Start with Connecticut Code of Evidence. In Connecticut, Connecticut evidence practice is organized under the Connecticut Code of Evidence. Relevance starts at Conn. Code Evid. §§ 4-1, 4-3; hearsay starts at Conn. Code Evid. §§ 8-1, 8-2. That is the question this guide answers for evidence law. Authenticity is a separate fight under Conn. Code Evid. §§ 9-1, 9-2. Depositions at trial: Conn. Practice Book §§ 13-1 through 13-15 govern civil depositions; § 13-10 addresses use at trial including when the witness is unavailable. Criminal discovery is controlled by Conn. Crim. P. 13 and case law; deposition use at criminal trial is exceptional and requires a recognized hearsay exception.
General standards of admissibility
Connecticut starts every evidence dispute with relevance and unfair prejudice. Under Conn. Code Evid. §§ 4-1, 4-3, evidence is relevant when it has any tendency to make a fact of consequence more or less probable, and relevant evidence is still excluded when its probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. Preliminary questions of admissibility are for the court; conditional relevance and limited-purpose instructions keep otherwise-usable proof from becoming a Trojan horse for propensity or truth-of-the-matter use.
Connecticut uses chapter-section numbering (e.g., 8-5(6)) rather than FRE-style rule numbers in the Code itself. The Connecticut Code of Evidence is published with official commentary that courts treat as persuasive.
Practice tip: articulate the theory of relevance in one sentence before citing the exception. Lawyers who lead with "it's a business record" without explaining what fact the record proves often lose the 403 balance even when the hearsay foundation is clean.
Character evidence
Character evidence in Connecticut is governed by Conn. Code Evid. §§ 4-4, 4-5. The default rule is familiar: evidence of a person's character or character trait is not admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character or trait. The same body of law then carves out the classic exceptions — essential-element character, accused-opens-the-door reputation or opinion, and other-acts evidence offered for a non-propensity purpose such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake.
Other-acts notice, 403 balancing, and limiting instructions do most of the real work. In criminal cases, prosecutors who dump prior misconduct without a specific non-propensity theory invite reversal; defense counsel who open the door to good-character testimony without anticipating rebuttal create the very propensity inference the rules were designed to police.
Connecticut character-evidence opinions
State of Connecticut v. Rubin Rodriguez
State of Connecticut v. Rubin Rodriguez, 180 Conn. 382 (1980)
…resented the question whether the only method for eliciting character evidence was to inquire of the character witness’ knowledge of the *393 defendant’s or another witness’ reputation in the community for the trait in issue. In both cases this court concluded that character evidence could be elicited either by inquiry into the character witness’ knowledge of the individual’s g…
On character evidence, State of Connecticut v. Rubin Rodriguez speaks to the Connecticut dispute in this passage: "resented the question whether the only method for eliciting character evidence was to inquire of the character witness’ knowledge of the *393 defendant’s or another witness’ reputation in the community for the trait in issue. In both cases this court concluded that character evid" The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
State of Connecticut v. Kareem Hedge
State of Connecticut v. Kareem Hedge, 297 Conn. 621 (2010)
…lude that neither § 4-4 (a) nor § 4-5 (a) bars admission of character evidence or evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts when that evidence is offered for the purpose of raising a reasonable doubt as to a defendant’s guilt and otherwise satisfies the criteria for the admissibility of third party culpability evidence. “We begin our review of the issue presented by noting that,…
Connecticut opinions such as State of Connecticut v. Kareem Hedge are cited where character evidence is disputed. The court stated: "lude that neither § 4-4 (a) nor § 4-5 (a) bars admission of character evidence or evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts when that evidence is offered for the purpose of raising a reasonable doubt as to a defendant’s guilt and otherwise satisfies the criteria for the admissibil" That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
State of Connecticut v. Robert Moye
State of Connecticut v. Robert Moye, 177 Conn. 487 (1979)
…s three categories of objectionable testimony: (1) indirect character evidence, (2) evidence of prior criminal misconduct, and (3) personal admissions of misconduct. *500 In his brief the defendant asserts that the trial court allowed the state to introduce prejudicial and irrelevant testimony concerning his character, the sole purpose of which was to prejudice the jury. All of…
State of Connecticut v. Robert Moye is worth reading on Connecticut character evidence because the court put the point in its own words: "In his brief the defendant asserts that the trial court allowed the state to introduce prejudicial and irrelevant testimony concerning his character, the sole purpose of which was to prejudice the jury." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
State of Connecticut v. Buddy Beavers
State of Connecticut v. Buddy Beavers, 290 Conn. 386 (2009)
…mony in violation of: (1) the rule against the admission of propensity evidence; Conn. Code Evid. § 4-5; and (2) the marital communications privilege. The defendant also claims that the trial court improperly admitted the state arson investigator’s opinion testimony concerning the ultimate issue in this case, namely, whether the fire was set intentionally, in violation of § 7-3…
On character evidence, State of Connecticut v. Buddy Beavers speaks to the Connecticut dispute in this passage: "Conn. Code Evid. § 4-5; and (2) the marital communications privilege." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
State of Connecticut v. Matthew Steven Johnson
State of Connecticut v. Matthew Steven Johnson, 289 Conn. 437 (2008)
…im because the evidence was cross admissible to demonstrate propensity in accordance with our recent decisions in State v. DeJesus, 288 Conn. 418, 953 A.2d 45 (2008), and State v. Snelgrove, 288 Conn. 742, 954 A.2d 165 (2008). 3 With respect to the defendant’s second claim, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the state to present the chal…
State of Connecticut v. Matthew Steven Johnson is worth reading on Connecticut character evidence because the court put the point in its own words: "State v. DeJesus, 288 Conn. 418, 953 A.2d 45 (2008), and State v. Snelgrove, 288 Conn. 742, 954 A.2d 165 (2008)." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Alfonso Puorto Et Ux. vs. Salvino Chieppa Et Ux.
Alfonso Puorto Et Ux. vs. Salvino Chieppa Et Ux., 78 Conn. 401 (1905)
…ul for the defendants to erect the brick addition, as they *404 did, upon the strip of land eight or ten feet wide between the defendants’ old house and the divisional line. They acquired no such right by prescription. Section 4046 of the General Statutes, which has been in force since 1847, provides that “ no occupant of real estate shall acquire, by adverse, occupation, the r…
Alfonso Puorto Et Ux. vs. Salvino Chieppa Et Ux. is worth reading on Connecticut character evidence because the court put the point in its own words: "They acquired no such right by prescription." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
STATE of Connecticut v. GERALD A.
STATE of Connecticut v. GERALD A., 183 Conn. App. 82 (2018)
…was prejudicial, had no probative value, constituted ''bad character evidence,'' and that despite any limiting instruction the court might give, the jury would use the evidence to conclude that the defendant was ''a bad guy.'' Defense counsel conceded that he planned to cross-examine the witnesses on the issue of their late disclosures. When the court asked whether such questi…
STATE of Connecticut v. GERALD A. is worth reading on Connecticut character evidence because the court put the point in its own words: "Defense counsel conceded that he planned to cross-examine the witnesses on the issue of their late disclosures." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
John Doe v. John M. Christoforo Et Al.
