Supreme Court of the United States, 2024

The Supreme Court affirmed Diaz's conviction, holding that an expert's testimony that most drug couriers know they are transporting drugs does not violate Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b).

The Court, in an opinion by Justice Thomas joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, affirmed the Fifth Circuit and held that ATF exceeded its statutory authority by classifying bump stocks as machineguns.

The Supreme Court held that the pro‑life doctors and medical associations lack Article III standing to challenge the FDA's 2016 and 2021 regulatory changes to mifepristone, and therefore reversed the Fifth Circuit and remanded for further proceedings.

Justice Kavanaugh, writing for a unanimous Court, held that the doctors and medical associations lacked Article III standing to challenge FDA’s 2016 and 2021 changes to mifepristone regulation.

The Supreme Court held that the Lanham Act's names clause, which bars registration of trademarks containing a living individual's name without consent, does not violate the First Amendment.

The Court unanimously reversed the Federal Circuit and upheld the Lanham Act’s names clause, which prohibits registering a mark identifying another living individual without written consent.

The Supreme Court affirmed the Eighth Circuit, holding that a corporation's contractual obligation to redeem a decedent's shares does not offset life‑insurance proceeds, which must be included in the corporation's fair market value for estate‑tax purposes.

The Supreme Court held that a corporation’s contractual obligation to redeem a decedent’s shares at fair market value does not offset life‑insurance proceeds used for the redemption, so those proceeds must be included in the corporation’s fair market value when valuing the shares for estate tax purposes, and affirmed…

The Supreme Court held that the NRA plausibly alleged a First Amendment claim that DFS Superintendent Maria Vullo coerced regulated insurers to terminate business with the NRA to punish its gun‑promotion advocacy, and vacated and remanded the Second Circuit’s judgment.

The Supreme Court held that the National Rifle Association plausibly alleged a First Amendment violation because the New York Department of Financial Services superintendent, Maria Vullo, coerced regulated insurers to terminate business with the NRA to punish or suppress its gun‑promotion advocacy.

The Supreme Court held that the Second Circuit applied the preemption analysis for New York's interest‑on‑escrow law incorrectly, failing to follow the Dodd‑Frank‑incorporated Barnett Bank standard.

The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s grant of habeas relief, holding that the circuit misapplied the Strickland prejudice standard and that the new mitigating evidence presented at the federal evidentiary hearing was insufficient to show a reasonable probability of a different sentencing outcome.

The Supreme Court held that the NRA plausibly alleged a First Amendment claim that DFS Superintendent Vullo coerced regulated entities to terminate business with the NRA to punish or suppress its gun‑promotion advocacy, vacating the Second Circuit’s judgment and remanding for further proceedings.

The Supreme Court held that the Ninth Circuit misapplied Strickland and erred in finding prejudice, so Jones did not demonstrate a reasonable probability of avoiding the death sentence; the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s grant of habeas relief and remanded for further proceedings.

The Supreme Court vacated the Second Circuit’s judgment and remanded for a proper preemption analysis, holding that the appellate court failed to apply the Dodd‑Frank‑incorporated Barnett Bank standard for determining whether a state law significantly interferes with a national bank’s powers.

The Court, in a per curiam order, denied the petition for a writ of certiorari filed by Natoya Cunningham. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissent, arguing that the Court should have granted review to reconsider the precedent allowing six‑member juries and to protect the constitutional right to a twelve‑person jury.

The Court affirmed the appellate courts, holding that a prior state drug conviction qualifies as an ACCA predicate if the drug was listed on the federal schedules at the time the state offense was committed. The decision rests on a backward‑looking interpretation of the statute’s language and purpose.

The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit, holding that when parties have entered into two contracts—one containing an arbitration delegation clause and another containing a forum‑selection clause—a court, not an arbitrator, must decide which contract governs the arbitrability question.

The Supreme Court held that a prior state drug conviction qualifies as an ACCA predicate if the drug was listed on the federal schedules at the time of the state conviction, affirming the lower courts' enhanced sentencing judgments.

The Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Jackson and joined by all nine Justices, held that when parties have entered into two contracts that conflict over who decides arbitrability, a court—not an arbitrator—must decide which contract governs, and therefore affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s judgment.

