Georgia's rule on evidence law turns on a feature the national template does not capture: Georgia evidence practice is organized under the Georgia Evidence Code (O.C.G.A. Title 24). Relevance starts at O.C.G.A. §§ 24-4-401, 24-4-403; hearsay starts at O.C.G.A. §§ 24-8-801, 24-8-802. The controlling authority is Georgia Evidence Code (O.C.G.A. Title 24). Authenticity is a separate fight under O.C.G.A. §§ 24-9-901, 24-9-902. Depositions at trial: O.C.G.A. § 9-11-32 and Georgia Uniform Superior Court Rules govern civil deposition use at trial, including former testimony under O.C.G.A. § 24-8-804(b)(1). Criminal cases follow Uniform Superior Court Rule 17.1 and O.C.G.A. Title 17 discovery statutes; deposition use at criminal trial requires a codified hearsay exception.
Contents
- General standards of admissibility
- Character evidence
- Hearsay: start with the definition
- Party admissions
- Business records
- Important hearsay exceptions that do not require unavailability
- Declarant unavailable
- Dying declarations
- Medical diagnosis or treatment statements
- Use of depositions at trial
- Authenticity: why it matters and how to prove it
- Practice checklist
- Frequently asked questions
Worked example under Georgia law
The illustration below uses only rules already stated for Georgia. It is a research hypothetical, not a prediction of what a court will do.
A lawyer in Georgia wants to offer a medical record, a party email, and a statement the declarant made while believing death was imminent.
- Clear relevance and unfair prejudice under O.C.G.A. §§ 24-4-401, 24-4-403.
- If the email is the opposing party's, test O.C.G.A. § 24-8-801(d)(2) before the hearsay definition in O.C.G.A. §§ 24-8-801, 24-8-802.
- For the medical record, lay the business-records foundation in O.C.G.A. § 24-8-803(6) and the treatment purpose in O.C.G.A. § 24-8-803(4).
- For the deathbed statement, meet O.C.G.A. § 24-8-804(b)(2), then authenticate every exhibit under O.C.G.A. §§ 24-9-901, 24-9-902.
Georgia keeps hearsay, character, and authenticity on different rules inside the Georgia Evidence Code (O.C.G.A. Title 24). Winning one does not win the others.
General standards of admissibility
Georgia starts every evidence dispute with relevance and unfair prejudice. Under O.C.G.A. §§ 24-4-401, 24-4-403, evidence is relevant when it has any tendency to make a fact of consequence more or less probable, and relevant evidence is still excluded when its probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. Preliminary questions of admissibility are for the court; conditional relevance and limited-purpose instructions keep otherwise-usable proof from becoming a Trojan horse for propensity or truth-of-the-matter use.
Pre-2013 Georgia evidence law was a mix of statutes and common law; older cases must be read carefully for continuing validity. Georgia retains distinct rules on new-trial motions for evidentiary error.
Practice tip: articulate the theory of relevance in one sentence before citing the exception. Lawyers who lead with "it's a business record" without explaining what fact the record proves often lose the 403 balance even when the hearsay foundation is clean.
Character evidence
Character evidence in Georgia is governed by O.C.G.A. §§ 24-4-404, 24-4-405. The default rule is familiar: evidence of a person's character or character trait is not admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character or trait. The same body of law then carves out the classic exceptions — essential-element character, accused-opens-the-door reputation or opinion, and other-acts evidence offered for a non-propensity purpose such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake.
Other-acts notice, 403 balancing, and limiting instructions do most of the real work. In criminal cases, prosecutors who dump prior misconduct without a specific non-propensity theory invite reversal; defense counsel who open the door to good-character testimony without anticipating rebuttal create the very propensity inference the rules were designed to police.
Georgia character-evidence opinions
Farley v. the State — Sears, J., concurring
Farley v. the State — Sears, J., concurring, 265 Ga. 622 (1995)
…ndant’s general character is irrelevant and inadmissible.11 Character evidence is excluded because a jury must determine a defendant’s guilt or innocence based solely on evidence relevant to the crime charged, and not based on a belief that the defendant has a criminal character or a general propensity to commit bad acts.12 Evidence of an independent crime or bad act committed…
Practitioners open Farley v. the State — Sears, J., concurring when Georgia character evidence turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Character evidence is excluded because a jury must determine a defendant’s guilt or innocence based solely on evidence relevant to the crime charged, and not based on a belief that the defendant has a criminal character or a general propensity to commit bad acts." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Payne v. the State — Hunstein, J., dissenting
Payne v. the State — Hunstein, J., dissenting, 285 Ga. 137 (2009)
…fendant’s general character is irrelevant and inadmissible. Character evidence is excluded because a jury must determine a defendant’s guilt or innocence based solely on evidence relevant to the crime charged, and not based on a belief that the defendant has a criminal character or a general propensity to commit bad acts. . . . [Evidence of a prior crime is character evidence o…
Georgia opinions such as Payne v. the State — Hunstein, J., dissenting are cited where character evidence is disputed. The court stated: "Character evidence is excluded because a jury must determine a defendant’s guilt or innocence based solely on evidence relevant to the crime charged, and not based on a belief that the defendant has a criminal character or a general propensity to commit bad acts. . . ." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Pitts v. the State — Ellington, J., dissenting
Pitts v. the State — Ellington, J., dissenting, 260 Ga. App. 553 (2003)
…rged. I *566believe that the testimony was inadmissible bad character evidence, that counsel’s failure to raise an appropriate objection or timely move for a mistrial constituted deficient performance, and that Pitts was prejudiced thereby. Accordingly, I would reverse his convictions based upon ineffective assistance of counsel and would remand this case for a new trial. A tho…
Georgia opinions such as Pitts v. the State — Ellington, J., dissenting are cited where character evidence is disputed. The court stated: "I *566believe that the testimony was inadmissible bad character evidence, that counsel’s failure to raise an appropriate objection or timely move for a mistrial constituted deficient performance, and that Pitts was prejudiced thereby." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Daireem Raishawn Parker v. State
Daireem Raishawn Parker v. State, 339 Ga. App. 285 (2016)
…that the trial court erred in finding he opened the door to character evidence and in limiting his explanation *286 of a prior criminal charge. He also argues that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. For the following reasons, we affirm. Construed in favor of the verdict, the evidence showed that a woman and her boyfriend were walking from the parking deck to t…
Daireem Raishawn Parker v. State is worth reading on Georgia character evidence because the court put the point in its own words: "He also argues that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. For the following reasons, we affirm." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
OLIVER v. State
OLIVER v. State, 329 Ga. App. 377 (2014)
…. But despite this proffer, the trial court ruled that such character evidence was inadmissible. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury acquitted Oliver on the charges of malice murder, felony murder predicated upon burglary, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a burglary. However, the jury convicted him on the charges of voluntary manslaughter, as a lesser-i…
Georgia opinions such as OLIVER v. State are cited where character evidence is disputed. The court stated: "But despite this proffer, the trial court ruled that such character evidence was inadmissible." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Floyd v. State
Floyd v. State, 321 Ga. 717 (2025)
…that the evidence should have been excluded as inadmissible character evidence under OCGA § 24-4-404 (b), and that it was highly prejudicial, and thus, inadmissible under OCGA § 24-4-403. These claims, too, fail. At trial, McCartney was called as a witness prior to Whitley. Under direct examination, she denied telling Whitley that Appellant told her that he committed the crime.…
On character evidence, Floyd v. State speaks to the Georgia dispute in this passage: "OCGA § 24-4-404 (b), and that it was highly prejudicial, and thus, inadmissible under OCGA § 24-4-403. These claims, too, fail. At trial, McCartney was called as a witness prior to Whitley." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
WILSON v. The STATE.