John Doe v. John M. Christoforo Et Al., 87 Conn. App. 359 (2005)
…little significance here. Propensity evidence, a species of character evidence, is excludible, in part, because of its prejudicial effect. See, e.g., 1 C. McCormick, Evidence (5th Ed. 1999) § 190. “[E]vidence of character in any form — reputation, opinion from observation, or specific acts — generally will not be received to prove that a person engaged in certain conduct ... on…
Connecticut opinions such as John Doe v. John M. Christoforo Et Al. are cited where character evidence is disputed. The court stated: "Propensity evidence, a species of character evidence, is excludible, in part, because of its prejudicial effect. See, e.g., 1 C. McCormick, Evidence (5th Ed. 1999) § 190." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
How the Connecticut rule applies
Apply the Connecticut authorities in order. The facts are simplified so the statute and the standard are visible.
A lawyer in Connecticut wants to offer a medical record, a party email, and a statement the declarant made while believing death was imminent.
- Clear relevance and unfair prejudice under Conn. Code Evid. §§ 4-1, 4-3.
- If the email is the opposing party's, test Conn. Code Evid. § 8-3(2) before the hearsay definition in Conn. Code Evid. §§ 8-1, 8-2.
- For the medical record, lay the business-records foundation in Conn. Code Evid. § 8-5(6) and the treatment purpose in Conn. Code Evid. § 8-5(4).
- For the deathbed statement, meet Conn. Code Evid. § 8-6(2), then authenticate every exhibit under Conn. Code Evid. §§ 9-1, 9-2.
Connecticut keeps hearsay, character, and authenticity on different rules inside the Connecticut Code of Evidence. Winning one does not win the others.
Hearsay: start with the definition
Most hearsay objections in Connecticut are won or lost on the definition, not on an exception. Under Conn. Code Evid. §§ 8-1, 8-2, hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Non-hearsay purposes — verbal acts, effect on the listener, notice, circumstantial evidence of state of mind, and impeachment — remain available when the proponent can articulate them without asking the jury to believe the declarant.
Layered hearsay (hearsay within hearsay) requires an exception or exclusion for each layer. Machine-generated data and non-assertive conduct sit outside the hearsay definition in FRE-aligned jurisdictions, but they still need authenticity and, often, expert or business-records foundations.
Connecticut hearsay opinions
State of Connecticut v. Richard Saucier
State of Connecticut v. Richard Saucier, 283 Conn. 207 (2007)
…nce at trial pursuant to the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule, § 8-3(4) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence.[2]*636 Pursuant to that inquiry, we also must consider whether the Appellate Court properly reviewed this ruling by the trial court under the plenary, rather than the abuse of discretion, standard of review. The defendant appeals, upon our grant of certificati…
Practitioners open State of Connecticut v. Richard Saucier when Connecticut hearsay turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Connecticut Code of Evidence.[2]*636 Pursuant to that inquiry, we also must consider whether the Appellate Court properly reviewed this ruling by the trial court under the plenary, rather than the abuse of discretion, standard of review." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
State of Connecticut v. Gregory B. Winot
State of Connecticut v. Gregory B. Winot, 294 Conn. 753 (2010)
…ed, arguing, inter alia, that "the [mother's] statement was hearsay and that offering it for impeachment purposes was a mere subterfuge for introducing substantively inadmissible evidence [as contemplated by § 6-4 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence].[18] Outside of the presence of the jury, the mother repudiated her statement, and the court sustained the state's objection and…
State of Connecticut v. Gregory B. Winot is worth reading on Connecticut hearsay because the court put the point in its own words: "ed, arguing, inter alia, that 'the [mother's] statement was hearsay and that offering it for impeachment purposes was a mere subterfuge for introducing substantively inadmissible evidence [as contemplated by § 6-4 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence].[18] Outside of the presence" Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Althea S. Dinan v. Donat C. Marchand, Administrator (Estate of Albert A. Garofalo)
…plaintiffs challenged testimony on the alternate ground of hearsay, but that the Appellate Court’s impropriety was harmless. We also conclude that the Appellate Court properly concluded that the record was inadequate to evaluate the propriety of the exclusion of the third party testimony. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court. The following facts and proce…
Althea S. Dinan v. Donat C. Marchand, Administrator (Estate of Albert A. Garofalo) is worth reading on Connecticut hearsay because the court put the point in its own words: "Appellate Court’s impropriety was harmless. We also conclude that the Appellate Court properly concluded that the record was inadequate to evaluate the propriety of the exclusion of the third party testimony. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Mary E. Hutchinson v. Alfred Plante, Jr., Et Al.
Mary E. Hutchinson v. Alfred Plante, Jr., Et Al., 175 Conn. 1 (1978)
…own knowledge is an out-of-court declaration and therefore hearsay, but it is admissible because the statutory indicia of reliability are present. The accident report in question, which is before us as an exhibit, contains remarks about the parties, their vehicles, the weather, the road conditions and the like that apparently are based on the trooper’s personal observations af…
Mary E. Hutchinson v. Alfred Plante, Jr., Et Al. is worth reading on Connecticut hearsay because the court put the point in its own words: "own knowledge is an out-of-court declaration and therefore hearsay, but it is admissible because the statutory indicia of reliability are present. The accident report in question, which is before us as an exhibit, contains remarks about the parties, their vehicles, the weather, t" Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Dena G. Kaiko v. Sheldon Dolinger
Dena G. Kaiko v. Sheldon Dolinger, 184 Conn. 509 (1981)
…the defendant’s objection to the question on the ground of hearsay, the plaintiff claimed the admissibility of the conversation as an exception to the hearsay rule because it involved the declaration of a deceased owner of property regarding the use or title of his property. The evidence was excluded but the ground of admissibility that the plaintiff advanced at trial has not…
Connecticut opinions such as Dena G. Kaiko v. Sheldon Dolinger are cited where hearsay is disputed. The court stated: "the defendant’s objection to the question on the ground of hearsay, the plaintiff claimed the admissibility of the conversation as an exception to the hearsay rule because it involved the declaration of a deceased owner of property regarding the use or title of his property. The" That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Beverly Ferguson v. Robert Smazer
Beverly Ferguson v. Robert Smazer, 151 Conn. 226 (1963)
…ted George to support the child. That this was inadmissible hearsay is obvious. Neither the plaintiff’s lack of constancy in accusation nor her admission by speech or conduct that George was the father of her child could be proved in such a manner. It was not, of course, a statement against George’s proprietary or pecuniary interest, nor was it a statement as to pedigree. The s…
On hearsay, Beverly Ferguson v. Robert Smazer speaks to the Connecticut dispute in this passage: "George to support the child. That this was inadmissible hearsay is obvious. Neither the plaintiff’s lack of constancy in accusation nor her admission by speech or conduct that George was the father of her child could be proved in such a manner." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
State of Connecticut v. Luis Galarza — Schaller, J., concurring
State of Connecticut v. Luis Galarza — Schaller, J., concurring, 97 Conn. App. 444 (2006)
…endant objected on the ground that the statement was double hearsay and did not fall within any hearsay exception, including spontaneous utterance. The court admitted the statement into evidence as a spontaneous utterance in order *475to prove Rivera’s state of mind. During Bonilla’s testimony, the court informed the jury that the statement was not being offered as proof of the…
Practitioners open State of Connecticut v. Luis Galarza — Schaller, J., concurring when Connecticut hearsay turns on the distinction in this sentence: "The court admitted the statement into evidence as a spontaneous utterance in order *475to prove Rivera’s state of mind." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Party admissions
Statements of an opposing party are among the most important routes around the hearsay bar. Connecticut treats them under Conn. Code Evid. § 8-3(2). Nothing about the statement need be against interest, contemporaneous, or based on personal knowledge — the theory is adversarial, not reliability-based. A party cannot complain that his own words are unreliable when offered against him.
