Brendon A. Boyce v. Julie A. Jarvis, f/k/a Julie A. Boyce

                IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

                                        

                                                                APRIL TERM, A.D. 2021

                                                                          June 30, 2021

 BRENDON A. BOYCE,

 Appellant
 (Defendant),

 v.
                                                      S-20-0231
 JULIE A. JARVIS, f/k/a JULIE A.
 BOYCE,

 Appellee
 (Plaintiff).

                    Appeal from the District Court of Johnson County
                       The Honorable William J. Edelman, Judge


Representing Appellant:
      Benjamin L. Keller, Kinnaird Law Office, P.C., Sheridan, Wyoming


Representing Appellee:
      Elizabeth B. Lance and Toni E. Hartzel, Lance & Hall LLP, Cheyenne, Wyoming


Before DAVIS, C.J., and FOX, KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, and GRAY, JJ.



NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.
Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne,
Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before
final publication in the permanent volume.
DAVIS, Chief Justice.

[¶1] Brendon Boyce appeals the denial of his petition for modification of alimony. Prior
to the hearing on his petition, the district court reduced Mr. Boyce’s child support based
on an imputed income of $4,000.00 per month. On appeal, he claims that the court should
have similarly imputed his income for alimony and reduced his alimony payments in
proportion to the decrease in his income. We affirm.

                                        ISSUES

[¶2]   Mr. Boyce presents a single issue, which we restate as follows:

             Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied his
             request to modify alimony?

                                        FACTS

[¶3] Brendon Boyce and Julie Jarvis, formerly Julie Boyce, were divorced in Connecticut
in 2016 and have two children. The parties entered into a separation agreement, which set
terms for child support and alimony. The Connecticut court found that the agreement was
fair and equitable and incorporated it by reference into the parties’ decree of divorce.

[¶4] With respect to child support, the parties agreed that Mr. Boyce would pay Ms.
Jarvis “Five Hundred ($500.00) Dollars per week, payable on the first of each month by
cash or check, which is in accordance with the [Connecticut] Child Support and Arrearage
Guidelines.” The parties further agreed that Mr. Boyce would pay alimony. The alimony
provisions were as follows:

             3.2 Commencing January 1, 2017, the Wife shall receive
             alimony from the Husband in the amount of $3,500.00 per
             month, payable on the first of each month until August 31,
             2021. Alimony shall be paid by either cash or check. Alimony
             shall terminate to Wife from Husband in the following
             occurrences[:] the death of either party, the remarriage of the
             Wife, or the cohabitation of the Wife as defined below. The
             termination of Wife’s alimony due to cohabitation shall only
             be exercisable by the Husband if he is paying at least the
             amount of $3,500.00 per month and is current on his payments.
             The term “cohabitation” as defined herein means the Wife’s
             living with any person, other than her mother, for a period of
             ninety (90) days or more, regardless of whether her living with
             such person alters her financial circumstances or not.



                                             1
                                       * * * *

             3.4 For purposes of alimony, no upward modification shall be
             allowed until such time that the parties respective gross
             incomes increase as such: Wife’s gross income to exceed
             $100,000.00 per year, and the Husband’s gross income to
             exceed $275,000.00 per year. If the Wife’s income shall
             exceed $100,000.00 per year, alimony shall be reduced by
             $15.00 for every one hundred dollars earned above
             $100,000.00, with such reduction to begin the month
             immediately following such change in the Wife’s earnings. If
             the Husband’s income shall exceed $275,000.00 per year,
             alimony shall be increased by $15.00 for every one hundred
             dollars earned above $275,000.00, with such increase being
             paid by the Husband as a lump-sum alimony payment no later
             than June 1st of the year after any year in which his gross
             income exceeds $275,000.00.

             3.5 At the close of each calendar year, and before June 1st of
             the following year, the parties shall exchange computations
             describing the total amount of his/her gross income from all
             sources received during the calendar year immediately
             preceding the date of such statement as well as copies of any
             and all tax returns and supporting IRS forms, including but not
             limited to IRS Forms K-1, W-2, 1099 and the like, filed for the
             preceding tax year.

