The court affirmed the denial of Durkin’s retaliatory-eviction defense because the trial court’s finding that renovation, rather than retaliation, was Chong’s primary motive was not clearly erroneous.
State highest court
Supreme Court of the Northern Mariana Islands
The 40 most recent opinions analysed by LawDiver, newest first. The case name opens the published case page. Read full opinion opens the opinion text.
Recent opinions
The CNMI Supreme Court addressed whether two claimants could inherit from the intestate estate of Anunciacion Magofna ('Asako') as children customarily adopted through the Chamorro practice of poksai. The court held that a decedent's own statutory adoption of a child is a departure from custom, so Annette P.
The court held that a disciplinary committee elected by a majority vote of active Bar members need only receive a majority of the votes cast, not affirmative votes from a majority of the entire active membership.
The CNMI Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part a trial court judgment in an inverse condemnation case. The court held that inverse condemnation claims are subject to statutes of limitations but that Conrad Sablan's claim accrued in 2013 when a survey revealed the government's encroachment, making his…
The Supreme Court affirmed the determination that Sarah was not an heir and that the Homestead remained part of Francisco’s estate. The Guam divorce decree could not transfer the Saipan property without constitutionally sufficient jurisdiction, and Article XII independently barred the decree from conveying a long-term…
The court affirmed dismissal of the Bank’s separate action seeking recovery of estate assets from Ohry. It held that a creditor ordinarily must use the objection procedure in the probate case and that Ohry was a distributee, not a statutory transferee against whom the Bank could sue under 8 CMC § 2506.
The court held that equal protection challenges to Commonwealth statutes require heightened rational basis review, which examines the Legislature’s actual justification and the law’s real effects rather than hypothetical rationales.
The Court affirmed dismissal of the quiet-title and libel counterclaims, setting aside the entry of default, and the judgment holding John liable for abuse of process. It held that the probate court’s final determination of NMD status precluded John from relitigating that status in a quiet-title counterclaim, and that…
The court held that the 1953 title determination gave adequate notice that the property was awarded to Rita Rogolifoi’s heirs alone, and that the Silvestre Estate’s due-process challenge was independently barred by the twenty-year statute of limitations.
The court granted mandamus and vacated the denial of Abraczinskas’s motion to disqualify the assigned judge. Considering the case-specific circumstances together, it concluded that a reasonable person with knowledge of the facts could question the judge’s impartiality and that the denial was clear error; the remaining…
The court held that awarding past and future medical expenses while awarding zero damages for pain and suffering was erroneous, and remanded for the trial court to determine pain-and-suffering damages from the existing record.
April 28, 19995 N. Mar. I. 250
The court affirmed dismissal of IGI’s tort claims because the Commonwealth’s generally applied common law did not recognize attempted extortion or civil conspiracy as independent torts, and the complaint also alleged insufficient supporting facts.
The court affirmed the denial of Mafnas’s Rule 60(b) motion. It concluded that the trial court acted within its discretion because it was bound to comply with the appellate mandate and could not grant relief that would conflict with it; finality also counseled against reopening the judgment.
April 12, 19995 N. Mar. I. 238
The court reversed the Superior Court’s judgment because it improperly used parol evidence to negate an integrated bill of sale and also committed errors in admitting incomplete or unauthenticated documents and taking judicial notice of materials outside the trial evidence.
March 4, 19995 N. Mar. I. 228
The court affirmed summary judgment for the government, concluding that the Division of Public Lands was the lawful successor to the Marianas Public Land Corporation and therefore had standing to enforce the appellants’ permits.
February 8, 19995 N. Mar. I. 220
The court upheld the instruction distinguishing sworn testimony from lawyers’ arguments and rejected the challenge to the punitive-damages instruction, which was also unpreserved.
February 4, 19995 N. Mar. I. 211
The court denied the petition for extraordinary relief, concluding that the petitioners had not shown the exceptional circumstances required for a writ and could challenge the counsel-substitution ruling after final judgment.
January 21, 19995 N. Mar. I. 208
The court affirmed the denial of defendants’ Rule 60(b) motion because the lower court was bound by the law of the case and acted within its discretion. It also affirmed the finding that the motion was frivolous and the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions.
The court held that the Board of Elections violated the plaintiffs’ federal equal-protection right to vote through an inadequately justified procedure for disqualifying voters, and that the individual Board members were not entitled to qualified immunity.
November 16, 19985 N. Mar. I. 178
The court affirmed the denial of the government’s request for a permanent injunction, holding that IAC’s game satisfied the applicable definition of bingo because it was played at a fixed location using bingo cards that were distributed or made available to players.