Scope questions dominate practice: the party's own statement; adopted statements (including silence in circumstances where a reasonable person would deny); statements by authorized speakers; agent or employee statements on matters within the scope of the relationship; and, in criminal conspiracy cases, coconspirator statements during and in furtherance of the conspiracy. A defendant generally cannot introduce his own exculpatory out-of-court statement as a "party admission" against himself — the rule runs one way.
Connecticut party-admission opinions
State of Connecticut v. Rhondell Bonner
State of Connecticut v. Rhondell Bonner, 290 Conn. 468 (2009)
…ot challenge Goetz’ assessment. Moreover, defense counsel’s admission that he “did need time to review the file, [conduct] discovery, talk to [the defendant] and continue to conduct investigation,” suggests that an indeterminate amount of the delay between June 3, 2004, and October 27, 2004, was the result of continuances requested by the defense, which also is excludable under…
Practitioners open State of Connecticut v. Rhondell Bonner when Connecticut party admissions turns on the distinction in this sentence: "ot challenge Goetz’ assessment. Moreover, defense counsel’s admission that he “did need time to review the file, [conduct] discovery, talk to [the defendant] and continue to conduct investigation,” suggests that an indeterminate amount of the delay between June 3, 2004, and Octob" Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
In Re Tayler F. Et Al.
In Re Tayler F. Et Al., 296 Conn. 524 (2010)
…respondent filed a motion in limine seeking to preclude the admission of any out-of-court statements made by the children on the ground that they were inadmissible hearsay to which no exception applied. The court addressed the motion before hearing testimony from the department’s first witness. The department and the father both contended that the motion in limine should be den…
On party admissions, In Re Tayler F. Et Al. speaks to the Connecticut dispute in this passage: "The court addressed the motion before hearing testimony from the department’s first witness." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Albert Stanley v. City of Hartford
Albert Stanley v. City of Hartford, 140 Conn. 643 (1954)
…“(2) Amendments to pleadings; “(3) Stipulations of parties, admissions of fact, and of documents which will avoid unnecessary proof; “(4) The limitation of number of expert witnesses; “(5) Possibility of settlement; “(6) Such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the action. “Upon consideration of the above matters, the court may make any appropriate order and such ord…
On party admissions, Albert Stanley v. City of Hartford speaks to the Connecticut dispute in this passage: "Amendments to pleadings; “(3) Stipulations of parties, admissions of fact, and of documents which will avoid unnecessary proof; “(4) The limitation of number of expert witnesses; “(5) Possibility of settlement; “(6) Such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the action." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
State of Connecticut v. Curtis Burney
State of Connecticut v. Curtis Burney, 288 Conn. 548 (2008)
…ven days after it occurred. Defense counsel objected to the admission of the testimony on the ground that Thorpe and Slocum were presented as constancy of accusation witnesses and demeanor evidence is beyond the scope of constancy testimony under State v. Troupe, 237 Conn. 284, 677 A.2d 917 (1996). After hearing the parties’ arguments, the trial court characterized defense coun…
Practitioners open State of Connecticut v. Curtis Burney when Connecticut party admissions turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Defense counsel objected to the admission of the testimony on the ground that Thorpe and Slocum were presented as constancy of accusation witnesses and demeanor evidence is beyond the scope of constancy testimony under State v. Troupe, 237 Conn. 284, 677 A.2d 917 (1996)." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
State v. Ayala — dissenting
State v. Ayala — dissenting, 333 Conn. 225 (2019)
…d. 2d 177 (2004) (sixth amendment confrontation clause bars admission of testimonial hearsay against criminal defendant unless defendant had prior opportu- nity for cross-examination and witness is unavailable); see also Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 370 n.13, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 179 L. Ed. 2d 93 (2011) (due process clauses of fifth and fourteenth amendments may bar admission…
State v. Ayala — dissenting is worth reading on Connecticut party admissions because the court put the point in its own words: "Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 370 n.13, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 179 L. Ed." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
William A. Madsen Et Al. v. Michael G. Gates Et Al.
William A. Madsen Et Al. v. Michael G. Gates Et Al., 85 Conn. App. 383 (2004)
…fs’ counsel stated that he did not have an objection to the admission of the complete interrogatories. The court stated, “Well, these are interrogatories and [the defendants’ counsel is] offering that portion in which [he] got answers as to what bills were paid.” The court asked if there was an objection to this admission, to which the plaintiffs’ counsel replied, “No objection…
William A. Madsen Et Al. v. Michael G. Gates Et Al. is worth reading on Connecticut party admissions because the court put the point in its own words: "The court stated, “Well, these are interrogatories and [the defendants’ counsel is] offering that portion in which [he] got answers as to what bills were paid." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
State v. James K.
State v. James K., 347 Conn. 648 (2023)
…ed a motion in limine before trial, seeking to preclude the admission of the video recording of V’s forensic interview. The defendant claimed that the video had limited probative value and was unduly prejudicial, insofar as it consti- tuted cumulative evidence of the facts to be elicited during V’s trial testimony. The defendant also claimed that the video would improperly bols…
On party admissions, State v. James K. speaks to the Connecticut dispute in this passage: "V’s forensic interview. The defendant claimed that the video had limited probative value and was unduly prejudicial, insofar as it consti- tuted cumulative evidence of the facts to be elicited during V’s trial testimony." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Business records
The business-records exception under Conn. Code Evid. § 8-5(6) is the everyday path for medical charts, employment files, bank statements, and maintenance logs. The foundation requires a record made at or near the time by — or from information transmitted by — someone with knowledge; kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity; and made as a regular practice. A custodian or other qualified witness (or a qualifying certification where the jurisdiction allows it) lays the foundation. The opponent may still attack lack of trustworthiness when the source or method of preparation indicates unreliability — litigation-driven reports are the classic failure mode.
Do not confuse authenticity with the business-records exception. You still need to show the exhibit is what you claim it is; the hearsay exception then answers why the out-of-court assertions inside it may be considered for their truth.