[¶5] At the time of the divorce, Mr. Boyce worked as an oilfield operator, drilling oil
wells. He contracted work through Boyce Consulting, Inc., a company of which he was
the sole owner and shareholder. In 2018, Boyce Consulting lost an important drilling
contract due to decreased industry demand. Mr. Boyce discontinued operations of Boyce
Consulting and set up a new entity called Boyce Development Corporation, of which he
was also the sole shareholder.

[¶6] In March of 2018, Mr. Boyce secured a new short-term drilling contract through
Boyce Development, but the contract was not for a definite amount of work. It paid
approximately the same per diem rate as the contract that Mr. Boyce lost, but it did not
provide him equal economic benefit. During this time, Mr. Boyce began transitioning his
company to real estate ventures since he was having difficulty securing drilling work.
Through Boyce Development, he reinvested income and purchased a duplex in Florida and
a condominium in Spain. After actual expenses and investment costs, Mr. Boyce paid
himself a salary of $4,000.00 per month, after taxes, from Boyce Development.



                                            2
[¶7] On January 9, 2018, Ms. Jarvis filed a notice of filing of foreign judgment in
Wyoming’s Fourth Judicial District Court, as well as a petition seeking an order to show
cause why Mr. Boyce should not be held in contempt for failing to provide required
financial documentation and for failing to make alimony payments. At that time, Ms. Jarvis
lived with the two minor children in Johnson County, and Mr. Boyce lived in Florida.

[¶8] The district court held a hearing on June 1, 2018 and issued an order on October 12,
2018. It noted that Mr. Boyce had not sought to modify alimony through the courts and
found him in contempt for his failure to pay. It entered “a judgment against [Mr. Boyce],
individually, and Boyce Development Corporation in the amount of $42,000 for past due
alimony.”

[¶9] In addition to the petition relating to alimony, Ms. Jarvis also petitioned the court to
increase her child support. The district court heard arguments on the same day as the
contempt hearing, June 1, 2018, but it did not issue a written order on the modification of
child support until approximately eight months later, on February 28, 2019.

[¶10] The court found that at the time of the divorce Ms. Jarvis worked as a school
administrator earning approximately $10,166.00 per month. It found that at the time of the
modification hearing she was earning a net income of $1,261.79 per month, and that she
was not voluntarily underemployed.

[¶11] With respect to Mr. Boyce, it found that he was earning approximately $7,939.32
per month in income from his company at the time of the original support order. It found
that Mr. Boyce was earning a salary of $4,000.00 per month from his company at the time
of the modification hearing, and it used that figure to compute child support. The court
further found that Mr. Boyce was investing all available company profits into a new real
estate development venture, and that those investment expenditures were reasonable and
legitimate considering the uncertainty of work in the oilfields.

[¶12] Based on these figures, the district court reduced child support from $2,000.00 per
month to $1,085.00 per month. Ms. Jarvis appealed the decision, but we summarily
affirmed based on briefing deficiencies. Jarvis v. Boyce, 

, 

 (Wyo. 2019).

[¶13] On December 10, 2018, Ms. Jarvis filed another motion for an order to show cause,
which alleged that Mr. Boyce had violated the divorce decree by failing to turn over any
documents showing income from subcontractors for Boyce Consulting and Boyce
Development for 2016 and 2017 tax years to date, as well as failing to turn over any income
documents for 2017 to date. The district court held another hearing on February 13, 2019.
Following the hearing, it found no willful violation of the decree and therefore did not find
Mr. Boyce in contempt in an order entered on April 19, 2019.



                                              3
[¶14] During this same time frame, on January 17, 2019, Mr. Boyce filed a petition to
reduce alimony, in which he asserted that the financial position of both parties had
substantially changed since their divorce. On January 30, 2019, Ms. Jarvis filed yet another
petition for an order to show cause asking the court to hold Mr. Boyce in contempt for
failing to pay the outstanding judgment from the October 2018 order, and for his continuing
failure to remit alimony payments.