March 25, 19985 N. Mar. I. 157
The court held that the Public Purpose Land Exchange Act does not create a judicial cause of action for compensation claims. A claimant must first submit a claim to MPLC through the Act’s administrative process, with judicial review available later under the Administrative Procedure Act.
February 18, 19985 N. Mar. I. 155
The Court answered that the four bills enacted and signed by the Tenth Legislature were validly before the Governor even though they were delivered after the Eleventh Legislature had organized.
November 28, 19975 N. Mar. I. 131
The court held that the Public Purpose Land Exchange Authorization does not create a direct judicial cause of action for compensation and that a claimant must first pursue the statute’s administrative process.
The court affirmed the divorce decree, holding that the statutory two-year residency requirement requires physical presence in the Commonwealth and does not require domicile or permanent residency.
The court affirmed the denial of Bank of Hawaii’s request for a new trial, concluding that the small-claims rule gave the trial court discretion to grant one. It also held that the Bad Checks Act allowed Lucy Sablan thirty days from receipt of the demand letter to pay, so her payment was timely and she owed no…
February 5, 19975 N. Mar. I. 53
The court affirmed Mitchell’s assault-and-battery conviction, concluding that the offense was included in the aggravated-assault charge as alleged and supported by the evidence. It held that restitution could encompass reasonable expenses incurred by the injured person’s wife, but Mitchell did not have to pay the…
November 27, 19965 N. Mar. I. 43
The court held that Sablan’s sentence was imposed under the robbery statute and was not a deferred imposition of sentence under 6 CMC § 4113. Because § 4113 did not apply, the order to pay restitution as a condition of her partially suspended sentence did not require suspension of the entire sentence.
The court affirmed the judgment awarding the Unginao land to Corbiniano, concluding that the trial court did not clearly err in finding that Isabel and Juan distributed the land to him through a partida.
August 5, 19965 N. Mar. I. 21
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment requiring Camacho to pay Limón unpaid wages, liquidated damages, and attorney’s fees, concluding that the record supported the work-hour findings and that the Nonresident Workers Act governed the remedies.
July 10, 19965 N. Mar. I. 14
The court affirmed the judgment enforcing the parties’ land contract. It held that the deed’s language was enforceable, that the contract required the seller to have marketable title when performance was due rather than when the contract was signed, and that the appellants showed no independent basis to disturb…
November 30, 19954 N. Mar. I. 304
The court held that the evidence was insufficient to support treating United as Oh’s alter ego and making United liable for the commission attributed to Oh. It therefore reversed the judgment offsetting United’s claim by the commission and remanded with instructions to enter judgment for United in the specified…
The court affirmed summary judgment for Hotel Nikko, concluding that the record would permit no reasonable inference that the security guards were Nikko’s servants rather than employees of independent contractor FAMCO.
The court affirmed summary judgment requiring the Public School System to reimburse Riley for his wife’s airfare to his point of recruitment. It held that the unqualified contract definitions included a spouse who became Riley’s dependent after the contract was signed, and that PSS offered no evidence creating a…
September 18, 19923 N. Mar. I. 243
The court affirmed the judgment that the Civil Service Commission and its Personnel Officer had no authority to review or approve the employment contracts or exempt status of employees in the mayors’ offices.
The court affirmed the declaratory judgment that Govendo’s administrative appeal was untimely and void because the 30-day period began when the CRM permit decision was issued, not when he received actual notice.
February 11, 19922 N. Mar. I. 482
The court affirmed dismissal of the fiduciary-duty claim and both parts of the claim concerning legislative approval and construction within the beach setback, because the pleaded facts did not establish those violations.
The court held that the builder’s warranty did not bar Reyes from pursuing separate contract, habitability, and consumer-protection claims, and it adopted an implied warranty of habitability applicable to a contractor who builds a home on the owner’s land.
The court affirmed the probate court’s determination that Rofag customarily adopted Magdalena and that her sons were his heirs. It held that a probate court may decide customary adoption as part of determining heirs, and that the applicable proof standard is a preponderance of the evidence.
November 16, 19901 N. Mar. I. 415
The court held that the trial court erred by applying an antiquated common-law rule that denied a wife an interest in property acquired during marriage. That rule was neither the common law generally understood and applied in the United States nor permissible under the NMI Constitution’s prohibition on sex…
March 19, 19901 N. Mar. I. 112
The court granted the sanctions motions in part, finding that O’Connor misleadingly presented contested factual allegations as established facts and that Mitchell filed a factually speculative and legally unsupported supplemental mandamus petition.