid. 801, 802.
- For the medical record, lay the business-records foundation in Idaho R. Evid. 803(6) and the treatment purpose in Idaho R. Evid. 803(4).
- For the deathbed statement, meet Idaho R. Evid. 804(b)(2), then authenticate every exhibit under Idaho R. Evid. 901, 902.
Idaho keeps hearsay, character, and authenticity on different rules inside the Idaho Rules of Evidence. Winning one does not win the others.
Party admissions
Statements of an opposing party are among the most important routes around the hearsay bar. Idaho treats them under Idaho R. Evid. 801(d)(2). Nothing about the statement need be against interest, contemporaneous, or based on personal knowledge — the theory is adversarial, not reliability-based. A party cannot complain that his own words are unreliable when offered against him.
Scope questions dominate practice: the party's own statement; adopted statements (including silence in circumstances where a reasonable person would deny); statements by authorized speakers; agent or employee statements on matters within the scope of the relationship; and, in criminal conspiracy cases, coconspirator statements during and in furtherance of the conspiracy. A defendant generally cannot introduce his own exculpatory out-of-court statement as a "party admission" against himself — the rule runs one way.
Idaho party-admission opinions
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross Appellant, v. Dale Carter SHACKELFORD, Defendant-Appellant-Cross Respondent
…substantial rights shall be disregarded.” I.C.R. 52. b. The admission of Donna Fontaine’s out-of-court statements was in error, but that error was harmless. Shackelford first argues that the district court erred in allowing multiple out-of-court statements made by Donna Fontaine to be introduced under Idaho Rule of Evidence 803(3) because (1) Shackelford did not inject the issu…
Idaho opinions such as STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross Appellant, v. Dale Carter SHACKELFORD, Defendant-Appellant-Cross Respondent are cited where party admissions is disputed. The court stated: "I.C.R. 52. b. The admission of Donna Fontaine’s out-of-court statements was in error, but that error was harmless." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Preston Adam JOY, Defendant-Appellant
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Preston Adam JOY, Defendant-Appellant, 155 Idaho 1 (2013)
…f mistake or accident. The State also contends that even if admission of the evidence was error, it was harmless. Generally, “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.” I.R.E. 404(b). This evidence of prior misconduct “may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as p…
Practitioners open STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Preston Adam JOY, Defendant-Appellant when Idaho party admissions turns on the distinction in this sentence: "The State also contends that even if admission of the evidence was error, it was harmless. Generally, “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.” I.R.E. 404(b)." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. William Perry RADABAUGH, Defendant-Appellant
…confirmed especially in light of Radabaugh’s incriminating admissions which substantiate the fact that Radabaugh’s acts were integral components of a common scheme or plan. 6 In the case at bar appellant has failed to point out wherein the joint trial of the two charges worked to his prejudice. His unsupported statement is not sufficient. People v. Northcott, 209 Cal. 639, 289…
Idaho opinions such as STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. William Perry RADABAUGH, Defendant-Appellant are cited where party admissions is disputed. The court stated: "Radabaugh’s incriminating admissions which substantiate the fact that Radabaugh’s acts were integral components of a common scheme or plan. 6 In the case at bar appellant has failed to point out wherein the joint trial of the two charges worked to his prejudice." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Ramiro G. CONTRERAS and Omar Baeza Martinez, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Clare B. RUBLEY, Defendant-Appellant
…sed to admit negligence in response to certain requests for admission. Likewise, Contreras sought attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(4) based upon his claim for an amount of damages less than $25,000 in a personal injury action. Rubley opposed any award of attorney fees to respondents and sought attorney fees for *576herself under I.C. § 12-120(4) as the prevailing party and und…
Practitioners open Ramiro G. CONTRERAS and Omar Baeza Martinez, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Clare B. RUBLEY, Defendant-Appellant when Idaho party admissions turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Likewise, Contreras sought attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(4) based upon his claim for an amount of damages less than $25,000 in a personal injury action. Rubley opposed any award of attorney fees to respondents and sought attorney fees for *576herself under I.C." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Kerin R. McGILL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Connie FRASURE, Defendant, and Dayton R. Guidinger and Doreen M. Guidinger
…rgued that evidence of Neal’s statement could come in as an admission by an agent of a party-opponent under I.R.E. 801(d)(2). McGill also called Neal as a witness to confirm that he had made the statement to Crist and to show the basis for his statement. Neal said that he had not been present at the alleged earlier ejection of Frasure. Neal stated that just after the Frasure-Mc…
On party admissions, Kerin R. McGILL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Connie FRASURE, Defendant, and Dayton R. Guidinger and Doreen M. Guidinger speaks to the Idaho dispute in this passage: "Neal’s statement could come in as an admission by an agent of a party-opponent under I.R.E. 801(d)(2). McGill also called Neal as a witness to confirm that he had made the statement to Crist and to show the basis for his statement." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Harlan B. JENSEN, Dba Jensen Construction, Plaintiff-Counterdefendant Respondent-Cross Appellant, v. Bartlett R
…notes had been forwarded to the broker. Jensen asserts that admission of the evidence, upon which the district court relied to determine the amount of the damages due Westberg, Bailey and Dobrusky, was contrary to the Idaho Rule of Evidence 408. That rule provides: Compromise and offers to compromise. — Evidence of (1) furnishing, offering, or promising to furnish, or (2) accep…
Idaho opinions such as Harlan B. JENSEN, Dba Jensen Construction, Plaintiff-Counterdefendant Respondent-Cross Appellant, v. Bartlett R are cited where party admissions is disputed. The court stated: "Jensen asserts that admission of the evidence, upon which the district court relied to determine the amount of the damages due Westberg, Bailey and Dobrusky, was contrary to the Idaho Rule of Evidence 408. That rule provides: Compromise and offers to compromise." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
SIMPLOT SOILBUILDERS, INC., a Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Russell LEAVITT and John Houtman
….” 91 Idaho 576, 428 P.2d at 495. There was no error in the admission of this testimony. Regarding the two exhibits introduced into evidence over objection, defendant’s exhibit 1, the papers signed by Houtman, and defendant’s exhibit 2, Leavitt’s records of charges to Houtman for the work as performed, were business records within I.C. § 9-414 and were admissible'. Judgment aff…
On party admissions, SIMPLOT SOILBUILDERS, INC., a Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Russell LEAVITT and John Houtman speaks to the Idaho dispute in this passage: "Idaho 576, 428 P.2d at 495. There was no error in the admission of this testimony." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Business records
The business-records exception under Idaho R. Evid. 803(6) is the everyday path for medical charts, employment files, bank statements, and maintenance logs. The foundation requires a record made at or near the time by — or from information transmitted by — someone with knowledge; kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity; and made as a regular practice. A custodian or other qualified witness (or a qualifying certification where the jurisdiction allows it) lays the foundation. The opponent may still attack lack of trustworthiness when the source or method of preparation indicates unreliability — litigation-driven reports are the classic failure mode.