[¶15] The district court held a hearing on May 15, 2019. It ordered the parties to submit
written briefs on Connecticut law and its applicability to the modification of alimony.
Approximately fourteen months after the hearing, the district court issued an order on the
petition.1 It found that Mr. Boyce did not meet his burden to justify a modification of
alimony. It further found that he owed $47,000.00 in alimony, $1,250.00 in unpaid medical
bills, and $3,941.00 in attorney fees with statutory interest at 10% per annum. Since Mr.
Boyce had overpaid child support in the amount of $14,063.00, the district court entered a
total judgment against him in the amount of $40,928.00.

[¶16] Mr. Boyce timely appealed the district court’s denial of his petition to modify
alimony. In his notice of appeal, his counsel noted that the hearing was not reported, and
that therefore a statement of the evidence would be prepared pursuant to W.R.A.P. 3.03.
The district court settled the record as requested, and it entered its factual findings under
that rule on October 30, 2020.

                                       STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶17] The parties’ separation agreement, which was incorporated into the decree of
divorce, contained a choice of law provision, providing that the laws of Connecticut would
apply to construction of the agreement and resolution of any dispute arising thereunder. In
the event that another state’s substantive law applies to a dispute, Wyoming law still
controls any procedural matters, including the applicable standard of review. Denbury
Onshore, LLC v. APMTG Helium LLC, 

, 

 (Wyo.
2020).

[¶18] We review a district court’s denial of a petition to modify alimony for an abuse of
discretion. Linden v. Linden, 

, 

 (Wyo. 2020).

                   The basis of modification of alimony, similar to changes in
                   child support, is a change in circumstance. The decision rests
                   in the sound discretion of the court provided that a change in
                   circumstances does exist. The test for decision in alimony
                   revision . . . like child support, is exercised discretion of the


1
    Nothing in the record explains this delay, and we can think of no valid reason for it.


                                                         4
              district court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent clear
              abuse.

 (quoting Dorr v. Newman, 

 (Wyo. 1990)); see also Johnson v.
Johnson, 

, 

 (Wyo. 2020) (“We do not overturn the
decision of the trial court unless we are persuaded of an abuse of discretion or the presence
of a violation of some legal principle.”) (citation omitted).

              A court does not abuse its discretion unless it acts in a manner
              which exceeds the bounds of reason under the circumstances.
              Our review entails evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence
              to support the district court’s decision, and we afford the
              prevailing party every favorable inference while omitting any
              consideration of evidence presented by the unsuccessful party.
              Findings of fact not supported by the evidence, contrary to the
              evidence, or against the great weight of the evidence cannot be
              sustained. Similarly, an abuse of discretion is present when a
              material factor deserving significant weight is ignored.

Johnson, ¶ 10, 

 (quoting Jacobson v. Kidd, 

, ¶ 14, 

 (Wyo. 2018) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

                                      DISCUSSION

A.     Choice of Law

[¶19] The choice of law provision in the parties’ agreement states:

                                 ARTICLE XIV – SITUS

                     14.1 It is understood and agreed that this Agreement is
              entered into under the laws of the State of Connecticut, and the
              execution hereof wherever and whenever undertaken shall be
              deemed to be completed upon delivery of the Agreement in
              Connecticut. The laws of the State of Connecticut shall be
              applied to any construction of this Agreement and in the
              resolution of any dispute arising hereunder.

The record is not entirely clear whether the district court applied Connecticut or Wyoming
law, but its request for briefing on Connecticut law and the statement in its order that it
received and reviewed that briefing suggest that it did apply Connecticut law.




                                              5
[¶20] Mr. Boyce argues that the parties’ choice of law should be respected, and that
Connecticut law applies. Ms. Jarvis contends that Wyoming law should apply because Mr.
Boyce did not argue Connecticut law below, and the district court therefore had no
opportunity to determine whether Connecticut law is contrary to Wyoming law, policy or
interests. She asserts, however, that the result will be the same regardless of which state’s
law applies.

