Start with Arkansas Rules of Evidence. In Arkansas, Arkansas evidence practice is organized under the Arkansas Rules of Evidence. Relevance starts at Ark. R. Evid. 401, 403; hearsay starts at Ark. R. Evid. 801, 802. That is the question this guide answers for evidence law. Authenticity is a separate fight under Ark. R. Evid. 901, 902. Depositions at trial: Ark. R. Civ. P. 32 governs use of depositions in civil trials for any purpose permitted by the rules or by Ark. R. Evid. In criminal practice, Ark. R. Crim. P. 16 governs discovery; deposition testimony at trial generally requires a hearsay exception such as Ark. R. Evid. 804(b)(1).
General standards of admissibility
Arkansas starts every evidence dispute with relevance and unfair prejudice. Under Ark. R. Evid. 401, 403, evidence is relevant when it has any tendency to make a fact of consequence more or less probable, and relevant evidence is still excluded when its probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. Preliminary questions of admissibility are for the court; conditional relevance and limited-purpose instructions keep otherwise-usable proof from becoming a Trojan horse for propensity or truth-of-the-matter use.
Arkansas retains Rule 616 on religious beliefs or opinions and has state-specific rape-shield provisions in Rule 412. Verify the Arkansas Supreme Court's online rule pamphlet for amendments.
Practice tip: articulate the theory of relevance in one sentence before citing the exception. Lawyers who lead with "it's a business record" without explaining what fact the record proves often lose the 403 balance even when the hearsay foundation is clean.
Character evidence
Character evidence in Arkansas is governed by Ark. R. Evid. 404, 405. The default rule is familiar: evidence of a person's character or character trait is not admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character or trait. The same body of law then carves out the classic exceptions — essential-element character, accused-opens-the-door reputation or opinion, and other-acts evidence offered for a non-propensity purpose such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake.
Other-acts notice, 403 balancing, and limiting instructions do most of the real work. In criminal cases, prosecutors who dump prior misconduct without a specific non-propensity theory invite reversal; defense counsel who open the door to good-character testimony without anticipating rebuttal create the very propensity inference the rules were designed to police.
Arkansas character-evidence opinions
Tommy Joe CRAWFORD v. STATE of Arkansas
Tommy Joe CRAWFORD v. STATE of Arkansas, 362 Ark. 301 (2005)
…red; (4) Victim impact evidence or statements; (5) Relevant character evidence; (6) Evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The criteria for departure from the sentencing standards may serve as examples of this type of evidence; (7) Evidence relevant to guilt presented in the first stage; (8) Evidence held inadmissible in the first stage may be resubmitted for con…
On character evidence, Tommy Joe CRAWFORD v. STATE of Arkansas speaks to the Arkansas dispute in this passage: "Victim impact evidence or statements; (5) Relevant character evidence; (6) Evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Orville LINDSEY v. STATE of Arkansas — Newbern, J., dissenting
Orville LINDSEY v. STATE of Arkansas — Newbern, J., dissenting, 319 Ark. 132 (1994)
…t committed crime ‘A.” Mr. Lindsey did not open the door to character evidence. Here is how the testimony in question appears in the record: BY MR. IRWIN [Defense Counsel]: Q. Mr. Tallent [County SCAN Director], did you discover that a court in this state had placed these children with Mr. Orville Lindsey? A. Excuse me? Q. Did you discover that a court in the State of Arkansas…
Practitioners open Orville LINDSEY v. STATE of Arkansas — Newbern, J., dissenting when Arkansas character evidence turns on the distinction in this sentence: "A.” Mr. Lindsey did not open the door to character evidence. Here is how the testimony in question appears in the record: BY MR. IRWIN [Defense Counsel]: Q. Mr. Tallent [County SCAN Director], did you discover that a court in this state had placed these children with Mr." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Richard CLARK v. STATE of Arkansas
Richard CLARK v. STATE of Arkansas, 323 Ark. 211 (1996)
…pursuant to Ark. R. Evid. 404(b) and 403, respectively, as character evidence that had no relevance except to show appellant’s propensity to commit the crime charged, and that was unfairly prejudicial. This argument is meritless. In Greenlee v. State, 318 Ark. 191, 197, 884 S.W.2d 947, 950 (1994), we reversed Greenlee’s conviction for the rape of a five-year-old girl on other…
On character evidence, Richard CLARK v. STATE of Arkansas speaks to the Arkansas dispute in this passage: "Ark. R. Evid. 404(b) and 403, respectively, as character evidence that had no relevance except to show appellant’s propensity to commit the crime charged, and that was unfairly prejudicial. This argument is meritless. In Greenlee v. State, 318 Ark. 191, 197, 884 S.W." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
J.D. STEWART v. STATE of Arkansas
J.D. STEWART v. STATE of Arkansas, 316 Ark. 153 (1994)
…character is admissible. The State, however, is limited in character evidence about the victim under 404(a)(2) to rebutting what the defense has presented. In cases where the character of the victim is an essential element of the defense, Ark. R. Evid. 405(b) permits inquiry into specific instances of the victim’s conduct. The trial court concluded that it did not believe that…
Practitioners open J.D. STEWART v. STATE of Arkansas when Arkansas character evidence turns on the distinction in this sentence: "The State, however, is limited in character evidence about the victim under 404(a)(2) to rebutting what the defense has presented. In cases where the character of the victim is an essential element of the defense, Ark. R. Evid." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Cartrell Lewan McCOY v. STATE of Arkansas — Hannah, J., concurring
Cartrell Lewan McCOY v. STATE of Arkansas — Hannah, J., concurring, 354 Ark. 322 (2003)
…validity and future viability of the longstanding rule that character evidence is not admissible to prove conduct in conformity with that character. If the rule has not yet been swallowed up by its exceptions, then the rule has so far descended into the gaping maw of the exceptions that the rule is all but lost. The application of the rule in both our trial and appellate courts…
Practitioners open Cartrell Lewan McCOY v. STATE of Arkansas — Hannah, J., concurring when Arkansas character evidence turns on the distinction in this sentence: "If the rule has not yet been swallowed up by its exceptions, then the rule has so far descended into the gaping maw of the exceptions that the rule is all but lost." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Donald Vern SAUL v. STATE of Arkansas — Hannah, J., concurring
Donald Vern SAUL v. STATE of Arkansas — Hannah, J., concurring, 365 Ark. 77 (2006)
…e evidence. This is a hard case because even aside from the character evidence at issue in this appeal, the evidence of guilt is so clear. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes set out well the difficulty we face in a case such as the present appeal. In his dissent in Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400-01 (1904), Justice Holmes stated: Great cases, like hard ca…
Donald Vern SAUL v. STATE of Arkansas — Hannah, J., concurring is worth reading on Arkansas character evidence because the court put the point in its own words: "This is a hard case because even aside from the character evidence at issue in this appeal, the evidence of guilt is so clear. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes set out well the difficulty we face in a case such as the present appeal. In his dissent in Northern Securities Co. v." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
How the Arkansas rule applies
Apply the Arkansas authorities in order. The facts are simplified so the statute and the standard are visible.