WILSON v. The STATE., 351 Ga. App. 50 (2019)
…d telephone conversation because it contained impermissible character evidence. For the following reasons, we affirm. On appeal from a criminal conviction, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, and the defendant no longer enjoys the presumption of innocence. We do not weigh the evidence or determine witness credibility, but only determine if the evide…
On character evidence, WILSON v. The STATE. speaks to the Georgia dispute in this passage: "For the following reasons, we affirm. On appeal from a criminal conviction, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, and the defendant no longer enjoys the presumption of innocence." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Hearsay: start with the definition
Most hearsay objections in Georgia are won or lost on the definition, not on an exception. Under O.C.G.A. §§ 24-8-801, 24-8-802, hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Non-hearsay purposes — verbal acts, effect on the listener, notice, circumstantial evidence of state of mind, and impeachment — remain available when the proponent can articulate them without asking the jury to believe the declarant.
Layered hearsay (hearsay within hearsay) requires an exception or exclusion for each layer. Machine-generated data and non-assertive conduct sit outside the hearsay definition in FRE-aligned jurisdictions, but they still need authenticity and, often, expert or business-records foundations.
Georgia hearsay opinions
Momon v. the State
Momon v. the State, 249 Ga. 865 (1982)
…tions by the defendant that Detective Henry's testimony was hearsay and the crimes were not similar, that one Ann Rembert (since deceased) reported being abducted and raped by two men in a late 1960 greenish *866 blue automobile, that the defendant was arrested ten months later, and that Ms. Rembert identified the defendant's photograph from a photographic array and identified…
Momon v. the State is worth reading on Georgia hearsay because the court put the point in its own words: "Detective Henry's testimony was hearsay and the crimes were not similar, that one Ann Rembert (since deceased) reported being abducted and raped by two men in a late 1960 greenish *866 blue automobile, that the defendant was arrested ten months later, and that Ms." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Clark v. the State; Storey v. the State
Clark v. the State; Storey v. the State, 271 Ga. 6 (1999)
…ssity exception to the statute prohibiting the admission of hearsay evidence (OCGA § 24-3-1), of testimony concerning a statement made by the victim two months before his death. At trial, the victim’s brother-in-law testified that Brian had told him that Brian and appellants were “in a gang called ‘Free Birds’. . . .” It is undisputed that the witness's testimony as to what Bri…
Georgia opinions such as Clark v. the State; Storey v. the State are cited where hearsay is disputed. The court stated: "OCGA § 24-3-1), of testimony concerning a statement made by the victim two months before his death. At trial, the victim’s brother-in-law testified that Brian had told him that Brian and appellants were “in a gang called ‘Free Birds’. . . ." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Livingston v. the State
Livingston v. the State, 268 Ga. 205 (1997)
…ements admissible under the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule (OCGA § 24-3-5), and the remainder admissible under the “necessity” exception to the hearsay rule. OCGA § 24-3-1 (b). Appellant contends that the evidence against him, excluding the hearsay testimony recounting the Waldrips’ statements which he contends was erroneously admitted, is insufficient to authoriz…
On hearsay, Livingston v. the State speaks to the Georgia dispute in this passage: "OCGA § 24-3-5), and the remainder admissible under the “necessity” exception to the hearsay rule. OCGA § 24-3-1 (b)." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Roebuck v. the State — Fletcher, J., concurring
Roebuck v. the State — Fletcher, J., concurring, 277 Ga. 200 (2003)
…owever, the only corroborating evidence is the inadmissible hearsay upon which the expert relied. But because Roebuck did not object to the admission of the hearsay, and because we should overrule our prior cases holding that hearsay has no probative value even when admitted without objection, I would hold that the hearsay admitted in this case can serve as the necessary corrob…
On hearsay, Roebuck v. the State — Fletcher, J., concurring speaks to the Georgia dispute in this passage: "owever, the only corroborating evidence is the inadmissible hearsay upon which the expert relied. But because Roebuck did not object to the admission of the hearsay, and because we should overrule our prior cases holding that hearsay has no probative value even when admitted with" The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Character v. the State; Roberts v. the State
Character v. the State; Roberts v. the State, 285 Ga. 112 (2009)
…tted Tharpe to testify under the necessity exception to the hearsay rule about a prior difficulty between Lovejoy and the Characters. Tharpe testified that Lovejoy told him that, a couple of weeks before the shooting, he was playing a dice game with the Characters and won about $3,000 to $4,000. When Lovejoy finished playing and was walking away from the game, the Characters pu…
On hearsay, Character v. the State; Roberts v. the State speaks to the Georgia dispute in this passage: "Tharpe to testify under the necessity exception to the hearsay rule about a prior difficulty between Lovejoy and the Characters." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Scott v. the State — Melton, J., dissenting
Scott v. the State — Melton, J., dissenting, 281 Ga. 373 (2006)
…dence of any such abuse proffered by Scott was inadmissible hearsay which the trial court properly excluded. Therefore, I must respectfully dissent. To support the allegation of Buffington’s past behavior, Scott proffered an “intake worksheet” used by DFACS to process incoming claims of abuse. This worksheet contained the allegations of Buffing-ton’s neighbor that Buffington ha…
Georgia opinions such as Scott v. the State — Melton, J., dissenting are cited where hearsay is disputed. The court stated: "Scott was inadmissible hearsay which the trial court properly excluded. Therefore, I must respectfully dissent. To support the allegation of Buffington’s past behavior, Scott proffered an “intake worksheet” used by DFACS to process incoming claims of abuse." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Shaver v. the State
Shaver v. the State, 199 Ga. App. 428 (1991)
…ufficient to sustain the convictions. The state offered the hearsay testimony regarding the victim’s out-of-court statements pursuant to the exception created in OCGA § 24-3-16 (the Child Hearsay Statute), under which these statements in a child molestation case are admissible “if the child is available to testify in the proceedings and the court finds that the circumstances of…
Georgia opinions such as Shaver v. the State are cited where hearsay is disputed. The court stated: "ufficient to sustain the convictions. The state offered the hearsay testimony regarding the victim’s out-of-court statements pursuant to the exception created in OCGA § 24-3-16 (the Child Hearsay Statute), under which these statements in a child molestation case are admissible “i" That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Party admissions
Statements of an opposing party are among the most important routes around the hearsay bar. Georgia treats them under O.C.G.A. § 24-8-801(d)(2). Nothing about the statement need be against interest, contemporaneous, or based on personal knowledge — the theory is adversarial, not reliability-based. A party cannot complain that his own words are unreliable when offered against him.
