Supreme Court of the United States

Holloway Aka Ali v. United States

March 2, 1999526 U.S. 1

Summary

The Court, in an opinion by Justice Stevens joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, held that the federal carjacking statute's intent requirement includes an intent to kill or seriously harm the driver if necessary to obtain the car. The relevant intent must exist when the defendant demands or takes control of the vehicle; an empty threat or intimidating bluff alone is insufficient. The Court rejected application of the rule of lenity and affirmed. Justice Scalia dissented without any other Justice joining, arguing that ordinary usage excludes conditional intent of this kind and that any ambiguity should be resolved through lenity. Justice Thomas separately dissented without any other Justice joining, emphasizing the absence of statutory language or a sufficiently settled historical tradition establishing that intent includes conditional intent.

Holding

  • Whether conditional intent satisfies the federal carjacking statute's specific-intent requirement.. Section 2119 is satisfied when, at the moment the defendant demands or takes control of the vehicle, the defendant intends to kill or seriously harm the driver if necessary to steal the car, or regardless of whether doing so is necessary. An empty threat or intimidating bluff alone does not establish that intent.
  • Whether the rule of lenity governs the interpretation of § 2119's intent requirement.. The rule of lenity does not require excluding conditional intent from § 2119.

Docket 97-7164

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Holloway Aka Ali v. United States (SCOTUS 1999) | LawDiver