Colorado evidence practice is organized under the Colorado Rules of Evidence. Relevance starts at Colo. R. Evid. 401, 403; hearsay starts at Colo. R. Evid. 801, 802. That is what separates Colorado evidence law from a generic national summary. Read Colorado Rules of Evidence before the background sections below. Authenticity is a separate fight under Colo. R. Evid. 901, 902. Depositions at trial: Colo. R. Civ. P. 30 and 32 authorize civil depositions and trial use for any purpose allowed by the rules or Colo. R. Evid. Criminal practitioners use Colo. R. Crim. P. 16 for discovery; prior recorded testimony may be admitted under Colo. R. Evid. 804(b)(1) when unavailability is established under 804(a).
Character evidence
Character evidence in Colorado is governed by Colo. R. Evid. 404, 405. The default rule is familiar: evidence of a person's character or character trait is not admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character or trait. The same body of law then carves out the classic exceptions — essential-element character, accused-opens-the-door reputation or opinion, and other-acts evidence offered for a non-propensity purpose such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake.
Other-acts notice, 403 balancing, and limiting instructions do most of the real work. In criminal cases, prosecutors who dump prior misconduct without a specific non-propensity theory invite reversal; defense counsel who open the door to good-character testimony without anticipating rebuttal create the very propensity inference the rules were designed to police.
Colorado character-evidence opinions
Brooke E. Rojas v. The People of the State of Colorado
Brooke E. Rojas v. The People of the State of Colorado, 2022 CO 8 (2022)
…ctrine these days is often used as a shortcut for admitting character evidence about criminal defendants. While we seek to ensure that defendants are tried for the crimes with which they've been charged and not for seeming to have a propensity to engage in criminal conduct, "[c]riminal occurrences do not always take place on a sterile stage." People v. Lobato, 530 P.2d 493, 496…
Brooke E. Rojas v. The People of the State of Colorado is worth reading on Colorado character evidence because the court put the point in its own words: "While we seek to ensure that defendants are tried for the crimes with which they've been charged and not for seeming to have a propensity to engage in criminal conduct, '[c]riminal occurrences do not always take place on a sterile stage.' People v. Lobato, 530 P." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Timothy MASTERS, Petitioner, v. the PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent
Timothy MASTERS, Petitioner, v. the PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent, 58 P.3d 979 (2002)
…'s bad character; and (2) the prosecution was offering this character evidence for the purpose of proving that Defendant acted in conformity therewith when he allegedly murdered Peggy Hettrick. The prosecution responded that this evidence was admissible under CRE 404(b) because it was not being offered to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conform…
On character evidence, Timothy MASTERS, Petitioner, v. the PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent speaks to the Colorado dispute in this passage: "Defendant acted in conformity therewith when he allegedly murdered Peggy Hettrick." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner, v. Gary Lee MILLER, Respondent
…for truthfulness was attacked, he could not introduce such character evidence. The prosecution maintained that according to Wheatley, a defendant’s character for truthfulness is not attacked simply because a defendant takes the witness stand and is cross-examined at trial. In short, a challenge to a defendant’s credibility does not constitute an attack on the defendant’s chara…
On character evidence, The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner, v. Gary Lee MILLER, Respondent speaks to the Colorado dispute in this passage: "The prosecution maintained that according to Wheatley, a defendant’s character for truthfulness is not attacked simply because a defendant takes the witness stand and is cross-examined at trial." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado v. Michael Lee JONES — Bender, J., concurring
…ainst the admission of improper propensity, disposition, or character evidence that has been veiled under a vague showing of similarity. This is especially true in a case like this, where the other acts evidence has been offered to show a common plan of sexual assaults: [Tlhe courts sometimes use the rubric "plan" as a subterfuge for admitting the defendant's similar sexual mis…
Colorado opinions such as The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado v. Michael Lee JONES — Bender, J., concurring are cited where character evidence is disputed. The court stated: "ainst the admission of improper propensity, disposition, or character evidence that has been veiled under a vague showing of similarity. This is especially true in a case like this, where the other acts evidence has been offered to show a common plan of sexual assaults: [Tlhe cou" That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
20SC399 - Rojas v. People
20SC399 - Rojas v. People, 504 P.3d 296 (2022)
…ctrine these days is often used as a shortcut for admitting character evidence about criminal defendants. While we seek to ensure that defendants are tried for the crimes with which they’ve been charged and not for seeming to have a propensity to engage in criminal conduct, “[c]riminal occurrences do not always take place on a sterile stage.” People v. Lobato, 530 P.2d 493, 496…
On character evidence, 20SC399 - Rojas v. People speaks to the Colorado dispute in this passage: "While we seek to ensure that defendants are tried for the crimes with which they’ve been charged and not for seeming to have a propensity to engage in criminal conduct, “[c]riminal occurrences do not always take place on a sterile stage.” People v. Lobato, 530 P." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
People v. Williams
People v. Williams, 2016 COA 48 (2016)
…s operandi evidence can easily become nothing more than the character evidence that Rule 404(b) prohibits." United States v. Smith, 103 F.3d 600, 603 (7th Cir. 1996). Common plan evidence is subject to similar abuse. People v. Delgado, 890 P.2d 141, 144 (Colo. App. 1994); see also 1 Edward J. Imwinkelried, Uncharged Misconduct Evidence § 3:24, Westlaw (database updated Dec. 201…
On character evidence, People v. Williams speaks to the Colorado dispute in this passage: "Rule 404(b) prohibits.' United States v. Smith, 103 F.3d 600, 603 (7th Cir. 1996). Common plan evidence is subject to similar abuse. People v. Delgado, 890 P.2d 141, 144 (Colo. App. 1994); see also 1 Edward J." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Hearsay: start with the definition
Most hearsay objections in Colorado are won or lost on the definition, not on an exception. Under Colo. R. Evid. 801, 802, hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Non-hearsay purposes — verbal acts, effect on the listener, notice, circumstantial evidence of state of mind, and impeachment — remain available when the proponent can articulate them without asking the jury to believe the declarant.
Layered hearsay (hearsay within hearsay) requires an exception or exclusion for each layer. Machine-generated data and non-assertive conduct sit outside the hearsay definition in FRE-aligned jurisdictions, but they still need authenticity and, often, expert or business-records foundations.