[¶21] To resolve conflicts of this nature, we have adopted the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws § 187 (1971 & Supp. 1989). Bradley v. Bradley, 

,

 (Wyo. 2007) (citing Resource Technology Corp. v. Fisher Scientific Co.,

 (Wyo. 1996)). It states:

                     (1) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern
              their contractual rights and duties will be applied if the
              particular issue is one which the parties could have resolved by
              an explicit provision in their agreement directed to that issue.

                      (2) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern
              their contractual rights and duties will be applied, even if the
              particular issue is one which the parties could not have resolved
              by an explicit provision in their agreement directed to that
              issue, unless either

                      (a) the chosen state has no substantial relationship to the
              parties or the transaction and there is no other reasonable basis
              for the parties’ choice, or

                     (b) application of the law of the chosen state would be
              contrary to a fundamental policy of a state which has a
              materially greater interest than the chosen state in the
              determination of the particular issue[.]

Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 187 (1971 & Supp. 1989).

[¶22] There is no doubt that the parties had significant contacts with Connecticut when
they executed the separation agreement. Both parties resided and owned real property
there. Consequently, Connecticut had a reasonable relationship to the matters at issue in
this case. See generally Bradley, ¶ 21, 

 (finding that the choice of law
provision was valid when the parties’ owned real property in the state and planned to spend
a considerable amount of time there when they entered into the agreement).

[¶23] In Bradley, a premarital agreement contained a choice of law provision applying
Minnesota law to divorce decree modifications. ¶¶ 3-9, 

. We interpreted


                                               6
the Restatement to generally respect the parties’ contractual choice of law, and we
reiterated that we apply the parties’ choice unless “it is contrary to the law, public policy,
or the general interests of Wyoming’s citizens.” Id. ¶ 21, 

.

[¶24] We reject Ms. Jarvis’ suggestion that the district court could have concluded that
Connecticut law is “contrary to the law, public policy, or the general interests of
Wyoming’s citizens.” First, she provides no cogent analysis to support her assertion. See
generally Bradley, ¶¶ 21-22, 

 (rejecting general statements that a choice
of law provision is contrary to law); Fleet v. Guyette, 

, 

 (Wyo. 2020) (citing Osban v. State, 

, ¶ 7 n.2, 

, 741 n.2 (Wyo.
2019) (“An appellant is required to present this court with relevant authority and cogent
argument. It is not enough to identify a potential issue with the expectation that this court
will flesh out the matter from there.”)). Second, Ms. Jarvis could have raised any such
concern with the district court when it asked for briefing on Connecticut law, and there is
no indication in the record that she did so.

[¶25] We therefore conclude that the parties’ choice of Connecticut law is valid. We also
note, however, that Wyoming and Connecticut rules for modifying alimony are very
similar, and consequently we will refer to cases from both jurisdictions. See generally
Bradley, ¶ 15, 

 (applying analogous cases from Minnesota and Wyoming
to interpret contracts since both states’ rules were similar).

B.     Modification of Alimony

[¶26] We next turn to Mr. Boyce’s argument that the district court abused its discretion
when it found that he failed to justify a modification of alimony under Connecticut law.

1.     Record on Review

[¶27] At the outset, we note that our review is limited by the parties’ failure to have the
district court proceeding reported.

              When no transcript has been made of the trial proceedings, this
              Court accepts the trial court’s findings as being the only basis
              for deciding the issues which pertain to the evidence.
              Armstrong v. Pickett, 

 (Wyo. 1993). In the
              absence of anything to refute them, we will sustain the trial
              court’s findings, and we assume that the evidence presented
              was sufficient to support those findings. Osborn v. Pine
              Mountain Ranch, 

 (Wyo. 1989).




                                               7
Willowbrook Ranch, Inc. v. Nugget Expl., Inc., 

 (Wyo. 1995); see also
Sears v. Sears, 

, 

 (Wyo. 2021); Martin v. DeWitt,

, 

 (Wyo. 2014).

[¶28] We confront the same limitations when we are provided a settled statement of the
evidence that does not provide a sufficient basis to evaluate the district court’s exercise of
discretion.

