Supreme Court of the United States, 2011

The Court held that review under 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1) is confined to the record before the state court and concluded that Pinholster had not shown that the state court unreasonably rejected his penalty-phase ineffective-assistance claim on that record.

The Court held that federal review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) is confined to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits. Applying that limitation and doubly deferential review, the Court held that Pinholster failed to show that the California Supreme Court unreasonably…

Justice Kagan, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor, dissents arguing that taxpayers should have standing under Flast v. Cohen to challenge Arizona’s tax credit under the Establishment Clause.

The Court held that a district attorney’s office cannot be held liable under §1983 for failure to train prosecutors based on a single Brady violation where the plaintiff did not show a pattern of similar violations or circumstances making the violation an obvious consequence of inadequate training.

The Court held that a local government cannot be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for failing to train prosecutors based on a single Brady violation absent a pattern of similar constitutional violations or an exceptionally obvious need for training.

Justice Scalia, with Justice Thomas joining as to all but footnote 6, dissents. He argues the FLSA anti-retaliation provision covers only official grievances filed with courts or agencies, not complaints to employers.

The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's reversal of a dismissal of a securities-fraud class action against Matrixx Initiatives concerning nondisclosed reports that its leading cold remedy, Zicam, caused users to lose their sense of smell.

The Supreme Court held that the Fair Labor Standards Act’s antiretaliation provision protects oral complaints, reversing the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation that limited protection to written complaints.

The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s unpublished memorandum decision that granted federal habeas relief on a Batson claim. The Court held that the state court’s fact-finding was not unreasonable under AEDPA and that the Ninth Circuit failed to afford the required deference to the trial court’s credibility…

Justice Alito concurred in the Court's opinion holding that Exemption 2 of FOIA does not support the 'High 2' interpretation. He separately emphasized that Exemption 7(F) remains an option for withholding security information compiled for law enforcement purposes such as crime prevention.

Justice Thomas, joined by Kennedy and Alito, dissents from the Court's holding that Skinner may challenge Texas's postconviction DNA statute under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thomas argues due process challenges to state collateral review procedures are not cognizable under § 1983 and should proceed via habeas corpus, warning…

The Court held that FOIA Exemption 2 protects only records related to employee relations and human resources, rejecting the broader 'High 2' interpretation that shielded internal rules risking circumvention of agency regulations. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion, reversing the Ninth Circuit.

Justice Alito concurs, agreeing that Exemption 2 of the Freedom of Information Act does not support the 'High 2' interpretation. He separately underscores the Government may rely on other exemptions and notes the Navy raised a viable alternative argument under Exemption 7(F) that remains open on remand.

The Court held that “collateral review” under AEDPA means judicial reexamination of a judgment in a proceeding outside the direct-review process. Because a Rhode Island Rule 35 motion to reduce a sentence is not part of direct review and entails judicial reexamination of the sentence, it tolls AEDPA’s one-year federal…

Justice Breyer, dissenting, argues that the Court should defer to the 30-year-old D.C. Circuit decision in Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms interpreting Freedom of Information Act Exemption 2.

The Supreme Court held that FOIA Exemption 2, which covers internal personnel rules and practices, applies only to human resources matters and does not extend to records whose disclosure might risk circumvention of the law.

The Supreme Court held that a state prisoner's postconviction claim for DNA testing of crime-scene evidence is properly brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 rather than exclusively in a habeas petition, because success would yield only access to the evidence—which may prove exculpatory, inculpatory, or inconclusive—and…

The Court held that a convicted prisoner may bring a §1983 action seeking post‑conviction DNA testing because the claim does not necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction, and the federal courts have subject‑matter jurisdiction over such a claim.

The Supreme Court held that Exemption 2 of the Freedom of Information Act is limited to records concerning employee relations and human resources, rejecting the "High 2" doctrine that exempted internal records whose disclosure would risk circumvention of agency regulations.

The Court held that FOIA Exemption 2 covers only records concerning employee relations and human resources. Because the Navy's explosives data and maps do not relate to personnel rules, they are not exempt under Exemption 2. Justice Breyer dissented, arguing for continued adherence to the D.C.