Do not confuse authenticity with the business-records exception. You still need to show the exhibit is what you claim it is; the hearsay exception then answers why the out-of-court assertions inside it may be considered for their truth.
Idaho business-records opinions
Patricia E. HENDERSON, Petitioner-Respondent, v. Vernon K. SMITH, Defendant-Appellant; STATE of Idaho, DEPARTMENT OF
…rturn the trial court’s exercise of its discretion to admit business records evidence absent a clear showing of abuse. Id. The magistrate admitted the Paternity Evaluation Report under the business records exception to the hearsay rule, over the objections of Smith. Under the business records exception to the hearsay rule, a report or data compilation is not excluded by the hea…
Idaho opinions such as Patricia E. HENDERSON, Petitioner-Respondent, v. Vernon K. SMITH, Defendant-Appellant; STATE of Idaho, DEPARTMENT OF are cited where business records is disputed. The court stated: "Id. The magistrate admitted the Paternity Evaluation Report under the business records exception to the hearsay rule, over the objections of Smith." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES, LLC., Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Lloyd MACDONALD, Defendant-Appellant
…contain adequate foundation and is not admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule. MacDonald challenged the admissibility of the Robertson Affidavit, arguing that the statements contained in the affidavit are hearsay and lack adequate foundation. He argued that the affidavit should not be considered when deciding the cross-motions for summary judgment b…
Idaho opinions such as PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES, LLC., Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Lloyd MACDONALD, Defendant-Appellant are cited where business records is disputed. The court stated: "MacDonald challenged the admissibility of the Robertson Affidavit, arguing that the statements contained in the affidavit are hearsay and lack adequate foundation." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
STATE of Idaho, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND WELFARE, Ex Rel., Deborah L. OSBORN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Gene ALTMAN
…e court to one. The department’s attorney did not raise the business records exception or the “other exceptions” provision of I.R.E. 803(6) and (24). Although the department did not preserve the question of the applicability of these exceptions by invoking them at trial, we address these questions, because the trial court explicitly rejected the applicability of any exception t…
On business records, STATE of Idaho, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND WELFARE, Ex Rel., Deborah L. OSBORN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Gene ALTMAN speaks to the Idaho dispute in this passage: "The department’s attorney did not raise the business records exception or the “other exceptions” provision of I.R.E. 803(6) and (24)." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Thomas C. McPHIE, Defendant-Appellant
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Thomas C. McPHIE, Defendant-Appellant, 104 Idaho 652 (1983)
…e, we hold nevertheless that the price tag falls within the business records exception to the hearsay rule as stated in I.C. § 9-414: "A record of an act, condition or event, shall, insofar as relevant, be competent evidence if the custodian or other qualified witness testifies to the identity and the mode of its preparation, and if it was made in the regular course of business…
On business records, STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Thomas C. McPHIE, Defendant-Appellant speaks to the Idaho dispute in this passage: "e, we hold nevertheless that the price tag falls within the business records exception to the hearsay rule as stated in I.C. § 9-414: 'A record of an act, condition or event, shall, insofar as relevant, be competent evidence if the custodian or other qualified witness testifies t" The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Donald P. CHRISTENSEN Dba Don Christensen & Associates, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Roy RICE & Jane Doe Rice Dba Vista
…nly a theory of “account stated;” (2) whether Christensen’s business records were inadmissible as evidence of an insurance contract between the parties; and (3) whether the trial judge erroneously disregarded Rice’s testimony at trial. We hold that Christensen’s complaint was sufficient to apprise Rice of the nature of the claims against him and to permit recovery on more than…
Practitioners open Donald P. CHRISTENSEN Dba Don Christensen & Associates, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Roy RICE & Jane Doe Rice Dba Vista when Idaho business records turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Christensen’s business records were inadmissible as evidence of an insurance contract between the parties; and (3) whether the trial judge erroneously disregarded Rice’s testimony at trial." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Jeremy York CUNNINGHAM, Defendant-Appellant.