The Court held that the three‑judge district court erred in finding that race predominated in South Carolina’s District 1 redistricting and in its vote‑dilution analysis, reversing those rulings and remanding for further proceedings.

The Supreme Court held that the three‑judge District Court erred in finding that race predominated in South Carolina's redistricting of District 1 and also erred in its vote‑dilution analysis, reversing both rulings and remanding for further proceedings.

The Court held that a prior state drug conviction qualifies as an ACCA predicate if the drug was listed on the federal schedules at the time of the state offense, affirming the lower courts' sentencing enhancements.

The Supreme Court held that the 60‑day filing deadline in 5 U.S.C. §7703(b)(1) is a procedural, non‑jurisdictional requirement, and that the phrase “pursuant to” in 28 U.S.C. §1295(a)(9) does not make the deadline jurisdictional; consequently it vacated the Federal Circuit’s judgment and remanded for further…

The Court held that the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau's funding scheme, which allows the agency to draw money from the Federal Reserve System up to a statutory cap, satisfies the Appropriations Clause.

The Supreme Court held that the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s funding scheme—drawing up to a capped amount from the Federal Reserve’s earnings—satisfies the Constitution’s Appropriations Clause, reversing the Fifth Circuit and remanding for further proceedings.

Justice Kagan, writing for a majority of six Justices, held that the Copyright Act’s three‑year limitations period governs when a claim accrues but imposes no separate three‑year cap on monetary damages; therefore a plaintiff with a timely claim under the discovery rule may recover damages for infringements regardless…

Justice Kagan, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson, held that the Copyright Act imposes no separate three-year limit on monetary recovery for a timely infringement claim.

The Court held that a Title VII claim challenging a discriminatory job transfer requires the plaintiff to show some disadvantageous change in an identifiable term or condition of employment, rejecting any requirement that the harm be significant; it vacated the Eighth Circuit’s judgment and remanded for further…

The Supreme Court held that a district court's failure to enter a preliminary forfeiture order before sentencing under Rule 32.2(b)(2)(B) does not deprive the court of authority to order forfeiture, and such non‑compliance is reviewed under harmless‑error principles.

The Supreme Court held that a district court’s failure to enter a preliminary forfeiture order before sentencing under Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(2)(B) does not strip the court of authority to order forfeiture at sentencing, and such non‑compliance is reviewed under harmless‑error principles.

The Court held that because Texas law provides an inverse‑condemnation cause of action, the petitioners may pursue their takings claims under that state‑law vehicle. The Supreme Court vacated the Fifth Circuit’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings.

The Supreme Court held that petitioners may pursue their Takings Clause claims through the Texas state-law inverse‑condemnation cause of action, vacating the Fifth Circuit’s judgment and remanding for further proceedings.

The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of certiorari in Mckesson v. Doe. The Court expressed no view on the merits of the negligence liability claim against the protest leader and noted that lower courts will consider the impact of the recent Counterman decision.

The Supreme Court held that the exemption from the Federal Arbitration Act in §1 applies to transportation workers based on the nature of their work, not on whether their employer is in the transportation industry.

The Supreme Court held that pure omissions are not actionable under Rule 10b–5(b), meaning a failure to disclose information required by Item 303 cannot support a private securities fraud claim unless it renders a prior statement misleading.

The Court, in a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Sotomayor, held that pure omissions are not actionable under Rule 10b‑5(b); a private claim under Rule 10b‑5(b) requires that the omission render the statements made misleading. The Court vacated the Second Circuit’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings.

The Court held that a transportation worker need not work in the transportation industry to fall within the §1 exemption of the Federal Arbitration Act. The opinion, authored by Chief Justice Roberts for a unanimous Court, applied ejusdem generis and prior decisions such as Circuit City and Saxon to conclude that the…

The Court held that an immigration judge's determination of whether a qualifying relative would suffer "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" is a mixed question of law and fact that is reviewable under §1252(a)(2)(D), and that the Third Circuit erred in finding it lacked jurisdiction.

The Court held that an immigration judge's determination of whether a noncitizen's removal would cause "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" is a mixed question of law and fact reviewable under 8 U.S.C. §1252(a)(2)(D), and that underlying factual findings remain unreviewable under §1252(a)(2)(B)(i).