Colorado hearsay opinions
Clifton BLECHA, Petitioner, v. the PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent
Clifton BLECHA, Petitioner, v. the PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent, 962 P.2d 931 (1998)
…ha, 940 P.2d 1070 (Colo.App.1996), to determine whether the hearsay statement of a previously acquitted co-defendant, Roger Younger (Younger), was properly admitted at the trial of the defendant-appellant, Clifton Blecha (Blecha). A jury convicted Blecha of first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder of a fellow inmate at the Limón Correctional Facility. Th…
Practitioners open Clifton BLECHA, Petitioner, v. the PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent when Colorado hearsay turns on the distinction in this sentence: "P.2d 1070 (Colo.App.1996), to determine whether the hearsay statement of a previously acquitted co-defendant, Roger Younger (Younger), was properly admitted at the trial of the defendant-appellant, Clifton Blecha (Blecha)." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner, v. the DISTRICT COURT OF EL PASO COUNTY, and Honorable Bernard
…r the trial court properly excluded a four-year-old child’s hearsay statements that alleged her father had sexually abused her. The prosecution argues that the trial court erred in holding the statements inadmissible. Specifically, the prosecution claims that the trial court erred by finding that the child, although not competent, was “available” to testify under section 13 — 2…
Colorado opinions such as The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner, v. the DISTRICT COURT OF EL PASO COUNTY, and Honorable Bernard are cited where hearsay is disputed. The court stated: "The prosecution argues that the trial court erred in holding the statements inadmissible." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Clarence McCLURE, Defendant-Appellant
…on in limine requesting the district court to admit certain hearsay statements made by Carol to thirteen individuals, pursuant to section 13-25-129, 6A C.R.S. (1987). The district court held a hearing to determine whether the statements concerning the alleged sexual assault met the statutory criteria for admission. Over defendant’s objection, the court concluded that statements…
The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Clarence McCLURE, Defendant-Appellant is worth reading on Colorado hearsay because the court put the point in its own words: "Carol to thirteen individuals, pursuant to section 13-25-129, 6A C.R.S. (1987). The district court held a hearing to determine whether the statements concerning the alleged sexual assault met the statutory criteria for admission." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
v. Brown
v. Brown, 471 P.3d 1234 (2020)
…t by Department — Admission of Records in Court; Evidence — Hearsay In this proceeding, a division of the court of appeals considers whether section 42-2-121(2)(c)(II), C.R.S. 2019, allows automatic admission of a hearsay statement within a traffic accident report. The division concludes that the district court misinterpreted the statute when it admitted a witness’s hearsay sta…
On hearsay, v. Brown speaks to the Colorado dispute in this passage: "Department — Admission of Records in Court; Evidence — Hearsay In this proceeding, a division of the court of appeals considers whether section 42-2-121(2)(c)(II), C.R.S. 2019, allows automatic admission of a hearsay statement within a traffic accident report." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Debbie LEITING, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Vinay MUTHA, Defendant-Appellant
…ed on the grounds that each document contained inadmissible hearsay. The trial court overruled the objections and admitted the documents. The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff, and the trial court entered judgment accordingly. I. Relying on CRE 805, defendant contends that, even if the ALJ’s decision was otherwise admissible under CRE 803(8), it was inadmissible her…
Practitioners open Debbie LEITING, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Vinay MUTHA, Defendant-Appellant when Colorado hearsay turns on the distinction in this sentence: "The trial court overruled the objections and admitted the documents. The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff, and the trial court entered judgment accordingly. I." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jim Dale PATRICK, Defendant-Appellee
…s order excluding evidence of a child-victim’s out-of-court hearsay statements based upon its finding that section 13-25-129, 6A C.R.S. (1987), was unconstitutional as applied and that the prosecution could not corroborate the hearsay statements. 1 The statements were made by C.M., a minor female who was allegedly sexually assaulted by Patrick, her stepfather. The trial court w…
On hearsay, The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jim Dale PATRICK, Defendant-Appellee speaks to the Colorado dispute in this passage: "A C.R.S. (1987), was unconstitutional as applied and that the prosecution could not corroborate the hearsay statements. 1 The statements were made by C.M., a minor female who was allegedly sexually assaulted by Patrick, her stepfather." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert J. RAFFAELLI, Defendant-Appellant
…fendant’s objection that this testimony was inadmissible as hearsay, the trial court admitted the statements. We disagree as to the admissibility of certain of the statements and therefore reverse. I. Applicable Rules of Evidence Because defendant’s wife refused to testify on Fifth Amendment grounds, she was unavailable as a witness under CRE 804(a). See People v. Harding, 671…
The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert J. RAFFAELLI, Defendant-Appellant is worth reading on Colorado hearsay because the court put the point in its own words: "We disagree as to the admissibility of certain of the statements and therefore reverse. I. Applicable Rules of Evidence Because defendant’s wife refused to testify on Fifth Amendment grounds, she was unavailable as a witness under CRE 804(a). See People v." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Pomeroy v. the People.
Pomeroy v. the People., 116 Colo. 518 (1947)
…could not be received under any recognized exception to the hearsay rule, *. Its admission constituted reversible error. “Statements concerning the question of responsibility for an injury or physical condition are inadmissible. Lowery v. Jones, 219 Ala. 201, 202, 121 So. 704, 706, 64 A.L.R. 553, 555-6 (see also top of p. 564 of Annotation) . The responsibility cannot be fi…
Practitioners open Pomeroy v. the People. when Colorado hearsay turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Its admission constituted reversible error. “Statements concerning the question of responsibility for an injury or physical condition are inadmissible. Lowery v. Jones, 219 Ala. 201, 202, 121 So. 704, 706, 64 A.L.R. 553, 555-6 (see also top of p. 564 of Annotation) ." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Party admissions
Statements of an opposing party are among the most important routes around the hearsay bar. Colorado treats them under Colo. R. Evid. 801(d)(2). Nothing about the statement need be against interest, contemporaneous, or based on personal knowledge — the theory is adversarial, not reliability-based. A party cannot complain that his own words are unreliable when offered against him.
Scope questions dominate practice: the party's own statement; adopted statements (including silence in circumstances where a reasonable person would deny); statements by authorized speakers; agent or employee statements on matters within the scope of the relationship; and, in criminal conspiracy cases, coconspirator statements during and in furtherance of the conspiracy. A defendant generally cannot introduce his own exculpatory out-of-court statement as a "party admission" against himself — the rule runs one way.