…" The district court also admitted this affidavit under the business records exception to the hearsay rule over Cunningham's continuing objection to a lack of foundation. The witness then testified to everything found in the affidavit. Cunningham did not cross-examine the witness or present any evidence or testimony. At closing, Cunningham argued that the timesheet was similar…
Idaho opinions such as STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Jeremy York CUNNINGHAM, Defendant-Appellant. are cited where business records is disputed. The court stated: "The district court also admitted this affidavit under the business records exception to the hearsay rule over Cunningham's continuing objection to a lack of foundation. The witness then testified to everything found in the affidavit." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Olegario G. CURIEL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Ronald MINGO, Defendant-Respondent
Olegario G. CURIEL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Ronald MINGO, Defendant-Respondent, 100 Idaho 303 (1979)
…then incorporated this photocopy of the ledger into his own business records and used it as the basis for computing the amount to be set off against the money he owed Curiel for the hauling services. The appellant represents that the amount of money earned by Mingo's drivers was based upon the weight of potatoes hauled, at a fixed rate per hundredweight. From these gross earnin…
Idaho opinions such as Olegario G. CURIEL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Ronald MINGO, Defendant-Respondent are cited where business records is disputed. The court stated: "Curiel for the hauling services. The appellant represents that the amount of money earned by Mingo's drivers was based upon the weight of potatoes hauled, at a fixed rate per hundredweight." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Important hearsay exceptions that do not require unavailability
Three present-sense and mental-state exceptions carry most of the remaining traffic in Idaho trial practice.
Excited utterance — Idaho R. Evid. 803(2). A statement relating to a startling event or condition, made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused. Timing is elastic; composure defeats the exception even minutes after the event, while visible distress can preserve it for hours.
Present sense impression — Idaho R. Evid. 803(1). A statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while or immediately after the declarant perceived it. Contemporaneity is strict — seconds and minutes, not hours — and excitement is not required.
Then-existing mental, emotional, or physical condition — Idaho R. Evid. 803(3). Statements of then-existing state of mind (including intent and plan) come in; statements of memory or belief offered to prove the fact remembered generally do not. Intent-to-meet-another-person cases remain the hardest applications.
Declarant unavailable
When the declarant is unavailable under Idaho R. Evid. 804(a), Idaho opens a second suite of exceptions. Unavailability typically includes privilege, refusal to testify despite court order, lack of memory, death or then-existing infirmity, and absence despite reasonable efforts to procure attendance. The proponent bears the burden of proving unavailability with specific facts — a bare assertion that the witness "could not be found" is not enough.
Former testimony under Idaho R. Evid. 804(b)(1) is the workhorse once unavailability is shown: testimony given as a witness at a trial, hearing, or lawful deposition, offered against a party who had an opportunity and similar motive to develop it by direct, cross, or redirect. Criminal confrontation analysis runs in parallel and is not satisfied merely because a hearsay exception applies.
Dying declarations
Dying declarations under Idaho R. Evid. 804(b)(2) remain a narrow but decisive exception in homicide and, in many jurisdictions, civil cases involving the cause or circumstances of what the declarant believed to be impending death. The foundational showing is the declarant's belief that death was imminent — not that death in fact followed within any particular time — plus a statement concerning the cause or circumstances of what the declarant believed to be the impending death. Courts police coaching and narrative expansions aggressively.
Idaho dying-declaration opinions
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross Appellant, v. Dale Carter SHACKELFORD, Defendant-Appellant-Cross Respondent
…n “Dr. Shepard has poisoned me” was neither admissible as a dying declaration (as the State had argued), nor as evidence of the victim’s state of mind. Id. at 103, 54 S.Ct. at 25, 78 L.Ed. at 201. The defendant attempted to show that the victim had “exhibited a weariness of life and a readiness to end it,” which gave “plausibility to the hypothesis of suicide.” Id. The Court st…
Practitioners open STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross Appellant, v. Dale Carter SHACKELFORD, Defendant-Appellant-Cross Respondent when Idaho dying declaration turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Dr. Shepard has poisoned me” was neither admissible as a dying declaration (as the State had argued), nor as evidence of the victim’s state of mind. Id. at 103, 54 S.Ct. at 25, 78 L.Ed. at 201." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
STATE v. FONG LOON
STATE v. FONG LOON, 29 Idaho 248 (1916)
…ved in this appeal; that is, the admission of the purported dying declaration of the deceased Fong Chung, being state’s exhibit 16. The shooting took place at 622 Front street, in Boise, Ada county, on the evening of July 21, 1913, some time between 9 and 10 o’clock. Immediately after Fong Chung received the gunshot wound he was conveyed to the St. Luke’s hospital, in Boise, an…
Practitioners open STATE v. FONG LOON when Idaho dying declaration turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Fong Chung, being state’s exhibit 16. The shooting took place at 622 Front street, in Boise, Ada county, on the evening of July 21, 1913, some time between 9 and 10 o’clock. Immediately after Fong Chung received the gunshot wound he was conveyed to the St." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Jose SANTANA, Defendant-Appellant
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Jose SANTANA, Defendant-Appellant, 135 Idaho 58 (2000)
…ow it.” During its closing, the state relied on Hernandez’s dying declaration by arguing: “It was Santana who fired the shot ... and we know that because of Mr. Hernandez’s dying declaration.” The state also pursued this point by offering the following line of argument to the jury: Ms. Cassidy (Santana’s co-counsel) said in her closing argument that Santana didn’t know Hernande…
Idaho opinions such as STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Jose SANTANA, Defendant-Appellant are cited where dying declaration is disputed. The court stated: "During its closing, the state relied on Hernandez’s dying declaration by arguing: “It was Santana who fired the shot ... and we know that because of Mr. Hernandez’s dying declaration.” The state also pursued this point by offering the following line of argument to the jury: Ms." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Lawrence C. THOMAS and Larry Drapeau, Defendants-Appellants
…n went on to point out the examples of the admissibility of dying declarations of the testimony of a deceased witness who has testified at a former trial. “The argument seems to be, rather, that in any given case the Constitution requires a reappraisal of every exception to the hearsay rule, no matter how long established, in order to determine whether, in the words of the Cour…
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Lawrence C. THOMAS and Larry Drapeau, Defendants-Appellants is worth reading on Idaho dying declaration because the court put the point in its own words: "n went on to point out the examples of the admissibility of dying declarations of the testimony of a deceased witness who has testified at a former trial. “The argument seems to be, rather, that in any given case the Constitution requires a reappraisal of every exception to the h" Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