                Although this law has developed for the most part in cases
                where neither a transcript of the proceedings nor a settled
                statement of the evidence has been provided, the same
                rationale holds true in cases where the settled statement of the
                evidence does not address the issues presented to this Court, or
                does not provide sufficient basis for a finding of abuse of
                discretion.

Beeman v. Beeman, 

, 

 (Wyo. 2005).

[¶29] In its order settling the record, the district court identified the exhibits received in
evidence and summarized each party’s testimony. In the last paragraph, it “found that the
testimony offered by Ms. Jarvis was more credible and reliable and based its ruling on her
testimony.”

[¶30] Because we have no transcript, we must assume that the court’s summary accurately
reflects Ms. Jarvis’ testimony. Additionally, because we defer to a trial court’s credibility
determinations, we must accept its decision to base its ruling on that testimony. See
generally McMurry v. McMurry, 

, 

 (Wyo. 2010) (“We
generally defer to the district court’s findings since it is in a better position to assess the
witnesses’ credibility, weigh the evidence and judge the respective merits and needs of the
parties.”). Our review is therefore confined to the district court’s summary of Ms. Jarvis’
testimony and the exhibits admitted into evidence to determine whether the district court’s
denial of the petition to modify alimony was reasonable.2




2
  Neither party contends that the district court abused its discretion in settling the record. See Bolding v.
Kindel Concrete, LLC, 

, 

 (Wyo. 2014) (noting that settling of record
is within district court’s discretion) (quoting Northwest Bldg. Co., LLC v. Northwest Distrib. Co., 

, 

 (Wyo. 2012)). Mr. Boyce does take issue with the court’s summary of Ms.
Jarvis’ testimony, but because there is no transcript of the evidentiary proceedings, he is unable to point to
any inaccuracies. We again emphasize the importance of having evidentiary proceedings reported and
designating the transcript as part of the record on appeal when a party wishes to challenge a trial court’s
factual findings.


                                                      8
2.     District Court’s Exercise of Discretion

[¶31] In Connecticut, alimony modification is governed by Connecticut General Statutes
§ 46b–86 (a), which provides in relevant part: “Unless and to the extent that the decree
precludes modification . . . an order for alimony or support . . . may, at any time thereafter,
be . . . altered or modified . . . upon a showing of a substantial change in the circumstances
of either party. . . .” O’Donnell v. Bozzuti, 

 (Conn. App. 2014). “Under
that statutory provision, the party seeking the modification bears the burden of
demonstrating that such a change has occurred.” Flood v. Flood, 

, 77, cert.
denied, 

 (Conn. App. 2020). “[T]he moving party must demonstrate that
circumstances have changed since the last court order such that it would be unjust or
inequitable to hold either party to it.” Olson v. Mohammadu, 

 (Conn.
App. 2016) (quoting Borkowski v. Borkowski, 

 (Conn. 1994)). “Simply put,
before the court may modify an alimony award . . . pursuant to § 46b–86, it must make a
threshold finding of a substantial change in circumstances with respect to one of the
parties.” Harlow v. Stickels, 

, 710 (Conn. App. 2014) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted).

              Once a trial court determines that there has been a substantial
              change in the financial circumstances of one of the parties, the
              same criteria that determine an initial award of alimony and
              support are relevant to the question of modification
              [Connecticut General Statute § 46b-82 (West 2021)]. The
              power of the trial court to modify the existing order does not,
              however, include the power to retry issues already decided . . .
              or to allow the parties to use a motion to modify as an appeal.
              . . . Rather, the trial court’s discretion includes only the power
              to adapt the order to some distinct and definite change in the
              circumstances or conditions of the parties. . . .

              Thus, when presented with a motion for modification, a court
              must first determine whether there has been a substantial
              change in the financial circumstances of one or both of the
              parties. . . . Second, if the court finds a substantial change in
              circumstances, it may properly consider the motion and, on the
              basis of the [Connecticut] General Statutes § 46b–82 criteria,
              make an order for modification. . . . The court has the authority
              to issue a modification only if it conforms the order to the
              distinct and definite changes in the circumstances of the
              parties.




