Supreme Court of the United States, 2014

The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Illinois Supreme Court, holding that jeopardy attached when the jury was sworn and that the trial court’s directed verdict of not guilty was an acquittal that bars any retrial under the Double Jeopardy Clause.

The Court, in an opinion by Justice Ginsburg, held that laches cannot bar a claim for copyright damages brought within the Copyright Act’s three-year limitations period. Extraordinary circumstances may justify threshold denial of particular equitable relief, and delay may affect injunctions and awards of profits at…

The Supreme Court held that under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, 'any part of the property... returned' refers only to the money lost by a victim, not to collateral taken by the victim until that collateral is sold and proceeds are received.

The Court held that the Town of Greece’s practice of opening monthly board meetings with prayer does not violate the Establishment Clause. Relying on Marsh v. Chambers and historical tradition, the Court concluded that legislative prayer need not be nonsectarian and did not unconstitutionally coerce nonadherents in…

The Supreme Court held that the Town of Greece’s practice of opening its meetings with a prayer does not violate the Establishment Clause, reversing the Second Circuit. The Court relied on the historical tradition of legislative prayer articulated in Marsh v.

The Court vacated the Fifth Circuit's qualified-immunity judgment because that court improperly resolved disputed facts in favor of the officer at summary judgment. The Court held that the evidence had to be viewed in the light most favorable to Tolan, including disputes about lighting, his mother's demeanor, the…

The Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit's judgment vacating EPA's Cross-State Air Pollution Rule. The Court held that the Clean Air Act does not require EPA to provide states an additional opportunity to submit State Implementation Plans after EPA quantifies emission budgets.

The Court held that the Federal Circuit's Brooks Furniture framework improperly restricted district courts' discretion to award attorney fees in exceptional patent cases under 35 U.S.C. § 285.

Justice Sotomayor delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court, holding that appellate courts must review all aspects of a district court’s exceptional-case determination under 35 U.S.C. § 285 for abuse of discretion.

The Court held that restitution under 18 U.S.C. §2259 is proper only to the extent the defendant's offense proximately caused the victim's losses, reading the catchall category's 'proximate result' limitation across all six enumerated loss categories.

The Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit's grant of habeas relief to Robert Woodall, who claimed that the trial court's refusal to instruct the penalty-phase jury not to draw adverse inferences from his silence violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Applying 28 U.S.C.

The Court held that the aggregate contribution limits imposed by federal campaign-finance law violate the First Amendment. Although preventing quid pro quo corruption or its appearance is a legitimate objective, the aggregate limits were poorly fitted to that objective because existing safeguards made circumvention of…

The Supreme Court held that who may sue for false advertising under Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), is a question of statutory interpretation rather than 'prudential standing': a plaintiff must plead, and ultimately prove, an injury to a commercial interest in reputation or sales proximately caused by the…

The Court held that a railroad right-of-way granted under the General Railroad Right-of-Way Act of 1875 was an easement that terminated upon abandonment, leaving the underlying land unburdened. This ruling relied on the Court's prior decision in Great Northern Railway Co. v.

The Court held that the General Railroad Right-of-Way Act of 1875 granted only an easement, not a fee, so that when the railroad abandoned the right of way the easement was extinguished and title remained with the landowner.

Justice Sotomayor dissents from the Court's holding that the General Railroad Right-of-Way Act of 1875 granted only an easement, not a fee, arguing the decision ignores controlling precedent in Townsend and Stringham which recognized a reversionary interest in the Government.

The Supreme Court held that indicted defendants facing a pretrial restraint on their assets under 21 U.S.C. Sec. 853(e) have no constitutional right, at a Monsanto hearing, to relitigate the grand jury's prior probable cause determination that they committed the crimes charged.

Justice Scalia, concurring, states that while he believes Georgia v. Randolph was wrongly decided, he joins the Court's opinion because it faithfully applies Randolph. He separately addresses an argument that the search violated the Fourth Amendment based on property law rights to exclude the police.

The Supreme Court held that consent by a co-occupant validates a warrantless search even if another co-occupant previously objected to the search but was not present at the time of consent. The Court refused to extend the narrow exception in Georgia v.

The Court held that Nevada could not exercise specific personal jurisdiction over the Georgia officer because all of his allegedly tortious conduct occurred in Georgia and he had no contacts with Nevada.

The Court held that Georgia v. Randolph's rule requiring a physically present objector's refusal to be dispositive does not apply when the objector is absent due to lawful arrest. Evidence obtained from a co-occupant's consent after the objector's arrest was admissible.

The Court, in an opinion by Justice Breyer, held that a patentee retains the burden of proving infringement when a licensee seeks a declaratory judgment of noninfringement while continuing royalty payments under its license.

The Court held that the Due Process Clause bars California from exercising general jurisdiction over Daimler for claims brought by foreign plaintiffs concerning conduct that occurred entirely abroad.

The Court held that a suit filed by a State as the sole plaintiff seeking restitution for its citizens does not meet CAFA's definition of a "mass action" because the statute requires 100 or more named plaintiffs; therefore the case is not removable to federal court and is remanded to state court.