STATE v. ALFRED LUNDHIGH
STATE v. ALFRED LUNDHIGH, 30 Idaho 365 (1917)
…ing witnesses Ernest Pappas and Edith Boos to testify as to dying declarations on' the part of the deceased. There can be no doubt but that these dying declarations were made in the presence of approaching dissolution, and both the statements of the deceased at the time and the surrounding conditions show conclusively that the deceased was cognizant of his condition. It appears…
Practitioners open STATE v. ALFRED LUNDHIGH when Idaho dying declaration turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Ernest Pappas and Edith Boos to testify as to dying declarations on' the part of the deceased." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
STATE v. GILBERT
STATE v. GILBERT, 8 Idaho 346 (1902)
…o permit in evidence the testimony of witnesses proving the dying declarations of the deceased, made immediately after the affray, to the effect that he was “stabbed to the heart, that he was1 dying, and that he was done for.” The evidence shows that deceased had a large wound inflicted in his side with a knife, and that his entrails and a portion of one of his lungs was protru…
On dying declaration, STATE v. GILBERT speaks to the Idaho dispute in this passage: "o permit in evidence the testimony of witnesses proving the dying declarations of the deceased, made immediately after the affray, to the effect that he was “stabbed to the heart, that he was1 dying, and that he was done for.” The evidence shows that deceased had a large wound in" The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Kody Shane BUTCHER, Defendant-Appellant
…ruled that Wiggins’ testimony was not admissible to show a dying declaration by Morgan or to show Morgan’s state of mind or present sense impression. Counsel made an offer of proof as to Wiggins’ testimony. On rebuttal, the state presented the testimony of Jennifer Ploof, a waitress at the Office Bar. Ploof testified that she saw Butcher at the bar with four or five Hispanic m…
On dying declaration, STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Kody Shane BUTCHER, Defendant-Appellant speaks to the Idaho dispute in this passage: "Wiggins’ testimony was not admissible to show a dying declaration by Morgan or to show Morgan’s state of mind or present sense impression. Counsel made an offer of proof as to Wiggins’ testimony." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Richard ELISONDO, Defendant-Appellant — Bistline, J., concurring
…e to testify. This view explains the recogni*423tion of the dying declaration exception, which dispenses with any requirement of cross-examination, and the refusal to make an exception for prior recorded statements, taken subject to cross examination by the accused, when the witness is still available to testify. Compare Mattox v. United States, supra, with Motes v. United Stat…
Idaho opinions such as STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Richard ELISONDO, Defendant-Appellant — Bistline, J., concurring are cited where dying declaration is disputed. The court stated: "Compare Mattox v. United States, supra, with Motes v." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Medical diagnosis or treatment statements
Statements made for medical diagnosis or treatment under Idaho R. Evid. 803(4) cover medical history, past or present symptoms, and their general cause when reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. The exception is not limited to treating physicians; statements to nurses, EMTs, and consulting clinicians can qualify when the diagnostic purpose is genuine. Fault and identity remain the usual battleground: "I was hit by a car" is often pertinent; "the light was green" usually is not; abuser identity in child-abuse and domestic-violence cases is heavily litigated.
Idaho medical-statement opinions
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Walter Dee MOORE, Defendant-Appellant
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Walter Dee MOORE, Defendant-Appellant, 131 Idaho 814 (1998)
…reserved for appeal and we decline to consider it. Id. VII. MEDICAL DIAGNOSIS HEARSAY EXCEPTION Moore contends that the district court erred when it admitted, over objection, testimony about statements made by S.K. to Dr. Gabica during his examination of her. Admission of hearsay evidence under an exception is reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. Zimmerman, 121 Idaho 971,…
Idaho opinions such as STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Walter Dee MOORE, Defendant-Appellant are cited where medical diagnosis hearsay is disputed. The court stated: "Id. VII. MEDICAL DIAGNOSIS HEARSAY EXCEPTION Moore contends that the district court erred when it admitted, over objection, testimony about statements made by S.K. to Dr. Gabica during his examination of her." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. John Asa ZIMMERMAN, Defendant-Appellant
…215 (Utah 1986). Only out-of-court statements necessary for medical diagnosis and treatment are admissible under I.R.E. 803(4). The victim did not make her statements to Dr. Krasnec for the purposes of medical treatment. Therefore, it was error to admit them pursuant to this hearsay exception. *975Next, we must determine if this testimony is admissible pursuant to I.R.E. 803(24…
Idaho opinions such as STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. John Asa ZIMMERMAN, Defendant-Appellant are cited where medical diagnosis hearsay is disputed. The court stated: "Utah 1986). Only out-of-court statements necessary for medical diagnosis and treatment are admissible under I.R.E. 803(4). The victim did not make her statements to Dr. Krasnec for the purposes of medical treatment." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Herman Clifford KAY, Defendant-Appellant
…therefore admissible under I.R.E. 803(2). D. Statements for Medical Diagnosis or Treatment Over defense counsel’s hearsay objections, Dr. Kevin Kraal, an emergency room physician, and Dr. Barton Adrian, a pediatrician, were allowed to testify to statements made by N.M. during the course of medical examinations. Each physician related N.M.’s descriptions of what had occurred dur…
Idaho opinions such as STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Herman Clifford KAY, Defendant-Appellant are cited where medical diagnosis hearsay is disputed. The court stated: "I.R.E. 803(2). D. Statements for Medical Diagnosis or Treatment Over defense counsel’s hearsay objections, Dr. Kevin Kraal, an emergency room physician, and Dr. Barton Adrian, a pediatrician, were allowed to testify to statements made by N.M." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Gregory Joseph NELSON, Defendant-Appellant
…hich allows use of hearsay statements made “for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treat *216 ment.” The rule is premised on the assumption that such statements are generally trustworthy because the declarant is motivate…
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Gregory Joseph NELSON, Defendant-Appellant is worth reading on Idaho medical diagnosis hearsay because the court put the point in its own words: "hich allows use of hearsay statements made “for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treat *216 ment.” The rule is premise" Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
State v. Christensen
State v. Christensen, 166 Idaho 373 (2020)
…e because the victims’ statements were made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. The interviews were admitted at trial by stipulation. A jury found Christensen guilty on four of the five counts. Christensen appeals the district court’s admission of the interviews. We affirm. II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On May 30, 2017, A.M.O. told a peer tutor that Christen…
