Tennessee Supreme Court

State of Tennessee v. Marlo Davis

June 3, 20152015 Tenn. LEXIS 463

Summary

The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the defendant's second-degree murder conviction, holding that the trial court properly admitted a witness's prior statement and preliminary-hearing testimony as substantive evidence and that any error concerning the witness's unavailability was harmless. The Court also held that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction and that inconsistent verdicts on alternative counts did not warrant relief or violate double-jeopardy principles because the reckless-homicide verdict merged into the second-degree murder conviction. Chief Justice Lee, concurring, agreed with the result but criticized the lengthy delay before trial and its effect on witness memory and the evidentiary issues.

Holding

  • Admission of Spencer's written statement as recorded recollection. A witness's suspected feigned or exaggerated memory loss does not by itself defeat the admissibility of a prior recorded recollection when the other requirements for the hearsay exception are satisfied. The trial court therefore did not reversibly err in admitting Spencer's written statement.
  • Admission of Spencer's written statement and preliminary-hearing testimony as prior inconsistent statements. For purposes of the prior-inconsistent-statement hearsay exception, a witness's prior statement about events is inconsistent with the witness's trial testimony when the witness claims at trial to be unable to remember those events. Suspected feigned or exaggerated memory loss does not eliminate the inconsistency. Admission of the statement and testimony was not reversible error.
  • Admission of Spencer's preliminary-hearing testimony as former testimony of an unavailable witness. The trial court did not commit reversible error in treating Spencer as unavailable despite his claimed memory loss. Even if the court should have technically ordered Spencer to testify before finding unavailability, any error was harmless because the record showed that an order would have been fruitless.
  • Confrontation rights. Admission of Spencer's prior statement and preliminary-hearing testimony did not violate the defendant's federal or state confrontation rights because Spencer appeared at trial and was available for cross-examination, even though he claimed not to remember the underlying events.
  • Sufficiency of the evidence for second-degree murder and reckless homicide. The evidence was sufficient to support the second-degree murder conviction and, necessarily, the reckless-homicide conviction.
  • Inconsistent verdicts and double jeopardy. Inconsistent guilty verdicts on alternative counts arising from a single criminal act are not, by themselves, a basis for relief when the evidence supports the conviction returned. The verdicts finding second-degree murder on one count and reckless homicide on the other did not require a new trial or reversal, and double jeopardy did not require merger of the second-degree murder conviction into the reckless-homicide conviction.

Docket W2011-01548-SC-R11-CD

Cited authorities

  • Tenn. R. App. P. 11
  • Tenn. R. Evid. 801(c)
  • Tenn. R. Evid. 802
  • Tennessee Rules of Evidence 803(5)
  • Tennessee Rules of Evidence 803(26)
  • Tennessee Rules of Evidence 612
  • Rule 803(5)
  • Tennessee Rule of Evidence 803(5)

Cited by