Supreme Court of the United States

United States v. Rahimi

June 21, 2024602 U.S. 680

Summary

The Supreme Court held that 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(8), which bars firearm possession by individuals subject to domestic-violence restraining orders containing credible-threat findings, does not violate the Second Amendment on its face: an individual found by a court to pose a credible threat to the physical safety of another may be temporarily disarmed. Applying Bruen, the Court clarified that a regulation need only be 'relevantly similar' to — consistent with the principles underpinning — the Nation's tradition of firearm regulation exemplified by the founding-era surety and going-armed laws, not a 'historical twin.' The Court reversed the Fifth Circuit, which had erred by demanding a historical twin and by focusing on hypothetical applications instead of the Salerno facial-challenge standard, and remanded; it also rejected the Government's broader theory that anyone deemed not 'responsible' may be disarmed. Justice Sotomayor (joined by Justice Kagan) and Justices Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett filed concurrences, while Justice Thomas dissented, contending the proffered historical analogues were not sufficiently similar.

Holding

  • Whether 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(8) violates the Second Amendment on its face.. No. When an individual has been found by a court to pose a credible threat to the physical safety of another, that individual may be temporarily disarmed consistent with the Second Amendment; §922(g)(8) is constitutional as applied to the facts of Rahimi's own case, so his facial challenge fails.
  • Whether Bruen requires a modern firearm regulation to be a 'historical twin' of founding-era laws or only a 'relevantly similar' analogue.. Only a relevantly similar analogue: the appropriate analysis considers whether the challenged regulation is consistent with the principles that underpin the Nation's regulatory tradition; the law must comport with the principles underlying the Second Amendment but need not be a 'dead ringer' or a 'historical twin.'
  • Whether the founding-era surety laws and going armed laws are proper historical analogues for §922(g)(8).. Yes. Taken together, the surety and going armed laws confirm that when an individual poses a clear threat of physical violence to another, the threatening individual may be disarmed; §922(g)(8) fits neatly within the tradition those regimes represent.
  • Whether the Fifth Circuit correctly applied Bruen and the Court's facial-challenge precedents.. No. The panel erred in reading Bruen to require a 'historical twin' rather than a 'historical analogue,' and it misapplied facial-challenge precedent by focusing on hypothetical scenarios where §922(g)(8) might raise constitutional concerns rather than the circumstances in which the provision was most likely to be constitutional.
  • Whether an individual may be disarmed under the Second Amendment simply because he is not 'responsible.'. No. The Court rejects the Government's contention that Rahimi may be disarmed simply because he is not 'responsible'; Heller and Bruen used the term only to describe the class of ordinary citizens who undoubtedly enjoy the Second Amendment right, without defining it or addressing the status of citizens who were not 'responsible.'

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