Scope questions dominate practice: the party's own statement; adopted statements (including silence in circumstances where a reasonable person would deny); statements by authorized speakers; agent or employee statements on matters within the scope of the relationship; and, in criminal conspiracy cases, coconspirator statements during and in furtherance of the conspiracy. A defendant generally cannot introduce his own exculpatory out-of-court statement as a "party admission" against himself — the rule runs one way.
Georgia party-admission opinions
Clark v. the State; Storey v. the State
Clark v. the State; Storey v. the State, 271 Ga. 6 (1999)
…from mentioning in its opening statement appellant Storey’s admission to police that he had accidentally shot Brian. “[T]he opening statement is of no small significance in that it outlines for the jury what a party intends to show at trial.” Sims v. State, 251 Ga. 877 (3) (311 SE2d 161) (1984). The prosecutor is permitted to use the opening statement to set out what the eviden…
Georgia opinions such as Clark v. the State; Storey v. the State are cited where party admissions is disputed. The court stated: "Storey’s admission to police that he had accidentally shot Brian. “[T]he opening statement is of no small significance in that it outlines for the jury what a party intends to show at trial.” Sims v. State, 251 Ga. 877 (3) (311 SE2d 161) (1984)." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
BAILEY v. EDMUNDSON; And Vice Versa
BAILEY v. EDMUNDSON; And Vice Versa, 280 Ga. 528 (2006)
…of fact, the trial court erred by forcing him to accept the admission of a prima facie case. Where the burden of proof rests with the plaintiff in a civil action, he “is entitled to the opening and concluding arguments except that if the defendant introduces no evidence or admits aprima-facie case, the defendant shall be entitled to open and conclude.” (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA…
On party admissions, BAILEY v. EDMUNDSON; And Vice Versa speaks to the Georgia dispute in this passage: "Where the burden of proof rests with the plaintiff in a civil action, he “is entitled to the opening and concluding arguments except that if the defendant introduces no evidence or admits aprima-facie case, the defendant shall be entitled to open and conclude.” (Emphasis supplied." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Brooks v. the State; Ball v. the State; Clark v. the State
Brooks v. the State; Ball v. the State; Clark v. the State, 281 Ga. 14 (2006)
…rooks and Ball both argue that the trial court erred in the admission of certain hearsay statements made by their co-defendants. Ball argues that the trial court erred by admitting the hearsay statements made by Brooks to Ferguson. Similarly, Brooks argues that the trial court erred by not giving a limiting instruction informing the jury that the testimony of Nelson, regarding…
On party admissions, Brooks v. the State; Ball v. the State; Clark v. the State speaks to the Georgia dispute in this passage: "Ball both argue that the trial court erred in the admission of certain hearsay statements made by their co-defendants. Ball argues that the trial court erred by admitting the hearsay statements made by Brooks to Ferguson." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
GLISPIE v. State
GLISPIE v. State, 300 Ga. 128 (2016)
…hone found in Glispie’s possession were admissible as party admissions? (2) Did the Court of Appeals err in concluding that the trial court did not err in denying Glispie’s motion in limine to exclude the text messages? As found by the Court of Appeals, the record in this case shows the following: [0]n February 7, 2013, at about 2:00 a.m., Nathan Watts, a Rockdale County sherif…
Practitioners open GLISPIE v. State when Georgia party admissions turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Glispie’s possession were admissible as party admissions?" Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
DAVIS Et Al. v. THE STATE
DAVIS Et Al. v. THE STATE, 194 Ga. App. 482 (1990)
…on admitted committing a crime because of the rule that the admission of a person that he, and not the accused, was the actual perpetrator of the offense is not admissible in favor of the accused. See Massey v. State, 243 Ga. 228 (6) (253 SE2d 196) (1979); Little v. Stynchcombe, 227 Ga. 311 (2) (180 SE2d 541) (1971). The United States Supreme Court has held that “where constitu…
DAVIS Et Al. v. THE STATE is worth reading on Georgia party admissions because the court put the point in its own words: "See Massey v. State, 243 Ga. 228 (6) (253 SE2d 196) (1979); Little v. Stynchcombe, 227 Ga. 311 (2) (180 SE2d 541) (1971)." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Park v. the State
Park v. the State, 230 Ga. App. 274 (1998)
…6-4 (b); 17-16-5; and 17-16-7. 23 See OCGA § 24-3-31 (party admissions are admissible). 24 OCGA § 24-3-2. 25 OCGA § 16-3-21 (b) (3). 26 Montgomery v. State, 173 Ga. App. 570, 572 (2) (327 SE2d 770) (1985). 27 Taylor v. State, 176 Ga. App. 567, 574 (4) (b) (336 SE2d 832) (1985). 28 249 Ga. 223, 228 (290 SE2d 71) (1982). 29 See Williams v. State, 180 Ga. App. 562, 563 (1) (349 SE…
Park v. the State is worth reading on Georgia party admissions because the court put the point in its own words: "See OCGA § 24-3-31 (party admissions are admissible). 24 OCGA § 24-3-2. 25 OCGA § 16-3-21 (b) (3). 26 Montgomery v. State, 173 Ga. App. 570, 572 (2) (327 SE2d 770) (1985). 27 Taylor v. State, 176 Ga. App. 567, 574 (4) (b) (336 SE2d 832) (1985). 28 249 Ga." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
William Clifford Chase, Jr. v. State
William Clifford Chase, Jr. v. State, 337 Ga. App. 449 (2016)
…s exception to the hearsay rule. That exception permits the admission of a business record (A) made at or near the time of the described acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses; (B) made by, or from information transmitted by, a person with personal knowledge and a business duty to report; (C) kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity; and (D) it wa…
Practitioners open William Clifford Chase, Jr. v. State when Georgia party admissions turns on the distinction in this sentence: "s exception to the hearsay rule. That exception permits the admission of a business record (A) made at or near the time of the described acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses; (B) made by, or from information transmitted by, a person with personal knowledge and a busin" Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Jaylend Devone Glispie v. State
Jaylend Devone Glispie v. State, 335 Ga. App. 177 (2015)
…ver various objections he made at trial. 17 “On appeal, the admission of evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” 18 A proper application of the abuse-of-discretion review recognizes the range of possible conclusions the trial judge may reach, and that there will often be occasions in which we will *184 affirm the evidentiary ruling of a trial court even though we woul…
Jaylend Devone Glispie v. State is worth reading on Georgia party admissions because the court put the point in its own words: "On appeal, the admission of evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Business records
The business-records exception under O.C.G.A. § 24-8-803(6) is the everyday path for medical charts, employment files, bank statements, and maintenance logs. The foundation requires a record made at or near the time by — or from information transmitted by — someone with knowledge; kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity; and made as a regular practice. A custodian or other qualified witness (or a qualifying certification where the jurisdiction allows it) lays the foundation. The opponent may still attack lack of trustworthiness when the source or method of preparation indicates unreliability — litigation-driven reports are the classic failure mode.