Connecticut business-records opinions
Emigrant Mortgage Company, Inc. v. Walter D’agostino
Emigrant Mortgage Company, Inc. v. Walter D’agostino, 94 Conn. App. 793 (2006)
…nd (2) admitted an exhibit into evidence that was neither a business record nor properly authenticated. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. The following facts and procedural history are relevant to the defendant’s appeal. On June 26, 2001, the defendant executed an adjustable rate note in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $2,025,000, secured by a mortgage on prope…
On business records, Emigrant Mortgage Company, Inc. v. Walter D’agostino speaks to the Connecticut dispute in this passage: "We affirm the judgment of the trial court. The following facts and procedural history are relevant to the defendant’s appeal." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Lm Insurance Corporation v. Connecticut Dismanteling, LLC
Lm Insurance Corporation v. Connecticut Dismanteling, LLC, 172 Conn. App. 622 (2017)
…roperly admitted into evidence a certain document under the business records exception to the rule against hearsay, (2) there was insufficient evidence to support the judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff and (3) the court improperly drew an adverse inference against the defendant for failing to call two witnesses at trial. We disagree with the defendant's claims, and, ac…
Lm Insurance Corporation v. Connecticut Dismanteling, LLC is worth reading on Connecticut business records because the court put the point in its own words: "roperly admitted into evidence a certain document under the business records exception to the rule against hearsay, (2) there was insufficient evidence to support the judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff and (3) the court improperly drew an adverse inference against the de" Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Jenzack Partners, LLC v. Stoneridge Associates, LLC
Jenzack Partners, LLC v. Stoneridge Associates, LLC, 334 Conn. 374 (2020)
…the admission of the exhibit under the statutory (§ 52-180) business records exception to the hearsay rule, concluding that the original note balance for the computation of debt was not calculated by the plaintiff and that it was received, rather than made, in the ordinary course of business, and, thus, the exhibit failed to satisfy the requirements of the business records exce…
On business records, Jenzack Partners, LLC v. Stoneridge Associates, LLC speaks to the Connecticut dispute in this passage: "the admission of the exhibit under the statutory (§ 52-180) business records exception to the hearsay rule, concluding that the original note balance for the computation of debt was not calculated by the plaintiff and that it was received, rather than made, in the ordinary course" The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
In Re Tayler F. Et Al.
In Re Tayler F. Et Al., 111 Conn. App. 28 (2008)
…st witness and offered his police report into evidence as a business record. The respondent objected on the ground that the document “contain[ed] numerous hearsay statements.” The petitioner asserted that William B.’s statements were not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted but that the children’s statements were being offered under the catch-all or residual excep…
Connecticut opinions such as In Re Tayler F. Et Al. are cited where business records is disputed. The court stated: "The respondent objected on the ground that the document “contain[ed] numerous hearsay statements.” The petitioner asserted that William B." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
State of Connecticut v. Michael A. Torelli
State of Connecticut v. Michael A. Torelli, 103 Conn. App. 646 (2007)
…ourt concluded that the recording was admissible within the business record exception to the rule against hearsay because 911 operators have a duty to take the calls and record them. The court rejected the defendant’s objection that the exception was inapplicable because civilians who relay information to the police are under no business duty to do so. On appeal, the defendant…
Connecticut opinions such as State of Connecticut v. Michael A. Torelli are cited where business records is disputed. The court stated: "The court rejected the defendant’s objection that the exception was inapplicable because civilians who relay information to the police are under no business duty to do so." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
JENZACK PARTNERS, LLC v. STONERIDGE ASSOCIATES, LLC, Et Al.
JENZACK PARTNERS, LLC v. STONERIDGE ASSOCIATES, LLC, Et Al., 183 Conn. App. 128 (2018)
…alance that was improperly admitted into evidence under the business records exception because it was provided by Sovereign at the time the note was acquired by the plaintiff and, therefore, Buland's testimony is inadmissible hearsay. 7 In response, the plaintiff argues that exhibit 22 was properly admitted into evidence under the business records exception to establish the sta…
Practitioners open JENZACK PARTNERS, LLC v. STONERIDGE ASSOCIATES, LLC, Et Al. when Connecticut business records turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Sovereign at the time the note was acquired by the plaintiff and, therefore, Buland's testimony is inadmissible hearsay." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Important hearsay exceptions that do not require unavailability
Three present-sense and mental-state exceptions carry most of the remaining traffic in Connecticut trial practice.
Excited utterance — Conn. Code Evid. § 8-5(2). A statement relating to a startling event or condition, made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused. Timing is elastic; composure defeats the exception even minutes after the event, while visible distress can preserve it for hours.
Present sense impression — Conn. Code Evid. § 8-5(1). A statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while or immediately after the declarant perceived it. Contemporaneity is strict — seconds and minutes, not hours — and excitement is not required.
Then-existing mental, emotional, or physical condition — Conn. Code Evid. § 8-5(3). Statements of then-existing state of mind (including intent and plan) come in; statements of memory or belief offered to prove the fact remembered generally do not. Intent-to-meet-another-person cases remain the hardest applications.
Declarant unavailable
When the declarant is unavailable under Conn. Code Evid. § 8-6(a), Connecticut opens a second suite of exceptions. Unavailability typically includes privilege, refusal to testify despite court order, lack of memory, death or then-existing infirmity, and absence despite reasonable efforts to procure attendance. The proponent bears the burden of proving unavailability with specific facts — a bare assertion that the witness "could not be found" is not enough.
Former testimony under Conn. Code Evid. § 8-6(1) is the workhorse once unavailability is shown: testimony given as a witness at a trial, hearing, or lawful deposition, offered against a party who had an opportunity and similar motive to develop it by direct, cross, or redirect. Criminal confrontation analysis runs in parallel and is not satisfied merely because a hearsay exception applies.
Dying declarations
Dying declarations under Conn. Code Evid. § 8-6(2) remain a narrow but decisive exception in homicide and, in many jurisdictions, civil cases involving the cause or circumstances of what the declarant believed to be impending death. The foundational showing is the declarant's belief that death was imminent — not that death in fact followed within any particular time — plus a statement concerning the cause or circumstances of what the declarant believed to be the impending death. Courts police coaching and narrative expansions aggressively.