Colorado party-admission opinions
Diana K. CHURCHEY, Petitioner, v. ADOLPH COORS COMPANY, Respondent
Diana K. CHURCHEY, Petitioner, v. ADOLPH COORS COMPANY, Respondent, 759 P.2d 1336 (1988)
…party's motion for summary judgment is denied, that party's admission of the absence of a factual dispute terminates. Morlan, 127 Colo, at 14, 252 P.2d at 102; 10A C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, supra, § 2720, at 20-22. Therefore, Churchey's assertion that the facts material to her legal theory were undisputed could "not be applied in connection with [Coors' ] similar motion"…
Practitioners open Diana K. CHURCHEY, Petitioner, v. ADOLPH COORS COMPANY, Respondent when Colorado party admissions turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Morlan, 127 Colo, at 14, 252 P.2d at 102; 10A C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, supra, § 2720, at 20-22." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Timothy MASTERS, Petitioner, v. the PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent
Timothy MASTERS, Petitioner, v. the PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent, 58 P.3d 979 (2002)
…and did not want to be made fun of. In addition to his own admission, a footprint found in the bloody drag trail close to the body indicated that Defendant had been there that morning. Subsequently, the police conducted consensual searches of Defendant's bedroom, locker, and backpack. In Defendant's bedroom, police found a large collection of knives and swords. The collection…
Colorado opinions such as Timothy MASTERS, Petitioner, v. the PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent are cited where party admissions is disputed. The court stated: "In addition to his own admission, a footprint found in the bloody drag trail close to the body indicated that Defendant had been there that morning. Subsequently, the police conducted consensual searches of Defendant's bedroom, locker, and backpack." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner, v. John FASY, Respondent
…n treating the victim since June 1988. Fasy objected to the admission of Dr. Mosley’s testimony that the victim suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder. 2 Fasy argued that such testimony should not be admitted because it was the equivalent of a statement that the child was telling the truth about the alleged sexual assault. The district court overruled Fasy’s objection. Th…
Colorado opinions such as The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner, v. John FASY, Respondent are cited where party admissions is disputed. The court stated: "June 1988. Fasy objected to the admission of Dr. Mosley’s testimony that the victim suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Tuttle v. The People
Tuttle v. The People, 33 Colo. 243 (1905)
…re both suspected. Tbeir statements were not confessions or admissions of guilt, but related principally to their whereabouts and movements at and about the time of the homicide. They made no objection to testifying, were not represented by counsel, and were not warned that their statements might be used against them, or that they were privileged to refuse to testify if they so…
Practitioners open Tuttle v. The People when Colorado party admissions turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Tbeir statements were not confessions or admissions of guilt, but related principally to their whereabouts and movements at and about the time of the homicide." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
People v. Short
People v. Short, 425 P.3d 1208 (2018)
…pecific incident,” “this fact alone is insufficient to deny admission of the evidence, because expert testimony generally tends to bolster or attack the credibility of another witness.” People v. Koon, 724 P.2d 1367, 1370 (Colo. App. 1986). B. The Detective ¶ 21 We also perceive nothing improper about the detective’s testimony. The detective was not testifying to the truthfulne…
People v. Short is worth reading on Colorado party admissions because the court put the point in its own words: "People v. Koon, 724 P.2d 1367, 1370 (Colo. App. 1986). B. The Detective ¶ 21 We also perceive nothing improper about the detective’s testimony." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
BURLINGTON NORTHERN RAILROAD COMPANY, Petitioner, v. Sidney L. HOOD, Respondent
…its right to cross-examine the plaintiff about his alleged admission to his wife. We granted the defendant’s petition for certiorari to consider whether the court of appeals properly resolved these evidentiary issues. We now reverse the judgment and remand the case for a new trial. I. The issues in this case arise out of a negligence claim filed by Sidney L. Hood for injuries…
Practitioners open BURLINGTON NORTHERN RAILROAD COMPANY, Petitioner, v. Sidney L. HOOD, Respondent when Colorado party admissions turns on the distinction in this sentence: "We granted the defendant’s petition for certiorari to consider whether the court of appeals properly resolved these evidentiary issues. We now reverse the judgment and remand the case for a new trial. I. The issues in this case arise out of a negligence claim filed by Sidney L." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Paul MONTOYA, Defendant-Appellee
…dequate evidentiary foundation has been established for the admission of challenged evidence. A trial court’s ruling on that question will necessarily be fact-specific in nature. While a pretrial ruling on the admissibility of certain evidence may serve to expedite the trial itself by eliminating hearings outside the presence of the jury, see Uptain v. Huntington Lab, Inc., 723…
The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Paul MONTOYA, Defendant-Appellee is worth reading on Colorado party admissions because the court put the point in its own words: "A trial court’s ruling on that question will necessarily be fact-specific in nature. While a pretrial ruling on the admissibility of certain evidence may serve to expedite the trial itself by eliminating hearings outside the presence of the jury, see Uptain v. Huntington Lab, Inc." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
A concrete Colorado scenario
Here is one way the Colorado pieces fit together. Change any fact and the statute may point somewhere else.
A lawyer in Colorado wants to offer a medical record, a party email, and a statement the declarant made while believing death was imminent.
- Clear relevance and unfair prejudice under Colo. R. Evid. 401, 403.
- If the email is the opposing party's, test Colo. R. Evid. 801(d)(2) before the hearsay definition in Colo. R. Evid. 801, 802.
- For the medical record, lay the business-records foundation in Colo. R. Evid. 803(6) and the treatment purpose in Colo. R. Evid. 803(4).
- For the deathbed statement, meet Colo. R. Evid. 804(b)(2), then authenticate every exhibit under Colo. R. Evid. 901, 902.
Colorado keeps hearsay, character, and authenticity on different rules inside the Colorado Rules of Evidence. Winning one does not win the others.
Business records
The business-records exception under Colo. R. Evid. 803(6) is the everyday path for medical charts, employment files, bank statements, and maintenance logs. The foundation requires a record made at or near the time by — or from information transmitted by — someone with knowledge; kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity; and made as a regular practice. A custodian or other qualified witness (or a qualifying certification where the jurisdiction allows it) lays the foundation. The opponent may still attack lack of trustworthiness when the source or method of preparation indicates unreliability — litigation-driven reports are the classic failure mode.
Do not confuse authenticity with the business-records exception. You still need to show the exhibit is what you claim it is; the hearsay exception then answers why the out-of-court assertions inside it may be considered for their truth.