Do not confuse authenticity with the business-records exception. You still need to show the exhibit is what you claim it is; the hearsay exception then answers why the out-of-court assertions inside it may be considered for their truth.
Georgia business-records opinions
Santana v. the State
Santana v. the State, 283 Ga. App. 696 (2007)
…ish a foundation for the documents to be admitted under the business records exception to the hearsay rule. We disagree. *698 The admission of evidence lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, and we will not reverse such determinations absent abuse of that discretion. 3 “Although hearsay evidence is generally inadmissible, OCGA § 24-3-14 provides an exception for t…
On business records, Santana v. the State speaks to the Georgia dispute in this passage: "We disagree. *698 The admission of evidence lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, and we will not reverse such determinations absent abuse of that discretion." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Oldham v. the State
Oldham v. the State, 205 Ga. App. 268 (1992)
…concentration level may be admitted into evidence under the business records exception to the hearsay rule, *270 when the party seeking to admit the test results lays a proper foundation by offering the testimony of a witness who is familiar with the method of record keeping, who can therefore testify that the entry of the test result was made in the regular course of business…
On business records, Oldham v. the State speaks to the Georgia dispute in this passage: "concentration level may be admitted into evidence under the business records exception to the hearsay rule, *270 when the party seeking to admit the test results lays a proper foundation by offering the testimony of a witness who is familiar with the method of record keeping, who" The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
William Clifford Chase, Jr. v. State
William Clifford Chase, Jr. v. State, 337 Ga. App. 449 (2016)
…isagree. The state tendered the application pursuant to the business records exception to the rule against hearsay. 7 To authenticate the document, it used the self-authentication procedure set forth in OCGA § 24-9-902 (11), which allows a party to authenticate a business record by submitting a declaration from a records custodian certifying that it: (A) Was made at or near the…
Practitioners open William Clifford Chase, Jr. v. State when Georgia business records turns on the distinction in this sentence: "The state tendered the application pursuant to the business records exception to the rule against hearsay." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
ANGEL BUSINESS CATALYSTS, LLC v. BANK OF THE OZARKS
ANGEL BUSINESS CATALYSTS, LLC v. BANK OF THE OZARKS, 316 Ga. App. 253 (2012)
…ing affidavit and the attached documents were admissible as business records, and that the attached documents did not establish the amounts they owed. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm. “Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, c…
Practitioners open ANGEL BUSINESS CATALYSTS, LLC v. BANK OF THE OZARKS when Georgia business records turns on the distinction in this sentence: "For the reasons set forth below, we affirm. “Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
SOUTHERN COMPANY v. HAMBURG and vice versa — Eldridge, J., concurring
SOUTHERN COMPANY v. HAMBURG and vice versa — Eldridge, J., concurring, 233 Ga. App. 135 (1998)
…quate foundation, these statements are admissible under the business record exception to the hearsay rule, OCGA § 24-3-14. See N. D. T., Inc. v. Connor, 196 Ga. App. 314, 316 (6) (395 SE2d 901) (1990). OCGA § 24-3-14 (c) provides that lack of personal knowledge by the maker of the records does not affect the records’ admissibility *138but affects only the weight to be accorded…
On business records, SOUTHERN COMPANY v. HAMBURG and vice versa — Eldridge, J., concurring speaks to the Georgia dispute in this passage: "OCGA § 24-3-14. See N. D. T., Inc. v. Connor, 196 Ga. App. 314, 316 (6) (395 SE2d 901) (1990)." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Dixon v. the State
Dixon v. the State, 227 Ga. App. 533 (1997)
…rial court erred by admitting the hospital record under the business record exception to the hearsay rule because the State failed to lay a proper foundation, and (2) admission of the hospital record as evidence of the test results denied him his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. The State laid a proper foundation for admission of the document as a business record pursuan…
Dixon v. the State is worth reading on Georgia business records because the court put the point in its own words: "State failed to lay a proper foundation, and (2) admission of the hospital record as evidence of the test results denied him his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Antavious Lejuan Jones v. State
Antavious Lejuan Jones v. State, 812 S.E.2d 337 (2018)
…Because we find that the log sheet was admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule, we now affirm. "On appeal, we review the trial court's grant of a motion in limine for abuse of discretion." (Citations and punctuation omitted.) State v. Wilkins , 302 Ga. 156 , 160, 805 S.E.2d 868 (2017). See also Marchman v. State , 299 Ga. 534 , 539 (2), 787 S.E.2d 73…
Antavious Lejuan Jones v. State is worth reading on Georgia business records because the court put the point in its own words: "Because we find that the log sheet was admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule, we now affirm. 'On appeal, we review the trial court's grant of a motion in limine for abuse of discretion.' (Citations and punctuation omitted.) State v. Wilkins , 302 Ga." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Important hearsay exceptions that do not require unavailability
Three present-sense and mental-state exceptions carry most of the remaining traffic in Georgia trial practice.
Excited utterance — O.C.G.A. § 24-8-803(2). A statement relating to a startling event or condition, made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused. Timing is elastic; composure defeats the exception even minutes after the event, while visible distress can preserve it for hours.
Present sense impression — O.C.G.A. § 24-8-803(1). A statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while or immediately after the declarant perceived it. Contemporaneity is strict — seconds and minutes, not hours — and excitement is not required.
Then-existing mental, emotional, or physical condition — O.C.G.A. § 24-8-803(3). Statements of then-existing state of mind (including intent and plan) come in; statements of memory or belief offered to prove the fact remembered generally do not. Intent-to-meet-another-person cases remain the hardest applications.
