Supreme Court of the United States
Rocky Dietz, Petitioner v. Hillary Bouldin.
June 9, 2016579 U.S. 40
Summary
The Supreme Court held that a federal district court has a limited inherent power, in civil cases, to rescind a jury discharge order and recall the jury for further deliberations after discovering an error in its verdict, because the power is a reasonable response to correcting error and contravenes no rule or statute. Because discharged jurors face heightened taint risks, the Court cabined the power with a prejudice inquiry—delay between discharge and recall, juror communications, reactions to the verdict, and smartphone/internet access—and found no abuse of discretion where the jury was recalled within minutes with no apparent prejudice. The Court rejected petitioner's categorical common-law bar, his 'Humpty Dumpty' theory of irrevocable discharge, and proposed geographic discharge tests, and declined to review a forfeited objection to group questioning of the jurors. Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Kennedy, dissented, urging adherence to the common-law bright-line rule and a new trial.
Holding
- Whether a federal district court possesses inherent authority to rescind a jury discharge order and recall the jury for further deliberations after discovering an error in the verdict in a civil case.. Yes. A federal district court has the inherent power to rescind a jury discharge order and recall a jury for further deliberations after identifying an error in the jury's verdict.
- Whether the District Court abused its discretion in recalling the just-discharged jury under the prejudice safeguards governing the power.. No. The recall was a proper exercise of the power: the jury was discharged for only a few minutes, only one juror briefly left the building, no juror spoke to anyone about the case, and nothing suggested emotional reactions or electronic exposure that could have tainted the jury.
- Whether the common-law rule barring recall of a discharged jury controls in modern federal civil practice.. No. Even assuming the common-law tradition was as clear as Dietz contended, modern federal trial practice—including the harmless-error standard embodied in Rule 61 and the abandonment of sequestration—limits the common law's relevance to recalling a just-discharged jury.
- Whether a jury is irrevocably dissolved upon discharge, or whether geographic 'presence and control' tests should define when discharge becomes irreversible.. No. The Court rejected the 'Humpty Dumpty' theory that a jury ceases to exist when told it is excused; a discharge order is an ordinary order that can issue by mistake and be rescinded, and no good reason favors geographic or identity-based tests over a prejudice-focused inquiry.
- Whether the District Court erred by questioning the discharged jurors as a group rather than individually before reempaneling them.. The objection is forfeited and will not be reviewed, because Dietz's attorney raised no objection to this part of the court's process, though individual questioning could be the better practice in many circumstances.
Docket 15–458.
Cited authorities
- 28 U.S.C. § 1441
- Rule 51(b)(3)
- Rule 51(b)(3)
- Rule 51(b)(3)
- Rule 41(b)
- 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332
- Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a)
- 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457