A lawyer in Arkansas wants to offer a medical record, a party email, and a statement the declarant made while believing death was imminent.
- Clear relevance and unfair prejudice under Ark. R. Evid. 401, 403.
- If the email is the opposing party's, test Ark. R. Evid. 801(d)(2) before the hearsay definition in Ark. R. Evid. 801, 802.
- For the medical record, lay the business-records foundation in Ark. R. Evid. 803(6) and the treatment purpose in Ark. R. Evid. 803(4).
- For the deathbed statement, meet Ark. R. Evid. 804(b)(2), then authenticate every exhibit under Ark. R. Evid. 901, 902.
Arkansas keeps hearsay, character, and authenticity on different rules inside the Arkansas Rules of Evidence. Winning one does not win the others.
Hearsay: start with the definition
Most hearsay objections in Arkansas are won or lost on the definition, not on an exception. Under Ark. R. Evid. 801, 802, hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Non-hearsay purposes — verbal acts, effect on the listener, notice, circumstantial evidence of state of mind, and impeachment — remain available when the proponent can articulate them without asking the jury to believe the declarant.
Layered hearsay (hearsay within hearsay) requires an exception or exclusion for each layer. Machine-generated data and non-assertive conduct sit outside the hearsay definition in FRE-aligned jurisdictions, but they still need authenticity and, often, expert or business-records foundations.
Arkansas hearsay opinions
Abraham GRANT v. STATE of Arkansas
Abraham GRANT v. STATE of Arkansas, 357 Ark. 91 (2004)
…setta Pittman, under the dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule. Because this appeal involves a case in which life imprisonment has been imposed, jurisdiction is proper pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. l-2(a)(2). We find no error and affirm. Facts On June 20, 2001, appellant Abraham Grant entered an apartment in Helena, Arkansas, that belonged to his mother-in-law, Ms. Ros…
Practitioners open Abraham GRANT v. STATE of Arkansas when Arkansas hearsay turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Pittman, under the dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule. Because this appeal involves a case in which life imprisonment has been imposed, jurisdiction is proper pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. l-2(a)(2). We find no error and affirm." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Denaro Shatour COOK v. STATE of Arkansas
Denaro Shatour COOK v. STATE of Arkansas, 350 Ark. 398 (2002)
…Finally, he argues that the trial court erred in admitting hearsay testimony of Tim Dillard, who testified to what Appellant said to his brother before the robbery and murder. We affirm. This case was appealed to the court of appeals, affirmed, and we granted the petition for review. When we grant a petition for review pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 2-4, we treat the appeal as i…
Practitioners open Denaro Shatour COOK v. STATE of Arkansas when Arkansas hearsay turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Finally, he argues that the trial court erred in admitting hearsay testimony of Tim Dillard, who testified to what Appellant said to his brother before the robbery and murder. We affirm." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Charles Wesley COGBURN v. STATE of Arkansas — Purtle, J., concurring
Charles Wesley COGBURN v. STATE of Arkansas — Purtle, J., concurring, 292 Ark. 564 (1987)
…of Arizona held that state’s statutory exception for child hearsay to be unconstitutional as infringing upon the Court’s authority to make procedural rules for the judiciary. Even if Rule 803(25) is considered constitutional, it was not the intent of the General Assembly to allow anything and everything an alleged child victim said to be introduced at the trial. Certainly, it…
Arkansas opinions such as Charles Wesley COGBURN v. STATE of Arkansas — Purtle, J., concurring are cited where hearsay is disputed. The court stated: "Arizona held that state’s statutory exception for child hearsay to be unconstitutional as infringing upon the Court’s authority to make procedural rules for the judiciary." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Arthur L. GEORGE v. STATE of Arkansas — Dudley, J., dissenting
Arthur L. GEORGE v. STATE of Arkansas — Dudley, J., dissenting, 306 Ark. 360 (1991)
…rule that the social worker assigned to the case could give hearsay testiony under A.R.E. Rule 803(25). At trial, the court ruled that the child was competent to testify; later reversed its ruling and ordered the child’s testimony stricken. However, the court allowed the prosecutor to put the social worker’s testimony in evidence as “not going to the truth of the matter asserte…
Arkansas opinions such as Arthur L. GEORGE v. STATE of Arkansas — Dudley, J., dissenting are cited where hearsay is disputed. The court stated: "A.R.E. Rule 803(25). At trial, the court ruled that the child was competent to testify; later reversed its ruling and ordered the child’s testimony stricken." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Steve VANN v. STATE of Arkansas
Steve VANN v. STATE of Arkansas, 309 Ark. 303 (1992)
…d in evidence at the trial on the merits. At the trial, the hearsay statements were admitted, and the appellant was convicted of rape and sentenced to forty years in prison. We reverse and remand for a new trial. In the majority opinion of George v. State, 306 Ark. 360, 813 S.W.2d 792 (1991), we held, “Rule 803 (25) is constitutionally defective on its face, and we so hold.” Ho…
Practitioners open Steve VANN v. STATE of Arkansas when Arkansas hearsay turns on the distinction in this sentence: "At the trial, the hearsay statements were admitted, and the appellant was convicted of rape and sentenced to forty years in prison. We reverse and remand for a new trial. In the majority opinion of George v. State, 306 Ark. 360, 813 S.W." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Ronald WARD v. STATE of Arkansas
Ronald WARD v. STATE of Arkansas, 298 Ark. 448 (1989)
…a statement. Appellant sought to introduce Smith's alleged hearsay statement through Golden by A.R.E. § 803(24), the residual exception. The rule provides that a statement should not be excluded as hearsay, even though the declarant is available, when the statement is trustworthy and reliable. A good example of the rule in use is where a postmark, which is reliable hearsay, is…
Arkansas opinions such as Ronald WARD v. STATE of Arkansas are cited where hearsay is disputed. The court stated: "Appellant sought to introduce Smith's alleged hearsay statement through Golden by A.R.E. § 803(24), the residual exception. The rule provides that a statement should not be excluded as hearsay, even though the declarant is available, when the statement is trustworthy and reliable." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Party admissions
Statements of an opposing party are among the most important routes around the hearsay bar. Arkansas treats them under Ark. R. Evid. 801(d)(2). Nothing about the statement need be against interest, contemporaneous, or based on personal knowledge — the theory is adversarial, not reliability-based. A party cannot complain that his own words are unreliable when offered against him.
Scope questions dominate practice: the party's own statement; adopted statements (including silence in circumstances where a reasonable person would deny); statements by authorized speakers; agent or employee statements on matters within the scope of the relationship; and, in criminal conspiracy cases, coconspirator statements during and in furtherance of the conspiracy. A defendant generally cannot introduce his own exculpatory out-of-court statement as a "party admission" against himself — the rule runs one way.