Declarant unavailable
When the declarant is unavailable under O.C.G.A. § 24-8-804(a), Georgia opens a second suite of exceptions. Unavailability typically includes privilege, refusal to testify despite court order, lack of memory, death or then-existing infirmity, and absence despite reasonable efforts to procure attendance. The proponent bears the burden of proving unavailability with specific facts — a bare assertion that the witness "could not be found" is not enough.
Former testimony under O.C.G.A. § 24-8-804(b)(1) is the workhorse once unavailability is shown: testimony given as a witness at a trial, hearing, or lawful deposition, offered against a party who had an opportunity and similar motive to develop it by direct, cross, or redirect. Criminal confrontation analysis runs in parallel and is not satisfied merely because a hearsay exception applies.
Dying declarations
Dying declarations under O.C.G.A. § 24-8-804(b)(2) remain a narrow but decisive exception in homicide and, in many jurisdictions, civil cases involving the cause or circumstances of what the declarant believed to be impending death. The foundational showing is the declarant's belief that death was imminent — not that death in fact followed within any particular time — plus a statement concerning the cause or circumstances of what the declarant believed to be the impending death. Courts police coaching and narrative expansions aggressively.
Georgia dying-declaration opinions
STRICKLAND v. State
STRICKLAND v. State, 167 Ga. 452 (1928)
…(6), 94 (125 S. E. 52). Where the State introduced the *456dying declaration of the deceased, in which he stated that either the defendant or another officer, both of whom were pursuing and attempting to arrest him, shot him, and proved that the defendant, returning from the place where shots were heard, and having in his hand his pistol, stated that he had tried to cut off th…
STRICKLAND v. State is worth reading on Georgia dying declaration because the court put the point in its own words: "(6), 94 (125 S. E. 52). Where the State introduced the *456dying declaration of the deceased, in which he stated that either the defendant or another officer, both of whom were pursuing and attempting to arrest him, shot him, and proved that the defendant, returning from the plac" Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
SMITH v. State
SMITH v. State, 179 Ga. 791 (1934)
…verruled, and he excepted. The State introduced evidence of dying declarations, and *792the court charged the jury as follows: “Now on the subject of dying declarations the court gives you in charge this provision of our law: You are instructed that it is for the court, in the first instance, to determine whether the preliminary proof is sufficient to admit dying declarations';…
On dying declaration, SMITH v. State speaks to the Georgia dispute in this passage: "verruled, and he excepted. The State introduced evidence of dying declarations, and *792the court charged the jury as follows: “Now on the subject of dying declarations the court gives you in charge this provision of our law: You are instructed that it is for the court, in the fi" The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Sanford v. the State
Sanford v. the State, 287 Ga. 351 (2010)
…d that the statements were admissible into evidence *353 as dying declarations and as part of the res gestae. Sanford contends that such ruling was error because the statements inculpating him did not qualify as dying declarations in that Corbett was not in the “article of death” when she made the statements, and, in fact, did not die until several hours later; he further argue…
Georgia opinions such as Sanford v. the State are cited where dying declaration is disputed. The court stated: "d that the statements were admissible into evidence *353 as dying declarations and as part of the res gestae. Sanford contends that such ruling was error because the statements inculpating him did not qualify as dying declarations in that Corbett was not in the “article of death”" That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
PYLE v. State
PYLE v. State, 4 Ga. App. 811 (1908)
…ion for a new trial. The written statement objected to as a dying declaration is not literally or in substance set out in the motion, nor is it attached thereto as an exhibit. This court will look alone to the motion for a new trial,_ and what is set out therein and made a part thereof, for the purpose of determining whether the ruling complained of is erroneous. “Under no circ…
Practitioners open PYLE v. State when Georgia dying declaration turns on the distinction in this sentence: "The written statement objected to as a dying declaration is not literally or in substance set out in the motion, nor is it attached thereto as an exhibit." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
BUSH v. State
BUSH v. State, 109 Ga. 120 (1899)
…jury certain statements made by the deceased and offered as dying declarations. These statements were that at the schoolhouse Bush had cursed him for a G— d— son of a b — , and told him that he was going to kill him. To the admission of this evidence defendant objected on the ground that dying declarations could .only be admitted to prove who was the slayer, and the res geste o…
Georgia opinions such as BUSH v. State are cited where dying declaration is disputed. The court stated: "These statements were that at the schoolhouse Bush had cursed him for a G— d— son of a b — , and told him that he was going to kill him. To the admission of this evidence defendant objected on the ground that dying declarations could ." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
JEFFORDS v. State
JEFFORDS v. State, 162 Ga. 573 (1926)
…rmine whether -the preliminary proof is sufficient to admit dying declarations; but this ruling of the court is not binding upon the jury, for you must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement introduced as a dying declaration of the deceased was actually made by the deceased, and that she was in the article of death, and conscious of her condition at the time…
Georgia opinions such as JEFFORDS v. State are cited where dying declaration is disputed. The court stated: "rmine whether -the preliminary proof is sufficient to admit dying declarations; but this ruling of the court is not binding upon the jury, for you must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement introduced as a dying declaration of the deceased was actually made by" That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Ayers v. the State
Ayers v. the State, 110 S.E.2d 669 (1959)
…len in the presence of the witness Mason were admissible as dying declarations. The ultimate determination of whether or not a statement is a dying declaration is for the jury; whereas a prima facie case is all that is necessary to carry the declaration to the jury. Findley v. State, 125 Ga. 579 (1) (54 S. E. 106). “Declarations by any person in the article of death, who is con…
Ayers v. the State is worth reading on Georgia dying declaration because the court put the point in its own words: "Mason were admissible as dying declarations. The ultimate determination of whether or not a statement is a dying declaration is for the jury; whereas a prima facie case is all that is necessary to carry the declaration to the jury. Findley v. State, 125 Ga. 579 (1) (54 S. E. 106)." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
BENTON v. State
BENTON v. State, 158 Ga. 41 (1924)
…counsel that the proper foundation for the introduction of dying declarations had not been shown, that the deceased, in articulo mortis, stated that he had no ax, knife, or weapon, and that the defendant shot him. The preliminary proof was as follows: One Layfield asked the deceased if he had an ax or a knife, when the physician told the deceased to go ahead and tell Layfield…
Practitioners open BENTON v. State when Georgia dying declaration turns on the distinction in this sentence: "counsel that the proper foundation for the introduction of dying declarations had not been shown, that the deceased, in articulo mortis, stated that he had no ax, knife, or weapon, and that the defendant shot him. The preliminary proof was as follows: One Layfield asked the decea" Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Medical diagnosis or treatment statements
Statements made for medical diagnosis or treatment under O.C.G.A. § 24-8-803(4) cover medical history, past or present symptoms, and their general cause when reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. The exception is not limited to treating physicians; statements to nurses, EMTs, and consulting clinicians can qualify when the diagnostic purpose is genuine. Fault and identity remain the usual battleground: "I was hit by a car" is often pertinent; "the light was green" usually is not; abuser identity in child-abuse and domestic-violence cases is heavily litigated.