Connecticut dying-declaration opinions
State v. James Smith
State v. James Smith, 49 Conn. 376 (1881)
…the record fully justify such finding. The law relative to dying declarations is too well settled to require the citation of authorities. If, however, any are needed, they may be found in Wharton’s Crim. Ev., sec. 282; 1 Greenl. on Ev., sec. 158; Murphy v. The People, 37 Ill., 447; People v. Williams, 3 Parker, 84. 3. The accused next claims that the court erred in excluding t…
State v. James Smith is worth reading on Connecticut dying declaration because the court put the point in its own words: "The law relative to dying declarations is too well settled to require the citation of authorities. If, however, any are needed, they may be found in Wharton’s Crim. Ev., sec. 282; 1 Greenl. on Ev., sec. 158; Murphy v. The People, 37 Ill., 447; People v. Williams, 3 Parker, 84. 3." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
State of Connecticut v. Richard Saucier
State of Connecticut v. Richard Saucier, 283 Conn. 207 (2007)
…rt first concluded that the statement was inadmissible as a dying declaration because the victim’s condition when it was made did not “[give] fair support to the conclusion that hope had then been lost,” despite her fear that she was going to die, because “[f]ear or even belief that illness will end in death will not avail of itself to make a dying declaration. There must be a…
Connecticut opinions such as State of Connecticut v. Richard Saucier are cited where dying declaration is disputed. The court stated: "rt first concluded that the statement was inadmissible as a dying declaration because the victim’s condition when it was made did not “[give] fair support to the conclusion that hope had then been lost,” despite her fear that she was going to die, because “[f]ear or even belief t" That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
State of Connecticut v. Eugene Onofrio
State of Connecticut v. Eugene Onofrio, 179 Conn. 23 (1979)
…hearsay declarant, particularly as to a hearsay declarant’s dying declarations, is uniformly allowed. See Taborsky v. State, 142 Conn. 619, 629, 116 A.2d 433; State v. Vaughn, 171 Conn. 454, 460, 370 A.2d 1002; 5 Wigmore, Evidence, (Chadbourn Rev. 1970) § 1446; 2 Wharton, Criminal Evidence (13th Ed. Torcia) § 347 (impeachment of dying declarations). Although counsel for the def…
State of Connecticut v. Eugene Onofrio is worth reading on Connecticut dying declaration because the court put the point in its own words: "See Taborsky v. State, 142 Conn. 619, 629, 116 A.2d 433; State v. Vaughn, 171 Conn. 454, 460, 370 A.2d 1002; 5 Wigmore, Evidence, (Chadbourn Rev. 1970) § 1446; 2 Wharton, Criminal Evidence (13th Ed. Torcia) § 347 (impeachment of dying declarations)." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
The State of Connecticut vs. Harold N. Guilfoyle
The State of Connecticut vs. Harold N. Guilfoyle, 109 Conn. 124 (1929)
…mobile. A police officer (Keefe) was asked: “Did you take a dying declaration, or attempt to take a dying declaration from Mrs. Gaudet?” and answered, “Yes, sir.” Upon this a finding is *136 sought that Mrs. Gaudet made an ante mortem statement, but it was not offered in evidence by the State. No finding of fact that an ante mortem statement had been made could be predicated up…
Practitioners open The State of Connecticut vs. Harold N. Guilfoyle when Connecticut dying declaration turns on the distinction in this sentence: "A police officer (Keefe) was asked: “Did you take a dying declaration, or attempt to take a dying declaration from Mrs. Gaudet?" Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Henry Hamlin v. State
Henry Hamlin v. State, 48 Conn. 92 (1880)
…iscovered evidence of the Rev. Mr. Wooding would render the dying declarations of Shipman, which were received in evidence on the trial, inadmissible. This evidence is stated as follows:—“When in the presence of Shipman, after he was taken to his house, Shipman dropped a word from which I drew the conclusion that Shipman had some hope of recovery.”- It will be observed that it…
Henry Hamlin v. State is worth reading on Connecticut dying declaration because the court put the point in its own words: "Rev. Mr. Wooding would render the dying declarations of Shipman, which were received in evidence on the trial, inadmissible." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
The State of Connecticut vs. Erasmo Perretta Et Al.
The State of Connecticut vs. Erasmo Perretta Et Al., 93 Conn. 328 (1919)
…und. It is one of the most firmly settled rules in cases of dying declarations, that when the declaration is made by question and answer the entire conversation, question and answer, should be given so far as possible. In Reg. v. Mitchell, 17 Cox C. C. 503, 507, where the declaration was by question and .answer, it was said by,Cave, J.: “In such circumstances the form of the de…
Practitioners open The State of Connecticut vs. Erasmo Perretta Et Al. when Connecticut dying declaration turns on the distinction in this sentence: "It is one of the most firmly settled rules in cases of dying declarations, that when the declaration is made by question and answer the entire conversation, question and answer, should be given so far as possible. In Reg. v. Mitchell, 17 Cox C. C." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
The State of Connecticut vs. Antonio Manganella
The State of Connecticut vs. Antonio Manganella, 113 Conn. 209 (1931)
…uestion was clearly admissible as preliminary to a claim of dying declaration. The witness was then asked what he said to Cirillo relative to his dying. The objection that this was leading was untenable. Counsel for the accused discusses objections and exceptions taken to a dying declaration of Cirillo. It appears that Dr. Mongillo in the presence of Cirillo, the coroner and a…
On dying declaration, The State of Connecticut vs. Antonio Manganella speaks to the Connecticut dispute in this passage: "The witness was then asked what he said to Cirillo relative to his dying. The objection that this was leading was untenable. Counsel for the accused discusses objections and exceptions taken to a dying declaration of Cirillo. It appears that Dr." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
State v. John Cronin
State v. John Cronin, 64 Conn. 293 (1894)
…d to which Mrs. Page testified, were not only admissible as dying declarations, but were very clearly admissible because they tended to show that the deceased, at the time he made the declarations to which Mr. Horton testified, was in fact near death, as well as under a sense of impending dissolution. It was for this purpose, mainly, that the court admitted the testimony. Dying…
Practitioners open State v. John Cronin when Connecticut dying declaration turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Mrs. Page testified, were not only admissible as dying declarations, but were very clearly admissible because they tended to show that the deceased, at the time he made the declarations to which Mr." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Medical diagnosis or treatment statements
Statements made for medical diagnosis or treatment under Conn. Code Evid. § 8-5(4) cover medical history, past or present symptoms, and their general cause when reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. The exception is not limited to treating physicians; statements to nurses, EMTs, and consulting clinicians can qualify when the diagnostic purpose is genuine. Fault and identity remain the usual battleground: "I was hit by a car" is often pertinent; "the light was green" usually is not; abuser identity in child-abuse and domestic-violence cases is heavily litigated.
Connecticut medical-statement opinions
State of Connecticut v. Gregory Lamont Miller
State of Connecticut v. Gregory Lamont Miller, 121 Conn. App. 775 (2010)
…ss ... (5) ... A statement made for purposes of obtaining a medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external *780 source thereof, insofar as reasonably pertinent to the medical diagnosis or treatment.” “In other words, the admissibility of out-of-court…
Practitioners open State of Connecticut v. Gregory Lamont Miller when Connecticut medical diagnosis hearsay turns on the distinction in this sentence: "ss ... (5) ... A statement made for purposes of obtaining a medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external *780 source thereof, insofar as reasonably p" Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
State of Connecticut v. Estrella J.C.
State of Connecticut v. Estrella J.C., 169 Conn. App. 56 (2016)
…tted reversible error by admitting into evidence, under the medical diagnosis and treatment exception to the hearsay rule, the video recording of the forensic interview between Montelli and the victim. The defendant argues that the state had not met its burden of showing that the essential purpose of the interview was to further the victim's medical treatment. The following add…
Connecticut opinions such as State of Connecticut v. Estrella J.C. are cited where medical diagnosis hearsay is disputed. The court stated: "Montelli and the victim. The defendant argues that the state had not met its burden of showing that the essential purpose of the interview was to further the victim's medical treatment." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
State of Connecticut v. Donald M.
State of Connecticut v. Donald M., 113 Conn. App. 63 (2009)
…ther the statements were made for the purposes of obtaining medical diagnosis or treatment. State v. Kelly, 256 Conn. 23, 44, 770 A.2d 908 (2001). The rationale for excluding from the hearsay rule statements made in furtherance of obtaining treatment is that “we presume that such statements are inherently reliable because the patient has an incentive to tell the truth in order…
Practitioners open State of Connecticut v. Donald M. when Connecticut medical diagnosis hearsay turns on the distinction in this sentence: "State v. Kelly, 256 Conn. 23, 44, 770 A.2d 908 (2001)." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
STATE of Connecticut v. EDDIE N.C.