Arkansas party-admission opinions
Jon H. DODSON, M.D. v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY
Jon H. DODSON, M.D. v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, 345 Ark. 430 (2001)
…the case, the parties filed various requests for discovery, admissions, and production of documents. The parties exchanged motions to compel, motions to deem admissions admitted, and motions to strike discovery answers. Due to the constant bickering among the parties, the trial court entered an order on December 14, 1998, noting that the parties agreed at a hearing to resolve d…
Arkansas opinions such as Jon H. DODSON, M.D. v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY are cited where party admissions is disputed. The court stated: "The parties exchanged motions to compel, motions to deem admissions admitted, and motions to strike discovery answers." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Denaro Shatour COOK v. STATE of Arkansas
Denaro Shatour COOK v. STATE of Arkansas, 350 Ark. 398 (2002)
…801(d) (2) (v), which permits introduction into evidence of admissions, and in particular, a statement by a coconspirator of a party made during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. The trial court erred. What was at issue was a statement of a party. Ark. R. Evid. 801 (d) (2) (v) admits statements of coconspirators of a party. Appellant is the party. Buck is the coc…
On party admissions, Denaro Shatour COOK v. STATE of Arkansas speaks to the Arkansas dispute in this passage: "The trial court erred. What was at issue was a statement of a party. Ark. R. Evid. 801 (d) (2) (v) admits statements of coconspirators of a party. Appellant is the party." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Fikes v. Johnson
Fikes v. Johnson, 220 Ark. 448 (1952)
…nt in this case does not contain anything like the outright admission of fault that was present in the Bishop case. Nowhere in the statement did Johnson say that he ever crossed the center line, or that the trailer was on its side of the road, or that its clearance lights were burning. In view of these many differences the Bishop opinion is not controlling. After investigating…
Fikes v. Johnson is worth reading on Arkansas party admissions because the court put the point in its own words: "Bishop case. Nowhere in the statement did Johnson say that he ever crossed the center line, or that the trailer was on its side of the road, or that its clearance lights were burning. In view of these many differences the Bishop opinion is not controlling." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Joel Raymond RODRIGUEZ, Appellant v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee
Joel Raymond RODRIGUEZ, Appellant v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee, 2014 Ark. App. LEXIS 980 (2014)
…e appropriate basis for allowing the text message was as an admission by a party opponent pursuant to Rule 801(d)(2) of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence, rather than to refresh Hannah’s memory. See Neal v. State, 375 Ark. 389, 291 S.W.3d 160 (2009) (affirming where trial court reached the correct result, even if for a different reason). Rule 801(d)(2) provides: (d) Statements Whi…
Practitioners open Joel Raymond RODRIGUEZ, Appellant v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee when Arkansas party admissions turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Rule 801(d)(2) of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence, rather than to refresh Hannah’s memory. See Neal v. State, 375 Ark. 389, 291 S.W.3d 160 (2009) (affirming where trial court reached the correct result, even if for a different reason)." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
SILVICRAFT, INC. v. SOUTHEAST TIMBER CO., Inc., First State Bank of Gould, Ar., Kenneth Berzent Blagg, and Mable Sue
…. Appellant points to Ark. R. Evid. 802(d)(2) and says that admissions by a party opponent are not hearsay but that the statement must first be made by a party-opponent and then be offered against the party, not on his behalf. Although appellant is correct in theory, we do not see any real way to single out the hearsay statements that were objected to that are not part of — or…
Practitioners open SILVICRAFT, INC. v. SOUTHEAST TIMBER CO., Inc., First State Bank of Gould, Ar., Kenneth Berzent Blagg, and Mable Sue when Arkansas party admissions turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Appellant points to Ark. R. Evid. 802(d)(2) and says that admissions by a party opponent are not hearsay but that the statement must first be made by a party-opponent and then be offered against the party, not on his behalf." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Sybil L. SHERMAN, Administratrix of the Estate of Uriel Lambert Bearden, Jr. v. MOUNTAIRE POULTRY COMPANY, INC. Et
…have consistently held that statements in the nature of an admission by a party are admissible as original evidence. Bullington v. Farmers’ Tractor & Implement Co., Inc., 230 Ark. 783, 324 S. W. 2d 517 (1959). The authorities have extended this to admissions or declarations against interest made by a person who is not a party of record but who is a real party in interest, such…
Arkansas opinions such as Sybil L. SHERMAN, Administratrix of the Estate of Uriel Lambert Bearden, Jr. v. MOUNTAIRE POULTRY COMPANY, INC. Et are cited where party admissions is disputed. The court stated: "Bullington v. Farmers’ Tractor & Implement Co., Inc., 230 Ark. 783, 324 S. W. 2d 517 (1959)." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Business records
The business-records exception under Ark. R. Evid. 803(6) is the everyday path for medical charts, employment files, bank statements, and maintenance logs. The foundation requires a record made at or near the time by — or from information transmitted by — someone with knowledge; kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity; and made as a regular practice. A custodian or other qualified witness (or a qualifying certification where the jurisdiction allows it) lays the foundation. The opponent may still attack lack of trustworthiness when the source or method of preparation indicates unreliability — litigation-driven reports are the classic failure mode.
Do not confuse authenticity with the business-records exception. You still need to show the exhibit is what you claim it is; the hearsay exception then answers why the out-of-court assertions inside it may be considered for their truth.
