Supreme Court of the United States
Pugin v. Garland
June 22, 2023599 U.S. 600
Summary
Justice Kavanaugh, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Barrett, and Jackson, held that an offense may relate to obstruction of justice under 8 U. S. C. § 1101(a)(43)(S) without requiring a pending investigation or proceeding. Dictionaries, federal and state laws, the Model Penal Code, and the phrase “relating to” supported that interpretation. The Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit and reversed and remanded the Ninth Circuit. Justice Jackson concurred separately, suggesting that Congress might have intended Chapter 73 of Title 18 to define the relevant category of obstruction offenses, while reserving that question. Justice Sotomayor dissented, joined by Justice Gorsuch and, except for Part III, Justice Kagan. The dissent argued that generic obstruction requires a pending investigation or proceeding and criticized the majority’s categorical analysis and expansive reading of “relating to.” Part III additionally invoked the principle of resolving ambiguities in deportation statutes in favor of noncitizens.
Holding
- Whether a pending investigation or proceeding is necessary for an offense to relate to obstruction of justice under § 1101(a)(43)(S).. An offense may relate to obstruction of justice even if it does not require a pending investigation or proceeding.
- Whether the statute requires a reasonably foreseeable investigation or proceeding.. A separate foreseeability requirement should not be engrafted onto § 1101(a)(43)(S).
- Whether lenity requires adopting a pending-investigation-or-proceeding requirement.. The rule of lenity does not justify a pendency requirement; the Court did not decide whether lenity applies in this civil immigration context.
Docket 22-23