STATE of Connecticut v. EDDIE N.C., 178 Conn. App. 147 (2017)
…mother, treating physicians, and a social worker under the medical diagnosis and treatment exception to the hearsay rule, and (3) opinion evidence regarding the ultimate issue of whether A had been sexually assaulted, which the defendant claims constitutes plain error. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court. The jury reasonably could have found th…
Practitioners open STATE of Connecticut v. EDDIE N.C. when Connecticut medical diagnosis hearsay turns on the distinction in this sentence: "A had been sexually assaulted, which the defendant claims constitutes plain error. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
State v. Michael T.
State v. Michael T., 194 Conn. App. 598 (2019)
…ence because they failed to satisfy the requirements of the medical diagnosis and treatment excep- tion to the rule against hearsay, as established in State v. Griswold (160 Conn. App. 528), was not reviewable; the defendant’s appellate argument differed from what was presented to the trial court, defense counsel having claimed before the court that Griswold, a case where the d…
Practitioners open State v. Michael T. when Connecticut medical diagnosis hearsay turns on the distinction in this sentence: "ence because they failed to satisfy the requirements of the medical diagnosis and treatment excep- tion to the rule against hearsay, as established in State v. Griswold (160 Conn. App. 528), was not reviewable; the defendant’s appellate argument differed from what was presented t" Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
STATE of Connecticut v. Joseph ABRAHAM
STATE of Connecticut v. Joseph ABRAHAM, 181 Conn. App. 703 (2018)
…ly only to forensic interviews that "truly are pertinent to medical diagnosis and treatment" and never, barring special circumstances, to successive interviews. He argues that admitting subsequent interviews under the exception would "risk making the very concept of the hearsay rules obsolete" because the state could "repeatedly refer a complaining witness for interviews" until…
On medical diagnosis hearsay, STATE of Connecticut v. Joseph ABRAHAM speaks to the Connecticut dispute in this passage: "ly only to forensic interviews that 'truly are pertinent to medical diagnosis and treatment' and never, barring special circumstances, to successive interviews. He argues that admitting subsequent interviews under the exception would 'risk making the very concept of the hearsay r" The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
STATE of Connecticut v. EZEQUIEL R.R.
STATE of Connecticut v. EZEQUIEL R.R., 184 Conn. App. 55 (2018)
…the court erred by admitting into evidence, pursuant to the medical diagnosis or treatment exception to the hearsay rule, the video recording of the forensic interview between Craft and the victim. We disagree. The following additional facts and procedural history are relevant to this claim. On March 11, 2016, the defendant filed a motion in limine to preclude the video recordi…
Connecticut opinions such as STATE of Connecticut v. EZEQUIEL R.R. are cited where medical diagnosis hearsay is disputed. The court stated: "Craft and the victim. We disagree. The following additional facts and procedural history are relevant to this claim." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
STATE of Connecticut v. MANUEL T.
STATE of Connecticut v. MANUEL T., 186 Conn. App. 51 (2018)
…ued that the video recording was admissible pursuant to the medical diagnosis and treatment exception to the hearsay rule, which is codified in § 8-3 (5) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence. 5 The defendant objected to the admission of the video recording on the ground that the minor victim's statements made during the interview constituted inadmissible hearsay because the mino…
Practitioners open STATE of Connecticut v. MANUEL T. when Connecticut medical diagnosis hearsay turns on the distinction in this sentence: "ued that the video recording was admissible pursuant to the medical diagnosis and treatment exception to the hearsay rule, which is codified in § 8-3 (5) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence. 5 The defendant objected to the admission of the video recording on the ground that the m" Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Use of depositions at trial
Conn. Practice Book §§ 13-1 through 13-15 govern civil depositions; § 13-10 addresses use at trial including when the witness is unavailable. Criminal discovery is controlled by Conn. Crim. P. 13 and case law; deposition use at criminal trial is exceptional and requires a recognized hearsay exception.
Deposition use is always a two-layer problem: procedural permission to read or play the deposition, plus a hearsay path (often former testimony, party admission, or impeachment). Counsel who satisfy the civil or criminal procedure rule but skip the evidence-rule foundation invite a sustained objection; counsel who have a hearsay exception but failed to preserve the deposition under the procedural rule face the same result. Video designations, counter-designations, and completeness objections should be teed up before the jury is seated.
Connecticut deposition / former-testimony opinions
Michael P. Dorazio v. M. B. Foster Electric Company Et Al.
Michael P. Dorazio v. M. B. Foster Electric Company Et Al., 157 Conn. 226 (1968)
…pporting affidavit averred that the plaintiff admitted in a deposition, which had been filed with the clerk of the Superior Court, that Foster was in control of the scaffolding in question. An attorney associated with the law firm which represented the plaintiff filed his own affidavit in opposition to Flagg’s motion for summary judgment and averred that the adjuster employed b…
Michael P. Dorazio v. M. B. Foster Electric Company Et Al. is worth reading on Connecticut deposition / former testimony because the court put the point in its own words: "Superior Court, that Foster was in control of the scaffolding in question." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
State of Connecticut v. Stanford Lee Frye
State of Connecticut v. Stanford Lee Frye, 182 Conn. 476 (1980)
…er *482 onr criminal rnles, in determining whether or not a deposition is admissible into evidence because the deponent is claimed to be “unavailable,” the term “unavailable” is defined almost identically to include those situations set out in federal rule 804(a). See Practice Book, 1978, §§ 789-804, especially §§ 793, 803. 4 We have decided to employ the definition set out in…
Practitioners open State of Connecticut v. Stanford Lee Frye when Connecticut deposition / former testimony turns on the distinction in this sentence: "See Practice Book, 1978, §§ 789-804, especially §§ 793, 803." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
STATE of Connecticut v. RICHARD P.
STATE of Connecticut v. RICHARD P., 179 Conn. App. 676 (2018)
…cial authority, the testimony of any person may be taken by deposition if the testimony will be required at an evidentiary hearing and it appears: "(1) the testimony may not be available at the required evidentiary hearing because of physical or mental illness or infirmity of the witness; or "(2) the witness resides out of this state and cannot be compelled to attend and give t…
On deposition / former testimony, STATE of Connecticut v. RICHARD P. speaks to the Connecticut dispute in this passage: "cial authority, the testimony of any person may be taken by deposition if the testimony will be required at an evidentiary hearing and it appears: '(1) the testimony may not be available at the required evidentiary hearing because of physical or mental illness or infirmity of the" The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Anthony J. MAIO v. CITY OF NEW HAVEN
Anthony J. MAIO v. CITY OF NEW HAVEN, 326 Conn. 708 (2017)
…counsel's failure to attempt to "preserve her testimony" by deposition. The court made a similar finding as to J, the in-state witness, observing that counsel had sufficient time before trial to depose both complainants: "So what I'm saying is ... that through the discovery process, you had an opportunity to notice ... the depositions of both young ladies.... [Y]ou [c]ould have…
On deposition / former testimony, Anthony J. MAIO v. CITY OF NEW HAVEN speaks to the Connecticut dispute in this passage: "The court made a similar finding as to J, the in-state witness, observing that counsel had sufficient time before trial to depose both complainants: 'So what I'm saying is ... that through the discovery process, you had an opportunity to notice ..." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Shirley Ferris, Commissioner of Agriculture v. Anton Faford Et Al.