Arkansas business-records opinions
Anthony Ray TERRY v. STATE of Arkansas
Anthony Ray TERRY v. STATE of Arkansas, 309 Ark. 64 (1992)
…to admit the hospital records under A.R.E. Rule 803(6), the business records exception to the hearsay rule. Second, he claims he was not given an opportunity to explain or deny the hospital records as extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement as required by A.R.E. Rule 613(b). Third, appellant claims the admission of the hospital records was more prejudicial than pro…
Anthony Ray TERRY v. STATE of Arkansas is worth reading on Arkansas business records because the court put the point in its own words: "A.R.E. Rule 803(6), the business records exception to the hearsay rule. Second, he claims he was not given an opportunity to explain or deny the hospital records as extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement as required by A.R.E. Rule 613(b)." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Carl WILBURN v. STATE of Arkansas
Carl WILBURN v. STATE of Arkansas, 317 Ark. 73 (1994)
…rds, and finding that the records were admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule. On appeal, appellant argues Gilpin “had no knowledge as to the status of the records from the time she left the . . . motel.” The records are hearsay because they are written assertions made out of court, which were offered in evidence to prove the date and the amount of…
On business records, Carl WILBURN v. STATE of Arkansas speaks to the Arkansas dispute in this passage: "On appeal, appellant argues Gilpin “had no knowledge as to the status of the records from the time she left the . . . motel." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Byron HOOPER v. STATE of Arkansas
Byron HOOPER v. STATE of Arkansas, 311 Ark. 154 (1992)
…ransactions occuring between Dallas and El Dorado under the business record exception (A.R.E. Rule 803(6)) to the hearsay rule. We affirm. First, we summarily dismiss the appellant’s argument that the trial court erred in admitting the telephone records because the appellant failed to make a specific objection to preserve his argument on appeal. Below, the appellant objected to…
Byron HOOPER v. STATE of Arkansas is worth reading on Arkansas business records because the court put the point in its own words: "Dallas and El Dorado under the business record exception (A.R.E. Rule 803(6)) to the hearsay rule. We affirm." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Richard Lee MITCHAEL v. STATE of Arkansas
Richard Lee MITCHAEL v. STATE of Arkansas, 309 Ark. 151 (1992)
…fense, (2) admitting his work records as evidence under the business records exception to the hearsay rule absent testimony from the custodian or other qualified witness, and (3) refusing to grant his motion for new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel. We hold (1) the reference to the prior warrant was not sufficient to cause a mistrial, (2) a qualified witness tes…
Richard Lee MITCHAEL v. STATE of Arkansas is worth reading on Arkansas business records because the court put the point in its own words: "fense, (2) admitting his work records as evidence under the business records exception to the hearsay rule absent testimony from the custodian or other qualified witness, and (3) refusing to grant his motion for new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel. We hold (1) th" Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
WILDWOOD CONTRACTORS v. THOMPSON-HOLLOWAY REAL ESTATE AGENCY
WILDWOOD CONTRACTORS v. THOMPSON-HOLLOWAY REAL ESTATE AGENCY, 17 Ark. App. 169 (1986)
…rial court erred in admitting the results of the audit as a business record within the hearsay exception provided in Unif. R. Evid. 803(6). The rule provides that records of a regularly conducted business activity are not excluded by the hearsay rule from evidence “unless the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness.”…
On business records, WILDWOOD CONTRACTORS v. THOMPSON-HOLLOWAY REAL ESTATE AGENCY speaks to the Arkansas dispute in this passage: "Unif. R. Evid. 803(6). The rule provides that records of a regularly conducted business activity are not excluded by the hearsay rule from evidence “unless the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Kimberly Dione PACE v. STATE of Arkansas
Kimberly Dione PACE v. STATE of Arkansas, 2010 Ark. App. 491 (2010)
…dvanced by the State requires proof by the proponent of the business record that the facts set forth in the record were provided. by someone with personal knowledge of the facts themselves, not the mere personal knowledge of how a retail merchant keeps track of retail prices of stolen merchandise recovered from shoplifters. She urges that Mr. Carter had, at most, personal knowl…
On business records, Kimberly Dione PACE v. STATE of Arkansas speaks to the Arkansas dispute in this passage: "State requires proof by the proponent of the business record that the facts set forth in the record were provided." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
COLUMBIA MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. Larry PATTERSON and Roger Perry
COLUMBIA MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. Larry PATTERSON and Roger Perry, 320 Ark. 584 (1995)
…nt failed to comply with A.R.E. Rule 803(6), the so-called “business record hearsay exception.” Rule 803(6) provides as follows: Rule 803. Hearsay exceptions — Availability of declarant immaterial. — The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness: (6) Records of regularly conducted business activity. A memorandum, report,…
Practitioners open COLUMBIA MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. Larry PATTERSON and Roger Perry when Arkansas business records turns on the distinction in this sentence: "A.R.E. Rule 803(6), the so-called “business record hearsay exception.” Rule 803(6) provides as follows: Rule 803. Hearsay exceptions — Availability of declarant immaterial." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Carter A. WORLEY Jr. a/k/a Jack WORLEY v. STATE of Arkansas — Byrd, J., dissenting
…o counter this proof Worley sought to introduce, under the “Business Records as Evidence Act,” Ark. Stat. Ann. § 28-928 (Repl. 1962), other prior business transactions that had been prepared by his office manager, James Morrow, to show that the mis-location of the “1” was due to Morrow’s typing and not to a subsequent alteration. Among the records proffered was a draft to Gosne…
Arkansas opinions such as Carter A. WORLEY Jr. a/k/a Jack WORLEY v. STATE of Arkansas — Byrd, J., dissenting are cited where business records is disputed. The court stated: "Worley sought to introduce, under the “Business Records as Evidence Act,” Ark. Stat. Ann. § 28-928 (Repl." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Important hearsay exceptions that do not require unavailability
Three present-sense and mental-state exceptions carry most of the remaining traffic in Arkansas trial practice.
Excited utterance — Ark. R. Evid. 803(2). A statement relating to a startling event or condition, made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused. Timing is elastic; composure defeats the exception even minutes after the event, while visible distress can preserve it for hours.
Present sense impression — Ark. R. Evid. 803(1). A statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while or immediately after the declarant perceived it. Contemporaneity is strict — seconds and minutes, not hours — and excitement is not required.
Then-existing mental, emotional, or physical condition — Ark. R. Evid. 803(3). Statements of then-existing state of mind (including intent and plan) come in; statements of memory or belief offered to prove the fact remembered generally do not. Intent-to-meet-another-person cases remain the hardest applications.
Declarant unavailable
When the declarant is unavailable under Ark. R. Evid. 804(a), Arkansas opens a second suite of exceptions. Unavailability typically includes privilege, refusal to testify despite court order, lack of memory, death or then-existing infirmity, and absence despite reasonable efforts to procure attendance. The proponent bears the burden of proving unavailability with specific facts — a bare assertion that the witness "could not be found" is not enough.
Former testimony under Ark. R. Evid. 804(b)(1) is the workhorse once unavailability is shown: testimony given as a witness at a trial, hearing, or lawful deposition, offered against a party who had an opportunity and similar motive to develop it by direct, cross, or redirect. Criminal confrontation analysis runs in parallel and is not satisfied merely because a hearsay exception applies.
Dying declarations
Dying declarations under Ark. R. Evid. 804(b)(2) remain a narrow but decisive exception in homicide and, in many jurisdictions, civil cases involving the cause or circumstances of what the declarant believed to be impending death. The foundational showing is the declarant's belief that death was imminent — not that death in fact followed within any particular time — plus a statement concerning the cause or circumstances of what the declarant believed to be the impending death. Courts police coaching and narrative expansions aggressively.
