Supreme Court of the United States
Kentel Myrone Weaver, Petitioner v. Massachusetts.
June 22, 2017582 U.S. 286
Summary
The Supreme Court held that a structural error—here, closure of the courtroom to the public during two days of jury selection—does not entitle a defendant to automatic relief when it is raised for the first time in an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim rather than preserved and presented on direct review; the defendant must instead make a Strickland prejudice showing, either a reasonable probability of a different outcome or, as the Court assumed for analytical purposes, a demonstration that the violation rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. Public-trial violations are structural not because every closure makes a trial fundamentally unfair but because closure's effects are hard to measure and the right serves the public and press as well as the accused; raising the closure late also deprives the trial court of any chance to cure it and heightens finality concerns. Kentel Weaver, whose mother and her minister were turned away during voir dire, showed neither form of prejudice—his trial was not secret, the closure was limited to jury selection, and nothing suggests juror deceit or misconduct—so the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's denial of a new trial was affirmed.
Holding
- Whether Strickland prejudice must be shown when a structural error such as a public-trial violation is raised through an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim rather than preserved and raised on direct review.. Yes. Strickland prejudice is not established automatically by the presence of a structural error; the burden rests on the defendant to show either a reasonable probability of a different outcome or, as the Court assumed for analytical purposes, that the particular public-trial violation was so serious as to render the trial fundamentally unfair.
- Whether Weaver demonstrated the required prejudice from counsel's failure to object to the closure of the courtroom during jury selection.. No. Weaver offered no evidence of a reasonable probability of a different outcome, and the trial was not fundamentally unfair: the closure was confined to two days of voir dire, the courtroom remained open during the evidentiary phase, many non-juror venire members observed the proceedings, and the record reveals no juror deceit, prosecutorial or judicial misconduct, or loss of neutrality. He is not entitled to a new trial.
Docket 16–240.
Cited authorities
- 127 Harv. L. Rev. 2173
- 130 Harv. L. Rev. 1791
Cited by
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- United States of America, Appellee v. Jose Padilla-Galarza, Defendant, Appellant.