Shirley Ferris, Commissioner of Agriculture v. Anton Faford Et Al., 93 Conn. App. 679 (2006)
…ed to exercise due diligence by failing to take Etta Klee’s deposition when the commissioner knew or should have known that in light of Etta Klee’s age, she would be unavailable as a witness at the time of trial. The commissioner contends, on the other hand, that because Etta Klee was in good health at the time the affidavit was taken, it was reasonable to assume that she would…
Practitioners open Shirley Ferris, Commissioner of Agriculture v. Anton Faford Et Al. when Connecticut deposition / former testimony turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Etta Klee’s deposition when the commissioner knew or should have known that in light of Etta Klee’s age, she would be unavailable as a witness at the time of trial." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Friends of Animals, Inc. v. United Illuminating Company
Friends of Animals, Inc. v. United Illuminating Company, 124 Conn. App. 823 (2010)
…iscretion by (a) precluding from evidence excerpts from the deposition transcripts of three of the defendant’s employees and the defendant’s expert witness, (b) precluding the plaintiff from calling the defendant’s expert witness as its own expert witness, (2) improperly granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to make out a prima facie case and (3) improperly held…
Practitioners open Friends of Animals, Inc. v. United Illuminating Company when Connecticut deposition / former testimony turns on the distinction in this sentence: "iscretion by (a) precluding from evidence excerpts from the deposition transcripts of three of the defendant’s employees and the defendant’s expert witness, (b) precluding the plaintiff from calling the defendant’s expert witness as its own expert witness, (2) improperly granted" Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Amity Partners v. Woodbridge Associates, L.P.
Amity Partners v. Woodbridge Associates, L.P., 199 Conn. App. 1 (2020)
…andum of law in opposition thereto to which it attached the deposition testimony of B, a signatory to all of the relevant agreements, to establish the existence and terms of the alleged letter of direction. The plaintiff did not submit a copy of the letter of direction. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment thereon, determinin…
On deposition / former testimony, Amity Partners v. Woodbridge Associates, L.P. speaks to the Connecticut dispute in this passage: "B, a signatory to all of the relevant agreements, to establish the existence and terms of the alleged letter of direction. The plaintiff did not submit a copy of the letter of direction." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
State v. Oscar H.
State v. Oscar H., 204 Conn. App. 207 (2021)
…that the trial court improperly admitted into evidence the deposition testimony of B, whom the defendant also stabbed during the same incident, after having improperly determined pursuant to the former testimony exception to the rule against hearsay in the applicable provision (§ 8-6 (1)) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence that B, an undocumented immigrant, who had returned t…
Connecticut opinions such as State v. Oscar H. are cited where deposition / former testimony is disputed. The court stated: "that the trial court improperly admitted into evidence the deposition testimony of B, whom the defendant also stabbed during the same incident, after having improperly determined pursuant to the former testimony exception to the rule against hearsay in the applicable provision (§" That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Authenticity: why it matters and how to prove it
Authenticity is not a hearsay doctrine and it is not optional. Under Conn. Code Evid. §§ 9-1, 9-2, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is. Self-authenticating categories — certified public records, newspapers, acknowledged documents, trade inscriptions, and (where adopted) certified domestic records of a regularly conducted activity — shorten the path, but most trial exhibits still need a sponsoring witness, distinctive characteristics, chain of custody, or process-or-system evidence.
Connecticut state courts require authentication under Conn. Code Evid. § 9-1 before admitting hospital records, school disciplinary files, and electronic communications. The Code's commentary emphasizes gatekeeping for expert-dependent forensic evidence.
Why authenticity gets its own section in every Connecticut trial notebook:
- It is a condition precedent. An unauthenticated exhibit never reaches the relevance, hearsay, or privilege analysis in a useful way — the jury never properly considers it.
- Digital evidence multiplies the failure modes. Screenshots, social-media posts, text threads, and cloud downloads require hash values, account attribution, metadata, or a percipient witness who saw the content created or received.
- Chain of custody is authenticity by another name. Drugs, firearms, biological samples, and seized devices are excluded when the links from seizure to lab to courtroom are broken, even if a hearsay exception would otherwise apply to a lab report.
- Business-records shortcuts do not replace authentication. A custodian can explain record-keeping practices and still fail if nobody can say the particular PDF or printout is the record of this patient, this account, or this machine.
- Self-authentication is narrow. Counsel who wave a notarization or a letterhead and skip the rest of Rule 901-style analysis often lose when the document's contents are disputed.
Practical authentication checklist for Connecticut trials: identify the exhibit; choose a 901 method or a 902 category; line up the sponsoring witness or certificate; preserve chain-of-custody testimony for physical and digital items; and separate the authenticity objection from any hearsay objection so the court rules on each.
Connecticut authenticity opinions
STATE of Connecticut v. Keith CHEMLEN.
STATE of Connecticut v. Keith CHEMLEN., 165 Conn. App. 791 (2016)
…most writings in evidence.... In general, a writing may be authenticated by a number of methods, including direct testimony or circumstantial evidence.... Both courts and commentators have noted that the showing of authenticity is not on a par with the more technical evidentiary rules that govern admissibility, such as hearsay exceptions, competency and privilege.... Rather, t…
Connecticut opinions such as STATE of Connecticut v. Keith CHEMLEN. are cited where authentication is disputed. The court stated: "In general, a writing may be authenticated by a number of methods, including direct testimony or circumstantial evidence...." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
State of Connecticut v. Derrick Bouknight
State of Connecticut v. Derrick Bouknight, 323 Conn. 620 (2016)
…cebook 2 profile page and photographs thereon were properly authenticated. The following facts and procedural history are relevant to the present appeal, which arises out of a deadly shooting in the city of New Haven following a dispute between the victim, William Baines, and some of his neighbors. Baines lived in a house on West Division Street in New Haven with his girlfriend…
Practitioners open State of Connecticut v. Derrick Bouknight when Connecticut authentication turns on the distinction in this sentence: "The following facts and procedural history are relevant to the present appeal, which arises out of a deadly shooting in the city of New Haven following a dispute between the victim, William Baines, and some of his neighbors." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
STATE of Connecticut v. Brian J. SMITH
STATE of Connecticut v. Brian J. SMITH, 179 Conn. App. 734 (2018)
…the exhibit. Defense counsel argued that the state had not authenticated the exhibit because the state failed to prove that it came from the defendant's Facebook account or that it was his message. The prosecutor conducted a voir dire examination of Petsa in an attempt to provide a more complete foundation for the proffered exhibit. Petsa testified that she had a Facebook acco…
On authentication, STATE of Connecticut v. Brian J. SMITH speaks to the Connecticut dispute in this passage: "Defense counsel argued that the state had not authenticated the exhibit because the state failed to prove that it came from the defendant's Facebook account or that it was his message." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Charles D. Gianetti v. Health Net of Connecticut, Inc., Et Al.