Georgia medical-statement opinions
Allen v. State
Allen v. State, 543 S.E.2d 45 (2000)
…K.J. made to her licensed professional counselor under the medical diagnosis or treatment exception to the hearsay rule. He claims that the statements were not reasonably pertinent to the diagnosis or treatment of K.J. In November 1997, K.J. was referred to Margaret Brown (a licensed professional counselor) to be treated for past sexual abuse, anxiety related to a change in he…
On medical diagnosis hearsay, Allen v. State speaks to the Georgia dispute in this passage: "K.J. made to her licensed professional counselor under the medical diagnosis or treatment exception to the hearsay rule. He claims that the statements were not reasonably pertinent to the diagnosis or treatment of K.J. In November 1997, K.J." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Roberson v. the State
Roberson v. the State, 187 Ga. App. 485 (1988)
…ify. Under OCGA § 24-3-4, “[statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment shall be admissible in evidence.” “[OCGA § 24-3-4] permits, as an excep…
On medical diagnosis hearsay, Roberson v. the State speaks to the Georgia dispute in this passage: "ify. Under OCGA § 24-3-4, “[statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertine" The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Bearfield v. State
Bearfield v. State, 305 Ga. App. 37 (2010)
…under OCGA § 24-3-4[2] as a statement made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history. See Allen v. State, 247 Ga.App. 10, 12-14(1), (2), *367 543 S.E.2d 45 (2000) (holding that the history a patient gives to an emergency room physician during examination or treatment is admissible for impeachment purposes under the hearsay exception codified…
Georgia opinions such as Bearfield v. State are cited where medical diagnosis hearsay is disputed. The court stated: "OCGA § 24-3-4[2] as a statement made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history. See Allen v. State, 247 Ga.App. 10, 12-14(1), (2), *367 543 S.E." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Brown v. the State
Brown v. the State, 310 Ga. App. 835 (2011)
…to the extent that the statements were made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment, which were admissible under the hearsay exception. See OCGA § 24-3-4. 3 Rather, Brown’s challenge to the Examining Nurse’s testimony is based upon her recounting of M. B.’s statements regarding the events leading up to the rape incident and identification of Brown as the perpetrator, whi…
Georgia opinions such as Brown v. the State are cited where medical diagnosis hearsay is disputed. The court stated: "See OCGA § 24-3-4. 3 Rather, Brown’s challenge to the Examining Nurse’s testimony is based upon her recounting of M. B." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Thomas v. the State
Thomas v. the State, 288 Ga. App. 602 (2007)
…). The statements in this case that were admitted under the medical diagnosis or treatment exception do not fall within any of the described classes of testimonial statements. In particular, no objective witness would reasonably conclude that these statements were made under such circumstances that the statement would be available for use at a later trial. See State v. Stahl, 1…
Practitioners open Thomas v. the State when Georgia medical diagnosis hearsay turns on the distinction in this sentence: "The statements in this case that were admitted under the medical diagnosis or treatment exception do not fall within any of the described classes of testimonial statements." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
LEE v. PEACOCK Et Al. — Banke, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part
…ertinent part, as follows: “Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing . . . symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment shall be admissible in evidence.” (Emphasis supplied.) “The theory behind this exception to the hears…
On medical diagnosis hearsay, LEE v. PEACOCK Et Al. — Banke, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part speaks to the Georgia dispute in this passage: "Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing . . ." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company v. Smalley
Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company v. Smalley, 127 Ga. App. 652 (1972)
…ected to by the plaintiff on the ground that it contained a medical diagnosis of injury by a physician who was not present to testify and also contained a statement showing the place of the plaintiff’s injury as a washroom. (The plaintiff contended the injury occurred when he stepped off one of the defendant’s engines and fell on the roadbed.) The plaintiff objected to the medi…
On medical diagnosis hearsay, Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company v. Smalley speaks to the Georgia dispute in this passage: "The plaintiff contended the injury occurred when he stepped off one of the defendant’s engines and fell on the roadbed." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Use of depositions at trial
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-32 and Georgia Uniform Superior Court Rules govern civil deposition use at trial, including former testimony under O.C.G.A. § 24-8-804(b)(1). Criminal cases follow Uniform Superior Court Rule 17.1 and O.C.G.A. Title 17 discovery statutes; deposition use at criminal trial requires a codified hearsay exception.
Deposition use is always a two-layer problem: procedural permission to read or play the deposition, plus a hearsay path (often former testimony, party admission, or impeachment). Counsel who satisfy the civil or criminal procedure rule but skip the evidence-rule foundation invite a sustained objection; counsel who have a hearsay exception but failed to preserve the deposition under the procedural rule face the same result. Video designations, counter-designations, and completeness objections should be teed up before the jury is seated.
Georgia deposition / former-testimony opinions
TRANSAMERICA INSURANCE COMPANY v. THRIFT-MART, INC. Et Al.
TRANSAMERICA INSURANCE COMPANY v. THRIFT-MART, INC. Et Al., 159 Ga. App. 874 (1981)
…ta or estoppel by judgment is without merit. 2. In 1979 the deposition of Wayne Allen Moore, Commercial Union’s insured, was taken in connection with Thrift-Mart’s and Cook’s pending tort actions and Commercial Union’s then pending declaratory judgment action. Moore testified in the declaratory judgment action but died subsequent to the judgment in that case, affirmed in Thrift…
TRANSAMERICA INSURANCE COMPANY v. THRIFT-MART, INC. Et Al. is worth reading on Georgia deposition / former testimony because the court put the point in its own words: "In 1979 the deposition of Wayne Allen Moore, Commercial Union’s insured, was taken in connection with Thrift-Mart’s and Cook’s pending tort actions and Commercial Union’s then pending declaratory judgment action." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
THOMASON v. GENUINE PARTS COMPANY Et Al.
THOMASON v. GENUINE PARTS COMPANY Et Al., 156 Ga. App. 599 (1980)
…interrogatories, dying declarations, confessions of guilt, depositions, etc., should be allowed in evidence by reading same to the jury and presented in evidence in that form but not allowed to be in the possession of the jury during their deliberations. In other words, the jury heard the testimony from the witness stand but same should not be unduly emphasized by giving the j…
Georgia opinions such as THOMASON v. GENUINE PARTS COMPANY Et Al. are cited where deposition / former testimony is disputed. The court stated: "interrogatories, dying declarations, confessions of guilt, depositions, etc., should be allowed in evidence by reading same to the jury and presented in evidence in that form but not allowed to be in the possession of the jury during their deliberations. In other words, the jury" That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
BODREY v. CAPE Et Al.
