Tennessee Supreme Court
Dennis Pylant v. State of Tennessee
September 25, 20082008 Tenn. LEXIS 626
Summary
The Tennessee Supreme Court held that the post-conviction court abused its discretion in striking as hearsay the testimony of witnesses who recounted Amanda Davis' incriminating statements, because at the post-conviction hearing those statements were offered to show that trial counsel knew of potentially exculpatory evidence, not for the truth of the matter asserted. The Court further concluded that trial counsel performed deficiently by delegating the decision whether to call Davis to a 'vote by committee,' thereby foreclosing material and admissible exculpatory proof. Because the post-conviction court made no credibility findings about the proffered witnesses, the Court could not evaluate prejudice and reversed the Court of Criminal Appeals, remanding for a new post-conviction hearing.
Holding
- Whether the post-conviction court erred in striking as hearsay the testimony of witnesses who recounted Amanda Davis' incriminating statements.. Yes. The testimony was not hearsay at the post-conviction stage because it was offered not to prove the truth of the matter asserted (that Davis killed the victim) but to show that trial counsel was on notice of potentially exculpatory evidence and was deficient in failing to call those witnesses; striking it was illogical, unreasonable, caused an injustice to Petitioner, and constituted an abuse of discretion.
- Whether proof of Amanda Davis' incriminating statements could have been presented to the jury at trial had counsel called her.. Yes. Had Davis testified, one of three outcomes would have obtained: refusal to answer on Fifth Amendment grounds (making her unavailable under Tenn. R. Evid. 804(a)(1) and admitting the witnesses' accounts as statements against penal interest under 804(b)(3)); denial of having made the statements (permitting impeachment under Tenn. R. Evid. 613(b)); or admission of the statements (rendering the extrinsic testimony inadmissible but making her own admissions available to the defense). Under any scenario counsel could have placed the proof before the jury.
- Whether trial counsel performed deficiently in failing to call Amanda Davis and the witnesses who heard her incriminating statements.. Yes. Lead trial counsel performed deficiently in his method of deciding not to call Davis: he delegated the choice to a 'vote by committee' among himself, co-counsel with no previous jury-trial experience, and the client, contrary to ABA Standards placing strategic and tactical decisions with the lawyer after client consultation; by neither calling Davis nor establishing her unavailability, counsel foreclosed material, admissible exculpatory proof and disabled Petitioner from adducing it at trial.
- Whether the prejudice prong of Strickland can be evaluated, and the ineffective-assistance claim resolved, on the existing record.. No. Because the post-conviction court struck the testimony and made no credibility findings regarding the proffered witnesses, neither the Court of Criminal Appeals nor the Supreme Court can assess whether counsel's failures prejudiced Petitioner; the judgment is reversed and a new post-conviction hearing is required at which the court must assess credibility and then whether the absence of Davis' inculpatory statements brings the conviction into doubt.
Docket M2005-02721-SC-R11-PC
Cited authorities
- Tennessee Rule of Evidence 804(b)
- Tennessee Rule of Evidence 801(c)
- Tenn. R. Evid. 802
- Tenn. R. Evid. 803
- Tenn. R. Evid. 804(b)(3)
- Tenn. R. Evid. 804(b)
- Tenn. R. Evid. 804(a)
- Tennessee Rule of Evidence 804(a)(1)