Charles D. Gianetti v. Health Net of Connecticut, Inc., Et Al., 116 Conn. App. 459 (2009)
…ourt noted that the contract and extracted clauses had been authenticated through Choma’s affidavit. The referenced documents established that any right for payment of a claim was conditioned on the claimant’s sending written notice to the defendant of the injury or sickness for which the claim was being made within twenty days of the date of that injury or sickness. Further, w…
Practitioners open Charles D. Gianetti v. Health Net of Connecticut, Inc., Et Al. when Connecticut authentication turns on the distinction in this sentence: "The referenced documents established that any right for payment of a claim was conditioned on the claimant’s sending written notice to the defendant of the injury or sickness for which the claim was being made within twenty days of the date of that injury or sickness." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Charles D. Gianetti v. Anthem Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Connecticut
Charles D. Gianetti v. Anthem Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Connecticut, 111 Conn. App. 68 (2008)
…dgment ought not to have been considered because it was not authenticated properly. We disagree. “Practice Book § 17-45 provides in relevant part that [a] motion for summary judgment shall be supported by such documents as may be appropriate, including but not limited to affidavits, certified transcripts of testimony under oath, disclosures, written admissions and the like. . .…
On authentication, Charles D. Gianetti v. Anthem Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Connecticut speaks to the Connecticut dispute in this passage: "Practice Book § 17-45 provides in relevant part that [a] motion for summary judgment shall be supported by such documents as may be appropriate, including but not limited to affidavits, certified transcripts of testimony under oath, disclosures, written admissions and the like. . ." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
State v. Billings
State v. Billings, 217 Conn. App. 1 (2022)
…uted to the defendant because the screenshots were properly authenticated: the screenshots were admitted through W and A, who both testified that they knew the defendant and that they were able to directly link the defendant to the posts and messages in the screenshots on the basis of the content and distinctive characteristics of the posts, messages, and social media accounts,…
Connecticut opinions such as State v. Billings are cited where authentication is disputed. The court stated: "uted to the defendant because the screenshots were properly authenticated: the screenshots were admitted through W and A, who both testified that they knew the defendant and that they were able to directly link the defendant to the posts and messages in the screenshots on the bas" That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
STATE of Connecticut v. Raymond TUCKER
STATE of Connecticut v. Raymond TUCKER, 179 Conn. App. 270 (2018)
…fendant also argues that the 911 recording was not properly authenticated. To the extent this claim is not preserved, the defendant seeks review pursuant to State v. Golding , 213 Conn. 233 , 239-40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), or, alternatively, reversal as plain error. The state counters that the trial court reasonably exercised its discretion in overruling the defendant's objection…
STATE of Connecticut v. Raymond TUCKER is worth reading on Connecticut authentication because the court put the point in its own words: "To the extent this claim is not preserved, the defendant seeks review pursuant to State v. Golding , 213 Conn. 233 , 239-40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), or, alternatively, reversal as plain error." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Nancy E. Doyle, Administratrix (Estate of John A. Doyle), Et Al. v. Harold J. Kamm Et Al.
…a document used to refresh a witness’ recollection must be authenticated. We agree. We do not agree with the plaintiff that the erroneous ruling warrants relief, however, because there is no adequate record on which to determine whether the error was harmful. The following additional facts are relevant. The court’s ruling applied to two lines of questioning. On cross-examinati…
Connecticut opinions such as Nancy E. Doyle, Administratrix (Estate of John A. Doyle), Et Al. v. Harold J. Kamm Et Al. are cited where authentication is disputed. The court stated: "We agree. We do not agree with the plaintiff that the erroneous ruling warrants relief, however, because there is no adequate record on which to determine whether the error was harmful. The following additional facts are relevant." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Practice checklist
- State the relevance theory in one sentence before naming an exception.
- Run the 403 / unfair-prejudice balance explicitly for other-acts and graphic exhibits.
- For character or other-acts evidence, identify the non-propensity purpose and request a limiting instruction on the record.
- Decide whether an out-of-court statement is hearsay for the purpose offered before hunting exceptions.
- Lay business-records foundations with time, knowledge, regular practice, and custodial qualifications — or a qualifying certification.
- Prove unavailability with specific facts before offering former testimony or dying declarations.
- Treat deposition use as procedure-plus-hearsay; designate and counter-designate early.
- Authenticate every exhibit under Conn. Code Evid. §§ 9-1, 9-2 (or the self-authentication path) before arguing hearsay.
- Preserve chain of custody for physical and digital evidence with named custodians.
- Search LawDiver for recent Connecticut appellate evidence opinions before mediation or motions in limine.
Contents
- General standards of admissibility
- Character evidence
- Hearsay: start with the definition
- Party admissions
- Business records
- Important hearsay exceptions that do not require unavailability
- Declarant unavailable
- Dying declarations
- Medical diagnosis or treatment statements
- Use of depositions at trial
- Authenticity: why it matters and how to prove it
- Practice checklist
- Frequently asked questions
Frequently asked questions
What is the primary evidence source in Connecticut?
Connecticut applies the Connecticut Code of Evidence. Connecticut's Code of Evidence is a court-adopted FRE analogue (not a general statute); Conn. Code Evid. §§ 4-1 through 9-2 mirror federal structure with Connecticut commentary.
How do Connecticut courts decide relevance and unfair prejudice?
Under Conn. Code Evid. §§ 4-1, 4-3, evidence must make a fact of consequence more or less probable, and the court may exclude relevant evidence when unfair prejudice, confusion, or waste of time substantially outweighs its probative value.
Are party admissions hearsay in Connecticut?
Party-opponent statements under Conn. Code Evid. § 8-3(2) are generally excluded from the hearsay ban (or treated as an exception, depending on local drafting). They may be offered against the party who made or adopted them without showing unavailability.
What foundation is required for business records?
Under Conn. Code Evid. § 8-5(6), show a record made at or near the time from someone with knowledge, kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity, as a regular practice, through a custodian, qualified witness, or allowed certification — subject to trustworthiness attack.
When can I use a deposition at trial in Connecticut?
Conn. Practice Book §§ 13-1 through 13-15 govern civil depositions; § 13-10 addresses use at trial including when the witness is unavailable. Criminal discovery is controlled by Conn. Crim. P. 13 and case law; deposition use at criminal trial is exceptional and requires a recognized hearsay exception.
Why is authenticity separate from hearsay?
Authenticity asks whether the item is what you claim it is; hearsay asks whether out-of-court assertions inside it may be used for their truth. You can lose on either ground independently. Connecticut authenticity practice starts with Conn. Code Evid. §§ 9-1, 9-2.
Where do dying declarations and medical statements fit?
Dying declarations under Conn. Code Evid. § 8-6(2) require belief in impending death and concern the cause or circumstances of that believed death. Medical statements under Conn. Code Evid. § 8-5(4) require a genuine diagnostic or treatment purpose and reasonable pertinence to care.