District of Columbia Court of Appeals
Ralph Nader, Appellant v. Ralph De Toledano and Copley Press, Inc., Appellees
July 31, 1979408 A.2d 31
Summary
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals held, as a matter of first impression, that ordinary summary judgment procedures govern public figure libel actions: a plaintiff need not convince the trial judge of actual malice with convincing clarity, but need only present evidence from which a reasonable jury acting reasonably could find knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard by clear and convincing proof. Applying that standard, the court found a triable issue of actual malice as to columnist Ralph de Toledano — whose statement that a Senate subcommittee report demonstrated Nader had falsified and distorted evidence sat uneasily beside the report's express good-faith finding — and reversed summary judgment for him, while affirming summary judgment for syndicator Copley Press because the record showed at most negligence, not reckless disregard. Judge Harris concurred in the affirmance as to Copley Press but dissented as to de Toledano, arguing that the interpretive-privilege doctrine compelled affirmance and that the majority's approach would chill journalistic interpretation of official reports.
Holding
- What evidentiary showing must a public figure libel plaintiff make to defeat a defense motion for summary judgment under the actual malice standard?. Normal summary judgment principles apply: the plaintiff is not required to prove actual malice to the court with convincing clarity; summary judgment is proper only if, taking all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving plaintiff, a reasonable jury acting reasonably could not find actual malice by clear and convincing evidence.
- Whether de Toledano's characterization of the subcommittee report was privileged as a rational interpretation of an ambiguous document.. No. The report's explicit, unambiguous good-faith finding is inconsistent as a matter of law with an inference that Nader falsified and distorted evidence, so the proffered interpretation was not rationally available and the statement is not protected; the good-faith finding affords a sufficient evidentiary basis from which a reasonable jury could infer publication with actual malice, requiring reversal of summary judgment for de Toledano.
- Whether a genuine issue of material fact existed as to Copley Press's actual malice in syndicating the column.. No. The proffered inferences — that Copley knew little of de Toledano's reliability, that the charge was inherently improbable, and that its editor failed to read the report — amount at most to negligence, which is constitutionally inadequate to show reckless disregard; summary judgment for Copley Press was properly granted and is affirmed.
Docket 13019
Cited authorities
- R. 56(c)
- Rule 56(c)
- Rule 56(c)
- R. 56(c)
- Rule 56(c)
- 18 U.S.C. § 1001
- 54 Tex. L. Rev. 199
- 61 Va. L. Rev. 1349
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