Arkansas dying-declaration opinions
Abraham GRANT v. STATE of Arkansas
Abraham GRANT v. STATE of Arkansas, 357 Ark. 91 (2004)
…atements made by the victim, Ms. Rosetta Pittman, under the dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule. Because this appeal involves a case in which life imprisonment has been imposed, jurisdiction is proper pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. l-2(a)(2). We find no error and affirm. Facts On June 20, 2001, appellant Abraham Grant entered an apartment in Helena, Arkansas, that bel…
Practitioners open Abraham GRANT v. STATE of Arkansas when Arkansas dying declaration turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Ms. Rosetta Pittman, under the dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule. Because this appeal involves a case in which life imprisonment has been imposed, jurisdiction is proper pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. l-2(a)(2). We find no error and affirm." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Vina Mae THOMPSON v. STATE of Arkansas
Vina Mae THOMPSON v. STATE of Arkansas, 306 Ark. 193 (1991)
…r he was shot. The trial court admitted into evidence, as a dying declaration hearsay exception, Barker’s statement, “Vana Thompson shot me,” but refused to admit into evidence under the same exception, Barker’s statement “Don’t do anything to harm Vina.” 1 In order to qualify as a dying declaration under A.R.E. Rule 804, the statement must be made by a declarant while believin…
Practitioners open Vina Mae THOMPSON v. STATE of Arkansas when Arkansas dying declaration turns on the distinction in this sentence: "The trial court admitted into evidence, as a dying declaration hearsay exception, Barker’s statement, “Vana Thompson shot me,” but refused to admit into evidence under the same exception, Barker’s statement “Don’t do anything to harm Vina." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Company v. Enlow
St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Company v. Enlow, 115 Ark. 584 (1914)
…jections of the defendant, testimony tending to establish a dying declaration of the deceased to the effect that he was walking along by the side of the track when the train struck him. The ruling of the court in admitting this testimony is assigned as error, and it is quite clear to us that this assignment must be sustained and the judgment reversed. The declaration wias not ■…
On dying declaration, St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Company v. Enlow speaks to the Arkansas dispute in this passage: "The ruling of the court in admitting this testimony is assigned as error, and it is quite clear to us that this assignment must be sustained and the judgment reversed." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Alford v. State
Alford v. State, 161 Ark. 256 (1923)
…tements made by the deceased and offered in evidence as his dying declaration, you must believe, beyond a reasonable doubt, that such statements were -made under the belief by the deceased of impending dissolution; and that such statements are to be weighed under the same rules as the statements of other witnesses, and the evidence of the deceased «o given may be contradicted o…
Alford v. State is worth reading on Arkansas dying declaration because the court put the point in its own words: "tements made by the deceased and offered in evidence as his dying declaration, you must believe, beyond a reasonable doubt, that such statements were -made under the belief by the deceased of impending dissolution; and that such statements are to be weighed under the same rules a" Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Roger Allen HAMMON v. STATE of Arkansas
Roger Allen HAMMON v. STATE of Arkansas, 338 Ark. 733 (1999)
…urging that the trial court erred in admitting the victim’s dying declaration naming appellant as his assailant. We find no error and affirm appellant’s conviction and sentence of life imprisonment. Roger Cousins was found on the edge of a highway outside Judsonia by Tommy Cole. Cousins had been shot four times in the back and called out to Cole as he drove by, “Please help me.…
Arkansas opinions such as Roger Allen HAMMON v. STATE of Arkansas are cited where dying declaration is disputed. The court stated: "We find no error and affirm appellant’s conviction and sentence of life imprisonment. Roger Cousins was found on the edge of a highway outside Judsonia by Tommy Cole. Cousins had been shot four times in the back and called out to Cole as he drove by, “Please help me." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Nick Walker v. State
Nick Walker v. State, 39 Ark. 221 (1882)
…art of the testimony of Emanuel Aiken. And in admitting the dying declaration of Tom Jenkins. That defendant had discovered, after the trial, that Tom Jenkins had been rendered infamous by conviction and sentence to the penitentiary for burglary and larceny, in the Pulaski Circuit Court. I. The general charge of the court below to the jury was clear, and fair alike to the State…
Arkansas opinions such as Nick Walker v. State are cited where dying declaration is disputed. The court stated: "Emanuel Aiken. And in admitting the dying declaration of Tom Jenkins. That defendant had discovered, after the trial, that Tom Jenkins had been rendered infamous by conviction and sentence to the penitentiary for burglary and larceny, in the Pulaski Circuit Court. I." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Abraham GRANT v. STATE of Arkansas
Abraham GRANT v. STATE of Arkansas, 2015 Ark. LEXIS 543 (2015)
…9056 (per curiam). Grant’s next claims for relief concern a dying declaration made by the victim to a police officer who arrived at the crime scene shortly after the victim was shot. The officer, Captain David Lovell, testified at Grant’s trial that the victim said to him, “Abraham Grant shot me, and he ran out the back door.” At trial, Grant’s attorney argued that the statemen…
Abraham GRANT v. STATE of Arkansas is worth reading on Arkansas dying declaration because the court put the point in its own words: "Grant’s next claims for relief concern a dying declaration made by the victim to a police officer who arrived at the crime scene shortly after the victim was shot." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Wilburn W. Miller v. Herschel Goodwin and Dorothy Beevers, Administratrix
Wilburn W. Miller v. Herschel Goodwin and Dorothy Beevers, Administratrix, 246 Ark. 552 (1969)
…ed that the court should have excluded proof of a purported dying declaration by which Beevers tolcl a nurse at the hospital that “a butane truck ran them off the road.” The identification of the truck was important, because that was the most sharply disputed point of fact at the trial. Many witnesses saw Goodwin’s rig soon after it left the road and caught on fire, but Goodwin…
Practitioners open Wilburn W. Miller v. Herschel Goodwin and Dorothy Beevers, Administratrix when Arkansas dying declaration turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Beevers tolcl a nurse at the hospital that “a butane truck ran them off the road.” The identification of the truck was important, because that was the most sharply disputed point of fact at the trial." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Medical diagnosis or treatment statements
Statements made for medical diagnosis or treatment under Ark. R. Evid. 803(4) cover medical history, past or present symptoms, and their general cause when reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. The exception is not limited to treating physicians; statements to nurses, EMTs, and consulting clinicians can qualify when the diagnostic purpose is genuine. Fault and identity remain the usual battleground: "I was hit by a car" is often pertinent; "the light was green" usually is not; abuser identity in child-abuse and domestic-violence cases is heavily litigated.
Arkansas medical-statement opinions
Bryant M. FLORES v. STATE of Arkansas
Bryant M. FLORES v. STATE of Arkansas, 348 Ark. 28 (2002)
…vailable as a witness: . . . (4) Statements for Purposes of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment. Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensation, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. Ark. R.…
Bryant M. FLORES v. STATE of Arkansas is worth reading on Arkansas medical diagnosis hearsay because the court put the point in its own words: "Statements for Purposes of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Andrew M. HOLLAND, Appellant v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee — Hart, J., dissenting
…es not exclude as hearsay “[statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensation, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.” Ark. R. Evid. 803(4). This court has recognized that the basis for thi…
Arkansas opinions such as Andrew M. HOLLAND, Appellant v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee — Hart, J., dissenting are cited where medical diagnosis hearsay is disputed. The court stated: "es not exclude as hearsay “[statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensation, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinen" That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Kenneth BENSON and Louann Benson v. SHULER DRILLING COMPANY, Inc.