Colorado business-records opinions
Peter SCHMUTZ, Petitioner, v. Gene BOLLES, M.D.; Boulder Community Hospital; And Codman & Shurtleff, Inc., Respondents
…these incident reports should have been admitted under the business records exception of CRE 803(6) or under the residual exception of CRE 803(24). We conclude that the incident reports may be admissible as business records under CRE *1312 803(6) and that the reports must be considered individually to determine whether they qualify for admission under that rule. CRE 803(6) pro…
Peter SCHMUTZ, Petitioner, v. Gene BOLLES, M.D.; Boulder Community Hospital; And Codman & Shurtleff, Inc., Respondents is worth reading on Colorado business records because the court put the point in its own words: "CRE 803(6) or under the residual exception of CRE 803(24). We conclude that the incident reports may be admissible as business records under CRE *1312 803(6) and that the reports must be considered individually to determine whether they qualify for admission under that rule." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
William HENDERSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MASTER KLEAN JANITORIAL, INC., Defendant-Appellee
…ances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness." The business records exception is founded on a presumption of accuracy that exists because the information is reported by persons trained in the importance of precision and checked for its correctness, and because of the accuracy demanded by the nature of the business. See United States v. Snyder, 787 F.2d 1429 (10th Cir.1…
Practitioners open William HENDERSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MASTER KLEAN JANITORIAL, INC., Defendant-Appellee when Colorado business records turns on the distinction in this sentence: "The business records exception is founded on a presumption of accuracy that exists because the information is reported by persons trained in the importance of precision and checked for its correctness, and because of the accuracy demanded by the nature of the business." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
v. Brown
v. Brown, 471 P.3d 1234 (2020)
…70, 1374 (Colo. App. 1985) (police reports could qualify as business records and admitting the same in a civil case, but without explaining why the hearsay therein was reliable). ¶ 31 Focusing on the post-enactment cases, in Leiting, a division of this court held hearsay statements within public records are not automatically admissible under CRE 803(8).4 58 P.3d at 1053. And in…
On business records, v. Brown speaks to the Colorado dispute in this passage: "Colo. App. 1985) (police reports could qualify as business records and admitting the same in a civil case, but without explaining why the hearsay therein was reliable)." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Oscar HINOJOS-MENDOZA, Defendant-Appellant
…ts that by their nature were not testimonial — for example, business records or statements in furtherance of a conspiracy.” Crawford v. Washington, supra, 541 U.S. at 56, 124 S.Ct. at 1367. In People v. Shreck, 107 P.3d 1048, 1060 (Colo.App.2004), a division of this court held that documents showing the defendant’s pri- or convictions were nontestimonial official records “of a…
Colorado opinions such as The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Oscar HINOJOS-MENDOZA, Defendant-Appellant are cited where business records is disputed. The court stated: "Crawford v. Washington, supra, 541 U.S. at 56, 124 S.Ct. at 1367. In People v. Shreck, 107 P.3d 1048, 1060 (Colo.App." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
v. N.T.B
…st, but not the videos. He argued that these documents were business records that contained hearsay, which would be admissible only if authenticated under either CRE 803(6) or by a certification that complied with CRE 902(11). The prosecutor had neither endorsed a records custodian to testify concerning the requirements of CRE 803(6) nor provided an affidavit and notice under C…
On business records, v. N.T.B speaks to the Colorado dispute in this passage: "He argued that these documents were business records that contained hearsay, which would be admissible only if authenticated under either CRE 803(6) or by a certification that complied with CRE 902(11)." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
US Fidelity & Guaranty v. YOUNG LIFE CAMPAIGN
US Fidelity & Guaranty v. YOUNG LIFE CAMPAIGN, 42 Colo. App. 298 (1979)
…, that the computer documents were not admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule, because no sufficient foundation had been laid. Following this ruling, USF&G called Mr. Taylor, an official of Young Life, as an adverse witness. So far as here pertinent, he testified that Young Life had not made specific objections to any particular figure contained in…
Colorado opinions such as US Fidelity & Guaranty v. YOUNG LIFE CAMPAIGN are cited where business records is disputed. The court stated: "Following this ruling, USF&G called Mr. Taylor, an official of Young Life, as an adverse witness." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado Through the DENVER DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, in the Interest of R.D.H. and
…ssion of the records of the Brandon House shelter under the business records hearsay exception of CRE 803(6). Mother argues that the Brandon House records do not qualify as business records because they contain hearsay statements of other Brandon House residents and a DDSS case worker that lack the requisite guaranty of trustworthiness. We disagree. The business records excepti…
Practitioners open The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado Through the DENVER DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, in the Interest of R.D.H. and when Colorado business records turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Brandon House shelter under the business records hearsay exception of CRE 803(6)." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Raymond Lee ORTEGA, Defendant-Appellant
…*350 that both cell phone records (admitted pursuant to the business records hearsay exception)' and a certification by the custodian of records were testimonial. The Tenth Circuit concluded that the phone records were not testimonial because they were kept in the course of the phone company’s regularly conducted business, rather than created simply for litigation. Id. at 679.…
The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Raymond Lee ORTEGA, Defendant-Appellant is worth reading on Colorado business records because the court put the point in its own words: "The Tenth Circuit concluded that the phone records were not testimonial because they were kept in the course of the phone company’s regularly conducted business, rather than created simply for litigation. Id. at 679." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Important hearsay exceptions that do not require unavailability
Three present-sense and mental-state exceptions carry most of the remaining traffic in Colorado trial practice.
Excited utterance — Colo. R. Evid. 803(2). A statement relating to a startling event or condition, made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused. Timing is elastic; composure defeats the exception even minutes after the event, while visible distress can preserve it for hours.
Present sense impression — Colo. R. Evid. 803(1). A statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while or immediately after the declarant perceived it. Contemporaneity is strict — seconds and minutes, not hours — and excitement is not required.
Then-existing mental, emotional, or physical condition — Colo. R. Evid. 803(3). Statements of then-existing state of mind (including intent and plan) come in; statements of memory or belief offered to prove the fact remembered generally do not. Intent-to-meet-another-person cases remain the hardest applications.
Declarant unavailable
When the declarant is unavailable under Colo. R. Evid. 804(a), Colorado opens a second suite of exceptions. Unavailability typically includes privilege, refusal to testify despite court order, lack of memory, death or then-existing infirmity, and absence despite reasonable efforts to procure attendance. The proponent bears the burden of proving unavailability with specific facts — a bare assertion that the witness "could not be found" is not enough.
Former testimony under Colo. R. Evid. 804(b)(1) is the workhorse once unavailability is shown: testimony given as a witness at a trial, hearing, or lawful deposition, offered against a party who had an opportunity and similar motive to develop it by direct, cross, or redirect. Criminal confrontation analysis runs in parallel and is not satisfied merely because a hearsay exception applies.