Idaho opinions such as State v. Christensen are cited where medical diagnosis hearsay is disputed. The court stated: "The interviews were admitted at trial by stipulation. A jury found Christensen guilty on four of the five counts. Christensen appeals the district court’s admission of the interviews. We affirm. II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On May 30, 2017, A.M.O." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
State v. Al Muthafar
State v. Al Muthafar, 560 P.3d 1029 (2024)
…y from St. Al’s hospital to the FACES interview”; thus, all medical diagnosis had already been provided and the FACES exam was “purely for investigatory purposes.” In reply, the State laid additional foundation for the services that FACES nurses provide in their role, including specific medical treatments related to sexual assault and domestic violence victims. Before ruling on…
Idaho opinions such as State v. Al Muthafar are cited where medical diagnosis hearsay is disputed. The court stated: "St. Al’s hospital to the FACES interview”; thus, all medical diagnosis had already been provided and the FACES exam was “purely for investigatory purposes." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
State v. Towell
State v. Towell, 172 Idaho 648 (2023)
…eneral rule where the out-of-court statements were made for medical diagnosis or treatment. Such statements are not excluded by the hearsay rule regardless of whether the declarant is available as a witness. Such statements must be made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment; describe medical history, past or present symptoms, pain, sensations or 8 the source thereof; a…
State v. Towell is worth reading on Idaho medical diagnosis hearsay because the court put the point in its own words: "Such statements are not excluded by the hearsay rule regardless of whether the declarant is available as a witness." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Use of depositions at trial
Idaho R. Civ. P. 32 governs civil deposition use at trial. Idaho Crim. R. 16 limits criminal discovery; prior sworn testimony may be offered under Idaho R. Evid. 804(b)(1) when unavailability is established.
Deposition use is always a two-layer problem: procedural permission to read or play the deposition, plus a hearsay path (often former testimony, party admission, or impeachment). Counsel who satisfy the civil or criminal procedure rule but skip the evidence-rule foundation invite a sustained objection; counsel who have a hearsay exception but failed to preserve the deposition under the procedural rule face the same result. Video designations, counter-designations, and completeness objections should be teed up before the jury is seated.
Idaho deposition / former-testimony opinions
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. John Asa ZIMMERMAN, Defendant-Appellant
…in Limine, the trial court found: According to the Krasnec deposition, [the victim] presented to Dr. Krasnec complaining of nightmares, and stated that she hoped the nightmares would go away and understood that she had to tell the truth in order that Dr. Krasnec could help the nightmares to go away. Dr. Krasnec testified in her deposition as to the emotional state of [the vict…
Idaho opinions such as STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. John Asa ZIMMERMAN, Defendant-Appellant are cited where deposition / former testimony is disputed. The court stated: "Limine, the trial court found: According to the Krasnec deposition, [the victim] presented to Dr. Krasnec complaining of nightmares, and stated that she hoped the nightmares would go away and understood that she had to tell the truth in order that Dr." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
STATE of Idaho Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Phillip R. SMALLEY, Defendant-Appellant.
…t erred in admitting the victim's preliminary hearing video deposition instead of live in-court testimony, because she was not "unavailable" as required by the Idaho Rules of Evidence. The Court of Appeals upheld Smalley's convictions. This Court granted his petition for review of the trial court's decision and we affirm the district court. II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND…
On deposition / former testimony, STATE of Idaho Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Phillip R. SMALLEY, Defendant-Appellant. speaks to the Idaho dispute in this passage: "Idaho Rules of Evidence. The Court of Appeals upheld Smalley's convictions. This Court granted his petition for review of the trial court's decision and we affirm the district court. II." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
RUSS BALLARD & FAMILY ACHIEVEMENT INSTITUTE, a Corporation, Plaintiff, Counter-Defendant and Respondent, v. LAVA HOT
…as changed by stipulation of the parties), during which the deposition of Harold Irick, an alleged former owner of the property, and a founder and major shareholder in Lava Hot Springs Resort, Inc., was read into the record. Coats, Shuler Bros, and the United States asserted liens against the property which they claimed were prior to Ballard’s mortgage on the basis of judgments…
RUSS BALLARD & FAMILY ACHIEVEMENT INSTITUTE, a Corporation, Plaintiff, Counter-Defendant and Respondent, v. LAVA HOT is worth reading on Idaho deposition / former testimony because the court put the point in its own words: "Harold Irick, an alleged former owner of the property, and a founder and major shareholder in Lava Hot Springs Resort, Inc., was read into the record." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Richard ELISONDO, Defendant-Appellant
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Richard ELISONDO, Defendant-Appellant, 114 Idaho 412 (1988)
…otter, pointing out that the Potter Court was dealing with "depositions" of witnesses, and based its decision on the asserted violation of the confrontation clause of the United States Constitution. The Court in Mee correctly analyzed the decisions of the United States Supreme Court, which hold that the confrontation clause of the United States Constitution is not offended when…
Practitioners open STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Richard ELISONDO, Defendant-Appellant when Idaho deposition / former testimony turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Potter Court was dealing with 'depositions' of witnesses, and based its decision on the asserted violation of the confrontation clause of the United States Constitution." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
The STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Russell MEE, Defendant-Appellant
The STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Russell MEE, Defendant-Appellant, 102 Idaho 474 (1981)
…clause of the federal constitution. At trial in Potter, the depositions of two absent witnesses were introduced into evidence. A review of the statements of the court in Potter, as well as of the records on file with this court concerning that case, indicates clearly that the “depositions” involved were actually the transcripts of the testimony given at the defendant’s prelimin…
Idaho opinions such as The STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Russell MEE, Defendant-Appellant are cited where deposition / former testimony is disputed. The court stated: "At trial in Potter, the depositions of two absent witnesses were introduced into evidence." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Authenticity: why it matters and how to prove it
Authenticity is not a hearsay doctrine and it is not optional. Under Idaho R. Evid. 901, 902, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is. Self-authenticating categories — certified public records, newspapers, acknowledged documents, trade inscriptions, and (where adopted) certified domestic records of a regularly conducted activity — shorten the path, but most trial exhibits still need a sponsoring witness, distinctive characteristics, chain of custody, or process-or-system evidence.