Kenneth BENSON and Louann Benson v. SHULER DRILLING COMPANY, Inc., 316 Ark. 101 (1994)
…ity of declarant immaterial. (4) Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain or sensation or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. The Benso…
Practitioners open Kenneth BENSON and Louann Benson v. SHULER DRILLING COMPANY, Inc. when Arkansas medical diagnosis hearsay turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
William STALLNACKER v. STATE of Arkansas
William STALLNACKER v. STATE of Arkansas, 19 Ark. App. 9 (1986)
…to the hearsay rule for Statements made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensation, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. The child had been admitted to the emergency room at University Hospita…
William STALLNACKER v. STATE of Arkansas is worth reading on Arkansas medical diagnosis hearsay because the court put the point in its own words: "to the hearsay rule for Statements made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensation, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent" Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Kevin MEINS v. Judy C. MEINS (Shook)
Kevin MEINS v. Judy C. MEINS (Shook), 93 Ark. App. 292 (2005)
…her regarding their father’s disparaging remarks under the medical diagnosis or treatment exception. The court further stated that this portion of her testimony would go towards “the weight of the evidence, not necessarily the truth.” In this instance, the trial judge allowed Ms. Doan’s testimony under the medical diagnosis or treatment exception. Rule 803(4) of the Arkansas R…
On medical diagnosis hearsay, Kevin MEINS v. Judy C. MEINS (Shook) speaks to the Arkansas dispute in this passage: "The court further stated that this portion of her testimony would go towards “the weight of the evidence, not necessarily the truth.” In this instance, the trial judge allowed Ms. Doan’s testimony under the medical diagnosis or treatment exception." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Kenneth HAWKINS v. STATE of Arkansas
Kenneth HAWKINS v. STATE of Arkansas, 348 Ark. 384 (2002)
…vailable as a witness: * (4) Statements for Purposes of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment. Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensation, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. Id. We…
Arkansas opinions such as Kenneth HAWKINS v. STATE of Arkansas are cited where medical diagnosis hearsay is disputed. The court stated: "Statements for Purposes of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Arthur L. HICKS, Jr., Appellant v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee — Hart, J., concurring
…the Arkansas Rules of Evidence, Statements for Purposes of Medical Diagnosis or | uTreatment. The rule states: The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness: [[Image here]] (4) Statements for Purposes of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment. Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical…
Arthur L. HICKS, Jr., Appellant v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee — Hart, J., concurring is worth reading on Arkansas medical diagnosis hearsay because the court put the point in its own words: "Arkansas Rules of Evidence, Statements for Purposes of Medical Diagnosis or | uTreatment." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Use of depositions at trial
Ark. R. Civ. P. 32 governs use of depositions in civil trials for any purpose permitted by the rules or by Ark. R. Evid. In criminal practice, Ark. R. Crim. P. 16 governs discovery; deposition testimony at trial generally requires a hearsay exception such as Ark. R. Evid. 804(b)(1).
Deposition use is always a two-layer problem: procedural permission to read or play the deposition, plus a hearsay path (often former testimony, party admission, or impeachment). Counsel who satisfy the civil or criminal procedure rule but skip the evidence-rule foundation invite a sustained objection; counsel who have a hearsay exception but failed to preserve the deposition under the procedural rule face the same result. Video designations, counter-designations, and completeness objections should be teed up before the jury is seated.
Arkansas deposition / former-testimony opinions
Jon H. DODSON, M.D. v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY
Jon H. DODSON, M.D. v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, 345 Ark. 430 (2001)
…scovery, and a motion for order setting times and dates for depositions and procedures for authentication of evidence. The defendants responded on January 20, 1999. The defendants also filed a motion for a protective order or, in the alternative, a motion to quash Dodson's second set of interrogatories and requests for production arguing that they had nothing to do with the law…
Arkansas opinions such as Jon H. DODSON, M.D. v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY are cited where deposition / former testimony is disputed. The court stated: "The defendants responded on January 20, 1999." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Richard G. BENNETT v. STATE of Arkansas
Richard G. BENNETT v. STATE of Arkansas, 297 Ark. 115 (1988)
…ed upon insufficiency of the evidence; (2) in admitting the deposition testimony of witnesses for the State when there was no showing that the witnesses were unavailable for trial; (3) in not declaring a mistrial when the prosecution introduced a statement by Bennett not provided to the defense during discovery; (4) in admitting evidence in violation of Rules 401, 403, and 404(…
Practitioners open Richard G. BENNETT v. STATE of Arkansas when Arkansas deposition / former testimony turns on the distinction in this sentence: "ed upon insufficiency of the evidence; (2) in admitting the deposition testimony of witnesses for the State when there was no showing that the witnesses were unavailable for trial; (3) in not declaring a mistrial when the prosecution introduced a statement by Bennett not provided" Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
David HALE v. STATE of Arkansas
David HALE v. STATE of Arkansas, 343 Ark. 62 (2000)
…trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce video-deposition testimony in violation of his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation, Ark. R. Evid. 804, and Ark. Code Ann. § 16-44-202 ( Repl. 1999); (4) the trial court erred in refusing to compel a witness to testify in his behalf after the witness had been granted immunity from prosecution by the State; and (5) the tria…
On deposition / former testimony, David HALE v. STATE of Arkansas speaks to the Arkansas dispute in this passage: "State to introduce video-deposition testimony in violation of his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation, Ark. R. Evid. 804, and Ark. Code Ann. § 16-44-202 ( Repl." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Charles Wesley COGBURN v. STATE of Arkansas
Charles Wesley COGBURN v. STATE of Arkansas, 292 Ark. 564 (1987)
…on May 21, 1985, requesting permission to take a videotaped deposition of the victim pursuant to Ark.Stat.Ann. § 43-2036 (Supp.1985). The motion was granted and the deposition was scheduled for July 2, 1985. At the deposition, however, the child became emotionally distressed and was unable to testify. On earlier dates, February 13 and 15, 1985, Carol Dungan, assistant juvenile…
On deposition / former testimony, Charles Wesley COGBURN v. STATE of Arkansas speaks to the Arkansas dispute in this passage: "May 21, 1985, requesting permission to take a videotaped deposition of the victim pursuant to Ark.Stat.Ann. § 43-2036 (Supp.1985). The motion was granted and the deposition was scheduled for July 2, 1985." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
COLEMAN’S SERVICE CENTER, INC. v. FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, Southern Inn Management, Inc., and Audubon
…lternative, as admitted on several occasions throughout the deposition of Troy Coleman, principal owner of Defendant, Coleman’s Service Center, Inc., Plaintiff’s decision to restructure the financing on the Quality Inn Project, in lieu of foreclosure, was made in reliance on representations and warranties made by Defendant’s Royce Lee and Coleman’s Service Center, Inc., through…
COLEMAN’S SERVICE CENTER, INC. v. FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, Southern Inn Management, Inc., and Audubon is worth reading on Arkansas deposition / former testimony because the court put the point in its own words: "Troy Coleman, principal owner of Defendant, Coleman’s Service Center, Inc." Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Edward Eugene WHITNEY, Et Al. v. HOLLAND RETIREMENT CENTER, INC.