BODREY v. CAPE Et Al., 120 Ga. App. 859 (1969)
…[1], p. 2060. Such extraneous matter most often consists of depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file and affidavits, if any. Also among that which may be considered is oral testimony, judicial notice, presumptions, stipulations, concessions of counsel, certified transcript *861of a court, exhibits and other papers that have been identified by affidavit or oth…
On deposition / former testimony, BODREY v. CAPE Et Al. speaks to the Georgia dispute in this passage: "Such extraneous matter most often consists of depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file and affidavits, if any." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Tanner v. the State
Tanner v. the State, 213 Ga. 820 (1958)
…of the constitutional provision in question was to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits, such as were sometimes admitted in civil cases, being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness in which the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compe…
Tanner v. the State is worth reading on Georgia deposition / former testimony because the court put the point in its own words: "of the constitutional provision in question was to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits, such as were sometimes admitted in civil cases, being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness in which the accused has an opport" Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Pope v. Fields
Pope v. Fields, 273 Ga. 6 (2000)
…s on the motions for a directed verdict. Because Mrs. New’s deposition testimony from a related case was admissible under OCGA § 24-3-10 and the evidence supports the jury’s verdict, we affirm. The evidence presented at trial shows that Pope moved into Mrs. New’s house in the late 1980’s and began handling her financial affairs after she had surgery in 1991. In 1992 Pope hired…
Practitioners open Pope v. Fields when Georgia deposition / former testimony turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Because Mrs. New’s deposition testimony from a related case was admissible under OCGA § 24-3-10 and the evidence supports the jury’s verdict, we affirm. The evidence presented at trial shows that Pope moved into Mrs." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
WILLIAMS v. COCA-COLA COMPANY; And Vice Versa
WILLIAMS v. COCA-COLA COMPANY; And Vice Versa, 158 Ga. App. 139 (1981)
…roceeding... [W]here the former testimony is in the form of depositions or answers to interrogatories, there can be no objection to introducing the admissions contained in them.” Hope v. First Nat. Bank, 142 Ga. 310, 311 (3), 315 (82 SE 929). This continues to be the rule in Georgia. See such cases as Kelly v. Chrysler Corp., 129 Ga. App. 447 (1) (199 SE2d 856); Wheeler v. Frie…
Georgia opinions such as WILLIAMS v. COCA-COLA COMPANY; And Vice Versa are cited where deposition / former testimony is disputed. The court stated: "W]here the former testimony is in the form of depositions or answers to interrogatories, there can be no objection to introducing the admissions contained in them.” Hope v. First Nat. Bank, 142 Ga. 310, 311 (3), 315 (82 SE 929). This continues to be the rule in Georgia." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
MAYO v. OWEN, Administrator, Et Al.
MAYO v. OWEN, Administrator, Et Al., 67 S.E.2d 709 (1951)
…r named defendants are the blood heirs of the deceased. The deposition of Thomas R. Mayo was read in evidence. Pie admitted that he had been previously married to one Lucile Young; but, as to whether or not he had ever obtained a divorce from her, he refused to answer questions as to the time or place he obtained a divorce, on the ground that his answers might incriminate him.…
Georgia opinions such as MAYO v. OWEN, Administrator, Et Al. are cited where deposition / former testimony is disputed. The court stated: "The deposition of Thomas R. Mayo was read in evidence." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Authenticity: why it matters and how to prove it
Authenticity is not a hearsay doctrine and it is not optional. Under O.C.G.A. §§ 24-9-901, 24-9-902, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is. Self-authenticating categories — certified public records, newspapers, acknowledged documents, trade inscriptions, and (where adopted) certified domestic records of a regularly conducted activity — shorten the path, but most trial exhibits still need a sponsoring witness, distinctive characteristics, chain of custody, or process-or-system evidence.
Georgia's Title 24 places authentication in Article 9 (24-9-901 et seq.). Trial courts require foundational proof for gunshot residue, toxicology, and cellphone records before allowing the jury to consider exhibits, especially in felony criminal cases.
Why authenticity gets its own section in every Georgia trial notebook:
- It is a condition precedent. An unauthenticated exhibit never reaches the relevance, hearsay, or privilege analysis in a useful way — the jury never properly considers it.
- Digital evidence multiplies the failure modes. Screenshots, social-media posts, text threads, and cloud downloads require hash values, account attribution, metadata, or a percipient witness who saw the content created or received.
- Chain of custody is authenticity by another name. Drugs, firearms, biological samples, and seized devices are excluded when the links from seizure to lab to courtroom are broken, even if a hearsay exception would otherwise apply to a lab report.
- Business-records shortcuts do not replace authentication. A custodian can explain record-keeping practices and still fail if nobody can say the particular PDF or printout is the record of this patient, this account, or this machine.
- Self-authentication is narrow. Counsel who wave a notarization or a letterhead and skip the rest of Rule 901-style analysis often lose when the document's contents are disputed.
Practical authentication checklist for Georgia trials: identify the exhibit; choose a 901 method or a 902 category; line up the sponsoring witness or certificate; preserve chain-of-custody testimony for physical and digital items; and separate the authenticity objection from any hearsay objection so the court rules on each.
Georgia authenticity opinions
Stewart v. the State
Stewart v. the State, 246 Ga. 70 (1980)
…tation. She argues further that exhibit 21 was not properly authenticated and was not the best evidence available. Exhibit 21 consists of several forms which were transmitted by DFCS (department of family and children services) to Stewart’s employer, Riegel Textile Corporation, with a request that payroll information relating to Stewart for certain periods of time be provided.…
On authentication, Stewart v. the State speaks to the Georgia dispute in this passage: "She argues further that exhibit 21 was not properly authenticated and was not the best evidence available." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Nyankojo v. North Star Capital Acquisition
Nyankojo v. North Star Capital Acquisition, 298 Ga. App. 6 (2009)
…that these documents are inadmissible because they were not authenticated or attested to by a competent witness. It is true that [a] proper foundation must be laid for the introduction of documentary evidence. As a general rule, a writing will not be admitted into evidence unless the offering party tenders proof of the authenticity or genuineness of the writing. There is no pre…
On authentication, Nyankojo v. North Star Capital Acquisition speaks to the Georgia dispute in this passage: "It is true that [a] proper foundation must be laid for the introduction of documentary evidence. As a general rule, a writing will not be admitted into evidence unless the offering party tenders proof of the authenticity or genuineness of the writing." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Consolidated Freightways Corporation of Delaware v. Syncroflo, Inc.