                                               9
Berger v. Finkel, 

, 511 (Conn. App. 2015) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted)3; see also Linden, ¶ 13, 

 (“Modification, however, can
be made only on the showing of changed circumstances from those at the time of the former
decree. The changed circumstances must be substantial, and the appellant bears the burden
of showing this change before modification will occur.”) (internal quotation marks
omitted).

[¶32] Neither party asked the district court to make findings of fact, and the court’s order
does not explicitly state that the court found no substantial change in circumstances. The
order indicates:

                 3. Defendant argued in his Petition [for] Modification of
                 Alimony that since the divorce, his income had decreased to
                 such a degree to justify a modification under Connecticut law.
                 Plaintiff contested Defendant’s characterization of his
                 financial situation, arguing that he instead of honoring his
                 obligations under their divorce decree has been focused on
                 turning liquid assets in to non-liquid assets. Furthermore,
                 Plaintiff testified, and Defendant did not contest the testimony,
                 that although the court in Connecticut characterized the
                 payment as alimony, that in fact it was payment for her interest
                 in the business that the two of them were operating while
                 married, i.e. a property settlement agreement, not spousal
                 support.

                 4. Based on financial records, the parties’ testimony, the Court
                 finds that Defendant has not met his burden to justify a
                 modification of his alimony obligation. . . .

[¶33] Although the order does not explicitly state that the district court stopped its analysis
at the threshold determination that Mr. Boyce failed to show a substantial change in
circumstances, we believe the finding is implied. The court indicated that it based its ruling
on Ms. Jarvis’ testimony, which included testimony that Mr. Boyce continued to be well-
employed in the oilfields, that he was converting liquid assets to non-liquid assets, that he
was manipulating his reported income, and that he was capable of paying the alimony
originally ordered. We will therefore review the court’s order as if it had expressly found
that Mr. Boyce failed to show a substantial change in circumstances.

3
 The factors a court may consider after it finds a substantial change in circumstances are “the length of the
marriage, the causes for the . . . dissolution of the marriage, . . . the age, health, station, occupation, amount
and sources of income, earning capacity, vocational skills, education, employability, estate and needs of
each of the parties . . . and, in the case of a parent to whom the custody of minor children has been awarded,
the desirability and feasibility of such parent’s securing employment.” Connecticut General Statutes § 46b–
82 (a); see also Berman v. Berman, 

, 53 (Conn. App. 2021).


                                                        10
[¶34] Mr. Boyce contends that the district court abused its discretion in so ruling because
he demonstrated a significant change in his financial situation. He asserts that his income
diminished substantially due to the loss of his consulting contract and the uncertainty of
the oilfield industry, which caused his earnings and business income to fluctuate. He
further asserts that his income decreased from approximately $275,000 annually at the time
of the original award to approximately $80,000 annually at the time of the hearing, that he
has an outstanding debt to the Internal Revenue Service of more than $100,000, and that
he withdrew money from his retirement account to pay his alimony arrearage. Based on
this change in circumstances, he contends that the court should have found his imputed
income to be $4,000.00 a month, as it did in his child support modification, and that it
should have therefore modified his alimony accordingly.

[¶35] Mr. Boyce relies on two cases, Spencer v. Spencer, 

 (Conn. App.
2017), and Bauer v. Bauer, 

 (Conn. App. 2017), for the general
proposition that his monthly alimony obligation should be modified in proportion to his
claimed decrease in income. While both cases upheld a downward modification of alimony
based on a decrease in income and an inability to pay, we do not find them helpful in this
appeal.

[¶36] First, the cases are factually distinguishable. In Spencer and Bauer, the courts found
a decrease in income and an inability to pay the originally ordered alimony. In this case,
on the other hand, the court found that Mr. Boyce had not suffered a decrease in income
that would diminish his ability to pay the alimony as originally ordered. Additionally, Mr.
Boyce has both liquid and non-liquid assets, which also bears on the question of alimony
modification. See Connecticut General Statutes § 46b–82 (West 2020); Bartlett v. Bartlett,

 (Conn. 1991).