Edward Eugene WHITNEY, Et Al. v. HOLLAND RETIREMENT CENTER, INC., 323 Ark. 16 (1996)
…l court erred during trial when it allowed David L. Moore’s deposition read into evidence. Moore is a clinical social worker at the VA Hospital, and he had referred Leo and family to Holland as an appropriate care facility for Leo. After the trial court denied the estate’s motion, the estate brings this appeal. We first consider the estate’s argument that the trial court errone…
Practitioners open Edward Eugene WHITNEY, Et Al. v. HOLLAND RETIREMENT CENTER, INC. when Arkansas deposition / former testimony turns on the distinction in this sentence: "David L. Moore’s deposition read into evidence. Moore is a clinical social worker at the VA Hospital, and he had referred Leo and family to Holland as an appropriate care facility for Leo. After the trial court denied the estate’s motion, the estate brings this appeal." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Charles v. SIMMONS v. STATE of Arkansas
Charles v. SIMMONS v. STATE of Arkansas, 95 Ark. App. 114 (2006)
…residence were improperly admitted into evidence; that the deposition testimony of a victim who died before trial was improperly admitted into evidence; and that his sentence violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. We affirm. At trial, six young men testified against Simmons, all of whom had either lived or been a frequent guest in Simmons’…
On deposition / former testimony, Charles v. SIMMONS v. STATE of Arkansas speaks to the Arkansas dispute in this passage: "Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. We affirm." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
OUACHITA MINING AND EXPLORATION, INC. v. Jack WIGLEY, Mountain Resources, Inc., Russell Oinonen and Fred Kopp
…ant (appellee Jack Wigley) is permitted to use parts of his deposition in his case in chief after the plaintiff (appellant Ouachita Mining and Exploration, Inc.) has first presented parts of the same deposition to the jury. Ouachita Mining contends that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Wigley to use parts of his own deposition in his defense. We disagree, under…
Practitioners open OUACHITA MINING AND EXPLORATION, INC. v. Jack WIGLEY, Mountain Resources, Inc., Russell Oinonen and Fred Kopp when Arkansas deposition / former testimony turns on the distinction in this sentence: "Jack Wigley) is permitted to use parts of his deposition in his case in chief after the plaintiff (appellant Ouachita Mining and Exploration, Inc.) has first presented parts of the same deposition to the jury." Do not lift it out of the facts the court was deciding.
Authenticity: why it matters and how to prove it
Authenticity is not a hearsay doctrine and it is not optional. Under Ark. R. Evid. 901, 902, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is. Self-authenticating categories — certified public records, newspapers, acknowledged documents, trade inscriptions, and (where adopted) certified domestic records of a regularly conducted activity — shorten the path, but most trial exhibits still need a sponsoring witness, distinctive characteristics, chain of custody, or process-or-system evidence.
Arkansas state courts apply Ark. R. Evid. 901–902 to authenticate handwritten deeds, farm-equipment maintenance logs, and cell-phone extracts. Failure to authenticate is a common reversible error in rural property and domestic cases.
Why authenticity gets its own section in every Arkansas trial notebook:
- It is a condition precedent. An unauthenticated exhibit never reaches the relevance, hearsay, or privilege analysis in a useful way — the jury never properly considers it.
- Digital evidence multiplies the failure modes. Screenshots, social-media posts, text threads, and cloud downloads require hash values, account attribution, metadata, or a percipient witness who saw the content created or received.
- Chain of custody is authenticity by another name. Drugs, firearms, biological samples, and seized devices are excluded when the links from seizure to lab to courtroom are broken, even if a hearsay exception would otherwise apply to a lab report.
- Business-records shortcuts do not replace authentication. A custodian can explain record-keeping practices and still fail if nobody can say the particular PDF or printout is the record of this patient, this account, or this machine.
- Self-authentication is narrow. Counsel who wave a notarization or a letterhead and skip the rest of Rule 901-style analysis often lose when the document's contents are disputed.
Practical authentication checklist for Arkansas trials: identify the exhibit; choose a 901 method or a 902 category; line up the sponsoring witness or certificate; preserve chain-of-custody testimony for physical and digital items; and separate the authenticity objection from any hearsay objection so the court rules on each.
Arkansas authenticity opinions
Jennifer STEELE v. John LYON — Harrison, J., concurring
Jennifer STEELE v. John LYON — Harrison, J., concurring, 2015 Ark. App. LEXIS 336 (2015)
…Lyon’s case-in-chief because its contents were not properly authenticated and violated the best-evidence rule. |iní. John Lyon Was Not a Surprise Witness. We review the court’s decision to exclude or permit the testimony of any witness at trial under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Collins v. Hinton, 327 Ark. 159, 169, 937 S.W.2d 164, 169 (1997). Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedu…
On authentication, Jennifer STEELE v. John LYON — Harrison, J., concurring speaks to the Arkansas dispute in this passage: "Lyon’s case-in-chief because its contents were not properly authenticated and violated the best-evidence rule. |iní. John Lyon Was Not a Surprise Witness." The surrounding opinion shows how the court applied that language to the record.
Beirne & Burnside v. Imboden admr.