Idaho agricultural, mining, and rural-property disputes often turn on authenticated deeds, GPS tracks, and maintenance logs under Idaho R. Evid. 901–902 before business-record shortcuts apply.
Why authenticity gets its own section in every Idaho trial notebook:
- It is a condition precedent. An unauthenticated exhibit never reaches the relevance, hearsay, or privilege analysis in a useful way — the jury never properly considers it.
- Digital evidence multiplies the failure modes. Screenshots, social-media posts, text threads, and cloud downloads require hash values, account attribution, metadata, or a percipient witness who saw the content created or received.
- Chain of custody is authenticity by another name. Drugs, firearms, biological samples, and seized devices are excluded when the links from seizure to lab to courtroom are broken, even if a hearsay exception would otherwise apply to a lab report.
- Business-records shortcuts do not replace authentication. A custodian can explain record-keeping practices and still fail if nobody can say the particular PDF or printout is the record of this patient, this account, or this machine.
- Self-authentication is narrow. Counsel who wave a notarization or a letterhead and skip the rest of Rule 901-style analysis often lose when the document's contents are disputed.
Practical authentication checklist for Idaho trials: identify the exhibit; choose a 901 method or a 902 category; line up the sponsoring witness or certificate; preserve chain-of-custody testimony for physical and digital items; and separate the authenticity objection from any hearsay objection so the court rules on each.
Idaho authenticity opinions
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Jerome L. KORN, Defendant-Appellant
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Jerome L. KORN, Defendant-Appellant, 148 Idaho 413 (2009)
…Article IX of the Idaho Rules of Evidence, evidence must be authenticated before it may be admitted into evidence. Specifically, I.R.E. 901 states in relevant part that: (a) General Provision. The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what…
On authentication, STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Jerome L. KORN, Defendant-Appellant speaks to the Idaho dispute in this passage: "Article IX of the Idaho Rules of Evidence, evidence must be authenticated before it may be admitted into evidence. Specifically, I.R.E. 901 states in relevant part that: (a) General Provision." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Michael Eugene KOCH, Defendant-Appellant
…not its admissibility. The Idaho Rules of Evidence require “authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility,” which “is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” I.R.E. 901(a). Rule 901(b) contains an illustrative, but not exhaustive, list of suggested methods of identification, su…
On authentication, STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Michael Eugene KOCH, Defendant-Appellant speaks to the Idaho dispute in this passage: "The Idaho Rules of Evidence require “authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility,” which “is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” I.R.E. 901(a)." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. James A. NORTON, Defendant-Appellant
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. James A. NORTON, Defendant-Appellant, 134 Idaho 875 (2000)
…e sentences run concurrent. Norton appeals. II. ANALYSIS A. Authentication On appeal, Norton argues that the district court erred in admitting two exhibits over his objections that the state failed to lay a proper foundation prior to their admission. Specifically, Norton contends that the admission of state’s exhibits numbers thirteen and twenty-five, both fingerprint exhibits,…
Practitioners open STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. James A. NORTON, Defendant-Appellant when Idaho authentication turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Norton appeals. II. ANALYSIS A. Authentication On appeal, Norton argues that the district court erred in admitting two exhibits over his objections that the state failed to lay a proper foundation prior to their admission." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jim HOWARD, III, Defendant-Respondent
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jim HOWARD, III, Defendant-Respondent, 150 Idaho 471 (2011)
…to prove the enhancement because it satisfied the relevant authentication requirements of the I.R.E. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal as barred by double jeopardy. The case comes to this Court on a petition for review. We hold that a judgment of conviction need only comply with the I.R.E. in order to be admitted to prove an enhancement. However, we hold that Howard ca…
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jim HOWARD, III, Defendant-Respondent is worth reading on Idaho authentication because the court put the point in its own words: "I.R.E. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal as barred by double jeopardy. The case comes to this Court on a petition for review. We hold that a judgment of conviction need only comply with the I.R.E. in order to be admitted to prove an enhancement." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Joseph Craig NEWMAN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. STATE of Idaho, Respondent
Joseph Craig NEWMAN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. STATE of Idaho, Respondent, 149 Idaho 225 (2010)
…confidential bar misconduct records that were not properly authenticated. The photocopies do not contain any mark indicating that they are certified or otherwise authentic copies of original documents. Merely placing such photocopies in front of a trial court on counsel’s unsworn representation that they constitute copies of bar records is not sufficient to allow the court to…
Joseph Craig NEWMAN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. STATE of Idaho, Respondent is worth reading on Idaho authentication because the court put the point in its own words: "The photocopies do not contain any mark indicating that they are certified or otherwise authentic copies of original documents." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Olegario G. CURIEL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Ronald MINGO, Defendant-Respondent — Bistline, J., dissenting