[¶37] In Bartlett, the plaintiff alleged that it was improper for the trial court to refuse to
consider evidence of the vesting of the defendant’s inheritance as a basis for determining
whether a substantial change in circumstances warranted an alimony modification. 

. The plaintiff argued that that the court’s ruling was erroneous because the
defendant’s “financial circumstances had changed substantially due to his [newly vested]
inheritance.” 

. The defendant argued that the assets should not be considered
until he received a distribution. 

. The Connecticut Supreme Court disagreed with
defendant and concluded that an inheritance, once vested in the heir upon death of the
donor, constituted a changed circumstance that was properly considered in a request to
modify alimony, notwithstanding that the property had yet to be distributed. 

 The court
held that “all assets, liquid and nonliquid alike” must be considered on a motion to modify
alimony because a “contrary rule would encourage parties who acquire substantial amounts
of nonliquid assets after the original judgment to insulate themselves from paying more
alimony, despite their increased wealth.” 

.



                                               11
[¶38] As already noted above, the record supports that Mr. Boyce converted liquid assets
to non-liquid assets, was re-investing rental income into his business, including rental
income from a duplex in Florida and a condominium in Spain. The record further supports
Ms. Jarvis’ testimony that Mr. Boyce continued to be well-employed and could pay
alimony as originally awarded. Indeed, his 2018 invoices suggest that his company earned
approximately $223,280.00 from his subcontractor agreement. The invoices from March
2019 and April 2019 also indicate that his company was paid $51,800.00. Against this
limited record, we are unable to find an abuse of discretion in the district court’s conclusion
that Mr. Boyce did not show a substantial change in circumstances that would warrant a
downward modification of his alimony obligation.

[¶39] We are not persuaded otherwise by Mr. Boyce’s argument that there is an
inconsistency between the district court’s income calculation for his child support
obligation and its treatment of the requested alimony obligation. First, the court found Ms.
Jarvis’ testimony that Mr. Boyce had understated his income in the child support
modification hearing credible. Additionally, and more importantly, both Connecticut and
Wyoming law recognize that alimony and child support serve different purposes, and those
differences can affect whether a modification is appropriate. McKeon v. Lennon, 

 (Conn. 2016) (different purposes of alimony and child support must be considered
in determining modification requirements); Linden, ¶ 16, 

 (court is not
bound to modify alimony when it modifies child support). As we explained in Linden:

              Father argues that the district court must base child support and
              alimony on the same imputed income. We conclude, however,
              that the district court was not bound to modify alimony because
              it modified the child support. The alimony served a different
              purpose and was not awarded solely on the basis of income but
              was, to a degree, in lieu of property available for division. The
              district court is entitled to look at the totality of the
              circumstances in determining whether a modification is
              appropriate. Ready [v. Ready, 

], ¶ 22, 76 P.3d
              [836,] 842 [(Wyo. 2003)]; Muller [v. Muller], 838 P.2d [198,]
              199, 201 [(Wyo. 1992)]. Alimony is a separate inquiry from
              child support and may be based on a payor’s expectation of
              future earnings:

                     The cases have frequently and uniformly held that the
                     court may base its decision on the husband’s ability to
                     earn, rather than his current earnings. If the court were
                     limited to the momentary current earnings of a husband,
                     particularly one who was engaged in a seasonal industry
                     or whose earnings had widely fluctuated, the court
                     would get a distorted view of his financial potential.


                                               12
             Muller, 838 P.2d at 201 (quoting Meagher v. Meagher, 

, 

 (1961)). The trial court
             “was justified in considering employment expectancy
             reasonably created by [Father’s] experience, capability and
             physical ability” when it refused to modify the original award,
             notwithstanding the imputed income it used to modify child
             support. Muller, 838 P.2d at 199.

Linden, ¶ 16, 

.

                                     CONCLUSION

[¶40] Based on the record before us, we conclude that the district court could reasonably
find that Mr. Boyce failed to show a substantial change in circumstances that would warrant
a modification of his alimony obligation. We therefore find no abuse of its discretion in
the district court’s order denying the petition to modify his alimony obligation.

[¶41] Affirmed.




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