Dying declarations
Dying declarations under Colo. R. Evid. 804(b)(2) remain a narrow but decisive exception in homicide and, in many jurisdictions, civil cases involving the cause or circumstances of what the declarant believed to be impending death. The foundational showing is the declarant's belief that death was imminent — not that death in fact followed within any particular time — plus a statement concerning the cause or circumstances of what the declarant believed to be the impending death. Courts police coaching and narrative expansions aggressively.
Colorado dying-declaration opinions
The People of the State of Colorado v. Tony Dale MacKey
The People of the State of Colorado v. Tony Dale MacKey, 185 Colo. 24 (1974)
…ke the testimony of Officer Shaylor with respect to Brooks’ dying declaration, and (3) in not declaring a mistrial *28 after one of the juror’s rooms had been burglarized and the juror had conversed with a police officer during the sequestration. He also alleges that the verdict of first-degree murder in this case was not supported by the evidence; that the trial court failed t…
Colorado opinions such as The People of the State of Colorado v. Tony Dale MacKey are cited where dying declaration is disputed. The court stated: "Officer Shaylor with respect to Brooks’ dying declaration, and (3) in not declaring a mistrial *28 after one of the juror’s rooms had been burglarized and the juror had conversed with a police officer during the sequestration." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Reppin v. the People. — Hilliard, J., concurring
Reppin v. the People. — Hilliard, J., concurring, 95 Colo. 192 (1934)
…e concerned. 2. I think it was error to admit the so-called dying declaration of the deceased. Neither directly nor indirectly did the deceased indicate that he believed he would not survive. The record does not show that he referred to Ms condition. What is designated as his dying declaration is the story told by Chief of Police Harper, related in the interview he had with the…
Reppin v. the People. — Hilliard, J., concurring is worth reading on Colorado dying declaration because the court put the point in its own words: "I think it was error to admit the so-called dying declaration of the deceased. Neither directly nor indirectly did the deceased indicate that he believed he would not survive. The record does not show that he referred to Ms condition." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Zipperian v. The People
Zipperian v. The People, 33 Colo. 134 (1905)
…ons to the rule which excludes hearsay evidence pertains to dying declarations. They are admissible in evidence “where the death of the deceased is.the subject of the charge, and the circumstances of the death are the subject *137of the dying declaration.” If made when the deceased is in extremis, with a belief entertained by him that his death is imminent and there is no furth…
Practitioners open Zipperian v. The People when Colorado dying declaration turns on the distinction in this sentence: "They are admissible in evidence “where the death of the deceased is.the subject of the charge, and the circumstances of the death are the subject *137of the dying declaration." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Davis v. the People.
Davis v. the People., 77 Colo. 546 (1925)
…sel for defendant maintain that this was an offer to show a dying declaration, admissible under all the authorities. The people answer that the offered evidence was not a part of the res gestae, that it was merely Brown’s opinion, and that no proper foundation had been laid. We assume it was no part of the res gestae. Certainly it was not the mere opinion of Brown. The purpose…
Davis v. the People. is worth reading on Colorado dying declaration because the court put the point in its own words: "The people answer that the offered evidence was not a part of the res gestae, that it was merely Brown’s opinion, and that no proper foundation had been laid. We assume it was no part of the res gestae. Certainly it was not the mere opinion of Brown." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
McBride v. The People
McBride v. The People, 5 Colo. App. 91 (1894)
…f the statements of deceased, characterized and admitted as dying declarations. The law in regard to the admission of such evidence is well settled and has been for an indefinitely long period; so well settled that it is hardly necessary to cite authorities, and only to state the well established elementary principles that control it. Dying declarations are in their nature seco…
McBride v. The People is worth reading on Colorado dying declaration because the court put the point in its own words: "The law in regard to the admission of such evidence is well settled and has been for an indefinitely long period; so well settled that it is hardly necessary to cite authorities, and only to state the well established elementary principles that control it." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Polly v. the People.
Polly v. the People., 107 Colo. 6 (1940)
…ctions of defendant, on the ground that the statement was a dying declaration. The evidence concerning the conversation on July 31, although first ruled by the trial court to be inadmissible, subsequently was admitted on the theory that the scope of the cross-examination of the physician by defendant’s counsel rendered it admissible. We shall first consider the conversation of…
Colorado opinions such as Polly v. the People. are cited where dying declaration is disputed. The court stated: "The evidence concerning the conversation on July 31, although first ruled by the trial court to be inadmissible, subsequently was admitted on the theory that the scope of the cross-examination of the physician by defendant’s counsel rendered it admissible." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Barsch v. Hammond.
Barsch v. Hammond., 110 Colo. 441 (1943)
…it.” (1) This statement was admitted in evidence as a *445 dying declaration, and its admission as such is the principal ground for reversal in this case. Other matters urged are: (2) That Hammond was intoxicated. (3) That the court should have directed a verdict for defendant. (4) That the court erred in giving instruction No. 4. (5) That there was a variance between pleading…
On dying declaration, Barsch v. Hammond. speaks to the Colorado dispute in this passage: "This statement was admitted in evidence as a *445 dying declaration, and its admission as such is the principal ground for reversal in this case. Other matters urged are: (2) That Hammond was intoxicated. (3) That the court should have directed a verdict for defendant." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jesse LAGUNAS, Defendant-Appellant
…timony, finding that the statements were admissible both as dying declarations pursuant to § 13-25-119, C.R.S., and as excited utterances pursuant to CRE 803(2). A. Citing Clark v. People, 103 Colo. 371, 86 P.2d 257 (1939), the defendant argues that the evidence failed to show that all hope of recovery was abandoned by either Marquez or the medical practitioners attending him a…
The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jesse LAGUNAS, Defendant-Appellant is worth reading on Colorado dying declaration because the court put the point in its own words: "C.R.S., and as excited utterances pursuant to CRE 803(2). A. Citing Clark v. People, 103 Colo. 371, 86 P." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Medical diagnosis or treatment statements
Statements made for medical diagnosis or treatment under Colo. R. Evid. 803(4) cover medical history, past or present symptoms, and their general cause when reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. The exception is not limited to treating physicians; statements to nurses, EMTs, and consulting clinicians can qualify when the diagnostic purpose is genuine. Fault and identity remain the usual battleground: "I was hit by a car" is often pertinent; "the light was green" usually is not; abuser identity in child-abuse and domestic-violence cases is heavily litigated.