Chief Justice Roberts, writing for eight Justices, held that the First Amendment barred liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress, intrusion upon seclusion, and civil conspiracy arising from Westboro's picketing near Matthew Snyder's funeral.

Justice Breyer, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, agrees that 18 U.S.C. § 3742(g)(2) is unconstitutional and that district courts may consider post-sentencing rehabilitation despite USSG § 5K2.19. He argues that under Booker, Guidelines are advisory and departures are permissible when reasonable.

Justice Alito concurs in part and dissents in part. He agrees that the Court of Appeals relied on invalid statutory provisions and that sentencing courts must consider post-sentencing rehabilitation, though he would require greater weight for Guidelines policy statements.

The Supreme Court held that when a defendant's sentence has been set aside on appeal, the district court at resentencing may consider evidence of postsentencing rehabilitation, which may in appropriate cases support a downward variance from the now-advisory Guidelines range, because 18 U.S.C.

Justice Thomas dissents, arguing that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines prohibit downward departures based on postsentencing rehabilitation, and thus Pepper's 65-month sentence should be affirmed. He would apply the Guidelines as written under 18 U.S.C.

Justice Alito delivered the unanimous opinion of the eight participating Justices, holding that the 120-day deadline for appealing a Board of Veterans’ Appeals decision to the Veterans Court is not jurisdictional.

The Supreme Court held that the 120-day deadline for appealing a Board of Veterans’ Appeals decision to the Veterans Court is not jurisdictional but a mandatory claim-processing rule subject to equitable tolling.

The Supreme Court held that under USERRA an employer is liable when a supervisor performs an act motivated by antimilitary animus that is intended by the supervisor to cause an adverse employment action and that act is a proximate cause of the ultimate employment decision, rejecting the Seventh Circuit's 'singular…

The Supreme Court held that the 120-day deadline in 38 U.S.C. Sec. 7266(a) for filing a notice of appeal with the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims is not jurisdictional. Applying Arbaugh's clear-indication approach, the Court found no clear evidence that Congress intended jurisdictional consequences: the…

Justice Scalia dissents, arguing that Covington’s statements were testimonial under Crawford and Davis because the declarant’s intent determines testimonial status, not police intent.

Justice Scalia dissents, arguing the majority misapplied the Confrontation Clause by focusing on the police's purpose instead of the declarant's intent. He contends Covington's statements were testimonial and their admission violated Bryant's rights. He warns the decision resurrects discredited reliability analysis.

The Supreme Court held that the statements Anthony Covington, a mortally wounded shooting victim, made to the police officers who found him in a gas station parking lot were nontestimonial: the circumstances of the encounter objectively indicated that the primary purpose of the interrogation was to enable police…

The Court held that the victim’s statements to police were non‑testimonial because the primary purpose of the interrogation was to obtain information to address an ongoing emergency, so their admission did not violate the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause.

Justice Ginsburg, dissenting, disagrees with the majority’s finding that the victim’s statements were nontestimonial due to an ongoing emergency. She argues the statements were testimonial under Crawford and Davis, emphasizing the declarant’s intent.

The Court held that the victim’s statements to police identifying the shooter were not testimonial under the Confrontation Clause because the primary purpose of the interrogation was to meet an ongoing emergency.

Justice Thomas concurs in the judgment, agreeing the admission of Covington's statements did not violate the Confrontation Clause, but criticizes the majority's primary-purpose test as uncertain and disconnected from history.

Justice Thomas concurs in the judgment, holding that the plain‑text saving clause of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act unequivocally preserves state common‑law tort actions and therefore pre‑empts no such claim.

The Supreme Court held that FMVSS 208 does not pre-empt the state tort suit because unlike Geier, the regulation’s regulatory choice was not a significant federal objective. The Court reversed the state court’s dismissal. Justice Thomas and Justice Sotomayor concurred in the judgment.

Justice Sotomayor concurred to emphasize that Geier does not stand for the proposition that any agency choice between compliance options pre-empts state tort suits, reasoning that pre-emption requires evidence the agency deliberately sought variety.