Supreme Court of the United States
Gregory Dean Banister, Petitioner v. Lorie Davis
June 1, 2020590 U.S. 504
Summary
Justice Kagan's opinion for the Court held that a timely Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend a federal habeas judgment is part of the initial habeas proceeding, not a second or successive application subject to AEDPA's gatekeeping requirements. Such a motion suspends finality for appellate purposes, so Banister's notice of appeal was timely. The Court distinguished Gonzalez v. Crosby, which addressed Rule 60(b), and reversed and remanded. Justice Alito, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented, arguing that Gonzalez requires courts to classify postjudgment motions by their substance: a motion reasserting merits-based habeas claims is successive regardless of its label and does not toll the appeal deadline.
Holding
- Whether a Rule 59(e) motion constitutes a second or successive habeas application.. A timely Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend a habeas judgment is part of the initial habeas proceeding and is not a second or successive application under § 2244(b).
- Whether Banister's notice of appeal was timely.. Banister's timely Rule 59(e) motion postponed the start of the 30-day appeal period until the District Court disposed of that motion, and his notice of appeal was therefore timely.
Docket 18-6943
Cited authorities
- CA10
- CA10
- CA10
- CA10
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- 28 U.S.C. § 2244
- Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e)