Colorado medical-statement opinions
The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner/Cross-Respondent, v. Joe VIGIL, Respondent/Cross-Petitioner
…r the hearsay exception for statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment; 4) relevant portions of the child’s videotaped interview with the police officer were admissible pursuant to section 13-25-129, C.R.S. (2005), the hearsay exception for Statements of a Child Victim of Unlawful Sexual Offense Against a Child or of Child Abuse. At the trial, the doctor te…
Practitioners open The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner/Cross-Respondent, v. Joe VIGIL, Respondent/Cross-Petitioner when Colorado medical diagnosis hearsay turns on the distinction in this sentence: "C.R.S. (2005), the hearsay exception for Statements of a Child Victim of Unlawful Sexual Offense Against a Child or of Child Abuse." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
W.C.L., Jr., Petitioner, v. the PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent, and Concerning W.L. and M.L., Parents
…victim under CRE 803(2) and (4): the excited utterance and medical diagnosis exceptions to the hearsay rule. The Court of Appeals ruled that the codified hearsay exceptions were not applicable, but admitted the statements because the evidence was sufficiently trustworthy and necessary under common law rules. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. In February 1980, W.…
W.C.L., Jr., Petitioner, v. the PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent, and Concerning W.L. and M.L., Parents is worth reading on Colorado medical diagnosis hearsay because the court put the point in its own words: "CRE 803(2) and (4): the excited utterance and medical diagnosis exceptions to the hearsay rule." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Raymond Richard OLDSEN, Petitioner, v. the PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent
…to the hearsay rule for "[s]tatements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment." *1135 The rationale behind the exception is that the trustworthiness o…
Practitioners open Raymond Richard OLDSEN, Petitioner, v. the PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent when Colorado medical diagnosis hearsay turns on the distinction in this sentence: "to the hearsay rule for '[s]tatements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent" Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Brett A. GALLOWAY, Defendant-Appellant
…tement constituted an excited utterance. C. CRE 803(4), the medical diagnosis exception to the hearsay rule, includes: “[sjtate-ments made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to…
Colorado opinions such as The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Brett A. GALLOWAY, Defendant-Appellant are cited where medical diagnosis hearsay is disputed. The court stated: "tement constituted an excited utterance. C. CRE 803(4), the medical diagnosis exception to the hearsay rule, includes: “[sjtate-ments made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the incep" That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Use of depositions at trial
Colo. R. Civ. P. 30 and 32 authorize civil depositions and trial use for any purpose allowed by the rules or Colo. R. Evid. Criminal practitioners use Colo. R. Crim. P. 16 for discovery; prior recorded testimony may be admitted under Colo. R. Evid. 804(b)(1) when unavailability is established under 804(a).
Deposition use is always a two-layer problem: procedural permission to read or play the deposition, plus a hearsay path (often former testimony, party admission, or impeachment). Counsel who satisfy the civil or criminal procedure rule but skip the evidence-rule foundation invite a sustained objection; counsel who have a hearsay exception but failed to preserve the deposition under the procedural rule face the same result. Video designations, counter-designations, and completeness objections should be teed up before the jury is seated.
Colorado deposition / former-testimony opinions
MacK Willie THOMAS, Petitioner, v. the PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent
…court of appeals, he challenged the admission of videotaped depositions of two child victims pursuant to section 18-3-413, 8B C.R.S. (1986), and contended that his due process rights were denied by the failure of the prosecution to elect a specific incident of alleged sexual assault as the basis for each of the charges against him. The court of appeals found no error in the tri…
On deposition / former testimony, MacK Willie THOMAS, Petitioner, v. the PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent speaks to the Colorado dispute in this passage: "B C.R.S. (1986), and contended that his due process rights were denied by the failure of the prosecution to elect a specific incident of alleged sexual assault as the basis for each of the charges against him." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
The FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, in its Capacity as Receiver v. Yale A. FISHER — Coats, J., dissenting
…unchanged by the second change agreement; a bank official's deposition testimony that this statement was meant to signal the only change intended in the change agreement; and evidence that the 86 percent default rate was inserted automatically by new bank software without the loan officer's knowledge. 129 The majority does not suggest that the two disputed provisions of the thi…
Colorado opinions such as The FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, in its Capacity as Receiver v. Yale A. FISHER — Coats, J., dissenting are cited where deposition / former testimony is disputed. The court stated: "unchanged by the second change agreement; a bank official's deposition testimony that this statement was meant to signal the only change intended in the change agreement; and evidence that the 86 percent default rate was inserted automatically by new bank software without the loa" That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Thomas E. MARGENAU, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Leah M. BOWLIN, Defendant-Appellant
…ived a traffic ticket in connection with the accident, that deposition testimony was improperly admitted into evidence, and that the evidence does not support the amount of damages awarded. We affirm. On the morning of February 10, 1998, as defendant was traveling around a curve on Highway 85, she lost control of her car on the ice, crossed the center line, and hit plaintiff's…
Colorado opinions such as Thomas E. MARGENAU, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Leah M. BOWLIN, Defendant-Appellant are cited where deposition / former testimony is disputed. The court stated: "ived a traffic ticket in connection with the accident, that deposition testimony was improperly admitted into evidence, and that the evidence does not support the amount of damages awarded. We affirm. On the morning of February 10, 1998, as defendant was traveling around a curve" That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Linda L. NEWBROUGH, Defendant-Appellant
…that the trial court erroneously admitted M.D.’s videotaped deposition into evidence; second, that the trial court erroneously admitted a videotaped interview of M.D. by Dr. Ruth *157 Kempe; third, that the trial court erroneously admitted hearsay statements made by M.D. to her mother and a therapist; fourth, that the trial court erroneously admitted expert testimony regarding…
Colorado opinions such as The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Linda L. NEWBROUGH, Defendant-Appellant are cited where deposition / former testimony is disputed. The court stated: "M.D.’s videotaped deposition into evidence; second, that the trial court erroneously admitted a videotaped interview of M.D. by Dr. Ruth *157 Kempe; third, that the trial court erroneously admitted hearsay statements made by M.D." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MacK Willie THOMAS, Defendant-Appellant
….S. (1986 RepLVol. 8B) and allow the admission of videotape depositions of the victims in lieu of trial testimony. Although defendant generally objected to a videotape interview of the children, the record reflects that once the trial court ordered a videotape deposition of the children to be conducted, it allowed the parties to decide the details of the procedure that they wou…
Colorado opinions such as The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MacK Willie THOMAS, Defendant-Appellant are cited where deposition / former testimony is disputed. The court stated: "S. (1986 RepLVol. 8B) and allow the admission of videotape depositions of the victims in lieu of trial testimony." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Middlesex Safe Deposit and Trust Company v. Jacobs Et Al.