Beirne & Burnside v. Imboden admr., 14 Ark. 237 (1853)
…imants, because the claim in question had not been properly authenticated and presented for allowance, which motion the court granted, and adjudged costs against the claimants. The claimants took a bill of exceptions, and appealed to the Circuit Court for Randolph county, and at the May term, 1852, the latter court, the cause having been heard on this bill of exceptions, and an…
Arkansas opinions such as Beirne & Burnside v. Imboden admr. are cited where authentication is disputed. The court stated: "imants, because the claim in question had not been properly authenticated and presented for allowance, which motion the court granted, and adjudged costs against the claimants. The claimants took a bill of exceptions, and appealed to the Circuit Court for Randolph county, and at" That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Jerry HAWKINS v. STATE of Arkansas — Roaf, J., dissenting
Jerry HAWKINS v. STATE of Arkansas — Roaf, J., dissenting, 81 Ark. App. 479 (2003)
…by receiving into evidence contraband that was not properly authenticated due to a marked difference in the description provided by an undercover officer and a crime lab chemist. The supreme court held that because there was a significant possibility that the evidence tested was not the same as that purchased by the officer, the State was required to do more to establish the au…
Jerry HAWKINS v. STATE of Arkansas — Roaf, J., dissenting is worth reading on Arkansas authentication because the court put the point in its own words: "by receiving into evidence contraband that was not properly authenticated due to a marked difference in the description provided by an undercover officer and a crime lab chemist. The supreme court held that because there was a significant possibility that the evidence tested was" Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
COLUMBIA MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. Larry PATTERSON and Roger Perry
COLUMBIA MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. Larry PATTERSON and Roger Perry, 320 Ark. 584 (1995)
…court implicitly held the 25-page writing was not properly authenticated as Patterson’s complete policy by this witness. The requirement of authentication is separate from the requirement that a hearsay document must satisfy an applicable hearsay exception for admissibility. Our conclusion that the 25-page writing was not properly authenticated is consistent with the fact that…
Arkansas opinions such as COLUMBIA MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. Larry PATTERSON and Roger Perry are cited where authentication is disputed. The court stated: "Patterson’s complete policy by this witness. The requirement of authentication is separate from the requirement that a hearsay document must satisfy an applicable hearsay exception for admissibility." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Kaufman v. Redwine
Kaufman v. Redwine, 97 Ark. 546 (1911)
…hall be exhibited to the executor or administrator properly authenticated, within six months after the first granting of letters on the estate. “Fifth. All such demands as may be exhibited as aforesaid after six months and within one year after the first letters granted on the estate, and all demands not exhibited to the executor or administrator, as required by this act, befor…
Kaufman v. Redwine is worth reading on Arkansas authentication because the court put the point in its own words: "hall be exhibited to the executor or administrator properly authenticated, within six months after the first granting of letters on the estate. “Fifth. All such demands as may be exhibited as aforesaid after six months and within one year after the first letters granted on the es" Use that passage as the starting point, then read the facts that precede it.
Collier v. Trice
Collier v. Trice, 79 Ark. 414 (1906)
…th of November, 1902, Crawford presented the note, properly authenticated, to the administrator for allowance, who rejected the claim, and waived notice of presentation to the probate court. Thereafter Crawford, for a valuable consideration, assigned the note to FI. S. Trice, J. R. Miller and J. W. Weatherby. No further affidavit of authentication was made by the assignees or e…
Arkansas opinions such as Collier v. Trice are cited where authentication is disputed. The court stated: "November, 1902, Crawford presented the note, properly authenticated, to the administrator for allowance, who rejected the claim, and waived notice of presentation to the probate court. Thereafter Crawford, for a valuable consideration, assigned the note to FI. S. Trice, J. R." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Duwayne Harvey v. State of Arkansas
Duwayne Harvey v. State of Arkansas, 619 S.W.3d 902 (2021)
…n. First, Harvey argues that the receipts were not properly authenticated. Rule 901 of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence states, “The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that 2 the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” Both Harvey and the State acknowledge tha…
Arkansas opinions such as Duwayne Harvey v. State of Arkansas are cited where authentication is disputed. The court stated: "First, Harvey argues that the receipts were not properly authenticated." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
In Re Amendments to Rule 902 of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence
In Re Amendments to Rule 902 of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence, 2026 Ark. 62 (2026)
…o Rule 902 of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence governing self-authentication that is in line with the federal rules and also addresses authentication of electronically generated records in particular. It was published for comment, and we now adopt the change, effective immediately. See In re Amends. to Rule 902 of the Ark. R. Evid., 2025 Ark. 116 (per curiam). The amendments are…
Arkansas opinions such as In Re Amendments to Rule 902 of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence are cited where authentication is disputed. The court stated: "Rule 902 of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence governing self-authentication that is in line with the federal rules and also addresses authentication of electronically generated records in particular. It was published for comment, and we now adopt the change, effective immediately." That is the language to brief; the rest of the decision supplies the procedural posture.
Practice checklist
- State the relevance theory in one sentence before naming an exception.
- Run the 403 / unfair-prejudice balance explicitly for other-acts and graphic exhibits.
- For character or other-acts evidence, identify the non-propensity purpose and request a limiting instruction on the record.
- Decide whether an out-of-court statement is hearsay for the purpose offered before hunting exceptions.
- Lay business-records foundations with time, knowledge, regular practice, and custodial qualifications — or a qualifying certification.
- Prove unavailability with specific facts before offering former testimony or dying declarations.
- Treat deposition use as procedure-plus-hearsay; designate and counter-designate early.
- Authenticate every exhibit under Ark. R. Evid. 901, 902 (or the self-authentication path) before arguing hearsay.
- Preserve chain of custody for physical and digital evidence with named custodians.
- Search LawDiver for recent Arkansas appellate evidence opinions before mediation or motions in limine.
Contents
- General standards of admissibility
- Character evidence
- Hearsay: start with the definition
- Party admissions
- Business records
- Important hearsay exceptions that do not require unavailability
- Declarant unavailable
- Dying declarations
- Medical diagnosis or treatment statements
- Use of depositions at trial
- Authenticity: why it matters and how to prove it
- Practice checklist
- Frequently asked questions
Frequently asked questions
What is the primary evidence source in Arkansas?
Arkansas applies the Arkansas Rules of Evidence. Arkansas adopted FRE-based rules effective 2006; Ark. R. Evid. numbering tracks federal rules and Arkansas appellate courts cite FRE decisions persuasively.
How do Arkansas courts decide relevance and unfair prejudice?
Under Ark. R. Evid. 401, 403, evidence must make a fact of consequence more or less probable, and the court may exclude relevant evidence when unfair prejudice, confusion, or waste of time substantially outweighs its probative value.
Are party admissions hearsay in Arkansas?
Party-opponent statements under Ark. R. Evid. 801(d)(2) are generally excluded from the hearsay ban (or treated as an exception, depending on local drafting). They may be offered against the party who made or adopted them without showing unavailability.
What foundation is required for business records?
Under Ark. R. Evid. 803(6), show a record made at or near the time from someone with knowledge, kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity, as a regular practice, through a custodian, qualified witness, or allowed certification — subject to trustworthiness attack.
When can I use a deposition at trial in Arkansas?
Ark. R. Civ. P. 32 governs use of depositions in civil trials for any purpose permitted by the rules or by Ark. R. Evid. In criminal practice, Ark. R. Crim. P. 16 governs discovery; deposition testimony at trial generally requires a hearsay exception such as Ark. R. Evid. 804(b)(1).
Why is authenticity separate from hearsay?
Authenticity asks whether the item is what you claim it is; hearsay asks whether out-of-court assertions inside it may be used for their truth. You can lose on either ground independently. Arkansas authenticity practice starts with Ark. R. Evid. 901, 902.
Where do dying declarations and medical statements fit?
Dying declarations under Ark. R. Evid. 804(b)(2) require belief in impending death and concern the cause or circumstances of that believed death. Medical statements under Ark. R. Evid. 803(4) require a genuine diagnostic or treatment purpose and reasonable pertinence to care.