City of Chicago v. Morales

Summary

The Court affirmed the Illinois Supreme Court's judgment invalidating Chicago's gang congregation ordinance. Stevens wrote for six Justices in Parts I, II, and V, holding that the ordinance's definition of loitering as remaining in one place with no apparent purpose supplied insufficient standards to constrain police enforcement discretion. In Parts III, IV, and VI, joined only by Souter and Ginsburg, Stevens also reasoned that innocent loitering implicates protected liberty, a facial vagueness challenge was appropriate, and the ordinance failed to provide adequate notice. O'Connor, joined by Breyer, concurred in part and in the judgment, relying on standardless enforcement and emphasizing that narrower antigang measures remained available. Kennedy separately concurred in part and in the judgment, also expressing concerns about inadequate notice. Breyer separately concurred in part and in the judgment, explaining that unchecked police discretion rendered every application unconstitutional. Scalia dissented, arguing that the ordinance was clear, sufficiently constrained police discretion, and could not properly be invalidated facially. Thomas dissented, joined by Rehnquist and Scalia, rejecting a protected right to loiter and concluding that the ordinance provided adequate notice and enforcement standards.