Middlesex Safe Deposit and Trust Company v. Jacobs Et Al., 87 Colo. 445 (1930)
…tcy proceedings. Coram, the payee of the note, testified by deposition that his discharge in bankruptcy had paid his own note to the plaintiff bank, and in answer to a question propounded to him, *449 said: “I do not owe the plaintiff anything, as ray bankruptcy proceedings cleared me up with all creditors.” The trial court found, and so states in its opinion or findings, that…
Middlesex Safe Deposit and Trust Company v. Jacobs Et Al. is worth reading on Colorado deposition / former testimony because the court put the point in its own words: "I do not owe the plaintiff anything, as ray bankruptcy proceedings cleared me up with all creditors." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado v. Edmundo HERNANDEZ
The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado v. Edmundo HERNANDEZ, 19 Brief Times Rptr. 1 (1995)
…dez, appeals. He asserts error in the taking and use of the deposition of a prosecution witness and in the trial court’s advisement concerning his right to testify. We affirm. Two separate Crim.P. 15 motions were filed requesting the court to order the taking of the deposition of a witness. The People filed the first motion asserting that it was necessary to take the deposition…
On deposition / former testimony, The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado v. Edmundo HERNANDEZ speaks to the Colorado dispute in this passage: "He asserts error in the taking and use of the deposition of a prosecution witness and in the trial court’s advisement concerning his right to testify. We affirm. Two separate Crim.P. 15 motions were filed requesting the court to order the taking of the deposition of a witness." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Peo. Ex Rel. Faulk v. Dist. Ct. of 11th Jud.
Peo. Ex Rel. Faulk v. Dist. Ct. of 11th Jud., 667 P.2d 1384 (1983)
…ibiting the court from admitting into evidence at trial the deposition testimony of a defense witness. We issued a rule to show cause and now make the rule absolute. I. A brief review of this case is necessary in order to place the issues in proper focus. Mary Williams, the defendant in the pending trial, is charged with first degree murder after deliberation,[1] committed agai…
Peo. Ex Rel. Faulk v. Dist. Ct. of 11th Jud. is worth reading on Colorado deposition / former testimony because the court put the point in its own words: "We issued a rule to show cause and now make the rule absolute. I. A brief review of this case is necessary in order to place the issues in proper focus." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Authenticity: why it matters and how to prove it
Authenticity is not a hearsay doctrine and it is not optional. Under Colo. R. Evid. 901, 902, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is. Self-authenticating categories — certified public records, newspapers, acknowledged documents, trade inscriptions, and (where adopted) certified domestic records of a regularly conducted activity — shorten the path, but most trial exhibits still need a sponsoring witness, distinctive characteristics, chain of custody, or process-or-system evidence.
Colorado courts gate marijuana-related evidence, ski-resort incident reports, and mountain-rescue communications through Colo. R. Evid. 901. Authentication failures are a frequent basis for excluding body-camera and dash-camera clips in criminal trials.
Why authenticity gets its own section in every Colorado trial notebook:
- It is a condition precedent. An unauthenticated exhibit never reaches the relevance, hearsay, or privilege analysis in a useful way — the jury never properly considers it.
- Digital evidence multiplies the failure modes. Screenshots, social-media posts, text threads, and cloud downloads require hash values, account attribution, metadata, or a percipient witness who saw the content created or received.
- Chain of custody is authenticity by another name. Drugs, firearms, biological samples, and seized devices are excluded when the links from seizure to lab to courtroom are broken, even if a hearsay exception would otherwise apply to a lab report.
- Business-records shortcuts do not replace authentication. A custodian can explain record-keeping practices and still fail if nobody can say the particular PDF or printout is the record of this patient, this account, or this machine.
- Self-authentication is narrow. Counsel who wave a notarization or a letterhead and skip the rest of Rule 901-style analysis often lose when the document's contents are disputed.
Practical authentication checklist for Colorado trials: identify the exhibit; choose a 901 method or a 902 category; line up the sponsoring witness or certificate; preserve chain-of-custody testimony for physical and digital items; and separate the authenticity objection from any hearsay objection so the court rules on each.
Colorado authenticity opinions
v. People
…ptember 14, 2020 2020 CO 71 No. 19SC292, Gonzales v. People—Authentication—Audio Recordings— Evidence. The supreme court considers the appropriate standard for authenticating voice recordings for admission into evidence and holds that, in the absence of evidence suggesting that a proffered voice recording has been altered or fabricated, a proponent may authenticate a recording…
Practitioners open v. People when Colorado authentication turns on the distinction in this sentence: "CO 71 No. 19SC292, Gonzales v. People—Authentication—Audio Recordings— Evidence." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
People v. Rivera
People v. Rivera, 37 Colo. App. 4 (1975)
…perly admitted into evidence in that they were not properly authenticated pursuant to C.R.C.P. 44(a)(1). These exhibits were the only documentary evidence of his prior conviction and confinement. The defects complained of are that Exhibit 1, a copy of the mittimus which followed the larceny sentence, was not accompanied by the required certificate, and that although Exhibit 2,…
Practitioners open People v. Rivera when Colorado authentication turns on the distinction in this sentence: "C.R.C.P. 44(a)(1). These exhibits were the only documentary evidence of his prior conviction and confinement." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
v. N.T.B
…No. 18CA1613, People v. N.T.B. — Evidence — Admissibility — Authentication — Hearsay — Machine-generated Records — Hearsay Exceptions — Records of Regularly Conducted Activity A division of the court of appeals addresses the admissibility of evidence from a cloud storage account. First, the division holds that an investigating detective could provide sufficient background to au…
Colorado opinions such as v. N.T.B are cited where authentication is disputed. The court stated: "No. 18CA1613, People v. N.T.B. — Evidence — Admissibility — Authentication — Hearsay — Machine-generated Records — Hearsay Exceptions — Records of Regularly Conducted Activity A division of the court of appeals addresses the admissibility of evidence from a cloud storage account." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Brown v. the People
Brown v. the People, 124 Colo. 412 (1951)
…he time of trial and now, being that they were not properly authenticated. Section 2 of the 1945 act (Chapter 114, ’45 S. L., pages 310, 311) provides: “Section 2. On any trial under the provisions of this act, a duly authenticated copy of the record of former convictions and judgments of any court of record for any of said crimes against the party indicted or informed against…
Brown v. the People is worth reading on Colorado authentication because the court put the point in its own words: "Section 2 of the 1945 act (Chapter 114, ’45 S. L., pages 310, 311) provides: “Section 2." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Crist Silva, Also Known as Chris Silva and Crist Donald Silva v. the People of the State of Colorado