…nts occurred. There is also a total absence of testimony to authenticate the exhibit sought to be entered as even being the ledger sheet sent to Mingo. Mingo’s testimony alone was not sufficient to lay a proper foundation because Mingo had absolutely nothing to do with the preparation of the records. Since the preliminary requirements for admission were not met, the exhibit sho…
Practitioners open Olegario G. CURIEL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Ronald MINGO, Defendant-Respondent — Bistline, J., dissenting when Idaho authentication turns on the distinction in this sentence: "There is also a total absence of testimony to authenticate the exhibit sought to be entered as even being the ledger sheet sent to Mingo." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
SAFARIS UNLIMITED, LLC, a Georgia Limited Liability Company, Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross Appellant, v. Mike VON
…fact or by expert witnesses with specimens which have been authenticated." 3 Accord D. Craig Lewis, Idaho Trial Handbook § 21:2 (2d ed. 2017). As an evidentiary decision, the district court's decision to admit exhibit 40 is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. E.g. , Mulford v. Union Pac. R.R. , 156 Idaho 134 , 138, 321 P.3d 684 , 688 (2014). To determine whether the district…
Practitioners open SAFARIS UNLIMITED, LLC, a Georgia Limited Liability Company, Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross Appellant, v. Mike VON when Idaho authentication turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Accord D. Craig Lewis, Idaho Trial Handbook § 21:2 (2d ed. 2017). As an evidentiary decision, the district court's decision to admit exhibit 40 is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. E.g. , Mulford v. Union Pac. R.R. , 156 Idaho 134 , 138, 321 P.3d 684 , 688 (2014)." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Daniel W. SILVERSON, Defendant-Appellant
…by admitting into evidence exhibits that were not properly authenticated under I.R.E. 901. Silverson also contends that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing a unified sentence of ten years with a four-year minimum term of incarceration. For the following reasons, we affirm. FACTS The State of Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (the Department) offers a persona…
On authentication, STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Daniel W. SILVERSON, Defendant-Appellant speaks to the Idaho dispute in this passage: "I.R.E. 901. Silverson also contends that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing a unified sentence of ten years with a four-year minimum term of incarceration. For the following reasons, we affirm." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Practice checklist
- State the relevance theory in one sentence before naming an exception.
- Run the 403 / unfair-prejudice balance explicitly for other-acts and graphic exhibits.
- For character or other-acts evidence, identify the non-propensity purpose and request a limiting instruction on the record.
- Decide whether an out-of-court statement is hearsay for the purpose offered before hunting exceptions.
- Lay business-records foundations with time, knowledge, regular practice, and custodial qualifications — or a qualifying certification.
- Prove unavailability with specific facts before offering former testimony or dying declarations.
- Treat deposition use as procedure-plus-hearsay; designate and counter-designate early.
- Authenticate every exhibit under Idaho R. Evid. 901, 902 (or the self-authentication path) before arguing hearsay.
- Preserve chain of custody for physical and digital evidence with named custodians.
- Search LawDiver for recent Idaho appellate evidence opinions before mediation or motions in limine.
Contents
- General standards of admissibility
- Character evidence
- Hearsay: start with the definition
- Party admissions
- Business records
- Important hearsay exceptions that do not require unavailability
- Declarant unavailable
- Dying declarations
- Medical diagnosis or treatment statements
- Use of depositions at trial
- Authenticity: why it matters and how to prove it
- Practice checklist
- Frequently asked questions
General standards of admissibility
Idaho starts every evidence dispute with relevance and unfair prejudice. Under Idaho R. Evid. 401, 403, evidence is relevant when it has any tendency to make a fact of consequence more or less probable, and relevant evidence is still excluded when its probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. Preliminary questions of admissibility are for the court; conditional relevance and limited-purpose instructions keep otherwise-usable proof from becoming a Trojan horse for propensity or truth-of-the-matter use.
Idaho has localized rape-shield and character rules. Appellate review follows the abuse-of-discretion standard common to FRE jurisdictions.
Practice tip: articulate the theory of relevance in one sentence before citing the exception. Lawyers who lead with "it's a business record" without explaining what fact the record proves often lose the 403 balance even when the hearsay foundation is clean.
Character evidence
Character evidence in Idaho is governed by Idaho R. Evid. 404, 405. The default rule is familiar: evidence of a person's character or character trait is not admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character or trait. The same body of law then carves out the classic exceptions — essential-element character, accused-opens-the-door reputation or opinion, and other-acts evidence offered for a non-propensity purpose such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake.
Other-acts notice, 403 balancing, and limiting instructions do most of the real work. In criminal cases, prosecutors who dump prior misconduct without a specific non-propensity theory invite reversal; defense counsel who open the door to good-character testimony without anticipating rebuttal create the very propensity inference the rules were designed to police.