Consolidated Freightways Corporation of Delaware v. Syncroflo, Inc., 164 Ga. App. 275 (1982)
…y the shipper and accepted for himself and his assigns." To authenticate or identify for admission in evidence the applicable motor carrier classification which was incorporated by reference in the shipping order, appellant presented the testimony of Jerry Ard, its Atlanta office manager. He testified that the motor freight classification referred to in the shipping order was t…
Consolidated Freightways Corporation of Delaware v. Syncroflo, Inc. is worth reading on Georgia authentication because the court put the point in its own words: "To authenticate or identify for admission in evidence the applicable motor carrier classification which was incorporated by reference in the shipping order, appellant presented the testimony of Jerry Ard, its Atlanta office manager." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Cordell v. Bank of North Georgia
Cordell v. Bank of North Georgia, 295 Ga. App. 402 (2008)
…filing an affidavit from a hank official that purported to authenticate and to attach as exhibits copies of the note, the two renewals/modifications, the Cordell guaranty, and the demand letter. However, the affidavit in fact failed to attach the documents as exhibits. Relying on the provisions of the missing documents, the bank official affied that the note was in default, th…
On authentication, Cordell v. Bank of North Georgia speaks to the Georgia dispute in this passage: "Cordell guaranty, and the demand letter. However, the affidavit in fact failed to attach the documents as exhibits." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
BLAKE v. KES, INC.
BLAKE v. KES, INC., 329 Ga. App. 742 (2014)
…rt based its ruling, in part, on the exclusion of certain unauthenticated documents and depositions not filed 30 days before the hearing. The Blakes now appeal. 1. KES’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (a) The Blakes contend that the trial court, in granting summary judgment in favor of KES, erred by failing to consider, on procedural grounds, the deposition testimony of their med…
Georgia opinions such as BLAKE v. KES, INC. are cited where authentication is disputed. The court stated: "The Blakes now appeal. 1. KES’s Motion for Summary Judgment." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Standard Building Company, Inc. v. Wallen Concept Glazing, Inc.
Standard Building Company, Inc. v. Wallen Concept Glazing, Inc., 298 Ga. App. 443 (2009)
…otion for reconsideration and attached three exhibits: an unauthenticated computer printout from the Ohio Secretary of State’s office reflecting a corporation search for Standard (Exhibit A), a photocopy of a standard form agreement between a contractor and an owner for a stipulated sum (“ALA contract”), purportedly existing between the parties (Exhibit B), and a photocopy of a…
Georgia opinions such as Standard Building Company, Inc. v. Wallen Concept Glazing, Inc. are cited where authentication is disputed. The court stated: "otion for reconsideration and attached three exhibits: an unauthenticated computer printout from the Ohio Secretary of State’s office reflecting a corporation search for Standard (Exhibit A), a photocopy of a standard form agreement between a contractor and an owner for a stipula" That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
SULLIVAN v. DOUGLAS GIBBONS INCORPORATED
SULLIVAN v. DOUGLAS GIBBONS INCORPORATED, 58 Ga. App. 708 (1938)
…diction or a court of record, and it not appearing from the authenticated copy, pleadings, or other evidence that any statutory authority existed in the State of New York for an entry of a judgment in said court by the clerk, and it further appearing that the practice of the judgment being entered by a clerk of the court was unknown to the practice in the State of Georgia, the…
Practitioners open SULLIVAN v. DOUGLAS GIBBONS INCORPORATED when Georgia authentication turns on the distinction in this sentence: "diction or a court of record, and it not appearing from the authenticated copy, pleadings, or other evidence that any statutory authority existed in the State of New York for an entry of a judgment in said court by the clerk, and it further appearing that the practice of the judg" Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Practice checklist
- State the relevance theory in one sentence before naming an exception.
- Run the 403 / unfair-prejudice balance explicitly for other-acts and graphic exhibits.
- For character or other-acts evidence, identify the non-propensity purpose and request a limiting instruction on the record.
- Decide whether an out-of-court statement is hearsay for the purpose offered before hunting exceptions.
- Lay business-records foundations with time, knowledge, regular practice, and custodial qualifications — or a qualifying certification.
- Prove unavailability with specific facts before offering former testimony or dying declarations.
- Treat deposition use as procedure-plus-hearsay; designate and counter-designate early.
- Authenticate every exhibit under O.C.G.A. §§ 24-9-901, 24-9-902 (or the self-authentication path) before arguing hearsay.
- Preserve chain of custody for physical and digital evidence with named custodians.
- Search LawDiver for recent Georgia appellate evidence opinions before mediation or motions in limine.
Frequently asked questions
What is the primary evidence source in Georgia?
Georgia applies the Georgia Evidence Code (O.C.G.A. Title 24). Georgia recodified its evidence law in 2013 into O.C.G.A. Title 24, adopting FRE-style numbering (24-4-401, 24-8-801, etc.) while preserving some Georgia-specific provisions.
How do Georgia courts decide relevance and unfair prejudice?
Under O.C.G.A. §§ 24-4-401, 24-4-403, evidence must make a fact of consequence more or less probable, and the court may exclude relevant evidence when unfair prejudice, confusion, or waste of time substantially outweighs its probative value.
Are party admissions hearsay in Georgia?
Party-opponent statements under O.C.G.A. § 24-8-801(d)(2) are generally excluded from the hearsay ban (or treated as an exception, depending on local drafting). They may be offered against the party who made or adopted them without showing unavailability.
What foundation is required for business records?
Under O.C.G.A. § 24-8-803(6), show a record made at or near the time from someone with knowledge, kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity, as a regular practice, through a custodian, qualified witness, or allowed certification — subject to trustworthiness attack.
When can I use a deposition at trial in Georgia?
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-32 and Georgia Uniform Superior Court Rules govern civil deposition use at trial, including former testimony under O.C.G.A. § 24-8-804(b)(1). Criminal cases follow Uniform Superior Court Rule 17.1 and O.C.G.A. Title 17 discovery statutes; deposition use at criminal trial requires a codified hearsay exception.
Why is authenticity separate from hearsay?
Authenticity asks whether the item is what you claim it is; hearsay asks whether out-of-court assertions inside it may be used for their truth. You can lose on either ground independently. Georgia authenticity practice starts with O.C.G.A. §§ 24-9-901, 24-9-902.
Where do dying declarations and medical statements fit?
Dying declarations under O.C.G.A. § 24-8-804(b)(2) require belief in impending death and concern the cause or circumstances of that believed death. Medical statements under O.C.G.A. § 24-8-803(4) require a genuine diagnostic or treatment purpose and reasonable pertinence to care.