…iminal phase of this case. Exhibit M purported to be a duly authenticated copy of a prior felony conviction suffered by Silva in Chaffee County in 1960. The exhibit was an “authenticated” copy of the prior conviction, as opposed to a mere “certified” copy, as is required by C.R.S. 1963, 39-13-2. See also in this regard, Coppinger v. People, 152 Colo. 9, 380 P.2d 19 and Brown v.…
Colorado opinions such as Crist Silva, Also Known as Chris Silva and Crist Donald Silva v. the People of the State of Colorado are cited where authentication is disputed. The court stated: "Exhibit M purported to be a duly authenticated copy of a prior felony conviction suffered by Silva in Chaffee County in 1960. The exhibit was an “authenticated” copy of the prior conviction, as opposed to a mere “certified” copy, as is required by C.R.S. 1963, 39-13-2." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Daniel HUEHN, Defendant-Appellant
…rtain computer-generated records that were not sufficiently authenticated. We disagree. The exhibits at issue are computer records reflecting customer transactions and techni-clan servicing at the ATM on December 23 and 24, 1998. Four of the exhibits were records generated for Key Bank by Money Access Services (MAC), with whom Key Bank had contracted to process its ATM transact…
On authentication, The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Daniel HUEHN, Defendant-Appellant speaks to the Colorado dispute in this passage: "We disagree. The exhibits at issue are computer records reflecting customer transactions and techni-clan servicing at the ATM on December 23 and 24, 1998." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
v. Gonzales
v. Gonzales, 2019 COA 30 (2019)
…o. 16CA0750, People v. Gonzales — Evidence — Requirement of Authentication or Identification — Audio Recordings In a case involving the submission of a voicemail as evidence, the division addresses the standards for authenticating an audio recording under CRE 901 and declines to follow People v. Baca, 2015 COA 153, to the extent that it purports to establish an exclusive rule f…
v. Gonzales is worth reading on Colorado authentication because the court put the point in its own words: "Gonzales — Evidence — Requirement of Authentication or Identification — Audio Recordings In a case involving the submission of a voicemail as evidence, the division addresses the standards for authenticating an audio recording under CRE 901 and declines to follow People v." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jimmy J. VASQUEZ, Defendant-Appellant
…ulveda, 65 P.3d 1002, 1006 (Colo.2003). "The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims." CRE 901(a). Physical evidence may be authenticated and identified by testimony that a matter is what it is claimed to be. CRE 901…
Colorado opinions such as The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jimmy J. VASQUEZ, Defendant-Appellant are cited where authentication is disputed. The court stated: "P.3d 1002, 1006 (Colo.2003). 'The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.' CRE 901(a)." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Practice checklist
- State the relevance theory in one sentence before naming an exception.
- Run the 403 / unfair-prejudice balance explicitly for other-acts and graphic exhibits.
- For character or other-acts evidence, identify the non-propensity purpose and request a limiting instruction on the record.
- Decide whether an out-of-court statement is hearsay for the purpose offered before hunting exceptions.
- Lay business-records foundations with time, knowledge, regular practice, and custodial qualifications — or a qualifying certification.
- Prove unavailability with specific facts before offering former testimony or dying declarations.
- Treat deposition use as procedure-plus-hearsay; designate and counter-designate early.
- Authenticate every exhibit under Colo. R. Evid. 901, 902 (or the self-authentication path) before arguing hearsay.
- Preserve chain of custody for physical and digital evidence with named custodians.
- Search LawDiver for recent Colorado appellate evidence opinions before mediation or motions in limine.
Contents
- General standards of admissibility
- Character evidence
- Hearsay: start with the definition
- Party admissions
- Business records
- Important hearsay exceptions that do not require unavailability
- Declarant unavailable
- Dying declarations
- Medical diagnosis or treatment statements
- Use of depositions at trial
- Authenticity: why it matters and how to prove it
- Practice checklist
- Frequently asked questions
General standards of admissibility
Colorado starts every evidence dispute with relevance and unfair prejudice. Under Colo. R. Evid. 401, 403, evidence is relevant when it has any tendency to make a fact of consequence more or less probable, and relevant evidence is still excluded when its probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. Preliminary questions of admissibility are for the court; conditional relevance and limited-purpose instructions keep otherwise-usable proof from becoming a Trojan horse for propensity or truth-of-the-matter use.
Colorado has state-specific rules on character in sexual-offense cases (Rule 412) and specialized provisions for child-victim statements. C.R.S. supplements the rules for certain statutory privileges.
Practice tip: articulate the theory of relevance in one sentence before citing the exception. Lawyers who lead with "it's a business record" without explaining what fact the record proves often lose the 403 balance even when the hearsay foundation is clean.
Frequently asked questions
What is the primary evidence source in Colorado?
Colorado applies the Colorado Rules of Evidence. Colorado's rules closely follow the FRE; Colo. R. Evid. 401–902 are applied in state district and county courts with frequent reference to federal precedent.
How do Colorado courts decide relevance and unfair prejudice?
Under Colo. R. Evid. 401, 403, evidence must make a fact of consequence more or less probable, and the court may exclude relevant evidence when unfair prejudice, confusion, or waste of time substantially outweighs its probative value.
Are party admissions hearsay in Colorado?
Party-opponent statements under Colo. R. Evid. 801(d)(2) are generally excluded from the hearsay ban (or treated as an exception, depending on local drafting). They may be offered against the party who made or adopted them without showing unavailability.
What foundation is required for business records?
Under Colo. R. Evid. 803(6), show a record made at or near the time from someone with knowledge, kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity, as a regular practice, through a custodian, qualified witness, or allowed certification — subject to trustworthiness attack.
When can I use a deposition at trial in Colorado?
Colo. R. Civ. P. 30 and 32 authorize civil depositions and trial use for any purpose allowed by the rules or Colo. R. Evid. Criminal practitioners use Colo. R. Crim. P. 16 for discovery; prior recorded testimony may be admitted under Colo. R. Evid. 804(b)(1) when unavailability is established under 804(a).
Why is authenticity separate from hearsay?
Authenticity asks whether the item is what you claim it is; hearsay asks whether out-of-court assertions inside it may be used for their truth. You can lose on either ground independently. Colorado authenticity practice starts with Colo. R. Evid. 901, 902.
Where do dying declarations and medical statements fit?
Dying declarations under Colo. R. Evid. 804(b)(2) require belief in impending death and concern the cause or circumstances of that believed death. Medical statements under Colo. R. Evid. 803(4) require a genuine diagnostic or treatment purpose and reasonable pertinence to care.