Idaho character-evidence opinions
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Harold E. GRIST, Jr., Defendant-Appellant
…ating an exception in child sex cases to the prohibition of character evidence, we find it necessary to revisit a theoretical underpinning for the introduction of uncharged misconduct in cases involving the sexual abuse and exploitation of children. We further clarify that the admission of I.R.E. 404(b) evidence in a child sex case is subject to the same analysis as the admissi…
On character evidence, STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Harold E. GRIST, Jr., Defendant-Appellant speaks to the Idaho dispute in this passage: "We further clarify that the admission of I.R.E." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff/Respondent, v. David Leon JOHNSON, Defendant/Appellant
…s have sometimes interpreted Moore and Tolman as permitting character evidence to prove child-sex-abuse charges but expressly repudiated the notion that a different rule applies to 404(b) evidence in such cases. Id. at 51, 205 P.3d at 1187. This Court reasoned that “the theoretical underpinning of the admissibility of uncharged misconduct for purposes of ‘corroboration’ as arti…
On character evidence, STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff/Respondent, v. David Leon JOHNSON, Defendant/Appellant speaks to the Idaho dispute in this passage: "Moore and Tolman as permitting character evidence to prove child-sex-abuse charges but expressly repudiated the notion that a different rule applies to 404(b) evidence in such cases. Id. at 51, 205 P.3d at 1187." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Hector B. ALMARAZ, Jr., Defendant-Appellant
…rict court abused its discretion by admitting impermissible character evidence that gang members commit crimes and other violent acts and by admitting improper testimony from a police officer and an expert witness interpreting the security video from the scene of the crime. Almaraz also argues that the district court erred in failing to suppress an eyewitness identification due…
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Hector B. ALMARAZ, Jr., Defendant-Appellant is worth reading on Idaho character evidence because the court put the point in its own words: "rict court abused its discretion by admitting impermissible character evidence that gang members commit crimes and other violent acts and by admitting improper testimony from a police officer and an expert witness interpreting the security video from the scene of the crime. Almar" Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Michael Angelo HERNANDEZ, Defendant-Appellant
…to a peHinent trait of the victim’s character. That is, the character evidence must be relevant to a material issue in the case. *584 Hernandez argues that the evidence he proffered in this case was relevant to his claim that he acted to defend himself and his friend, Quinlivan, against an attack by Richardson. We agree that the district court erred in granting the prosecutor’s…
Practitioners open STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Michael Angelo HERNANDEZ, Defendant-Appellant when Idaho character evidence turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Hinent trait of the victim’s character. That is, the character evidence must be relevant to a material issue in the case." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Elias Manuel CUSTODIO, Defendant-Appellant
…otion in limine seeking to prohibit Custodio from admitting character evidence concerning the victims’ propensities for violence. The district court partially granted the state’s motion, ruling that evidence concerning the victims’ propensities for violence would be limited at trial to reputation and opinion testimony. Custodio then moved for a change of venue, which was denied…
Idaho opinions such as STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Elias Manuel CUSTODIO, Defendant-Appellant are cited where character evidence is disputed. The court stated: "Custodio from admitting character evidence concerning the victims’ propensities for violence." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. William F. DAMBRELL, Geo — Bistline, J., concurring in part and dissenting
…out to take place. The trial court’s ruling disallowing bad character evidence denied the defendants their right to a fair trial. If there is to be justice in the prosecution of criminal actions, these convictions must be vacated and the cause remanded for a new trial, or better in my mind, two separate trials.
Idaho opinions such as STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. William F. DAMBRELL, Geo — Bistline, J., concurring in part and dissenting are cited where character evidence is disputed. The court stated: "The trial court’s ruling disallowing bad character evidence denied the defendants their right to a fair trial." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Michael VIERRA, Defendant-Appellant
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Michael VIERRA, Defendant-Appellant, 125 Idaho 465 (1994)
…lan from her as well. Vierra identifies this information as character evidence of the victim, Berier, but ar *469 gues it should be admitted under I.R.E. 404(a)(2). That section states: Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to prove conduct; exceptions; other crimes. — (a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person’s character or a trait of character is not admiss…
On character evidence, STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Michael VIERRA, Defendant-Appellant speaks to the Idaho dispute in this passage: "Vierra identifies this information as character evidence of the victim, Berier, but ar *469 gues it should be admitted under I.R.E. 404(a)(2). That section states: Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to prove conduct; exceptions; other crimes." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Frequently asked questions
What is the primary evidence source in Idaho?
Idaho applies the Idaho Rules of Evidence. Idaho's rules mirror the FRE; Idaho R. Evid. 401–902 are applied in district and magistrate divisions with strong reliance on federal precedent.
How do Idaho courts decide relevance and unfair prejudice?
Under Idaho R. Evid. 401, 403, evidence must make a fact of consequence more or less probable, and the court may exclude relevant evidence when unfair prejudice, confusion, or waste of time substantially outweighs its probative value.
Are party admissions hearsay in Idaho?
Party-opponent statements under Idaho R. Evid. 801(d)(2) are generally excluded from the hearsay ban (or treated as an exception, depending on local drafting). They may be offered against the party who made or adopted them without showing unavailability.
What foundation is required for business records?
Under Idaho R. Evid. 803(6), show a record made at or near the time from someone with knowledge, kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity, as a regular practice, through a custodian, qualified witness, or allowed certification — subject to trustworthiness attack.
When can I use a deposition at trial in Idaho?
Idaho R. Civ. P. 32 governs civil deposition use at trial. Idaho Crim. R. 16 limits criminal discovery; prior sworn testimony may be offered under Idaho R. Evid. 804(b)(1) when unavailability is established.
Why is authenticity separate from hearsay?
Authenticity asks whether the item is what you claim it is; hearsay asks whether out-of-court assertions inside it may be used for their truth. You can lose on either ground independently. Idaho authenticity practice starts with Idaho R. Evid. 901, 902.
Where do dying declarations and medical statements fit?
Dying declarations under Idaho R. Evid. 804(b)(2) require belief in impending death and concern the cause or circumstances of that believed death. Medical statements under Idaho R. Evid. 803(4) require a genuine diagnostic or treatment purpose and reasonable pertinence to care.